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FM 3-09
Fire Support and Field Artillery Operations
APRIL 2020
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. This publication supersedes FM 3-09, dated 4 April 2014.
HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

This publication is available at the Army Publishing Directorate site (http://www.armypubs.army.mil), and the Central Army Registry site
(https://atiam.train.army.mil/catalog/dashboard).

Field Manual No. 3-09

*FM 3-09
Headquarters Department of the Army Washington, DC, 30 April 2020

Fire Support and Field Artillery Operations

Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3

Contents
Page
PREFACE..................................................................................................................... v
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ vii
FOUNDATIONS OF FIRE SUPPORT AND THE ROLE OF THE FIELD ARTILLERY .............................................................................................................. 1-1 Fire Support and the Threat ...................................................................................... 1-1 Fire Support in Joint and Unified Land Operations ................................................... 1-2 The Field Artillery’s Role and Core Competencies ................................................... 1-3 The Fire Support System........................................................................................... 1-3 Fire Support Functions .............................................................................................. 1-5 Characteristics of Fire Support .................................................................................. 1-6 Principles of Fire Support Planning, Coordintation, and Execution .......................... 1-7 Fire Support and Field Artillery Training Considerations........................................... 1-8
THE FIRE SUPPORT SYSTEM ................................................................................ 2-1
Section I – Fire Support System: Command and Control ................................... 2-1 Command and Control: Fire Support Personnel ....................................................... 2-1 Command and Control: Command Posts.................................................................. 2-6 Field Artillery Command Posts .................................................................................. 2-9 Joint Fire Support Command Posts ........................................................................ 2-11 Command and Control:Fire Support Networks ....................................................... 2-13
Section II – Fire Support System – Target Acquisition ..................................... 2-14
Section III – Fire Support System – Attack and Delivery CapabilitIes ............. 2-16 Surface To Surface Capabilities .............................................................................. 2-16 Air To Surface Capabilities ...................................................................................... 2-18
FIRE SUPPORT AND THE OPERATIONS PROCESS ........................................... 3-1
Section I – Fire Support Functions ........................................................................ 3-1 Support Forces in Contact......................................................................................... 3-1 Support the Concept of Operations ........................................................................... 3-2 Synchronize and Converge Fire Support (Lethal and Nonlethal) Across All Domains ..
............................................................................................................................ 3-2 Sustain and Protect the Fire Support System ........................................................... 3-2
Section II – Processes and Procedures ................................................................ 3-4 Suppresion of Enemy Air Defenses .......................................................................... 3-4 Counterfire ................................................................................................................. 3-5 The Targeting Process .............................................................................................. 3-9

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release: distribution is unlimited. *This publication supersedes FM 3-09, dated 4 April 2014.

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Contents
Chapter 4
Chapter 5 Chapter 6

Fire Support Planning and Coordination Principles ................................................ 3-14 Fratricide Prevention and Clearance of Fires Processes and Procedures............. 3-16 Fire Support and the Military Decision-Making Process ......................................... 3-19
Section III – Fire Support Preparation................................................................. 3-34 Rehearsals .............................................................................................................. 3-34
Section IV – Fire Support Execution ................................................................... 3-37 Principles Of Fire Support Execution ...................................................................... 3-38 Integration Of Fire Support And Airspace Control During Execution...................... 3-39
Section V – Fire Support Assessment ................................................................ 3-40
FIELD ARTILLERY OPERATIONS.......................................................................... 4-1
Section I – The Role of the Field Artillery ............................................................. 4-1
Section II – Field Artillery Organizations at Echelons Above Brigade .............. 4-2 Theater Fires Command ........................................................................................... 4-2 Field Artillery Brigade ................................................................................................ 4-2 Division Artillery......................................................................................................... 4-2
Section III – Field Artillery Capabilities in Depth ................................................. 4-4
Section IV – Field Artillery Organization for Combat .......................................... 4-5 The Principles Of Fire Support Execution Applied To Field Artillery Organization For Combat...................................................................................................................... 4-5 Field Artillery Inherent Responsibilities In Army Command Relationships ............... 4-7 Field Artillery Inherent Responsibilities In Army Support Relationships ................... 4-7
Section V – Key Considerations for Field Artillery Employment ..................... 4-10 Five Requirements For Accurate Predicted Fires ................................................... 4-10 Provide Proactive And Responsive Fires That Create Desired Effects .................. 4-11
Section VI – Fire Direction ................................................................................... 4-12 Tactical Fire Direction ............................................................................................. 4-13 Technical Fire Direction .......................................................................................... 4-13
FIRE IN OPERATIONS TO SHAPE, AND OPERATIONS TO PREVENT .............. 5-1
Section I – Operations to Shape Operational Environments ............................. 5-1
Section II – Operations to Prevent Conflict .......................................................... 5-3
FIRE SUPPORT IN DEPTH DURING LARGE-SCALE GROUND COMBAT OPERATIONS ........................................................................................................... 6-1 Prevail in Large-Scale Ground Combat Operations ................................................. 6-1
Section I – Fire Support in Deep Operations ....................................................... 6-1 Forcible Entry ............................................................................................................ 6-3 Forcible Entry Planning Considerations.................................................................... 6-5
Section II – The Defense......................................................................................... 6-6 The Enemy Attack..................................................................................................... 6-6 Common Defensive Control Measures ..................................................................... 6-7 Fire Support Considerations and the Characteristics of the Defense....................... 6-8 Types of Defensive Operations............................................................................... 6-10 Transition to the Offense......................................................................................... 6-13
Section III – The Offense ...................................................................................... 6-14 The Enemy Defense ............................................................................................... 6-14 Types of Offensive Operations ............................................................................... 6-17
Section IV – Enabling, Stability and Reconstitution Operations ..................... 6-24 Enabling Operations................................................................................................ 6-24 Stability Operations and Consolidation Area Fire Support ..................................... 6-36 Reconstitution Operations....................................................................................... 6-40

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Contents

Appendix A Appendix B Appendix C Appendix D

DEVELOPMENT OF FIRE SUPPORT AND FIELD ARTILLERY TASKS ............. A-1 FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION MEASURES .................................................... B-1 DENIED, DEGRADED AND DISRUPTED OPERATIONS...................................... C-1 ENVIRONMENTAL AND TERRAIN CONSIDERATIONS FOR FIRE SUPPORT .. D-1 SOURCE NOTES ................................................................................ Source Notes-1 GLOSSARY ................................................................................................ Glossary-1 REFERENCES ........................................................................................ References-1 INDEX ................................................................................................................ Index-1

Figures

Figure 1. Fire support logic chart....................................................................................................... x Figure 2. Hierarchy of Field Artillery doctrine publications................................................................xi Figure 1-1.The elements of the fire support system....................................................................... 1-5 Figure 1-2. The band of excellence................................................................................................ 1-8 Figure 2-1. Example of targeted area of interest.......................................................................... 2-15 Figure 3-1.The Army targeting decision process ......................................................................... 3-10 Figure 3-2. D3A Crosswalk and joint targeting process .............................................................. 3-11 Figure 3-3. Air tasking order cycle................................................................................................ 3-12 Figure 3-4. Planning and execution relationship .......................................................................... 3-16 Figure 6-1. Defensive arrangement ............................................................................................... 6-8 Figure 6-2. Task organized for a movement to contact ............................................................... 6-19 Figure 6-3. Example of Corps attack............................................................................................ 6-21 Figure 6-4. Exploitation and pursuit.............................................................................................. 6-22 Figure 6-5. Relief in place ............................................................................................................ 6-27 Figure 6-6. Defensive encirclement operations............................................................................ 6-31 Figure 6-7. Division Consolidation Area ....................................................................................... 6-40 Figure B-1. Coordinated fire line example......................................................................................B-2 Figure B-2. Fire support coordination line example .......................................................................B-3 Figure B-3. Free-fire area example ................................................................................................B-5 Figure B-4. Gridded reference graphic example ............................................................................B-6 Figure B-5. Kill box example ..........................................................................................................B-7 Figure B-6. No fire area example ...................................................................................................B-8 Figure B-7. Restrictive fire area example.......................................................................................B-9 Figure B-8. Restrictive fire line example ......................................................................................B-10 Figure B-9. Fire support area and a fire support station ..............................................................B-11 Figure B-10. Zone of fire example................................................................................................B-12 Figure B-11. Final protective fire example ...................................................................................B-13 Figure B-12. Boundaries example................................................................................................B-14 Figure B-13. Phase line and trigger line example ........................................................................B-15 Figure B-14. Position area for artillery example ...........................................................................B-16

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Figure B-15. Critical friendly zone example ................................................................................. B-17 Figure B-16. Call for fire zone example ....................................................................................... B-18 Figure B-17. Artillery target intelligence zone .............................................................................. B-19 Figure B-18. Censor zone example ............................................................................................. B-20 Figure B-19. Common sensor boundary example ....................................................................... B-21 Figure B-20. Airspace coordination area example ...................................................................... B-23
Tables
Introductory Table 1. New, modified, and rescinded terms ............................................................ viii Introductory Table 2. New, modified, and rescinded acronyms........................................................ ix Table 2-1. Fire support titles at brigade and above ....................................................................... 2-2 Table 3-1. Crosswalk of operations, joint targeting cycle, D3A, MDMP, and fire support task ... 3-13 Table 3-2. Clearance of fires responsibilities............................................................................... 3-18 Table 3-3. Fire support element during receipt of mission .......................................................... 3-19 Table 3-4. Fire support element during mission analysis ............................................................ 3-21 Table 3-5. Nested Commanders’ intent examples at JFLCC and division levels........................ 3-23 Table 3-6. Description of scheme of fires .................................................................................... 3-24 Table 3-7. Fire support element during course of action development ....................................... 3-27 Table 3-8. Example of minimum force protection package for FA systems ................................ 3-28 Table 3-9. Analysis of course of action (wargame) ..................................................................... 3-29 Table 3-10. Course of action comparison.................................................................................... 3-31 Table 3-11. Course of action approval......................................................................................... 3-32 Table 3-12. Orders production ..................................................................................................... 3-33 Table 4-1. The Seven Field Artillery inherent responsibilities in Army support relationships ........ 4-9 Table A-1. Fire Support Task Development Checklist................................................................... A-1 Table A-2. Example fire support task............................................................................................. A-3 Table A-3. Sample matrix for each fire support task ..................................................................... A-5 Table A-4. A completed matrix example for fire support tasks (referred as TTLODAC) ............... A-6 Table A-5. Sample matrix for fire support tasks (referred as PLOT-CR)....................................... A-7 Table A-6. A completed matrix example for fire support tasks (referred as PLOT-CR) ................ A-8 Table A-7. Example of an essential field artillery task ................................................................... A-9 Table A-8. Essential Field Artillery Task Example ....................................................................... A-11 Table A-9. A completed example of field artillery task (referred as TTLODAC) .......................... A-12 Table A-10. An example of a completed field artillery task (referred as TTLODAC)................... A-14 Table A-11. Attack guidance matrix (example)............................................................................ A-16 Table C-1. The five requirements for accurate predicted fire in fully operational and degraded
operations ................................................................................................................... C-4

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Preface
This publication is the Army's capstone manual for fire support and field artillery operations. It provides principles and functions for fire support elements (FSEs) and field artillery (FA) units conducting large-scale ground combat operations as a part of unified land operations (ULO) in contested multi-domain environments. It establishes the basis for understanding fire support (FS) and field artillery (FA) as critical components of the Fires Warfighting Function tasks. FM 3-09 establishes for the Artilleryman the core competencies, functions, characteristics, and principles of FS and FA.
To comprehend the doctrine contained in FM 3-09, readers must first understand the fundamentals of ULO described in ADP 3-0 and FM 3-0. They must understand the language of tactics and the fundamentals of the offense and defense, and echelons above brigade described in ADP 3-90 and FM 3-94. Users of FM 3-09 should also understand the fundamentals of stability described in ADP 3-07, and understand the functions and principles of intelligence and sustainment found in FM 2-0 and FM 4-0.
Army forces are normally employed with other Services as part of a joint force. Consequently, commanders and FS staffs must also refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine including JP 3-0, JP 3-09, JP 3-60, and JP 3-09.3.
The principal audience for FM 3-09 is all commanders and their staffs. This publication is intended to provide guidance for echelons above brigade for the planning, preparing, execution, and assessment of FS and the employment of FA in large-scale ground combat operations. Trainers and educators throughout the Army will also use this manual. This manual should be studied by those members of the combined arms team or other services who are responsible for the delivery of fires in support of ground combat operations.
Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable United States (U.S.), international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and established rules of engagement (ROE) (See FM 6-27/MCTP 11-10C).
FM 3-09 implements North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) standardization agreements (STANAG) 2484 and 3680.
FM 3-09 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. Terms for which FM 3-09 is the proponent publication (the authority) are marked with an asterisk (*) in the glossary and are boldfaced in the text. For other definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition.
FM 3-09 applies to the Regular Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and the United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.
The proponent of FM 3-09 is the Commandant, United States Army Field Artillery School and Chief of the Field Artillery. The preparing agency is the United States Army Fires Center of Excellence, Directorate of Training and Doctrine. Send comments and recommendations on a Department of the Army (DA) Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to Directorate of Training and Doctrine, 700 McNair Avenue, Suite 128, ATTN: ATSF-DD, Fort Sill, OK 73503; by e-mail to: mailto:usarmy.sill.fcoe.mbx.dotd-doctrine@mail.mil; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.

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Introduction
The aim of this publication is to establish the functions and principles of fire support planning, coordination, execution, and assessment and to describe the FS system in terms of its major components, functions, and required products. This publication describes the FS system as a complete entity and gives equal treatment to all of the diverse assets and capabilities that are designated as elements of the fire support system.
The theme of this publication is that the successful delivery of fires depends on the rapid and continuous integration and synchronization of all forms of FS assets with all elements of combat power, and across all domains for one purpose. This is to place the correct types and volume of fire at the right time and on the right targets, across all domains to ensure the success of the supported maneuver commander's concept of operations.
This publication provides the foundation for the development of subordinate FS and FA doctrine, force design, materiel acquisition, professional education, and individual and unit training. Fire support and field artillery techniques manuals go into further detail to explain specific duties for those individuals who actually work within the FS system.
The source document for FM 3-09 continues to be FM 3-0, Operations. Figure 1 on page x, shows the logic diagram for this publication. A hierarchy of doctrine publications that every fire supporter must understand is in figure 2 on page xi, which contains respective active hyper-links to relevant FA and FS doctrine.
The major changes from the 2014 FM 3-09 are listed below:  Formally recognizes that FS is inherently joint, multi-domain, and incorporates both special operation forces (SOF) as well as general purpose forces. As such, equal treatment is given to descriptions of joint and SOF elements of the FS system.  Retitles the manual from Field Artillery Operations and Fire Support to Fire Support and Field Artillery Operations.  Aligns FS with the Army's strategic roles.  Reintroduces the foundations of FS.  Introduces the core competencies and characteristics of fire support.  Changes the name of tactical echelon Fires Cells (battalion through corps) to FSEs in line with joint doctrine.  Transitions the memory aide AWIFM-N (adequate fire support for committed units, weight to the main effort or decisive operation, immediately available fire support for the commander to influence the operation, facilitate future operations, maximum feasible centralized control primarily in the defense, never place artillery in reserve) from a tool solely used to develop FA organization for combat to an acronym describing the principles of FS execution.  Reintroduces the four basic FS tasks and designates them as the functions of FS: support forces in contact, support the concept of operations, synchronize and converge FS (lethal and nonlethal) across all domains, and sustain and protect the FS system.  Clarifies and modifies the definitions of the force field artillery headquarters, fire support coordinator, chief of fires, deputy fire support coordinator, and fire support officer.  Reintroduces the establishment of essential FS and essential FA tasks.  Reintroduces the five requirements for accurate predicted fire.  Adds a chapter on degraded, denied, and disrupted operations.  Adds an appendix on the development of essential FS and essential FA tasks.
FM 3-09 contains six chapters and four appendices:

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Chapter 1 Covers an overview of the foundations of FS. Chapter 1 begins by defining FS, describes the characteristics of FS, and defines the FS system and FS functions.
Chapter 2 Covers the components of the FS system, this includes FS command and control, target acquisition, and attack/delivery systems.
Chapter 3 Covers FS and the operations process. It describes the basic FS functions it also covers FS planning, FS planning principles, and FS and the military decision-making process (MDMP).
Chapter 4 Covers the role of the FA, command and support relationships, FA inherent responsibilities, the key considerations for FA employment, and fire direction.
Chapter 5 Covers FS in operations to shape and prevent.
Chapter 6 Covers FS in large-scale ground combat operations. Describes general fire support considerations, provides tactics for fire support for the defense, addresses tactics for fire support for the offense, and covers enabling, stability and reconstitution operations.
Appendix A Covers the development of essential FS and FA Tasks.
Appendix B Covers fire support coordination measures (FSCMs) to include permissive, and restrictive, coordination measures.
Appendix C Covers denied, degraded and disrupted operations to include types of conditions, and the five requirement for accurate predicted fire during these operations.
Appendix D Covers environmental considerations for FS and FA.

NEW, RESCINDED, AND MODIFIED TERMS.
FM 3-09 becomes the proponent of Army terms, introduces new army terms and modifies the following Army terms. See introductory table 1. See introductory table 2 for new, modified and rescinded terms.
Introductory Table 1. New, modified, and rescinded terms

Term altitude artillery target intelligence zone attack guidance matrix call for fire call for fire zone censor zone common sensor boundary counterbattery fire counterpreparation fire critical friendly zone defensive fires fire support fire support coordinator fire support element fire support officer fire support plan

Remarks Modified/FM 3-09 becomes proponent Modified/FM 3-09 becomes proponent Modified/FM 3-09 becomes proponent Modified Modified Modified Modified New New Modified New New Army definition Modified New Modified Modified

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Introductory Table 1. New, modified, and rescinded terms (continued)

Term fire support planning fire support team force field artillery headquarters harassing fire interdiction fires observed fire offensive fires preparation fire priority of fires unobserved fire weapons locating radar

Remarks Modified Adopts joint definition Modified New New New New Modified Modified New New

Introductory Table 2. New, modified, and rescinded acronyms

Acronym EFAT EFST PLOT-CR
TFC WLR

Full Form essential field artillery task essential fire support task Purpose, location, observer, trigger, communications, and resources theater fires command weapons locating radar

Reasoning New New New
New Modified

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Figure 1. Fire support logic chart

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Figure 2. Hierarchy of Field Artillery doctrine publications

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Chapter 1
Foundations of Fire Support and the Role of the Field Artillery
Fire support is a rapid and continuous integration of surface to surface indirect fires, target acquisition, armed aircraft, and other lethal and nonlethal attack/delivery systems that converge against targets across all domains in support of the maneuver commander’s concept of operations. The functions, characteristics, and principles of supporting maneuver with fire and giving depth to operations across all domains--land, sea, air, space and cyberspace--have origins which are deeply rooted in the universal military experience. They are constant, and in conjunction with the role and core competencies of the field artillery (FA), will apply to future multi-domain operations just as they apply to the present. Rapidly emerging technology and future missions and capabilities will change the methods of employing FS as well as the degree by which FS is balanced with maneuver. However, the basic premise for why we provide fire support will remain unchanged.
1-1. Fire support (FS) is inherently joint, conducted in all domains, and simultaneously executed at all echelons of command. Lethal FS attack and delivery systems consist of indirect fire weapons and armed aircraft to include FA, mortars, naval surface fire support, and air-delivered munitions from fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft. Field artillery is equipment, supplies, ammunition, and personnel involved in the use of cannon, rocket, or surface-to-surface missile launchers. Nonlethal capabilities include cyberspace electromagnetic activities (CEMA), information related activities, space, and munitions such as illumination and smoke. Fires are the use of weapons systems to create a specific lethal or nonlethal effect on a target (JP 3-0). A nonlethal weapon is a weapon, device, or munition that is explicitly designed and primarily employed to incapacitate personnel or materiel immediately, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property in the target area or environment (JP 3-09).
1-2. The commander employs these capabilities to support the scheme of maneuver, to mass firepower, and to destroy, neutralize, and suppress enemy forces. Enemy a party identified as hostile against which the use of force is authorized (ADP 3-0). FS is a critical component of the fires warfighting function tasks of integrate and execute that allow the commander to converge effects across all domains to achieve positions of relative advantage in the context of large-scale ground combat operations (see ADP 3-19). Large-scale ground combat operations are sustained combat operations involving multiple corps and divisions (ADP 3-0). In large-scale ground combat operations, FS could be the principal means of destroying enemy forces. In this event, the scheme of maneuver would be designed specifically to capitalize on the effects of FS. The commander will utilize organic and joint attack/delivery assets and capabilities to provide joint FS. Joint fire support is joint fires that assist air, land, maritime, and special operations forces to move, maneuver, and control territory, populations, airspace, and key waters (JP 3-0).
FIRE SUPPORT AND THE THREAT
1-3. Strategic competitors and adversaries have studied our military operations closely over the last thirty years. They know the American way of war well and that we excel by emphasizing joint and combined operations; technological dominance; global power projection; strategic, operational, and tactical maneuver; joint fires; sustainment at scale; and mission command initiative. Strategic competitors like Russia and China are synthesizing emerging technologies like artificial intelligence, hypersonics, machine learning, nanotechnology, and robotics with their analysis of military doctrine and operations. They are deploying these capabilities in order to fight the United States through multiple layers of stand-off in all domains -

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space, cyber, air, sea, and land to counter our way of war by establishing zones of anti-access (A2)/area denial (AD). The enemy may employ A2/AD strategies. Enemy A2 refers to those actions and capabilities, usually long-range, designed to prevent an opposing force from entering an operational area (OA). AD refers to those actions and capabilities, usually of shorter range, designed not to keep an opposing force out, but to limit its freedom of action within the operational area.
1-4. A peer or near-peer force represents the greatest potential threat to the U.S. forces. Peer threats employ their resources across all domains to attack the vulnerabilities of the U.S. and our allies. The threat is any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm United States forces, United States national interests, or the homeland (ADP 3-0). They use their capabilities to create lethal and nonlethal effects throughout an operational environment (OE). An operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0). In a new era of great power competition, our nation's adversaries seek to achieve their strategic aims, short of conflict, by the use of layered stand-off in the political, military and economic realms to separate the U.S. from our unified action partners. During large-scale combat operations they will employ A2/AD to separate U.S. forces and our allies in time, space, and function in order to defeat us. Large-scale combat operations are extensive joint combat operations in terms of scope and size or forces committed, conducted as a campaign aimed at achieving operational and strategic objectives (ADP 3-0). Technological achievements over the past decades have made possible great qualitative improvements in their weaponry to match observed vulnerabilities in U.S. systems and forces. They seek to delay friendly forces long enough to achieve their goals and end hostilities before they reach culmination. Peer threats will employ various methods to employ their national elements of power to render U.S. military power irrelevant.
1-5. It is likely that U.S. and allied forces' FS assets will be outnumbered and outranged by peer systems. To defeat peer forces in large-scale combat, U.S. forces must first penetrate A2/AD systems, establish a position of relative advantage, retain the initiative and prevent enemy forces from achieving mass, momentum, and continuous land combat. A balanced application of both firepower and maneuver is essential for US forces to achieve these goals. This calls for synchronization and convergence across the FS system to attack high-payoff targets (HPTs) across the width and depth of the OA. A high-payoff target is a target whose loss to the enemy will significantly contribute to the success of the friendly course of action (JP 3-60). As opposed to a high-value target which is a target the enemy commander requires for the successful completion of the mission (JP 3-60). Not all high-value targets become HPTs.
1-6. Some peer threats have chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environment (CBRN) weapons capabilities and the ability to employ such weapons in certain situations. However, capability does not always equal intent to use, and it is generally presumed that most would use restraint. Preparation and planning that takes CBRN capabilities into account is of paramount importance in any confrontation with an adversary armed with them. Understanding threat CBRN weapons doctrine is important, particularly during large-scale combat operations.
1-7. The functions and principles of FS must apply to an ever-increasing number of hostile global situations that extend across the range of military operations. The FS system must be flexible enough to respond to any number of operations across the conflict continuum. Threat operations across all domains will attempt to degrade all aspects of FS, from command and control (C2), to target acquisition (TA), to delivery.
FIRE SUPPORT IN JOINT AND UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS
“Army forces have effectively integrated capabilities and synchronized actions in the air, land, and maritime domains for decades. Rapid and continued advances in technology and the military application of new technologies to the space domain, the electromagnetic spectrum, and the information environment (particularly cyberspace) require special consideration in planning and converging effects from across all domains.” FM 3-0.
1-8. Joint operations encompass all five domains: air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace which includes, the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) and the information environment. FS is most effective when its effects are converged across all of these domains. Convergence is the concerted employment of combat power against different decisive points in multiple domains to create effects against a system, formation, or capability. Combat power is the total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a

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Foundations of Fire Support and the Role of the Field Artillery
military unit or formation can apply at a given time (ADP 3-0). FS must also be integrated with our unified action partners. Unified action partners are those military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and elements of the private sector with whom Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate during the conduct of operations (ADP 3-0). An example of an Army FS capability employed as part of the joint force is long range precision surface to surface fires used to penetrate and dis-integrate the enemy's A2/AD systems both on land and at sea. Disintegrate is to disrupt the enemy's command and control system, degrading its ability to conduct operations while leading to a rapid collapse of the enemy's capabilities to fight (ADP 3-0). They are closely integrated into the joint force commander's (JFC)'s scheme of operations as part of the Army's overall FS contribution. The joint force commander is a general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force (JP 1).
1-9. ULO encompasses four strategic roles: shape operational environments, prevent conflict, prevail in large-scale combat, and consolidate gains. The strategic roles clarify the enduring reasons for which the U.S. Army is manned, organized, trained, and equipped. Strategic roles are not phases of an operation or a task, and they do not necessarily occur sequentially or on distinct terrain. Rather, the Army contributes to the joint operation specifically by providing forces and conducting operations across all four strategic roles. The maneuver commander is responsible for conducting these operations on a simultaneous basis. The requirement to integrate and synchronize FS with these strategic roles is inherent with this responsibility.
1-10. ULO and the conduct of large-scale ground combat operations does not pose any revolutionary challenges for the FS system. Instead, it reestablishes a requirement to increase the scope of FS to an operational level that has not existed since Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom.
THE FIELD ARTILLERY’S ROLE AND CORE COMPETENCIES
1-11. A role is the broad and enduring purpose for which the organization or branch is established (ADP 101). A branch has only one role. The role of the field artillery is to suppress, neutralize, or destroy the enemy by cannon, rocket, and missile fire and to integrate and synchronize all fire support assets into operations. This role clearly establishes why the field artillery was created-what our branch uniquely contributes to the conduct of combined and joint operations.
1-12. A core competency is an essential and enduring capability that a branch or an organization provides to Army operations (ADP 1-01). The field artillery has two core competencies that describe what our branch contributes to our Nation's security and to the JFC:
 To coordinate fire support, which is the planning and executing of fire so targets are adequately covered by a suitable weapon or group of weapons (JP 3-09).
 To deliver indirect fire. Indirect fire is fire delivered at a target not visible to the firing unit (TC 3-09.81).
THE FIRE SUPPORT SYSTEM
1-13. Fire support is achieved through simultaneous and coordinated interaction of all of the elements of the joint FS system, thorough continuous planning, aggressive coordination, and vigorous execution at all echelons of command. The FS system elements (figure 1-1 on page 1-5) are:
 Command and control (personnel, Command posts (CPs), networks, processes and procedures).  Target acquisition (TA).  Attack/delivery systems.
1-14. These elements are the tools the commanders uses to make fire support work. How they use these tools depends on how well commanders and staffs understand and integrate the core competency of the FS coordination process. This process must occur simultaneously at all echelons of command, but it is more complex at echelons above brigade.
1-15. The rapid and continuous integration of the FS system at all echelons of command across the joint forces must be synchronized with maneuver forces. For this reason, the commander seeks and may accept

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counsel on FS from his fire support coordinator (FSCOORD), but the commander must decide how the command will accomplish its mission.
1-16. The fire support coordinator is the senior field artillery commander for the theater, corps, division, brigade combat team who is the maneuver commander's primary advisor to plan, coordinate, and integrate field artillery and fire support in the execution of assigned tasks. This dual responsibility institutionalizes FS as commander's business, and requires the FA commander to know the functions and objectives of the ground force, the operation of the FS system, and the technical aspects of FA fire as the maneuver commander's most available attack/delivery system. To further understand the FS System, it is necessary to examine each element in greater detail; this will be done in Chapter 2.

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Figure 1-1.The elements of the fire support system
FIRE SUPPORT FUNCTIONS
1-17. A function the broad, general, and enduring role for which an organization is designed, equipped, and trained (JP 1). By applying the functions, guided by characteristics and principles, an organization or branch

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generates effects in the unique environment of the land domain to support the Army's operational concept. The four FS functions are the minimum requirements the FS system must fulfill to destroy, neutralize, or suppress the enemy. They give the commander and FSCOORD a frame of reference to evaluate and assess the overall effectiveness of the FS system. These four FS functions are:
 Support forces in contact.  Support the concept of operations.  Synchronize and converge FS (lethal and nonlethal) across all domains.  Sustain and protect the FS system.
1-18. These functions serve as unifying factors for the FS system. Each of these functions, in addition to applying to the system as a whole, applies to the individual FS parts. The four functions do not change or replace the traditional missions, roles, and operations of the different Army and joint FS assets. They do, however, provide a common point of departure for an operationally unified FS system. For example, U.S Air Force aircraft in support of ground operations must accomplish the four functions simultaneously. However, the Air Force does not consciously plan to work the four functions. Rather, it accomplishes its ground support mission through its normal provision of close air support (CAS), air interdiction (AI), strike coordination and reconnaissance (SCAR), and suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD). The final assessment of the ground support mission must be made in terms of the four functions. Underpinning these functions are mission command and disciplined initiative at all warfighting echelons. To further clarify these points, it is necessary to examine each function in greater detail; this will be done in Chapter 3.
CHARACTERISTICS OF FIRE SUPPORT
“Get the job done, tidy up the battlefield later.” Gen. Jack N. Merritt (Field Artillery)
1-19. A characteristic is a feature or quality that marks an organization of function as distinctive or is representative of that organization or function (ADP 1-01). The purpose of a characteristic is to clearly establish essential attributes that the organization or function must possess to be effective. These characteristics are inherent in the design, mind-set, and equipment for the field artillery and provides our branch the ability to accomplish our role. The characteristics of FS are:
 To violently apply lethal fires in accordance with the law of war and established rules of engagement (ROE).
 To always operate in the spirit of the offense.  To always operate as a single entity.
1-20. Violently apply lethal fires within the law of war and ROE: In large-scale ground combat operations, the goal of every FSCOORD, is to orchestrate a perfect harmony of intense violence within the law of war and established ROE in support of the supported commander's concept of operations. Law of war is that part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities (JP 3-84). Rules of engagement are directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered (JP 3-84). Unit commanders always retain the inherent right and obligation to exercise self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent.
“If you would make war, wage it with energy and severity; it is the only means of making it shorter and consequently less deplorable for mankind.” Gen. Napoleon Bonaparte
1-21. Always operate in the spirit of the offense: Fire support must always be conducted in the spirit of the offense. Regardless of whether the maneuver force is engaged in the offense or defense, its FS must be offensively minded as it rapidly and continuously strikes HPTs across all domains. For example, when a maneuver unit seizes an assigned objective and transitions to the defense its FS system continues to aggressively search for and attack HPTs throughout the depth of the maneuver unit's area of responsibility (AOR) in a proactive and responsive manner.
"In combat there is an overriding requirement to keep unrelenting pressure on the enemy to punish him and rob him of opportunities to take the initiative. But men tire, machines break down and the terrain and weather at times seem to be as much as an opponent as is

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the enemy. Yet, even under the worst circumstances, the artillery can continue to maintain the momentum." COL John G. Pappageorge (Infantry)
1-22. Operate as a single entity: The FS system is a single entity composed of a diverse group of attack and delivery systems, personnel, and materiel, most of which operate in different ways. All FS capabilities in all three elements of the FS system must function with a unity of effort and purpose. The methods of providing individual FS assets may vary in terms of C2 and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). However, individual interests and concerns of each FS organization or asset must be made subordinate to the overall mission and to the maneuver commander to rapidly and continuously integrate across all domains and function as a unified force.
"There is a tendency in each separate unit…to be one-handed puncher. By that I mean that the rifleman wants to shoot, the tanker wants to charge, the artilleryman to fire…That is not the way to win battles. If the band played a piece first with the piccolo, then with the brass horn, then with the clarinet, and then with the trumpet, there would be a hell of a lot of noise but no music." GEN George Patton (Armor)
PRINCIPLES OF FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING, COORDINTATION, AND EXECUTION
1-23. The key to effective FS is the maneuver commander's ability to bring assets to bear on the enemy in an integrated and coordinated manner that is synchronized with the scheme of maneuver. How well this occurs depends on how well FSCOORDs and staff understand and operate the FS coordination and execution processes. Execution is the act of putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission (ADP 5-0). The principles of FS planning, coordination, and execution are listed below, and will be further described in chapters 3 and 5. A principle is a comprehensive and fundamental rule or an assumption of central importance that guides how an organization approaches and thinks about the conduct of operations (ADP 1-01).
1-24. The principles of FS planning and coordination listed below facilitate integration into the Army's operations process.
 Plan early and continuously.  Ensure the continuous flow of target information.  Consider the use of all capabilities.  Use the lowest echelon capable of furnishing effective support.  Furnish the support requested.  Use the most effective FS means.  Avoid unnecessary duplication.  Consider airspace coordination.  Provide adequate support.  Provide for rapid coordination.  Provide for flexibility.  Use fire support coordination measures (FSCMs).
1-25. The principles of FS execution utilize the memory aid AWIFM-N:  Adequate FS for the committed units.  Weight to the main effort or the decisive operation.  Immediately available FS for the commander to influence the operation.  Facilitate future operations.  Maximum feasible centralized control (especially in the defense).  Never place artillery in reserve.

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FIRE SUPPORT AND FIELD ARTILLERY TRAINING CONSIDERATIONS
1-26. FA commanders are responsible for training both the FS and FA components of the FS system within their formations to ensure readiness. They consider their maneuver commanders' strategy for training the entire combined arms team. They rely on their firm grasp of FA and FS doctrine and TTP, tempered by their experience and military skills when developing training plans. The responsibility for training includes the authority to determine the frequencies of the certification and qualification tables described in TC 3-09.8. Critical in determining these frequencies is a dialogue between FA commanders and their maneuver commanders.
1-27. FA units that are trained, ready, and can win at the section, team, and platoon level are the foundational requirements to ensuring our supported maneuver formations can win in large-scale ground combat operations. FA commanders must balance this necessity for small unit proficiency against the requirement for higher level (battalion (BN) and battery) collective training and qualification. For example, a commander may choose to assume prudent risk by reducing resources for qualification of higher qualification tables in order ensure readiness at section, team, and platoon levels by increasing resources for this lower level training. However, this does not negate the requirement for proficiency at the battery and BN levels (see figure 1-2).

Figure 1-2. The band of excellence
1-28. FA and FS training considerations must be in line with the Army's principles for training found in ADP 7-0:
 Train as you fight.  Train to standard.  Train to sustain.  Train to maintain.

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TRAIN AS YOU FIGHT
1-29. The Army fights and trains as a combined arms team by training tasks and weapons conducted jointly by associated warfighting functions and functional units. Fire supporters and FA also train using multiechelon training techniques capitalizing on the inherent relationships among higher, lower, and adjacent units that habitually operate together. Commanders must create and integrate realistic training environments by replicating the complexities of the expected multi-domain operational environment, including: electronic warfare (EW), denied, degraded, or disrupted space operational environment (D3SOE) across their formations, in addition to operations in a CBRN OE. Whenever possible, incorporate multinational partner personnel and units during training events to increase interoperability and shared understanding of capabilities and limitations of FS systems. Multinational operations is a collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance (JP 3-16).
1-30. FA and FS training must be efficiently planned, resourced, and executed. Utilizing virtual and constructive training resources enables units to enter into live training better prepared. Simulation can build proper muscle memory without expending valuable, limited live training resources. Constructive training enables the staff to replicate the tempo of targeting and execution in large-scale ground combat operations. Fully incorporating systems such as warfighter simulation (referred to as WARSIM), call for fire trainer (referred to as CFFT), training aids, devices, simulators, and simulations (referred to as TADSS), and all the capabilities the combat training centers (referred to as CTCs) offer is vital to collective training. Live fire training not only ties this all together with a heightened sense of things, but also places the necessary stresses on the platforms and systems, validating that these weapons with operators can do what they are designed to do under all conditions.
TRAIN TO STANDARD
1-31. The Army is task and standards based as it trains, the descriptive unit training tool used are the combined arms training strategies. Commanders must ensure that their units master the fundamental’s building on a solid foundation as the soldiers execute progressively complex tasks.

TRAIN TO SUSTAIN
1-32. Once the unit achieves required task and weapon proficiencies it strives to maintain these proficiencies within the band of excellence. Many factors affect FS and FA training proficiency such as personnel turbulence, skill atrophy, and maintenance of equipment, physical fitness, and new equipment fielding and training. Successful commanders understand these factors and ensure that the training proficiencies attained do not degrade to a less than acceptable level. To overcome the anticipated highs and lows of training proficiency, commanders continually re-evaluate training plans, current proficiencies, and strategies. Sustaining high levels of proficiency sometimes proves more difficult than developing proficiency from a starting point.
1-33. Commanders must incorporate digital sustainment in their unit training plans. Digital sustainment training must be conducted with attention to detail and adherence to time standards. Digital tasks and troubleshooting procedures are perishable skills that need to be reinforced on a regular basis. Focus of this training must be at the end user level of the FS and FA C2 systems. All efforts must be expended to conduct this training in a field environment or over distances to replicate a field environment. The speed, accuracy, and responsiveness of fires in support of a commander's concept of operations depends on the proficiency with which firing units and TA capabilities utilize when communicating with digital systems.
1-34. The FA certification and qualification program is a commander's program and is a collaborative effort between the institutional and the operational force. FA commanders continuously assesses the unit's proficiency and readiness to perform its mission essential tasks. Each commander implements gunnery programs to achieve and sustain unit readiness and proficiency in these tasks. The commander uses all the resources available to implement an efficient gunnery program; which maximizes the use of ammunition, training area availability, and Soldier training time to sustain proficiency. Commanders need to know that

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units under their charge have a deep, practiced understanding of their role in combat. The FA Certification and Qualification program provides everyone between the commander and the individual sections with an objective means to gain that confidence. Through training, education, and experiences, sections, and thereby entire units, proficiency grows in supporting the commander's concept of the operation.
TRAIN TO MAINTAIN
1-35. As discussed earlier in this chapter, we will likely commence combat at a numerical disadvantage in attack/delivery platforms. For that reason, every gun, launcher, fire direction center (FDC), fuel truck, digital system, etc. is a precious commodity. Commanders have an obligation to ensure maintenance happens with the highest of standards and with competent leader involvement. The purpose of command emphasis on maintenance is to maintain combat power by keeping every gun and launcher in the fight during large-scale ground combat operations. Units train maintenance tasks continuously according to Army standards under a variety of conditions that replicate the challenges of combat operations.
1-36. Additionally, individual and unit maintenance tasks represent important training opportunities that leaders must exploit. Disciplined units conduct disciplined maintenance to Army standards in garrison, during training, and when deployed. Training to maintain also means leaders train subordinates to be good stewards of Army resources. Building a sense of stewardship and frugality conditions leaders and units to operate more effectively in austere operational conditions.

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Chapter 2
The Fire Support System
As discussed in chapter 1, FS is the product of a system consisting of three parts. FS C2, TA, and FS attack/delivery systems. Because of the diversity of the individual FS parts, the total FS system does not function through a common chain of command as does a maneuver organization. The maneuver commander does exercise C2 over their organic and attached FS assets, but commander has limited control over external FS capabilities that are available for use. The commander's ability to employ FS, as a system, and to integrate and synchronize FS results from an established process known as FS planning and coordination (further discussed in Chapter 3).
The elements of the FS system collectively deliver fires where and when needed to support the commander’s objectives. Responsibility for command, control, and coordination of the fire support system belongs to the ground force commander. The commander’s guidance is reflected in the scheme of fires, which must be synchronized with all of the elements of combat power, but especially with intelligence, movement and maneuver, and sustainment. The scheme of fires is the detailed, logical sequence of targets and fire support events to find and engage targets to support the commander’s objectives (JP 3-09).
Direction of the FS system is the responsibility of the FA commander. The maneuver commander charges the FA commander to ensure that all available FS capabilities are fully integrated and synchronized with the concept of operations. The FA commander serves as the maneuver commander's FSCOORD and speaks for the commander on all matters pertaining to FS.
Section I discusses the C2 element of the FS system in the order of personnel, CPs, and networks (the process and procedure component of C2 will be covered in Chapter 3); Section II covers the target acquisition element of the FS System; Section III covers FS attack/delivery systems.
SECTION I – FIRE SUPPORT SYSTEM: COMMAND AND CONTROL
2-1. Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission (JP 1). At every echelon of command, each commander establishes a command and control system is the arrangement of people, processes, networks, and command posts that enable commanders to conduct operations (ADP 6-0).
2-2. Cooperation among the various FS C2 organizations is necessary for the effective delivery of fires in time and in all domains. This is especially true in joint operations and in operations with unified action partners. Cooperation must be thought of as a product of the C2 the commander exerts to drive the FS system as a whole and the authority the commander gives the FSCOORD to orchestrate it.
COMMAND AND CONTROL: FIRE SUPPORT PERSONNEL
2-3. FS personnel are located at FA and maneuver CP's at every echelon of command. Commanders and staffs use several integrating processes to synchronize functions, organize activities, and create effects based

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on the commander's intent. For FS personnel, the critical processes include military decision-making (MDMP) and the targeting process and are discussed in chapter 3. These processes and procedures enable the FA commander to accomplish both aspects of the mission as a commander and FSCOORD. The FSCOORD splits time between the FA CP and maneuver commander's CP. Army and joint FS personnel and their duties are described in the following paragraphs.
FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATOR
2-4. The fire support coordinator commands their respective FA organization and advises the maneuver commander on all aspects of FS. As the FSCOORD, the FA commander will spend most of his time either with the maneuver commander or in the respective FSE. Both staffs must understand their responsibilities and assist the FSCOORD in facilitating fire support tasks.
2-5. It is important that the commander and key staff officers within the maneuver command recognize and understand that the FA commander is equally responsible for both aspects of the FA and FS mission. Also, the FA commander must recognize and understand that they have full responsibility for ensuring the efficient, effective operation of the FSE, just as they have command responsibility for ensuring timely and effective FA fire. See table 2-1 for FSCOORD titles at command echelon.

Table 2-1. Fire support titles at brigade and above

Force

FSCOORD or Chief of Fires

Echelon

TFC

FSCOORD

ASCC/

Chief of Fires

TFE

Corps

FSCOORD

(FAB CDR)

Division

FSCOORD

(DIVARTY CDR)

Brigade

FSCOORD

(FA BN CDR)

ASCC

Army Service component command

BN

battalion

CDR

commander

DFSCOORD deputy fire support coordinator

DIVARTY division artillery

FA

field artillery

FAB

field artillery brigade

FSCOORD fire support coordinator

FSO

fire support officer

TFC

theater fires command

TFE

theater fires element

Assisted by
DFSCOORD Deputy Chief of Fires DFSCOORD DFSCOORD FSO

2-6. The theater fires command (TFC) commander is always the FSCOORD for the theater. The corps commander can designate a field artillery brigade (FAB) commander as the FSCOORD. The division artillery (DIVARTY) commander is always the FSCOORD for the division. The FSCOORD for the brigade combat team (BCT) is the organic FA BN commander. The FSCOORD works closely with the chief of staff or executive officer, the assistant chief of staff, intelligence (G-2) and assistant chief of staff, operations (G-3) to ensure mutual understanding of all aspects of planning, preparation, execution and assessment of fires for operations. At echelons above division, the FSCOORD works closely with the respective air operations center (AOC), battlefield coordination detachment (BCD), and other unified action partners. Some of the FSCOORD's responsibilities include:
 Plan, prepare, execute, and assess all FS tasks in support of offensive, defensive and stability operations and provide inputs to the preparation of the operation plan (OPLAN) and operation order (OPORD), including Annex D (Fires).
 Develop, with the commander and G-3, a scheme of fires to support the operation.

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 Identify named area of interest (NAI) and targeted area of interest (TAI), HPTs, and additional events that may influence the positioning of FS attack/delivery systems.
 Supervise development of proposed HPT lists, target selection standards, and attack guidance matrices.
 Coordinate positioning of indirect FS assets.  Recommend FSCMs to support current and future operations and manage changes to them.  Recommend and implement the commander's counterfire and target engagement priorities.  Recommend to the commander the establishment, responsibilities, authorities, and duties of a
force field artillery (FFA) headquarters (HQ).  Integrate and synchronize joint FS and multinational fires with the other elements of combat
power.  Lead the targeting working group and facilitate the targeting board.  Accompany the commander during execution of tactical operations (when directed).  Provide for consolidated and focused FS and FA specific certification, readiness, and oversight
(personnel management, equipment issues, and training).  Establish standard operation procedures across the brigade, division, corps and theater.  Oversee the professional development of the 13-series career management field Soldiers.  Mentor, train, and educate junior FS and FA leaders on all aspects of the FS system.
CHIEF OF FIRES
2-7. The chief of fires is the senior fires staff officer at echelons above corps who advises the commander on the best use of available fires resources and provides input to the necessary orders (ADP 3-19). The chief of fires is located at the theater Army fires cell or joint task force (JTF), joint fires element (JFE) that does not have a TFC to execute joint fires. Joint fires are fires delivered during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated action to produce desired effects in support of a common objective (JP 3-0). The chief of fires facilitates the fires warfighting function and works closely with the J-3 (referred to as the operations directorate of a joint staff) to ensure mutual understanding of all aspects of planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of fires for operations.
DEPUTY FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATOR
2-8. The deputy fire support coordinator (DFSCOORD) is the senior FA staff officer at corps and division HQ, and at the TFC who is responsible for advising the commander on the best use of available FS attack/delivery capabilities, providing input to necessary orders, and developing and implementing the fire support plan. The DFSCOORD is a permanently assigned coordinating staff officer on the TFC, corps, and division staff. The DFSCOORD provides oversight of FS personnel, working groups and boards, and the joint air-ground integration center (JAGIC) when formed. When the FSCOORD is not present, the DFSCOORD performs the duties of the FSCOORD.
TARGETING OFFICER
2-9. Fire support elements (FSEs) from FA battalions (BNs) through corps, and fires cells at echelons above corps have assigned targeting officers. The targeting officer will drive the targeting process and is the technical subject matter expert on all matters relating to Army and joint targeting. Targeting officers will participate in the MDMP to develop the targeting products HPT list, attack guidance matrix (AGM), target synchronization matrix, and target selection standards. The targeting officer will develop weapons locating radar (WLR) guidance and oversee counterfire operations, to include, radar deployment orders, queuing schedules, and threat patterns in support of the targeting process. Weapons locating radar is a continuous target acquisition counterbattery system that detects in-flight projectiles, and communicates point of origin and point of impact locations. Targeting officers will manage requests to higher for effects outside of organic capability. For more information see ATP 3-60.

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FIELD ARTILLERY INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
2-10. The field artillery intelligence officer (FAIO) coordinates with brigade, corps and division internal and external intelligence elements to provide input to the development, nomination, and prioritization of targets originating from the G-2/ or battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer (S-2) all source analysis section. During planning FAIOs assist the S-2/G-2 targeting (referred to as the G-2T) with target development, coordinate with the targeting officers for no-strike list (NSL) and restricted target list management, the highpayoff target list (HPTL) and AGM. The FAIO is primarily responsible for the development of the target selection standards (TSS) working with both the intelligence collection manager and the FS noncommissioned officer (commonly known as a NCO) to determine cutoff values. The FAIO nominates targets to the FSE that are provided by the all source analysts and fusion cell chiefs. The FAIO assists the S2/G-2 with target value analysis and NAI/ TAI development. When an Army, corps or division is serving as a JTF or joint force land component commander (JFLCC), the FAIO works closely with the J-2 and J2T for target development. The FAIO is also responsible for the integration of FA C2 systems into the mission command networks in coordination with the FFA HQ S-6 and brigade, division or corps G-6. For more information see ATP 3-60.
BRIGADE FIRE SUPPORT OFFICER
2-11. A fire support officer is the operational to tactical level field artillery officer responsible for advising the supported commander or assisting the senior fires officer on fires functions and fire support. The brigade fire support officer (FSO) is the senior FA staff officer responsible for planning, preparing, and executing all aspects of FS for BCT operations. More than any other officer, the FSO must understand the FSCOORD's intent in supporting the maneuver plan and understands all of the duties of the FSCOORD listed in paragraph 2-6. For information on the duties and responsibilities see ATP 3-09.42.
BATTALION FIRE SUPPORT OFFICER
2-12. The BN FSO is the senior FA staff officer at the maneuver BN or attack helicopter BN. The BN FSO advises the respective BN commander on fire support planning and employment considerations. The BN FSO plans, prepares, executes, and provides assessment of all aspects of fire support for BN operations and provides bottom up refinement of the fire support plan. For more information on the BN FSO duties see ATP 3-09.42.
COMPANY FIRE SUPPORT OFFICER
2-13. The company FSO works for the company commander during combat operations to accomplish all FS tasks. The FSO is assigned to the FA BN and under the functional supervision of the BN FSO. The FSO devises the FS plan based on the commander's guidance and submits the plan to the commander for approval. The FSO plans, prepares, executes, and provides assessment of all aspects of FS for company operations and provides bottom up refinement of the FS plan. For more information on the company FSO duties see ATP 309.42.
FIRE SUPPORT SERGEANT
2-14. The company fire support sergeant or fire support non-commissioned officer (FSNCO) is the senior enlisted assistant to the company FSO. The fire support sergeant performs the duties of the FSO in their absence. The fire support sergeant advises the FSO on the allocation and tasking of joint fires observers, other observers, and trains the fire support team (FIST) and the forward observer (FO) in applicable FS tactics and techniques. A fire support team is a field artillery team provided for each maneuver company/troop and selected units to plan and coordinate all supporting fires available to the unit, including mortars, field artillery, naval surface fire support, and close air support integration (JP 3-09.3). For more information on the FIST and FS sergeant's duties see ATP 3-09.42.

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FORWARD OBSERVER
2-15. The FO is the fire support representative for the maneuver platoon. The FO's primary duty is to accurately locate targets, then call for, and adjust FS. The forward observer is an observer operating with front line troops and trained to adjust ground or naval gunfire and pass back battlefield information (JP 309). The FO must fully understand their responsibility within the observation plan and provide refinement or submit key targets for inclusion in the company fire plan. A fire plan is a tactical plan for using the weapons of a unit or formation so that their fire will be coordinated. For more information on FO duties see ATP 3-09.30.
JOINT FIRES OBSERVER
2-16. A joint fires observer (JFO) is a certified and qualified Service member who requests, controls, and adjusts, surface-to-surface fires; provides targeting information in support of CAS; and performs terminal guidance operations (JP 3-09.3). JFOs cannot perform terminal attack control of CAS missions and do not replace a qualified joint terminal attack controller (JTAC) or forward air controller (airborne) (FAC [A]). Terminal guidance operations are those actions that provide electronic, mechanical, voice or visual communications that provide approaching aircraft and/or weapons, additional information regarding a specific target location (JP 3-09).
OTHER JOINT AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES PERSONNEL AND DUTIES
2-17. FS is inherently joint and executed across all domains. As such, all Army FS personnel routinely interface with multiple joint FS and SOF personnel at every echelon of command. The following are key personnel that Army FS personnel routinely work with during joint operations. For greater detail, refer to JP 3-09 and JP 3-30:
 Director, AOC: Responsible to the joint force air component commander (JFACC) for integrating the planning, coordinating, allocating, tasking, executing, and assessing tasks for all joint air operations.
 Air liaison officer: The senior tactical air control party member attached to a ground unit who functions as the primary advisor to the ground commander on air power (JP 3-09.3).
 Naval Ground Liaison Officer, NGLO: acts as the liaison for a supporting naval task force. The NGLO coordinates all naval gunfire that is supporting the ground force commander or that may affect the operations of the ground force commander. The NGLO advises the ground force commander and FSCOORD on all matters pertaining to naval gunfire employment.
 J-2T (Targeting): The deputy director for targets for a joint staff.  United States Air Force (USAF) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) director:
Provides the JFACC with predictive and actionable intelligence, targeting support, and collection management expertise to support the air tasking cycle.  Forward air controller (airborne): A specifically trained and qualified aviation officer, normally an airborne extension of the tactical air control party, who exercises control from the air of aircraft engaged in close air support of ground troops (JP 3-09.3).  Joint terminal attack controller: A qualified (certified) Service member who, from a forward position, directs the action of combat aircraft engaged in close air support and other offensive air operations (JP 3-09.3).  SOF JTAC: Although all SOF operators are capable of employing surface fires and aviation fires from AC-130 aircraft, current and qualified SOF JTACs are recognized across all components of US Special Operations Command as the primary fires employment capability at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. These personnel are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. SOF JTACs are carefully selected to conduct special operations using modified equipment and trained in irregular warfare activities to achieve strategic and operational objectives in austere environments worldwide. SOF also employ SOF aviators as forward air controller, airborne [FAC (A)].  Shore Fire Control Party: The supporting United States Marine Corps (USMC) artillery BNs provide shore fire control party's to supported units. The shore fire control party consists of a naval

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surface fire support liaison team and spotting team. The naval surface fire support liaison team is specifically organized to handle liaison matters for the supported commander, while the spotting team is charged with requesting and adjusting fires of assigned direct support (DS) ships and general support (GS) ships.
COMMAND AND CONTROL: COMMAND POSTS
2-18. Fire support elements (FSEs), fires cells, and fires elements are located in maneuver command posts from BN through theater levels. Fire support element that section of the tactical operations center at every echelon above company responsible for targeting coordination and for integrating fires under the control or in support of the force (JP 3-09). These elements and cells are central clearing houses for planning, coordinating, and synchronizing fire support for the supported commander. The exact way they are organized varies among different organizations. The organization depends on the unit mission, availability of FS assets, and command preferences. The actual makeup of FS elements and cells is flexible. However, it ensures that all FS assets respond to the maneuver commander's intent. At corps and division levels, FSEs at tactical and support area CPs are extensions of the main CP FSE. They assist the main FSE and JAGIC controlling assets engaged in close and consolidation area operations. Below are descriptions of FS elements and cells within each echelon of Army and joint commands.
THEATER FIRES COMMAND/ELEMENT
2-19. An Army TFC and a theater fires element (TFE) provides C2 of assigned strategic fires capabilities, serves as the senior HQ assigned to an Army Service component command (ASCC)/Theater Army to integrate theater fires assets, and executes critical FS functions in in all phases of ULO. The organizational difference in these organizations is minimal. The decision to pursue two independent organizational structures highlight how the Army is pursuing differing approaches to the problem sets in different regions and will continue to evolve.
2-20. The TFC/TFE is designed to develop, nominate and converge effects on joint targets across the theater. This support to joint targeting will support the continuous setting of the theater to enable JFLCC/Field Army and Corps operations during the shape and prevent phases of ULO. The TFC ensures the Army's contribution to the joint targeting process is effectively planned and executed during shape and prevent and can seamlessly transition to large-scale ground combat operations in accordance with the ground force commander's priorities. This also provides greater deterrence options for the theater. For more information on the theater Army operations see ATP 3-93.
JOINT FIRES ELEMENT
2-21. The JFE is a staff element established by the JFC and composed of representatives from the J-3 (referred to as the operations directorate of a joint staff); the components (land, maritime, air, and special operations); and other elements of the JFC's staff, to include space and cyberspace operations representatives and the directorates (e.g., intelligence, logistics, plans, and civil-military operations). The JFE integrates and synchronizes fires planning and coordination on behalf of the JFC and should be near the joint operations center and co-located with the information operations cell. The JFE works closely with the command's J-2 to ensure the successful execution of the joint targeting cycle. For more information on the JFE see JP 3-09.
BATTLEFIELD COORDINATION DETACHMENT
2-22. The BCD is a specialized, regionally focused Army element that serves as the senior Army operational commander’s liaison with the air component. A BCD is co-located with the joint or combined AOC. The BCD is the Army’s interface for systems connectivity to the joint air operations center (JAOC) and for personnel integration with their JAOC counterparts. When a US Army HQ is designated as the JFLCC, the BCD may serve as the land component commander’s liaison to the air component commander when augmented with other unique land force representatives. For more information on the BCD see ATP 3-09.13. BCD tasks include:
 Facilitating the exchange of current intelligence and operational data.  Processing air support requests.

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 Monitoring and interpreting the land battle situation.  Coordinating for air and missile defense (referred to as AMD).  Coordinating for airlift.  Integrating airspace requirements.
JOINT FORCE LAND COMPONENT FIRES CELL
2-23. The joint force land component commander is the commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for recommending the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking land forces; planning and coordinating land operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned (JP 3-0). At echelons performing the role of the JFLCC, the fires cell coordinates, integrates, and assigns joint, interagency, and multinational fires to targets. It synchronizes fires, to include Army, joint, interagency, and multinational component air assets; SOF; naval surface fire support (NSFS); cyberspace operations; and EMS operations (JP 3-09). The JFLCC’s primary agency-to synchronize and coordinate joint fires and their effects-is either an Army fires cell or a USMC force fires coordination center or fire support coordination center of the J-3 (referred to as the operations directorate of a joint staff). The fires cell or center reviews the JFC's guidance and intent, and makes recommendations for the joint force land component commander to create the desired effects that support achievement of the objectives. The primary responsibility of the JFLCC is to advise the JFC on the best use of available land component fires capabilities, and execute the OPORD. For more information see JP 3-09 and JP 3-31.
CORPS FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENT
2-24. The corps FSE coordinates Army lethal and non-lethal attack/delivery capabilities and joint fires. The corps FSCOORD ensures that the corps FS system supports the corps commander’s guidance for fires, meets joint force requirements and reacts responsively to changing battlefield conditions. The FSE accomplishes these actions by developing, recommending, and coordinating the scheme of fires. The FSE may perform artillery sensor management and provide input to intelligence collection. The FSE assists the G-2 with target development, conducts targeting within the HQs and provides representatives to the current operations integration cell and support area command post (SACP). With significant Army and Air Force augmentation, the corps FSE has the ability to integrate with an air support operations center (ASOC) to form a JAGIC. When the corps serves as the base organization for a JTF or land component command (LCC) HQs, the FSE performs functions IAW joint publications. (See JP 3-01, JP 3-03, JP 3-09, JP 3-31, and JP 3-60). The FSE works closely with the force field artillery HQ, if one is established. The FAB, FSE can provide augmentation to the corps FSE as necessary.
JOINT TARGETING AND EXECUTION CAPABILITY
2-25. To ensure unity effort and fully integrated use of capabilities in shaping operations, an emerging TTP within the corps HQ could be used to synchronize all FS assets in consonance with the commander’s guidance. This TTP forms a cell designated as the joint targeting and execution cell (referred to as JTEC), which integrates with the corps FSE, and other Army, joint, and multinational elements of the FS system.
DIVISION FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENT
2-26. The division FSE develops, recommends, and briefs the scheme of fires, including effects, recommends targeting guidance to the commander, develops HPTs, selects targets for attack, and coordinates, integrates and assigns allocated joint, interagency and multinational fires to specific targets and target systems. The division FSE synchronizes all fire support for the command to include Army, joint and multinational. Division FSEs also participate in assessment (battle damage, munitions effectiveness, re-attack recommendations); develops planning guidance; provides target intelligence for planning and execution and coordinate with the respective ASOC as part of the JAGIC.

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JOINT AIR GROUND INTEGRATION CENTER
2-27. Located in the Army division current operations integration cell, the JAGIC provides commander’s a technique to coordinate, integrate, and control operations in division-assigned airspace and efficiently collaborate requirements with external airspace elements outside of the division area. The JAGIC co-locates decision making authorities from the land and air component to support the supported maneuver commander's objectives and intent. The JAGIC facilitates effective mission execution while managing the level of risk. Refer to ATP 3-91.1 for detailed description of the JAGIC.
FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENT
2-28. The FAB has an FSE HQs, an air support section, an air defense airspace management (ADAM) element, an information operations section, and a protection and lethal effects element. Each of the elements assists the current operations integration cell by providing additional expertise or dedicated manpower on an as needed basis. All elements in the FSE assist with planning by providing expertise or dedicated manpower on an as needed basis. The FAB FSE can augment a corps FSE as needed. For more information on the FAB FSE see ATP 3-09.24.
GENERAL FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENT FUNCTIONS AT ECHELONS ABOVE BRIGADE
2-29. General FSE functions include:  Plan, integrate, coordinate, and synchronize joint fires.  Conduct target management including recommendations, receipt, and distribution to subordinate fires units for ROE, HPT list, time sensitive targets, and restricted target and NSLs.  Lead the targeting working group and facilitate the targeting board as determined by the commander.  When authorized, executes the clearance of fires process for the commander.  Participate in the joint targeting process and development of targeting objectives.  Participate in joint targeting working groups and boards.  Provide access to joint fires for interagency and multinational forces.  Provide input to the air tasking order (ATO), airspace control plan, and airspace control order (ACO) which includes FSCM and airspace coordinating measure (ACM).  Process and submit AI nominations and remain in continuous contact with AOC/BCD.  Request and coordinate CAS, AI, and SCAR.  Team with the airspace element, air and missile defense cell, and the USAF's ASOC and tactical air control party (TACP) to perform airspace control responsibilities within division assigned airspace.  Provide input to the information collection plan to synchronize surveillance and reconnaissance assets with named areas of interest and designated targets in coordination with the all source analysis section.  Coordinate position areas for FA units under corps control with maneuver and airspace control agencies.  Monitor the ATO and process joint-surveillance and target attack radar systems targets.
BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENT
2-30. The BCT FSE plans, coordinates, integrates, synchronizes and deconflicts the employment and assessment of FS for both current and future operations. This includes FA, mortar, electronic attack, air support, naval surface fires support and other joint assets. The Air Force TACP typically collocates with the BCT FSE. The BCT FSE works closely with BN FSEs and company FIST. These organizations ensure responsive and effective fire support is provided to their respective maneuver commanders and actions are closely coordinated through the BCT main CP and FSE. For more information on the BCT FSE see ATP 309.42.

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COMBAT AVIATION BRIGADE FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENT
2-31. The combat aviation brigade (CAB) FSE integrates FS into the scheme of maneuver by developing a scheme of fires and leading the targeting working group in close coordination with the CAB battalion or brigade operations staff officer (S-3), S-2, and commander. Both missions are critical to the success of aviation operations. For more information on the CAB FSE see ATP 3-04.1.
BATTALION FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENT AND COMPANY FIRE SUPPORT TEAM
2-32. FSEs in the BCT’s maneuver BNs and CABs air reconnaissance BN and air reconnaissance squadron provide a fire support coordination capability for BN operations and are organized with an FSO and noncommissioned officer (commonly known as a NCO), an EW noncommissioned officer (commonly known as a NCO), and digital systems operators. The FSE may also have an Air Force TACP. Infantry and Armor Company and troop FIST enable effective artillery, mortar, and joint FS for the maneuver force. For more information see ATP 3-09.42.
FIELD ARTILLERY COMMAND POSTS
2-33. FA CPs integrate FA operations, targeting, and attack elements and synchronize the execution of FA missions. CPs must aggressively seek information about the current tactical situation (friendly unit locations, obstacles, cleared lanes, and bypassed units), while disseminating this information to all subordinate and supporting units. Since FA CPs are also primary enemy targets, they should be as small and mobile as possible to allow for rapid and frequent displacement.
FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE COMMAND POST
2-34. FAB CPs C2 the operations of subordinate FA BNs. They integrate FS planning and coordination, execution, target production, and information from all intelligence sources. A FAB can serve as the FFA HQ for a Corps or JTF, or the counterfire HQ for a JTF, corps, or division. Army National Guard FABs have a dual role, serving as both the Army National Guard division commander's force field artillery HQ and as a FAB when required. For more information on FABs see ATP 3-09.24.
DIVISION ARTILLERY COMMAND POST
2-35. As a division's FFA HQs, the DIVARTY plans, directs, coordinates, and controls the fires of all organic, attached, and reinforcing (R) FA units supporting the division. The CP develops FA support plans and ensures that available firepower adequately supports the division concept of operations. The DIVARTY can serve as the counterfire HQs for the division, or can delegate that role to an R FA unit since divisional assets engaging division HPTs beyond the close area are limited in large-scale ground combat operations.
2-36. If the counterfire HQ is delegated to an R FA unit, it is important to remember that the DIVARTY commander remains responsible for the overall division counterfire fight as the division commander's FSCOORD. The DIVARTY CP provides the division with the ability to have an alternate CP if the division CP has to displace or is incapacitated. The DIVARTY CP may perform C2 tasks for the division for a limited period only. For more information on DIVARTY organization and operations see ATP 3-09.90.
FORCE FIELD ARTILLERY HEADQUARTERS COMMAND POST
2-37. A force field artillery headquarters is a battalion size or higher units designated by the supported commander who specifies its duration, duties, and responsibilities. A command’s organic FA headquarters (HQ) is normally the FFA HQ (DIVARTY). When formations do not have an organic FA HQ (to include a JTF), the respective commander may designate an FFA HQ such as a FAB. Functions of the FFA HQ may include:
 Provides C2 for subordinate units which could include an FA BDE, rocket BNs, or cannon BNs to support the commander's concept of operations.
 Facilitates single point of contact for outside agency coordination for force protection and additional fires.

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 Accepts or passes control of fires during passage of lines operations.  Coordinates sustainment and protection of subordinate FA units.  Plans fires and positions all FA units with a support relationship of GS or general support-
reinforcing (GSR).  Recommends command and support relationships of FA units to the G-3 and the Commander.  Establishes meteorological (MET), survey, and radar TA plans for the command.  Produces a FA support plan or OPORD.  Assists the corps or division FSE in the production of Annex D (Fires) of the OPORD.  Facilitates targeting for the division and corps deep fight.  Orchestrates the counterfire battle for the commander.  Assigns a subordinate or R FA unit the duties of the counterfire HQ.  Serves as alternate corps or division CP for limited durations.
Note: North American Treaty Organization (NATO) FA units are given missions and responsibilities in accordance with NATO Standardization Agreement 2484. Other multinational FA units that are attached or OPCON are given missions and responsibilities in accordance with their national guidance.
COUNTERFIRE HEADQUARTERS COMMAND POST
2-38. Counterfire is fire intended to destroy or neutralize enemy weapons (JP 3-09). This includes counterbattery and countermortar fire. The counterfire battle is not a separate battle, but one aspect of the overall combined arms fight. Battle consists of a set of related engagements that lasts longer and involves larger forces than an engagement (ADP 3-90). Counterfire contributes by providing fires against the enemy indirect fire system; it protects friendly forces, combat functions, and facilities from enemy indirect fires by suppressing, neutralizing, or destroying enemy indirect fire weapons systems. It is also used against the enemy’s C2, ammunition, logistics, and TA capabilities. Counterfire is an integrated aspect of the overall combined arms approach to achieve fire superiority. See ATP 3-09.12 for detailed description of counterfire.
2-39. In large-scale ground combat operations, the corps and division commanders are responsible for counterfire throughout the depth of their AORs. The corps or division commander can assign the role of counterfire HQ to a FAB, DIVARTY, or a separate FA BN. The counterfire HQ must be allocated the necessary assets to conduct the counterfire fight. During LSCGO a corps should be allocated two FABs, one to serve as the counterfire HQ and one to serve as the FFA HQ. The counterfire HQ should be allocated CAS and JTACs. The counterfire HQ will coordinate with the division and corps G-2 for sensor tasking authority and additional intelligence capabilities to integrate all available assets into the counterfire fight in a proactive manner. The counterfire HQ duties include:
 Plan and coordinate sensor management.  Conduct pattern analysis of enemy indirect fire systems.  Establish counterfire TAIs.  Based off pattern analysis conduct WLR zone management in support of the counterfire fight.  Recommend positioning of counterfire delivery systems.  Write the target acquisition tab to Annex D.  Recommend counterfire TTP to facilitate permissive fires.  Participate in the targeting process and submit CAS, AI, and SCAR requests and nominations
through the division or corps FSE.  Establish counterfire mission digital and voice procedures and communications architecture using
Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) and the joint automated deep operations coordination system (JADOCS).

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JOINT FIRE SUPPORT COMMAND POSTS
2-40. Below are descriptions of additional joint FS agencies that most commonly interface with the Army during joint and multi-domain operations. For more detailed information on each of these elements of the joint FS system see JP 3-09.
JOINT AIR OPERATIONS CENTER
2-41. The JAOC is structured to operate as a fully integrated command center and should be staffed by members of all participating components, to include key staff positions, to fulfill the JFACC's responsibilities. A JAOC provides the capability to plan, coordinate, allocate, task, execute, monitor, and assess the activities of assigned or attached forces.
2-42. Through the JAOC, the JFACC monitors execution of joint air operations and directs changes as the situation dictates. As the lead C2 mechanism of the theater air-ground system, the JAOC should have secure and redundant communications with operations, logistics, weather, intelligence centers, and higher and lateral HQ, as well as subordinate units, to preclude degradation in its ability to control joint air forces. More information on the JAOC see JP 3-30.
AIR SUPPORT OPERATIONS CENTER
2-43. The ASOC is the primary control agency within the theater air control system for execution of air operations that directly support land operations within division-assigned airspace. The ASOC is an extension of, and directly subordinate to, the JAOC.
2-44. Normally co-located with the senior Army FSE, the ASOC performs a current operations function, while planning and execution functions are performed by members of the TACP. ASOC and TACP personnel at the Army division may be integrated with the division FSE and airspace element to form a JAGIC.
JOINT AIR COMPONENT COORDINATION ELEMENTS
2-45. The JFACC may establish one or more joint air component coordination elements (JACCEs) with other functional component commanders' HQ to include the JFLCC, joint force special operations component command, joint force maritime component command to better integrate joint air operations with their operations. When established, the JACCE is a component-level liaison that serves as the direct representative of the JFACC.
2-46. A JACCE is normally made up of the liaison joint FS C2 of the Service designated to provide the JFACC. The JACCE does not perform any C2 functions and the JACCE director does not have command authority over any air forces. The JACCE may be provided to the supported JTF HQ (if the theater JFACC is designated in support to a JTF) to better integrate air component operations within the overall joint force.
STRIKE COORDINATION AND RECONNAISSANCE AIRCREW
2-47. The SCAR Aircrew refers to an aircrew tasked to perform SCAR mission responsibilities. For more information on SCAR and SCAR Aircrew duties refer to ATP 3-60.2/MCRP 3-20D.1/NTTP 3-03.4.3/ AFTTP 3-2.72.
TACTICAL AIR CONTROL PARTY
2-48. The TACP is an air liaison unit co-located with ground maneuver units. TACPs are under the operational control of the ASOC and have two primary missions: to advise ground commanders on the capabilities and limitations of air operations (the responsibility of the air liaison officer [ALO]) and provide terminal attack control of CAS aircraft (the responsibility of the JTACs). Terminal attack control is the authority to control the maneuver of and grant weapons release clearance to attacking aircraft (JP 3-09.3).
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND CONTROL AGENCIES
USMC forces may be employed as, or part of, the joint force land component; as, or part of, the joint force maritime component; or as the joint force air component. USMC forces will operate as a Marine air-

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ground task force (MAGTF) consisting of a command element, a ground combat element, an aviation combat element, and a logistics combat element. Various agencies and elements within the marine air-ground task force help commanders to execute fires.
These agencies may be used for either a landing force or sustained land operations. The MAGTF command element organizes a fires and effects coordination center, which coordinates overall fires. At each level below the command element (division, regiment, and battalion), a fire support coordination center is established to advise and coordinate fires within the ground combat element. The fires and effects coordination center and each fire support coordination center are staffed with subject matter experts and representatives of the various USMC and Navy supporting arms.
AIR NAVAL GROUND LIAISON COMPANY
2-51. The air-naval ground liaison company provides the MAGTF commander a liaison capability to plan, coordinate, and conduct the terminal control of fires in support of joint and multinational forces operating within or adjacent to the MAGTF battlespace. Each air-naval ground liaison company contains USMC and Navy personnel qualified to plan, coordinate, and integrate all fire support assets available to the MAGTF, as well as joint and multinational forces.
MARITIME COMPONENT FIRE SUPPORT COMMAND AND CONTROL
2-52. The JFC may designate a joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC) to conduct joint maritime operations. The JFMCC is the supported commander for operations within the JFC-designated maritime area of operations (AO) (including airspace above the AO). When designated the supported commander, the JFMCC has authority to designate target priorities, effects, and timing of fires within the AO.
2-53. The primary responsibilities of the joint force maritime component commander regarding joint FS are to advise the JFC on the best use of available maritime component fires capabilities, provide maritime component joint FS requirements to the supporting commander(s) (if designated the supported commander), conduct component planning, and execute the OPORD.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMPONENT FIRE SUPPORT COMMAND AND CONTROL ORGANIZATIONS AND ELEMENTS
2-54. The joint force special operations component coordinates all FS in support of special operations and, when tasked, FS using SOF assets in support of other elements of the joint force. Special operations coordinate FS through both external and SOF channels.
2-55. Liaison between SOF and other elements of the joint force is critical to both effective support and the prevention of friendly fire incidents. SOF liaison elements provide special operations expertise to coordinate, synchronize, and deconflict operations in support of conventional forces and when special operations are conducted unilaterally. SOF C2 organizations, such as a special operations command and control element, may provide (or act as) liaison elements to coordinate FS with their respective Service components. Within SOF channels, various elements are established to assist commanders in the execution of their FS responsibilities. SOF organizations and elements that provide C2 capabilities with integrated FS functions include:
 Special operations joint task force (referred to as SOJTF). A SOJTF is the principal organization designed to meet all special operations requirements in major operations, campaigns, or a contingency. The SOJTF commander plans, integrates, and executes all special operations in a designated OA. The SOJTF is a general officer-/flag officer-led modular, tailorable, and scalable special operations task force designed to integrate and enable joint SOF made available to geographic combatant commanders and JFCs.
 Joint special operations task force (referred to as JSOTF). The JSOTF is formed to execute special operations in support of a campaign or other operations. The JSOTF is normally an O-6-led modular, tailorable, and scalable special operations task force (SOTF) designed to provide a capability to C2 multiple SOTFs or a SOFJTF consisting of both conventional forces and SOF.

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 Joint special operations air component (referred to as JSOAC). The JSOAC plans and executes joint special operations air activities and ensures effective coordination, synchronization, and deconfliction of such activities with conventional air operations. Another key responsibility of the JSOAC is to ensure close liaison is accomplished with other SOF components. The JSOAC also has direct liaison with the special operations liaison element (referred to as SOLE). The JSOAC commander will normally be the commander with the preponderance of aviation assets or the greatest capacity to plan, coordinate, allocate, task, control, and support assigned and attached special operations aviation assets.
 Special operations task force (SOTF). A SOTF is a grouping of SOF assets formed to carry out a specific operation or a continuing mission. SOTFs are scalable organizations built around the nucleus of Army SOF, USMC special operations units, or naval special warfare units. A SOTF establishes a FSC for targeting coordination and for integrating fires delivered on surface targets by fire-support means, under the control, or in support, of the tactical-level force.
 Special operations command and control element (referred to as SOCCE). The SOCCE synchronizes special operations with land and maritime operations. The SOCCE is normally employed when SOF conduct operations in conjunction with a conventional force. It co-locates with the command element of the supported commander and performs C2 or liaison functions directed by the special operations commander. The focus of fires coordination is on the synchronization and deconfliction of joint fires.
COMMAND AND CONTROL:FIRE SUPPORT NETWORKS
2-56. FS personnel operate FS digital systems providing C2, deconfliction and targeting architecture in an automated environment. Digital FS and C2 systems that are interoperable with all forces help maintain information flow between commanders, their staffs, and subordinate units. Digitally aided FS enables machine-to-machine exchange of required FS and targeting information for efficient and effective target engagement by joint and multinational forces. The primary FS digital systems used by Army FS personnel include AFATDS, JADOCS, and the forward observer system (FOS), both mounted and dismounted.
2-57. The JADOCS is a software application that presents and manipulates command, control, communications, intelligence, information, and communications interfaces to and from various systems to obtain, coordinate, and disseminate information. It maintains a comprehensive fires common operation picture, through the visualization of friendly air and land tracks, including artillery and radar positions via AFATDS, as well as hostile air tracks received from the air defense systems integration server. It maintains comprehensive target entity databases including access to the modernized integrated database as well as enemy and friendly order of battle databases received digitally from the intelligence distributed common ground station - Army. This digital integration of U.S. and allied fires provides a forum for nominating, vetting and validating suspect targets, determining methods of engagement, conducting target are risk mitigation in a coordinated and collaborative digital environment for both deliberate and dynamic targeting. JADOCS can be utilized on any classification of network and resides at BCT and above. JADOCS works with AFATDS via a direct server-client interface to execute both deliberate and dynamic targeting.
2-58. The AFATDS is a multi-service, integrated FA system that receives call for fires, processes fire missions, air support requests, counterfire missions, conducts technical and tactical fire direction of firing units, issues orders to firing batteries and WLRs, and communicates other related information to coordinate and maximize the use of all attack/delivery assets. It meets the needs of the FA for planning the use of critical resources and for managing, collecting, and passing vital fires data throughout AFATDS can create, store, and check FSCMs and ACMs for violations during fire mission processing. It establishes attack guidance and target selection standards for the expedited execution of the scheme of targeting. It performs detailed weaponeering and attack analysis for effective target engagement in accordance with the commander's desired effects. AFATDS can send both preplanned and immediate air support requests through each echelon of command to the supporting AOC via the BCD. AFATDS can export the United States message text format (referred to as USMTF) on DD Form 1972 (Joint Tactical Air Strike Request) message into the USAF's theatre battlefield management core system (referred to as TBMCS). It possesses limited capabilities to validate suspect targets and should be used with JADOCS for execution of deliberate and dynamic targeting. It is fielded from echelons above corps or USMC expeditionary force down to firing battery levels.

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The USMC's AFATDS is able to link digitally into the artillery and TA channels to achieve a rapid counterfire capability from either ground or air systems. AFATDS can communicate over a variety of networks using standard messaging formats such as variable message format, United States message text format (referred to as USMTF), and Link-16. It is interoperable with select coalition partner fire control systems via the artillery systems cooperative agreement protocol.
2-59. The FOS is an automated FS system used by commanders, FSEs/FSCOORDs, FSOs, FOs, and surveyors located at or employed remotely from the FS agencies at corps, division, regiment, brigade, squadron, BN, company, battery, troop, and platoon echelons. The FOS provides automated decisionmaking, planning, and execution capability, which provides seamless integration of synchronized and accurate fires into the maneuver commander's scheme of maneuver. The FOS performs automated, calls for fire, fire mission processing, artillery target intelligence, fire planning, clearance of fires, and survey and geometry processing supporting the FA mission. FOS networks with AFATDS which receives its digital messaging using variable message format transmitted on either tactical radio networks or local area networks.
JOINT AIR OPERATIONS COMMAND AND CONTROL NETWORKS
2-60. Normally, the joint air operation C2 system will be built around the C2 system of the Service component commander designated as the JFACC. Each Service component has an organic system designed for C2 of their air operations. Whether it is the Air Force's theater air control system (referred to as TACS), the Army air-ground system (referred to as AAGS), the Navy's composite warfare commander (referred to as CWC)/Navy tactical air control system (referred to as NTACS), Marine air command and control system (referred to as MACCS).
2-61. The special operations air-ground system (referred to as SOAGS) that serves as the nucleus for C2 of joint air operations, the remainder will be integrated to best support the JFC's concept of operations. When all elements of the theater air control system, Army air-ground system, CWC/NTACS, MACCS with FS coordination center hierarchy, and SOAGS integrate, the entire system is labeled the theater air-ground system (referred to as TAGS). Refer to JP 3-30 for more information.
SECTION II – FIRE SUPPORT SYSTEM – TARGET ACQUISITION
2-62. Success in battle relies heavily on the ability to accurately identify, locate, and attack HPTs. This calls for rapid and accurate target development, TA, and post-strike assessment. FS planners and FSCOORDs work closely with intelligence personnel and the FAIO to identify TA requirements and focus on detecting HPTs. As an element of the FS system, Target Acquisition is the detection, identification, and location of a target in sufficient detail to permit effective employment of capabilities that create the required effects (JP 360). Staffs evaluate target information from all sources and route it to the appropriate supporting commands. This includes information from all echelons and from adjacent and supporting elements. A target is an entity or object that performs a function for the threat considered for possible engagement or other action (JP 3-60).
2-63. Target acquisition is conducted in accordance with the five principles of the law of war/law of armed conflict to permit the effective employment of weapons. TA can occur at numerous points along the execution timeline and at all levels of command, including the attack and deliver system performing the final attack (JP 3-09).
Information Collection and Target Detection
2-64. Target acquisition requirements often comprise a large portion of the overall information collection effort especially when conducting deep operations or employing sophisticated cross domain fires like cyberspace operations. In some cases, especially during large-scale ground combat operations, units must be prepared to fight in order to acquire targets. The challenges to target acquisition against a peer threat include integrated air defense systems, long-range fires, counter reconnaissance, cyberspace and EW operations, deception operations, and camouflage. Commanders allocate maneuver, fires, and multi-domain ISR capabilities to enable target acquisition. For more information on how the staff and intelligence sections overcome collection gaps see FM 2-0.

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Named Area of Interest to Target Area of Interest
2-65. To effectively target the enemy, the intelligence and FS staffs develop NAIs and TAIs. The staff also develops a HPT list that can include geographic NAIs and TAIs as well as enemy organizations, networks, and individuals identified as key or critical to the OE and are taken into account in course of action (COA), branches and sequels. NAIs should not be tied to a specific terrain; rather, they should be based upon the enemy locations or suspected locations. NAIs are used both to confirm or deny an enemy COA and locate HPTs. TAIs cannot exist outside of an NAI as they are both inextricably linked to the commander’s priority information requirements and decision points. For a graphic example of a TAI see figure 2-1. The G-3 tasks ISR assets to observe NAIs and TAIs.
 A named area of interest is the geospatial area or systems node or link against which information that will satisfy a specific information requirement can be collected are usually to capture indications of adversary courses of action (JP 2-01.3).
 A target area of interest is the geographical area where high-value targets can be acquired and engaged by friendly forces (JP 2-01.3). Not all TAIs (see figure 2-1) will form part of the friendly COA; only TAIs associated with high priority targets are of interest to the commander. These are identified during the targeting staff and wargaming are recorded on both the targeting synchronization matrix and intelligence synchronization matrix. TAIs differ from engagement areas (EAs) in degree. EAs plan for the use of all available weapons; TAIs might be engaged by a single weapon and lead to the establishment of geographical targets, to include point, area, and linear, as recorded on the DA Form 4655 (Target List Worksheet).

Figure 2-1. Example of targeted area of interest
Target Acquisition Assets
2-66. Target acquisition can be accomplished by a wide range of capabilities, from visual identification to sophisticated electronic means. Target acquisition is most effective when comprised of complementary and unique collection assets and capabilities across echelons and warfighting functions. The expression of accuracy of TA assets is target location error and is criteria captured by the targeting team on the target selection standards. “Target selection standards are criteria applied to enemy activity (acquisitions and battlefield information) and used in deciding whether the activity is a target. Target selection standards put

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nominations into two categories: targets and suspected targets. Targets must meet accuracy and timeliness requirements for engagement. Suspected targets must be confirmed before any engagement” (ATP 3-60).
2-67. Some of the many possible target detection assets include satellites and other national assets, joint ISR systems to include the USAF distributed common ground system, unmanned aircraft system (UAS), WLR, FOs, scouts, and special operations forces. When planning the target acquisition portion of information collection, it is useful to group those assets into the four primary information collection tasks and missions of reconnaissance, surveillance, security operations, and intelligence operations. For a complete listing of intelligence collection capabilities by command echelon, refer to FM 2-0.
Target Engagement Authority
2-68. Engagement authority is an authority vested with a joint force commander that may be delegated to a subordinate commander, that permits an engagement decision (JP 3-01). The authority and responsibility to engage targets rests with the JFC responsible for the AO. The JFC communicates engagement criteria to the force through ROE specific to each AO. The JFC may delegate target engagement authority to subordinate commanders. In large-scale ground combat operations, especially during the offense, it is critical that Target Engagement Authority be delegated to the absolute lowest echelon that has the proper resources to identify and attack enemy formations, facilities, and other capabilities in-accordance with the Law of War and established ROE. This empowers agility by entrusting engagement decisions to leaders at the tactical edge.
SECTION III – FIRE SUPPORT SYSTEM – ATTACK AND DELIVERY CAPABILITIES
2-69. This section discusses lethal and nonlethal weapon systems capabilities. For more technical information see ATP 3-09.32/MCRP 3-31.6/NTTP 3-09.2/AFTTP 3-2.6, JFIRE, multi-service tactics, techniques and procedures for joint application of firepower.
 Joint FS surface to surface and air to surface capabilities.  CEMA.  Space operations.  Information related activities.
SURFACE TO SURFACE CAPABILITIES
2-70. Army, Navy, and USMC surface-to-surface indirect fires includes cannon, rocket, and missile systems as well as mortars organic to maneuver elements. FA attack/delivery systems provide continuously available fires under all weather conditions, all types of terrain, at increasingly greater ranges, and is the most available fire support weapon available within any AO available 24 hours a day with 360 degree coverage. FA provides close-support fires to maneuver forces, FA can also perform counterfire, interdiction, SEAD, and integrate into SCAR missions. FA employs a wide range of munitions, to include long range precision and near precision munitions that provide all-weather precision strike capability at great distances. FA support can range from tactical fires in a company AO to strategic fires across combatant command boundaries. FA units have several limitations:
 A Firing signature that makes the unit vulnerable to detection by enemy TA assets.  Limited self-defense capability against ground and air attacks.  Limited ability to destroy moving targets.
ROCKETS
2-71. The multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) supplements cannon artillery by delivering a large volume of fires in a very short period of time against HPTs at increasingly greater ranges. MLRS is used for counterfire and deliberate attacks against enemy air defense, light materiel, and personnel targets. The allweather MLRS fires free-flight and guided rockets and missiles. Free-flight or guided rocket options include warheads with either unitary high-explosive or dual-purpose improved conventional munitions.

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2-72. The guided-multiple launch rocket system (GMLRS) provides commanders with increased accuracy and much greater range. The extended range GMLRS will double the range of the current capability. Their extremely high altitude of delivery (apex of missile trajectory, maximum ordinate) requires close coordination with air planners and liaisons to ensure aircraft are not in the vicinity during launches and descents.
MISSILES
2-73. Long range hypersonic weapons and missiles will provide JFCs ground based fires with strategic range and effects. Long range hypersonic weapons contribute to opening windows of advantage by penetration of sophisticated A2/AD environments.
2-74. The Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) provides long-range, fire support. ATACMSs are fired from an MLRS or high mobility artillery rocket system (HIMARS) platform and may consist of antipersonnel/antimaterial submunitions or a unitary high-explosive warhead. The ATACMS retains the responsiveness of rockets, though it possesses a much greater range. The ATACMS antipersonnel/antimaterial warhead is designed to engage soft targets and the unitary high-explosive warhead is designed to engage fixed infrastructure while minimizing collateral damage. Due to the range and altitude of the ATACMS, target engagements require detailed airspace coordination and integration. For more discussion on MLRS or HIMARS and ATACMS, see ATP 3-09.60.
2-75. The Precision Strike Missile is a surface-to-surface long range missile fired from MLRS or HIMARS systems with greater range and lethality. This missile will be able to attack targets on the ground or at sea and will be a key capability used to penetrate and disintegrated adversary A2/AD capabilities.
2-76. The U.S. Navy Tomahawk is an all-weather, long-range, subsonic cruise missile used for deep land attack warfare, launched from U.S. Navy surface ships and submarines. The Tomahawk conventional variant, adds the capability to reprogram the missile while in-flight via two-way satellite communications to strike any of fifteen pre-programmed alternate targets or redirect the missile to any global positioning system (GPS) target coordinates.
CANNON ARTILLERY AND MORTARS
2-77. Cannon artillery is the most available attack system within the AO, capable of performing close support of maneuver, counterfire, interdiction, obscuration, and SEAD at increasingly extended ranges which will allow these systems to strike operationally or strategically relevant targets. Cannon artillery provides near immediate response times, 24-hour availability, and 360-degree coverage. Cannon artillery offers area and precision fires, such as the Excalibur and precision guidance kit (referred to as PGK). The Excalibur is a precision-guided, extended-range, 155-millimeter high-explosive cannon artillery projectile with an integrated global-positioning system that utilizes an inertial navigation system (INS) guidance and unitary warhead. It provides artillery capabilities in urban areas and restrictive terrain, while minimizing collateral damage. The precision guided kit is a trajectory-correcting fuse kit compatible with standard 155- millimeter munitions. It operates in all weather conditions, engages targets with increased accuracy, and has a nearvertical terminal trajectory. The replacement for dual purpose improved conventional munition, is the cannon-delivered area effects munitions. Until this is fielded, units plan on utilizing the, BONUS projectile currently in use by unified action partners, the projectile carries two sensor-fuzed munitions expelled during flight that detect and attack armored vehicles from above.
2-78. Extended range cannon artillery will provide increased lethality, and range, to provide the division commander with overmatch and accuracy. Its increased rate of fire will provide the capability to mass fires at specific points and, to strike targets in the division deep area in order to shape for BCTs.
2-79. Organic mortars are organized as platoons in maneuver and ranger BNs and as sections in Stryker and infantry BCT rifle companies. Mortars are high-angle, relatively short-range, high rate-of-fire, area fire weapons. Their mobility makes them well suited for close support of maneuver. Mortars can also be used for final protective fire, obscuration, and illumination. Refer to TC 3-22.90 for more information about mortars.

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NAVAL SURFACE FIRE SUPPORT
2-80. Naval surface fire support is fire provided by Navy surface gun and missile systems in support of a unit or units (JP 3-09.3). When supporting an amphibious assault, the commander, amphibious task force, prepares the overall NSFS plan. In general, the mission of NSFS units in an amphibious assault is to support the assault by destroying or neutralizing shore installations that oppose the approach of ships and aircraft and to deliver fires against enemy forces that may oppose the landing force, including its post-landing advance.
2-81. When the number of ships permits, individual ships will be assigned as DS to battalions conducting an amphibious assault. The DS mission establishes the priority in which the ship will process calls for supporting fire and the anticipated zone of fire (ZF). The ship delivers fires on planned targets and targets of opportunity in the ZF, which normally corresponds to the zone of action of the supported unit. The GS mission requires an NSFS ship to support the force as a whole, or that portion of the force assigned to the ship, by attacking targets in the ZF.
2-82. The MK 45 gun is a fully-automatic, naval gun mount that is designed to engage surface and air targets and to provide naval surface fire support for expeditionary operations. The MK 45 Mod 4 gun mount upgrade includes a longer barrel (62 caliber) that improves the gun's effectiveness as a land attack weapon for naval surface fire support.
2-83. Limitations of naval surface fire support. The observer must remain abreast of the gun-target-line relationship because the characteristic flat trajectory of naval gunfire results in a pronounced dispersion pattern along the gun target line (referred to as the GTL) range dispersion. The flat trajectory and high muzzle velocity of naval gunfire make the adjustment of naval gunfire difficult, particularly on flat terrain. The fall of shot of naval gunfire can be described as a narrow, elongated pattern as seen along the gun-target-line. The size of the pattern varies with range. For example, at 21,000 meters, the five-inch-gun mount will cause a round-to-round dispersion pattern that is approximately 150 meters long and 50 meters wide.
AIR TO SURFACE CAPABILITIES
2-84. Fixed-Wing Aircraft. Fixed-wing aircraft provide flexibility, range, speed, lethality, precision, and the ability to mass fires at a desired time and place. Fixed wing aircraft support the joint fires tasks of strategic attack, countering air and missile threats (including SEAD and offensive counterair), and interdiction. Fixedwing aircraft provide joint FS with AI, CAS, airborne C2, ISR, SCAR, SEAD, and FAC(A). The capacity of aircraft to deliver precision-guided munitions limits collateral damage. Also, aircraft may provide real-time attack assessment.
 Air interdiction, is air operations conducted to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy's military surface capabilities before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces, or to otherwise achieve objectives that are conducted at such distances from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required. Also called AI (JP 3-03).
 Close air support, is air action by aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces and that require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. Also called CAS (JP 3-09.3).
 Strike coordination and reconnaissance, a mission flown for the purpose of detecting targets and coordinating or performing attack or reconnaissance on those targets. Also called SCAR (JP 303). SCAR missions are flown in a specific geographic area and are an element of the C2 interface to allocate flights and assets, properly match weapons effects with targets to effectively and efficiently destroy targets per the supported commanders HPTL, and provide battle damage assessment (BDA).
 Suppression of enemy air defenses activity that neutralizes, destroys, or temporarily degrades surface-based enemy air defenses by destructive and/or disruptive means. Also called SEAD (JP 3-01).
2-85. Rotary wing aircraft. Rotary-wing aircraft can employ a variety of weapons, including precisionguided weapons beyond line of sight. They can quickly reach and move throughout the depth and breadth of the battlefield. This mobility and flexibility help the commander seize or retain the initiative. They can also

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provide terminal guidance for other weapon platforms, as well as operate during periods of limited visibility. The US Army normally employs attack helicopters as maneuver units to conduct two basic types of attack missions: attacks against enemy forces in close, friendly contact with other Army maneuver forces and attacks against enemy forces out of out of direct fire contact with friendly forces. Both can be executed as either hasty or deliberate attacks and are typically supported with integrated joint fires. This type of attack requires detailed planning and the full integration of manned and unmanned aircraft, and the simultaneous or sequential employment of CAS, indirect fires, and other enabling capabilities to mass effects, isolate, and destroy key enemy forces and capabilities. U.S. Army attack helicopters can also perform CAS in support of another component. The USMC employs its attack rotary-wing aviation primarily as a CAS platform. For more information on Army fixed wing aircraft and attack helicopters see ATP 3-09.32/MCRP 3-31.6/NTTP 3-09.2/AFTTP 3-2.6.
2-86. In addition to Army aviation responsibilities during SCAR, tactical level maneuver commanders can employ a method similar to the SCAR - a coordinated attack interdiction mission in which the ground maneuver commander plans/coordinates/employs a coordinated attack using supporting CAS, Attack Aviation, UAS, and artillery against HPTs and targets of opportunity inside the ATO cycle planning horizon and in close proximity to friendly forces (examples include engagement areas, enemy penetrations, and Level III threats in a consolidation area). This method, previously referred to as a joint air attack team or JAAT is a capability a tactical maneuver commander retains to ensure they can integrate rotary wing and fixed wing aircraft, supported by other fire support attack/delivery platforms (artillery, CEMA, NSFS, mortars) to locate and attack targets of opportunity in the close fight.
2-87. In situations such as this, the maneuver commander can designate the Army aviation commander with the highest situational awareness and ability to provide C2 as the on-scene commander (usually the Air Mission Commander). The on-scene commander is an individual in the immediate vicinity of an isolating event who temporarily assumes command of the incident (JP 3-50). The commander will coordinate directly with the appropriate tactical maneuver HQ FSE and FAC(A)/JTAC to execute the attack. The aviation commander designated as the on-scene commander is not a SCAR Aircrew, on-scene commander is simply a designated commander who temporarily assumes command of the coordinated attack. This method can be employed anywhere on the battlefield (including the consolidation area), across the range of military operations. CAS procedures may or may not be required depending on the proximity to friendly forces. Maximum synergy occurs when the on-scene commander of the coordinated attack possess the authority to coordinate the attack directly with the other team members. When CAS is not available, direct attack coordination is more efficient because there is no requirement for JTAC/FAC(A) control.
2-88. Unmanned Aircraft (UA). The long endurance of UA enables them to provide extended support to time sensitive targets (TST), high-value targets, and HPT missions. UA can also support or conduct CAS, SCAR, AI, and other joint fires missions. Specific tasks for the UA may include TA and marking, terminal guidance of ordnance, providing precision coordinates for GPS-aided munitions, delivery of onboard precision-guided ordnance, BDA, signal intelligence, communication/data relays, and retargeting to include shoot-look-shoot. UA should be requested, tasked, routed, controlled, and deconflicted in a manner similar to methods used for fixed-winged and rotary-winged manned aircraft, with exceptions made for their unmanned nature (such as the inability to see and avoid other air traffic). When the necessary equipment, network, and personnel are included it becomes a UAS. For more information on UAS employment see ATP 3-04.1.
STANDOFF WEAPONS
2-89. A standoff weapon is a medium-range, precision-guided, air to-surface glide weapon employing a variety of munitions that can be employed against land and sea targets. It is a launch-and-leave weapon that employs a GPS-aided INS and is capable of day, night, and adverse weather operations. Standoff weapons provide an ability to engage targets at extended ranges while minimizing the risk to friendly forces. Some examples of air-to-surface standoff capabilities include:
 The Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (referred to as JASSM) and its extended-range variant, which are air-launched, low-observable, subsonic cruise missiles specifically designed to penetrate air defense systems. The missiles incorporate GPS-aided INS guidance with an infrared seeker in the terminal phase of flight. Optimizing JASSM's full-precision and low-observable capabilities requires prior coordination with both strike units and target intelligence agencies.

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 The small diameter bomb (referred to as SDB), which is an air-launched, precision guided, glide weapon. It provides strike aircraft with high-loadout, all-weather, autonomous, standoff-attack capability outside of point defenses. SDB increment I provides precision capability through a GPS-aided INS against fixed targets, while SDB increment II incorporates a GPS-aided INS and additional tri-mode seeker, optimized for engaging fixed, relocatable, moving targets, at any time of day and in adverse weather conditions.
CYBERSPACE ELECTROMAGNETIC ACTIVITIES
2-90. Cyberspace electromagnetic activities is the process of planning, integrating, and synchronizing cyberspace and electronic warfare operations in support of unified land operations (ADP 3-0). Cyberspace operations are the employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace (JP 3-0). Both the offensive cyberspace operations (OCO) and defensive cyberspace operations response action (DCO-RA) missions may rise to the level of use of force, where physical damage or destruction of enemy systems require use of fires in cyberspace. OCO are intended to project power by the application of force in and through cyberspace and DCO-RA uses defensive measures, including fires, outside the defended network to protect it.
2-91. Cyberspace attack actions are a form of fires, are taken as part of an OCO or DCO-RA mission, are coordinated with other USG departments and agencies, and are carefully synchronized with planned fires in the physical domains. For more information on CEMA see FM 3-12.
2-92. Cyberspace operations are the employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace. OCO and DCO-RA missions may rise to the level of use of force, where physical damage or destruction of enemy systems require use of fires in cyberspace. OCO are intended to project power in and through cyberspace, and DCO-RA use defensive measures, including fires, outside the defended network to protect it. Cyberspace attack actions are a form of fires, taken as part of an OCO or DCO-RA mission, coordinated with other US governmental departments and agencies, and carefully synchronized with planned fires in the physical domains.
SPACE OPERATIONS
2-93. Many lethal and nonlethal fires capabilities depend on space capabilities to support, integrate, and deliver fires. Army space capabilities are integrated throughout the fires warfighting function, providing robust and reliable planning, contributing to target development, and providing positioning, navigation, and timing, satellite communications, imagery, geolocation, weather, and terrain capabilities.
2-94. As a FS attack/delivery capability, space control operations that create a desired effect on enemy space systems across all domains by employing a variety of measures to assure the use of space and attribute enemy attacks. These include terrestrial fires to defend space operations and assets. A capability for, or employment of, fires may deter threats and/or contain and de-escalate a crisis.
2-95. When deliberate, nonlethal FS attack/delivery capabilities are directed into the space domain, they must be coordinated between the affected combatant commands if time permits. By honoring the boundaries of the space domain, combatant commanders help preserve space situational awareness, spacecraft life span, and space system performance. For more information on space operations see JP 3-14.
INFORMATION RELATED ACTIVITIES
2-96. The integration and synchronization of FS with information-related activities through the targeting process is fundamental to creating the necessary synergy between information-related activities and more traditional maneuver and strike operations. Some information-related activities supporting joint fires include:
2-97. Military deception is actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military, paramilitary, or violent extremist organization decision makers, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission (JP 3-13.4). Deception applies to all levels of warfare, across the range of military operations, and is conducted during all phases of military operations. Physical attack/destruction can support military deception by shaping an enemy's intelligence collection capability through destroying or nullifying selected ISR capabilities or sites. Attacks can mask the

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main effort from the enemy. When properly integrated with operations security (OPSEC) and other information-related capabilities, deception can be a decisive tool in altering how the enemy views, analyzes, decides, and acts in response to friendly military operations. For more information on Army support to military deception see FM 3-13.4
2-98. OPSEC is a capability that identifies and controls critical information and indicators of friendly force actions attendant to military operations and incorporates countermeasures to reduce the risk of an adversary exploiting vulnerabilities. OPSEC identifies critical information and actions attendant to friendly military operations to deny observables to the threat intelligence systems. For example, camouflage and concealment are OPSEC measures and survivability operations tasks used to protect friendly forces and activities from enemy detection and attribution. For more information on operational security see JP 3-13.3.
2-99. Military information support operations which are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their behavior and ultimately the behavior of their governments. Selected audiences may include enemies, adversaries, unified action partners, and neutral groups or populations. Psychological operations support forces devise actions and craft messages using visual, audio, and audiovisual formats, which can then be delivered by air, land, and maritime means, and through cyberspace, to selected individuals and groups. Many actions of the FS system, such as strikes, have psychological impact, but they are not military information support operations unless their primary purpose is to influence the attitudes, rules, norms, beliefs, and subsequent behavior of a target audience. For more information see JP 3-13.2.
2-100. Fire support requirements should be deconflicted and synchronized with special technical operations (referred to as STO). Detailed information related to special technical operation and their contribution to fire support can be obtained from the special technical operations planners at combatant command or service component HQ.

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Chapter 3
Fire Support and the Operations Process
This chapter further discusses FS in the Operations Process in detail. Section 1 further explains the four FS functions. Section II describes key FS processes and procedures (as an element of C2) and the principles of FS planning and coordination. Section III describes FS preparation, primarily rehearsals. Section IV discusses the principles of FS execution (AWIFM-N). Section V discusses operational and combat assessment as they relate to FS.
“The artillery was my strongest tool. I repeatedly said it was more a matter of the infantry supporting the artillery than the artillery supporting the infantry…. I wish I knew the countless times that positions were taken or held due solely to TOT’s ….”
– Major General R.O. Barton, US 4th Infantry Division World War II
SECTION I – FIRE SUPPORT FUNCTIONS
3-1. The four functions of FS are the basic requirements the FS system must fulfill to destroy, neutralize, or suppress the enemy. The basic FS functions describe what FS must do. They are used as screening criteria during FS planning, rehearsals, and assessment of the overall conduct of the FS system.
SUPPORT FORCES IN CONTACT
3-2. The commander must provide responsive FS that ensures freedom of maneuver to forces engaged with the enemy in the close, deep, support, and consolidation areas. A force is always in some form of contact. ADP 3-90 describes the eight forms of contact as: visual; direct; indirect; non-hostile; obstacles; aircraft; CBRN; and electronic (Electronic contact includes contact in cyberspace). Units may experience all forms of contact simultaneously. Commanders should assume that friendly forces are always in contact in one or more domains, both during competition and conflict. Peer adversaries or enemies have both the cyberspace and space enabled capabilities to observe friendly forces routinely.
3-3. Throughout large-scale ground combat operations, FS must:  Provide deep fires to disrupt, delay, and destroy uncommitted enemy forces before they can engage friendly forces. This includes enemy A2/AD, CPs, airfields, air defense artillery (ADA), missiles, bridges and logistical infrastructure.  Plan counterfire to destroy, neutralize, or suppress the enemy's indirect fire weapon systems. Counterfire is fire intended to destroy or neutralize enemy weapons (JP 3-09). It Includes counterbattery and countermortar fire.  Provide close supporting fires. Close support is the action of the supporting force against targets or objectives that are sufficiently near the supported force as to require detailed integration or coordination of the supporting action (JP 3-31). These fires are used to engage enemy troops, weapons, or positions that are threatening or can threaten the force in either the offense or defense. They allow the commander to multiply combat power effects. Close support expands the battlefield depth, erodes enemy forces, and inflicts damage well beyond direct fire ranges.  Provide fires to suppress known enemy air defense weapons immediately before and during flight by friendly aircraft within the AO. Suppression of enemy air defenses is activity that neutralizes, destroys, or temporarily degrades surface-based enemy air defenses by destructive and/or disruptive means (JP 3-01).  Provide fires in support of consolidation area operations.

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SUPPORT THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
3-4. The FS system responds to the maneuver commander's plan through the scheme of fires, with integration and delivery of proactive, timely, and accurate FS. The concept of operations is a statement that directs the manner in which subordinate units cooperate to accomplish the mission and establishes the sequence of actions the force will use to achieve the end state (ADP 5-0).
3-5. The maneuver commander must retain direct control over sufficient firepower to influence the battle by attacking HPTs. Of particular concern to the maneuver commander in large-scale ground combat operations is the attack of counterfire targets, SEAD, deep fires, and support of consolidation area operations.
SYNCHRONIZE AND CONVERGE FIRE SUPPORT (LETHAL AND NONLETHAL) ACROSS ALL DOMAINS
3-6. Synchronization is the arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time (JP 2-0). Convergence is the concerted employment of combat power against different decisive points in multiple domains to create effects against a system, formation, or capability. It is essential that FS planning is performed concurrently with the development of the scheme of maneuver. Synchronization must occur within the FS system itself and also with the other elements of combat power.
3-7. FS must be synchronized with other joint force activities to include air operations, cyberspace operations, ISR functions, special operations, personnel recovery, and information related activities to optimize limited resources and avoid friendly fire incidents. Synchronization of FS is primarily done through the Army targeting process decide, detect, deliver, and assess and the joint targeting cycle. Tactical and technical rehearsals of the FS plan are also key to synchronization of FS across all domains. Successful use of this methodology helps attack the right target with the best weapon at the right time.
SUSTAIN AND PROTECT THE FIRE SUPPORT SYSTEM
3-8. Sustainment is a central, potentially decisive aspect of ensuring the FS system functions effectively. It is not a separate function or afterthought. Sustainment is the provision of logistics, financial management, personnel services, and health service support necessary to maintain operations until successful mission completion (ADP 4-0). FS and FA planners must conduct sustainment operations to ensure all elements of the FS system can continuously and rapidly integrate FS in all domains and ensure proper personnel services and health support. Ammunition, fuel, food, water, maintenance, transportation, and medical support are all critical to sustaining the FS system.
3-9. FS planners must also ensure proper protection measures are executed to ensure survivability of CPs, personnel, networks, target acquisition, and attack/delivery systems. Protection is the preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the boundaries of a given operational area (JP 3-0). The FSCOORD, who is also a commander, is responsible for providing the leadership that ensures that the FS system is sustained, protected, and can support the operation. FSCOORD identifies sustainment and protection requirements associated with all of the elements of the FS system and takes necessary actions to ensure that they are satisfied. The FSCOORD plans and monitors logistics readiness and training within the command and ensures that subordinate leaders understand and use external sustainment resources to the best effect. The FSCOORD ensures that coordination is made with supporting sustainment and protection elements outside the command.
SUSTAINMENT
3-10. The FSCOORD must ensure the following:  Formulate tactical plans to reflect logistics limitations and to exploit logistics capabilities.  Stocks and supplies are properly positioned to sustain FS systems. In large-scale ground combat operations, this is particularly critical for FA systems because of the high tonnage of munitions.

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 Weapon systems and all other equipment are maintained in a high state of readiness and sustainment systems are properly understood and used.
 Strict controls and priorities on supplies are employed to ensure strength at the decisive point. While fire support plans help determine a required supply rate (RSR). Required supply rate is the amount of ammunition expressed in terms of rounds per weapon per day for ammunition items fired by weapons, in terms of other units of measure per day for bulk allotment, and other items estimated to be required to sustain operations of any designated force without restriction for a specified period (ATP 3-09.23). They must be adjusted to conform to the controlled supply rate (CSR). Controlled supply rate is the rate of ammunition consumption that can be supported, considering availability, facilities, and transportation. It is expressed rounds per unit, individual, or vehicle per day (ATP 3-09.23). The FSCOORD must identify and mitigate the risk in the gap between the RSR and CSR.
 Develop and communicate clear logistical requirements to supporting sustainment elements. FA personnel must ensure that logistics personnel understand the types and amounts of ammunition required to support each phase of an operation. Properly submitting required logistical status reports is critical to this effort. At times, FA units may be required to draw ammunition in excess of their controlled supply rate for a specific requirement such as a preparation. The additional haul capacity will also need to be forecasted. In this case, ammunition may be issued for immediate consumption and is considered expended when issued.
 Synchronize combat configured loads to support the current and future fires plans informed by the FS planning and coordination process. Combat configured loads are preplanned packages of ammunition transported as a single unit for routine resupply, yet flexible enough to provide for a variety of operations.
 Resupply triggers across all classes of supply are aligned against essential field artillery task (EFAT) and are understood by the unit's sustainment personnel.
 Ensure adequate reconstitution operations are planned and rehearsed for the FS System.
PROTECTION
3-11. The FSCOORD must ensure the following:  Additional force protection resources (air defense, engineer, military police, maneuver, and aviation assets) are dedicated or designated as needed. Consider the use of multinational capabilities whose national caveats allow defensive actions, but not offensive actions. (See table 3-1 on page 3-13).  Subsequent firing positions for FA units are prepared before the operation, if possible.  All elements of the FS system take action to counter the enemy's firepower and maneuver by ensuring that personnel, equipment, and systems are difficult to locate, strike, and destroy using dispersion, decoys, camouflage, and frequent survivability moves.  Deception is employed to mislead the enemy (see FM 3-13.4).  Communication networks are protected, resilient, and redundant.  Conduct appropriate adjacent unit coordination for mutual support opportunities.  Engineers provide survivability and mobility assets for radars and firing units.  Plan and coordinate for opportunity surveillance by manned and unmanned aircraft transiting the area to include position areas artillery or CPs.  Ensure protection battle drills are developed and rehearsed to account for reaction to enemy air, ground, CBRN, indirect fire, jamming, or CEMA attacks.  Coordinate for and utilize handheld UASs to recon and surveil NAIs developed for protection.
TECHNICAL SUPPORT OF THE NETWORK
3-12. The FSCOORD must ensure the following:  Establish the communications priorities, primary, alternate, contingency and emergency (PACE) plan.

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 C2 (CPs, people, processes, and networks) is redundant where possible.  FS personnel are well trained and proficient with analog and digital systems, and training must be
continuous. Ensure unit digital sustainment training is planned, resourced, and emphasized at command levels.  Develop and utilize a detailed digital standard operating procedure (SOP).  FS meteorology, survey, and communications are accurate, redundant, and timely.  Request additional communications support if needed.
SECTION II – PROCESSES AND PROCEDURES
3-13. As discussed in chapter 2, processes and procedures are a component of the overall C2 system. The primary FS processes are targeting, FS planning and coordination, and the MDMP process. It is important to understand that all of these processes occur continuously and simultaneously with the overall operations process (see table 3-1 on page 3-13). Two critical FS procedures that all FS planners must understand and integrate into the operations process are SEAD and counterfire. Since these are so critical, they are described up front in this section. For more detail on SEAD refer to JP 3-01. For more detail on counterfire refer to ATP 3-09.12.
SUPPRESION OF ENEMY AIR DEFENSES
3-14. Army SEAD operations are designed to support operational and tactical plans by protecting Army aviation assets near the forward line of own troops (FLOT) or during cross-FLOT operations. SEAD also includes the protection of Air Force aircraft (such as CAS aircraft) supporting the ground commander's operation. The basic principle of Army SEAD operations is see-kill. This means that enemy air defense systems are attacked immediately upon detection, consistent with the commander's intent and the best application of resources. Formal SEAD fire planning normally is conducted and coordinated at division level or higher and may involve other services. See JP 3-01 for more detail on countering air and missile threats.
3-15. SEAD targeting and synchronization. The targeting process for SEAD is the same as for any other target set. It is conducted within the framework of intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and decide, detect, deliver, and assess and must support the four FS functions such as support air or rotary wing assets in contact with an air defense threat; fulfill an aspect of the commander's plan; be synchronized with the air operation; and be capable of sustaining its effort. The synchronization of SEAD is even more critical and difficult than the synchronization of FS for ground maneuver forces because of the time sensitivity of air operations. The responsibilities for SEAD targeting and synchronization run across the corps and division staff sections and are directed through the FSE. The FSCOORD manages and directs the corps or division SEAD effort.
3-16. SEAD objectives are specified by the JFC, who will consider the unique capabilities of each component to contribute to counterair operations. Counterair is a mission at the theater level that integrates offensive and defensive operations to attain and maintain a desired degree of control of the air and protection by neutralizing or destroying enemy aircraft and missiles, both before and after launch (JP 3-01). Traditionally, there are three categories of SEAD (AOR-/joint operations area-wide joint air defense system suppression, localized suppression, and opportune suppression), each of which reduces friendly attrition from an adversary's air defense system and creates more favorable conditions for friendly air operations. For each category, there are two means of executing SEAD, destructive and disruptive.
3-17. Air component SEAD capabilities. SEAD assets are often used in conjunction with other air operations such as air interdiction, offensive counterair, attack operations, and airborne operations when surface air defenses are a factor. Specially trained aircrew and specially equipped aircraft are designed for SEAD missions, especially against an enemy integrated air defense system (IADS). SEAD dedicated aircraft are normally equipped with special electronic detection and EA equipment capabilities (directed energy, antiradiation missiles, electromagnetic jamming, flares, chaff, and decoys). SEAD assets may be scarce and categorized as high-demand/low-density assets. Thus, during large-scale ground combat operations, they usually will not be tasked for missions without a SEAD requirement. Other fighter-attack and multi-role fighter crews normally are trained to support the SEAD mission, especially against the enemy air defense infrastructure.

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3-18. Surface component SEAD capabilities. Based on the JFC guidance, the land and maritime surface components' fires cells and FSEs will determine the weapon systems available to conduct SEAD. Examples of these capabilities include FA, mortars, naval surface fire, attack helicopters, EW, and surface-to-surface missiles (referred to as SSMs). To ensure unity of effort and conservation of force, components need to coordinate SEAD activities within their AO with the JFACC to ensure they meet mission requirements and do not interfere with other planned operations. The BCD can assist localized suppression operations by coordinating the means to request surface FS. A rapid and free exchange of SEAD target information between the JFACC and Army commanders is required for effective surface suppression.
3-19. Threat. Air defense threats can encompass many national or multinational systems normally integrated into an IADS. Adversaries' IADS have become increasingly complex and can differ widely from country to country in terms of organization, sophistication, and operational procedures. An adversary's IADS needs to be analyzed in-depth for strengths and weaknesses, especially seams in coverage. The goal is to identify command structure, air defense doctrine, early warning and tracking capabilities, C2 reliability/redundancy, and defensive weapons systems. SEAD operations target the HPTs of an IADS:
 C2 nodes/centers.  Surface-to-air missile sites.  Surface-to-air missile carriers and storage bunkers.  Antiaircraft artillery.  Early warning and fire control radars and ground control intercept sites.  Air defense operations and maintenance personnel.  Naval air defense assets.  Directed energy weapons.  EW systems.
3-20. SEAD operations are accomplished through denial, degradation, destruction, and disruption.  Denial eliminates the utility of an enemy's targeted system, usually without physical damage. Denial prevents an enemy from acquiring accurate information about friendly forces.  Degradation permanently impairs (partially or totally) the enemy's targeted systems, usually with physical damage. Degradation may confuse or delay the actions of an enemy.  Destruction seeks the destruction of the target system or operating personnel.
3-21. Disruption temporarily denies, degrades, delays, or neutralizes enemy surface air defense systems. Means include OCO, EA, and tactics such as avoidance or evasive flight profiles. In addition, UA can be used to actively employ disruptive means.
COUNTERFIRE
3-22. Like friendly FS systems, the threat FS systems can inflict serious damage on friendly maneuver forces, FS systems, and supporting infrastructure; therefore, the enemy's FS system must be acquired and eliminated. The counterfire battle is not a separate battle, but one aspect of the overall combined arms fight. Counterfire contributes by providing fires against the enemy integrated fires complex; it protects friendly forces, combat functions, and facilities from enemy indirect fires by neutralizing, or destroying enemy weapons, TA assets, observers (to include special purpose forces), C2 facilities, and communications and logistics sites. Counterfire gains freedom of maneuver for all friendly forces. Counterfire is inseparably tied to current and future operations and is part of the overall combined arms fight to achieve fire superiority.
3-23. In large-scale ground combat operations, the corps commander is responsible for counterfire throughout the depth of the corps AOR. They determine the best way to protect the corps combat forces and to defeat, delay, or disrupt the threat array. This estimate or analysis includes an assessment of the counterfire capabilities of the corps and its subordinate divisions. For more information on corps operations see ATP 392. The corps commander's counterfire responsibilities include the following:
 Segmenting the battlefield by delineating maneuver boundaries and assigning areas of responsibility for corps and its subordinate divisions. This helps establish the delineation of counterfire responsibilities within the corps zone.

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 Assigning missions and responsibilities, to include specific task requirements to intelligence assets through the G-2.
 Allocating resources. Corps assets may be retained at corps or allocated to subordinate divisions. Conversely, in some situations, the corps commander may require the use of division assets to support a corps counterfire responsibility. They should provide guidance for use of certain critical assets such as the any corps aviation assets, AI, ISR capabilities, SOF, and CEMA resources.
 Requesting additional TA and attack/delivery systems from theater or JTF level or from other joint headquarters.
 Detecting and attacking. The corps detects and attacks targets within its AOR, typically beyond the established fire support coordination line (FSCL). The corps also may attack targets within a division AOR when the division has forwarded such a request to corps based on priority and need. Within its capability, the corps may respond to requests for additional fires from adjacent units.
 Assessing. Finally, the corps commander must assess the protection of his combat units and the effects of counterfire against threat fire support systems. As appropriate, commander adjusts intelligence collection and/or attack priorities for protection of his force and attack of enemy targets. Commander may reallocate assets and modify the missions of subordinate units.
3-24. The corps commander decides how the corps will conduct counterfire operations. Coordinate and delineate corps, division, FAB, and DIVARTY responsibilities involved with enemy artillery analysis to reduce redundant efforts, and potential gaps and seams in analysis, production, and dissemination of intelligence information. They influences how subordinate division commanders fight through the allocation of corps assets, the issuance of attack guidance, and the identification of corps HPTs. Corps commander can support a division commander's counterfire efforts by attacking threat fire support systems at depth; thus, Corps commander helps to shape the division counterfire battle. In addition to allocating assets to divisions, the corps commander can further support a division counterfire battle by responding to the division requests with AI, SCAR, MLRS, CEMA, and EW. With respect to counterfire in the division AOR, the corps commander:
 Assigns missions to division and corps fire support assets and delineates their areas of responsibility by establishing boundaries.
 Detects and attacks targets forwarded by the division. As appropriate, the corps, after coordinating with the division FSE, may attack threat fire support targets within the division zone by massing fires to achieve required effects. Procedures for attacking threat systems firing from across boundaries also must be coordinated.
 Task-organizes and allocates assets. On the basis of the commander's intent and the mission variable factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (referred to as METT-TC), the corps commander can give the divisions' added assets for detection and attack of threat fire support. Most often, corps provides non divisional FA delivery assets to augment DIVARTY fire support capabilities. This can be done by either of the following actions:
 Assigning an FA brigade a tactical mission such as R or GSR to a DIVARTY.  Attaching the FA brigade to the division requiring augmentation. The FA brigade normally is then
further attached to the DIVARTY.
3-25. Division Counterfire Responsibility: Typically, most of the reactive counterfire battle takes place within the division AOR. Most of the threat active fire support systems are located in this area. The responsibilities of the division commander mirror those of the corps commander. Although his assets are fewer in number and variety, the division commander does have organic TA, target processing, and delivery assets to conduct counterfire. The FSCOORD for the division is responsible for orchestrating the division counterfire effort. When an FA brigade from corps is available to the division, the DIVARTY commander may assign it the counterfire role. Responsibility for the execution of the division counterfire effort, however, remains with the DIVARTY commander.

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PROACTIVE COUNTERFIRE
3-26. Proactive counterfire is the specific targeting of enemy indirect fire systems including their command and control, sensors, platforms, and logistics before they engage friendly forces. The proactive measures consist of zone management, site analysis, and position survivability considerations. Proactive counterfire process begins with targeting and continues throughout the operation. The G-2 and the targeting officer develop named areas of interest and target areas of interest where the enemy indirect fire assets are expected. The objective of proactive counterfire is to identify, locate, and attack to eliminate the enemy's strike capability before it can impact friendly operations. Rocket BNs from the FAB and AI normally performs the bulk of proactive counterfire in support of division operations, using TA and fires as well as allocated, joint, national or multinational assets to acquire and disable attack components of the enemy's strike capability. Examples of target sets include: cannon, rocket, and missile delivery units, prepared launch sites, artillery ammunition storage facilities, FDCs, counterfire radars, FOs, fixed or rotary wing airfields and fire support communication infrastructure. Intelligence assets must be synchronized and integrated to accurately locate targets; and attack assets (such as artillery, mortars, CAS, attack helicopters, naval surface fire support, and CEMA) must be dedicated against the threat total FS system. Considerations for conducting proactive counterfire include:
 All available artillery units participate.  Integrate all available joint FS attack/delivery systems.  Requires augmentation by Army and joint intelligence assets to locate and accurately target the
enemy indirect fire systems.  The G-2/S-2 typically has a leading role in managing this effort; intelligence feeds into common
ground station and cross-cueing radars and UAS are critical.  Establishing digital interface between the MLRS/HIMARS and cannon FA BN S-2s and the S-
2/liaisons is critical.  Making maximum use of permissive FSCMs to facilitate the clearance of fires; for example, in
defense the coordinated fire line (CFL) may be positioned close to friendly troops to facilitate quick engagements.  Managing no-fire areas (NFAs) that protect special operations forces, long-range surveillance detachments, reconnaissance troops, and scouts is critical.  Use of AFATDS to clear fires should be maximized.  Establishing radar call for fire zone (CFFZ).
REACTIVE COUNTERFIRE
3-27. Reactive counterfire provides immediate indirect and joint fires to neutralize, destroy, and suppress enemy indirect fire weapons once acquired. The FS system responds primarily to enemy mortar and artillery fires during or immediately following enemy engagement of friendly forces. Reactive counterfire usually requires quick response capabilities for optimum effectiveness and can benefit from the establishment of quick fire channels.
3-28. FA units employ a variety of counterfire acquisition assets to accurately locate enemy indirect fire assets as they are engaging friendly forces establishing sensor-to-shooter links to attack the enemy systems. Ensure that the mission fired report and artillery target intelligence is sent to the all source analysis section. Other key considerations for conducting reactive counterfire include airspace clearance, the use of both permissive fire support coordination measures that facilitate quick engagements and restrictive measures such as NFAs to protect critical assets, establishing quick-fire channels with sensor-to-shooter links, and designating radar zone managers.
THE COUNTERFIRE IMPERATIVES
3-29. Nested with the FS planning, coordination, and execution principles are the 10 counterfire imperatives. These 10 imperatives are a good tool to use in assessing and coordinating the overall counterfire fight.
 1. Provide commander's intent and guidance to enable counterfire operations and scheme of fire in support of the commander's objectives. Counterfire planning begins during the MDMP and

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continues throughout the targeting process feeding the targeting working group, targeting decision board, and intelligence collection plan. Commander's guidance (corps, division, BCT) sets the conditions for planning counterfire operations. The commander's guidance must be clear, concise and easily understood. Whenever commander's guidance for counterfire and targeting is not clearly understood during the planning of an operation, fire support planners should solicit that guidance from the commander. Commanders must include endstate in their planning guidance for counterfire, to promote unity of effort and the integration, and synchronization of available FS and collection assets. Successful counterfire operations may require commanders to accept risk elsewhere while seeking to exploit opportunities.
 2. Develop and execute an intelligence collection plan that supports the targeting and counterfire fight. Successful counterfire operations require proactive and continuous collection and analysis of the enemy FS system. WLRs and collection assets must be prioritized, integrated, and synchronized with counterfire operations. The FAIO and the information collection manager at each echelon ensures that target acquisition assets are properly integrated and synchronized into the overall collection and FS plan. The FSCOORD is responsible for positioning FS assets to respond to counterfire requirements. Position radars to support the observation and collection plans considering the enemy FS capabilities and range. Combat assessments, BDA, munitions effectiveness assessment (MEA) and reattack criteria will drive intelligence collection requirements for counterfire operations.
 3. Develop a permissive battlefield design using geometries and FSCMs. Using battlefield geometries and FSCMs to delineate the AO between corps and divisions is essential to effective counterfire operations and future planning. Permissive FSCMs allow for maximum use of destructive combat power to facilitate the attack of enemy indirect fire systems, while mitigating the risk to friendly forces. The commander adjusts battlefield geometries and FSCMs as required to keep pace with operations.
 4. Plan and manage terrain and distribute on common graphics (logistics sites, position area for artillery (PAA) - primary and alternate). Ensure FA units and sensors are positioned to support counterfire operations at points of vulnerability such as obstacles, canalizing terrain, bridges or gap crossings. The counterfire HQ is responsible for logistic support and recommends positioning of sensors and counterfire delivery systems, and ensures PAA and radar position areas are distributed and common graphics. Plan for primary, alternate and tertiary PAA and radar position areas.
 5. Plan airspace that allows for responsive counterfire (ACMs/airspace coordination areas/counterair). Close coordination is required to integrate air and space with counterfire operations. Counterfire operations in large-scale ground combat operations will require high volumes of air and space. ATACMS and guided multiple launch rocket system target engagements will require detailed airspace planning, coordination, and de-confliction. Unit airspace plans must be developed during MDMP and throughout the targeting and operational process to account for counterfire operations. When commanders have control of airspace, the JAGIC is the execution node for fires and airspace control.
 6. Designate and resource the counterfire HQ (role/manning/location). Define the FFA HQ role verses CF HQ role in the counterfire fight. The corps or division commander can designate the role of the counterfire HQ to a DIVARTY, FAB, or separate FA BN. The DIVARTY can provide the counterfire HQ for the division if task organized with the necessary firing units, sensors, target production section, and TA platoon to coordinate the counterfire fight. FABs can serve as the force field artillery HQ or the counterfire HQ for a division or corps. Army National Guard FABs are routinely assigned to support the divisions and corps as the counterfire HQ.
 7. Develop a sustainment and protection plan for all TA and attack/delivery capabilities. The execution of sustainment operations across all class of supply are critical to counterfire operations. CL V sustainment, ammunition, haul capability, triggers, RSR and CSR are crucial to the counterfire fight. Radar sections do not have the capability to provide force protection for themselves and firing units often need protection augmentation. A protection plan must be developed during MDMP to include engineer support, local force protection to secure movement along main supply and alternate supply routes, short-range air defense, cueing schedules, frequency management, and deception.

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 8. Communicate at distance using PACE plans, digital architecture, AFATDS database management, and liaison officers. When conducting counterfire in large-scale ground combat operations be prepared to operate in a degraded environment. Establish a PACE plan for the analog and digital architectures from sensor to shooter. AFATDS database must be verified and continuously updated to include; FSCMs, firing unit data, sensor data, targeting data, and communications architecture. Establish liaison officers at echelon and in adjacent units for cross boundary fires.
 9. Conduct tactical fire direction: Tactical fire direction and firing unit management is key to ensuring responsive fires. During MDMP and the targeting process develop target selection standards and attack guidance that enables rapid decision making and responsive fires. Plan for a dedicated all weather counterfire shooter using hot and cold status.
 10. Maximize radar foundational training strategy. Develop and rehearse the counterfire battle drill from sensor to shooter covering all elements of the PACE plan and all TA resources possible. Develop a weekly digital sustainment program that is focused and event driven at all echelons.
THE TARGETING PROCESS
3-30. The maneuver commander's FS requirements are continually identified, planned, and executed as part of the targeting process. Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities (JP 3-0). Targeting helps integrate and synchronize FS with other Army and joint functions (command and control [C2], intelligence, movement and maneuver, protection, sustainment, and information). The Army targeting process or joint targeting cycle coordinates and synchronizes fire support to shape enemy forces in the deep area to set conditions for subordinate units. Units use the Army targeting process or the joint targeting cycle as appropriate according to organizational echelon.
3-31. The Army targeting process and its steps of decide, detect, deliver, and assess is integrated with the operations process, joint targeting cycle, and the MDMP (See figure 3-1, and table 3-1 on pages 3-10 and 313). Targeting occurs continuously throughout an operation. Its steps mirror planning, preparing, executing, and assessing. Corps and below units normally utilize the Army targeting process. However, corps and divisions serving as the base HQ for a JTF or land component HQ employ joint planning and develop joint formatted plans and orders. Furthermore, Army units that require joint capabilities to conduct operations employ and interface with joint planning and processes, for example, the joint targeting cycle. Therefore, echelons above brigade Army commanders and staffs must understand and interface with the joint targeting cycle.

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Figure 3-1.The Army targeting decision process
3-32. The joint targeting cycle is a six-phase iterative process: commander's objectives, targeting guidance and intent, target development and prioritization, capabilities analysis, commander's decision and force assignment, mission planning and force execution, and assessment (see figure 3-2 on page 3-11). This process is not time-constrained nor rigidly sequential. Steps may occur concurrently, but it provides an essential framework to describe the steps that must be satisfied to conduct joint targeting successfully. To enable joint targeting the JFC establishes a joint targeting coordination board. A joint targeting coordination board is a group formed by the joint force commander to accomplish broad targeting oversight functions that may include, but are not limited to, coordinating targeting information; providing targeting guidance, synchronization, and priorities; and approving the joint integrated prioritized target list (JP 3-60). For more information on the Army targeting process and the joint targeting cycle see ATP 3-60 and JP 3-60.

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Figure 3-2. D3A Crosswalk and joint targeting process
3-33. The joint air tasking cycle begins with the JFC's objectives, incorporates guidance received during JFC and component coordination, and culminates with assessment of previous actions. The ATO (see figure 3-3 on page 3-12) articulates the tasking for joint air operations for a specific execution timeframe, normally 24 hours. The joint air tasking cycle is synchronized with the JFC's battle rhythm. The JAOC normally establishes a 72- to 96-hour ATO planning cycle. The battle rhythm articulates briefings, meetings, and report requirements. It provides suspense for targeting, friendly order of battle updates to produce the air battle plan that includes the ATO message and other products. The battle rhythm is essential to ensure information is available when and where required to provide products necessary for the synchronization of joint air operations with the JFC's concept of the operation and supporting other components' operations. Nonetheless, air operations must be responsive to a dynamic OE and the joint air tasking cycle must be flexible and capable of modification during ATO execution.

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Figure 3-3. Air tasking order cycle

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Table 3-1. Crosswalk of operations, joint targeting cycle, D3A, MDMP, and fire support task

Continuous Assessment

Operations Process
Plan

Joint Targeting Cycle
Commander’s Objectives, Targeting Guidance, and Intent

Target Development and Prioritization

Capabilities Analysis
Commander’s Decision and Force Assignment
Mission Planning and Force Execution

D3A

MDMP

Fire Support Task

Decide

Mission Analysis Perform target value analysis to develop high- value targets.
Provide fire support activities input to the commander’s targeting guidance and desired effects.

Designate potential high-payoff target lists.
Course of Action Deconflict and coordinate potential highDevelopment payoff targets.
Develop high-payoff target list.
Establish target selection standards.
Develop attack guidance matrix.
Develop fire support tasks.
Develop associated measures of performance and measures of effectiveness.

Course of Action Refine the high-payoff target list.

Analysis

Refine target selection standards.

Refine the attack guidance matrix.

Refine fire support tasks.

Refine associated

Measures of performance.

Measures of effectiveness.

Develop the target synchronization matrix.

Draft airspace control means requests.

Orders Production

Finalize the high-payoff target list.
Finalize target selection standards.
Finalize the attack guidance matrix.
Finalize the targeting synchronization matrix.
Finalize fire support tasks and execution matrices.
Finalize associated measures of performance and measures of effectiveness.
Submit information requirements to battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer.

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Table 3-1. Crosswalk of operations, joint targeting cycle, D3A, MDMP, and fire support task (continued)

Operations Process

Joint Targeting Cycle

Continuous Assess Assessment

Combat Assessment

D3A Detect

D3A – decide, Execute detect, deliver and
assess

MDMP–military decision-making
process

Deliver

MDMP

Fire Support Task

Orders Production

Execute Information Collection Plan.
Update information requirements as they are answered.
Update the high-payoff target list, attack guidance matrix, and targeting synchronization matrix.
Update fire support tasks.
Update associated measures of performance and measures of effectiveness.
Execute fire support tasks in accordance with the attack guidance matrix and the targeting synchronization matrix.

Prepare

Assess

Execute Information Collection Plan.
Assess task accomplishment (as determined by measures of performance).
Assess effects (as determined by measures of effectiveness).

FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING AND COORDINATION PRINCIPLES
3-34. The commander's ability to orchestrate and employ all available FS resources as a system and to integrate and synchronize fire support with the concept of operations results from an established process known as fire support planning and coordination. Fire support planning is the continuous process of analyzing, allocating, integrating, synchronizing, and scheduling fires to describe how the effects of fires facilitate maneuver force actions. Successful FS planning is the result of the FSCOORD's aggressive contribution to the maneuver commander's planning and decision-making process. Fire support coordination is the planning and executing of fire so targets are adequately covered by a suitable weapon or group of weapons (JP 3-09). Formal coordination binds FS resources together to create a unity of effort so that the multiple effects of each fire support asset across all domains are rapidly and continuously integrated and synchronized with the scheme of maneuver.
3-35. Fighting in LSCGO requires more careful FS planning because of the limited resources available to acquire and attack targets at extended ranges, and requires detailed coordination and employment of TA, attack, and assessment needs across all domains.
3-36. The FSCOORD utilizes the principles of fire support planning and coordination when advising the commander on the execution of fire support. These principles are extensions of our functions of fire support. The fire support planning and coordination principles are:
 Plan early and continuously. To effectively integrate fire support with the commander's concept of the operation, planning must begin when the commander states the mission and provides commander's guidance. The commander's guidance must be clear, concise and understood. Whenever commander's guidance is not understood during the planning of an operation, fire support planners should solicit that guidance from the commander. Planning is continuous and must keep pace with the dynamics of the operation.
 Ensure the continuous flow of targeting information. The FSCOORD ensures that TA requirements are identified and proactively focused on detecting HPTs within the desired formation. Ensure that target information from all sources are evaluated and routed to the appropriate attack means to include information from all echelons and from adjacent and supporting elements.

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 Consider the use of all lethal and nonlethal attack capabilities. The FSCOORD considers the full range of fires and other capabilities available at all levels. This includes coordinating for attack/delivery assets from available joint and multinational forces.
 Use the lowest echelon capable of furnishing effective support. FS is delivered by the lowest level that has the effective means to accomplish the mission. Planners decide what is needed and, if their assets are inadequate, coordinate for additional support from the appropriate echelon.
 Furnish the type of support requested. The fire support requester is in the best position to determine what is needed. However, the FSCOORD is in a position to weigh the request against the commander's guidance and the current and future needs for fire support. If a request for fire support is disapproved, the FSCOORD notifies all concerned. If possible, a new fire support means is substituted and all affected agencies must be informed.
 Use the most effective fire support attack/delivery system. The FSCOORD considers the nature and importance of the target, the engagement time window, the availability of attack assets, and the effects desired. In some circumstances, it may be necessary to sequence the attack by fixing the enemy with immediately available fire support assets while coordinating a subsequent, more detailed attack by more effective assets. An example of this is a situation in which air support is the most desired means but is about 20 minutes away. In this case, indirect-fire attack/delivery systems can fix the target until aircraft arrive.
 Avoid unnecessary duplication. A key task for the FSCOORD is to ensure that duplications of fire support requests are resolved when possible while the desired effects are achieved.
 Consider airspace coordination. The FSCOORD at the BCT and higher levels provides input concerning fire support use of airspace to those agencies and personnel engaged in airspace management to ensure that conflicts between surface-based indirect fire and air operations are minimized. For more information on airspace control see FM 3-52.
 Provide adequate support. The commander's guidance determines the amounts and types of FS needed for success. The FSCOORD must inform the maneuver commander when fire support requirements exceed capabilities.
 Provide for rapid and continuous coordination. The FSCOORD must know the capabilities of the various fire support attack/delivery systems and have immediate information on their availability. The FSCOORD must be aware of changes as they develop in order to attack both planned targets and targets of opportunity and to ensure that coordination channels are functioning smoothly. For rapid coordination, the following must be considered:  Exact locations of all friendly forces.  Scheme of maneuver of the supported force.  Supported commander's guidance and SOP.  Fire support coordinating measures in effect.  Rules of engagement.
 Provide for flexibility FS personnel anticipate and provide for future contingencies. On-order missions and careful positioning of assets give the commander the flexibility to respond to changing battlefield conditions.
 Use of FSCMs A fire support coordination measure is a measure employed by commanders to facilitate the rapid engagement of targets and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces (JP 3-0). They ensure that FS will not jeopardize troop safety, will interface with other fire support means, and will not disrupt adjacent unit operations. Any change to a FSCM must be communicated to all units affected. For more information on the use of FSCMs see appendix B.
3-37. In large-scale ground combat operations, FS planning is a top down process with bottom up refinement and continual coordination. FS planning at echelons above brigade involve deep operations, coordination of FS for future and current battles, and allocation of resources to subordinate units. At brigade and below levels, FSEs are more involved in the execution of the current battles and they fight within the parameters established by the higher headquarters and with the resources they have been allocated (see figure 3-4 on page 3-16).

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Figure 3-4. Planning and execution relationship
3-38. This is not meant to imply that brigade and battalion FSEs need not plan fires in advance of operations. They just don't plan as far into future battles as the FSEs at corps and division. In fact, the FS principle of use the lowest echelon capable of furnishing effective support, must always be considered by FS planners. FS planning, coordination, and execution should be done at the lowest level possible with the fewest number of elements necessary to accomplish the mission. For example:
 Division CFLs should be used sparingly and only to open up the division zone to fight the division deep battle. The division FSE is often too far removed to emplace, cancel, and move CFLs for the close fight.
 A FAB asset with a GSR mission to a DIVARTY makes positioning extremely difficult. A preferred method in the offense is to make that unit R with the necessary restrictions to facilitate future operations.
 SEAD should be planned and fired by the unit using the air support.
FRATRICIDE PREVENTION AND CLEARANCE OF FIRES PROCESSES AND PROCEDURES
3-39. Field Artillerymen must always maintain a mindset of violently applying lethal fires in accordance with the Law of War and established ROE. However, we must simultaneously reduce the risk that lethal fires cause unintentional killing and destruction to a prudent, acceptable level. This is done in a large part through fratricide prevention and clearance of fires processes.
3-40. Fratricide is the unintentional killing or wounding of friendly or neutral personnel by friendly firepower (ADP 3-37). Fratricide increases the possibility of mission failure, causes unacceptable loss of personnel and equipment, and erodes leadership effectiveness.
3-41. Minimizing exposure to potential fratricide is a command responsibility. Although the potential for fratricide is greatest during combat when chaos and confusion are at their greatest, it can also occur during training activities and combat simulations. Leaders must be knowledgeable of conditions that cause fratricide and implement fratricide countermeasures regardless of the environment. Efforts must be made to overcome potential hazards such as mistaken identity, navigation errors, or inaccurate or dysfunctional reporting procedures.
3-42. Although weapon systems can detect, engage, and destroy targets at maximum ranges, weapons sighting equipment does not have sufficiently high resolution of targets at extended ranges, especially under limited visibility conditions. Situational awareness helps overcome this deficiency in part and improve friendly capabilities to positively identify potential targets.

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FRATRICIDE COUNTERMEASURES
3-43. Fratricide countermeasures preserve and conserve the force. During the wargaming phase of the MDMP, commanders must identify control measures that reduce potential fratricide situations to an acceptable level. These must be incorporated into orders and plans to subordinate and adjacent commanders. In addition, rehearsals can be used to verify and modify the appropriateness of control measures and to ensure subordinates understand the operation. During execution, FSEs and FA CPs must track the location of friendly elements. This is especially critical during rapidly paced advances such as during attacks, exploitations, or pursuits. Specifics include:
 Individual errors are as simple as mistaken identity. If there is a possibility that enemy and friendly forces are intermixed in the target area, units must positively verify their identity after detection prior to engagement. Weapons errors include lapses in unit and individual discipline that allow powder charge errors, accidental discharges, incorrect gun data, and similar incidents. Unit errors include errors in the use of weapons-engagement areas or sectors or in using fire control measures.
 Strict adherence to procedural control measures such as permissive and restrictive maneuver and FSCMs. Fratricides can occur when FSCMs are not used, not disseminated, not tied to recognizable terrain features, or unknown.
 Dissemination and receipt of warnings and reports in sufficient time to allow for appropriate actions and synchronization.
 Preclusion of land navigation errors to prevent units from straying out of sector, reporting wrong locations, becoming disoriented, or unknowingly engaging targets out of sector.
 Adequate unit-leader experience. Ensure that junior leaders have the opportunity to gain the necessary experience and judgment to make rapid decisions under ambiguous, stressful conditions. Crews must be properly trained to increase the likelihood that they will not engage friendly forces.
 Special caution during periods of limited daytime visibility and at night.  Judicious use of materiel solutions, using active and passive measures to provide friendly forces
a unique signature to distinguish friend from foe. These may include marking devices and combat vehicle identification systems such as thermal beacons, thermal tape, and navigational aids.
CLEARANCE OF FIRES
3-44. The scheme of fires must also provide for clearance of fires. Clearance of fires is the process by which the supported commander ensures that fires or their effects will have no unintended consequences on friendly units or the scheme of maneuver. Clearance of fires ensures that fires attack enemy capabilities at the time, place, and with the effects the commander desires without resulting in casualties to friendly forces or noncombatants. It may be accomplished through a staff process and control measures, embedded in automated battle command systems, or through passive or active recognition systems. It remains a command responsibility at every level. General clearance of fires responsibilities are shown in (table 3-2 on page 3-18).

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Table 3-2. Clearance of fires responsibilities

Position
Maneuver Commander FSCOORD

FSE

CP

command post

FSCM

fire support coordination measure

FSCOORD fire support coordinator

FSE

fire support element

HQ

headquarters

ROE

rules of engagement

Responsibilities
Clears fires. Normally this is delegated to their CP and executed by the battle staff under the lead of the FSE.
Recommends clearance of fires guidelines to the commander.
Ensures friendly force safety through adherence to ROE, FSCMs and maneuver control measures. Use maneuver control measures and FSCMs to facilitate clearance of fires. Coordinate for clearance of fires across boundaries as required. Use automated systems to request clearance of fires. Warn controlling HQ if FSCMs or commander's attack guidance is about to be violated. Use rehearsals to validate responsibilities for clearance of fires.

3-45. During the planning process, staff officers must consider how to position sensors not only to gather intelligence but also to support information requirements that will assist in assessment and the clearance of fires. Although sensor placement may primarily focus on gathering enemy information, information collected on friendly forces is equally important.

3-46. Clear and understandable maneuver control measures are also a significant first step in the clearance of fires. Again, digital systems will enhance the accurate and rapid transmission of these measures. FSCMs not only assist in the integration of fires by facilitating the rapid engagement of targets. They also safeguard friendly forces.

3-47. Permissive measures (if positioned correctly and disseminated to all higher, adjacent and subordinate units), such as CFLs and free-fire areas, offer the opportunity for responsive fires on targets of opportunity. The size of restrictive measures (no fire areas, restrictive fire area [RFA]) should be verified to preclude unwarranted delays for otherwise responsive fires.

3-48. A procedure to consider in certain circumstances is pre-clearing fires. In some very specific instances, units can clear fires during the planning phase. Two such instances are: (1) fires into a planned CFFZ resulting from a radar acquisition from that planned CFFZ - the CFFZ must have been planned in advance and published in the radar deployment order; and (2) fires on a preplanned target, with a definable trigger, against a specific enemy, and according to the scheme of FS.

3-49. When fires are requested that are not pre-cleared or allowed by a permissive FSCM, they must be positively cleared. This procedure should be a battle drill in CPs. The best method is a redundant drill where a call for clearance is transmitted over two nets, the FS net and the maneuver net.

3-50. Positive clearance of fires is normally facilitated through prior planning, rehearsals, and careful placement of FSCMs. However, the clearance of targets of opportunity often presents special challenges. They must be delivered on short notice without undue delay in responsiveness and without jeopardizing friendly force security. For positive clearance of fires, the following should be obtained:
 Best available method of target location.  Positive identification of targets as enemy.  Eyes on target, if at all possible.  Clearance from appropriate external elements if target is outside unit boundaries.

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FIRE SUPPORT AND THE MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
3-51. The fire support staff and field artillery planners must strive to conduct parallel planning with the higher HQ staff. It is important that staff estimates, to include the intelligence estimate, sustainment estimate, engineer estimate, FS estimate, and the commander's estimate are updated prior to beginning MDMP and updated continuously throughout the process.

Receipt Of Mission

3-52. Upon receipt of mission (see table 3-3), the commander and staff consider implications of the new mission on the current fight and the friendly force current situation. After an initial assessment, FS assets and supporting FA units are alerted as soon as practicable to initiate their own parallel planning efforts (first warning order). FSEs, and FAIOs should also ensure that all IPB products to include likely enemy COAs are released to subordinate HQ as soon as cleared by the force G-2/S-2 to enhance parallel planning and IPB preparation at the lower levels of command. This warning order should provide subordinate FA elements the following as a minimum: FS planning begins with mission analysis. During mission analysis FS planners provide recommendations for possible FS task inputs based on the commander's guidance for FS and desired effects.
 Type of operation to be conducted.
 General outline of the AO.
 Any known or anticipated changes in the FA organization for combat.
 FSCMs, communications, and sustainment plan.
 Initial timelines.
3-53. The maneuver commander's planning guidance normally establishes options to be considered and essential tasks to be addressed. They may include enemy and friendly COAs to be pursued or rejected, associated priorities, and a time plan for mission planning, preparation, and execution. The accompanying commander's proposed intent provides the foundation for developing the eventual concept of operations. By outlining considerations for developing a scheme of maneuver, the commander also sets the stage for the allocation of forces and the design of supporting plans and annexes to include the FS and FA support plans.
Table 3-3. Fire support element during receipt of mission

MDMP STEP 1: RECEIPT OF MISSION

Staff Actions

Key FSE Actions

• Alert the staff and other key participants.

• Collect higher HQ OPLAN/OPORD, maps, current IPB, and fires running estimate.

• Gather the tools.
• Update running estimates.
• Conduct initial assessment.
• Issue the commander’s initial guidance.

• Update fires running estimate; gather facts from higher, lower, and adjacent FSEs, Fires Cells, and FA CPs.
• Provide FS input during formulation of the commander’s initial guidance and initial warning order.

• Issue the warning order.

CP

command post

FA

field artillery

FS

fire support

FSE

fire support element

HQ

headquarters

IPB

intelligence preparation of the battlefield

OPLAN operation plan

OPORD operation order

FSE Output
• Updated fires running estimate.
• Provide updated facts to higher, lower, and adjacent HQ.
• Fire support input to IPB and reconnaissance and surveillance tasking.

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Fire Support Running Estimate
3-54. The FS running estimate helps the commander build and maintain situational understanding and a realistic analysis of the effort allowing the commander to determine the effectiveness of attacks, revise support plans based on observed results, and re-prioritize the FS requirements. A running estimate is the continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the commander's intent and if planned future operations are supportable (ADP 5-0).
3-55. Any variable that could affect the mission is a factor. Before the estimate is started, available relevant information must be collected. Once this information has been assembled and the factors that could affect the plan have been identified, they should be listed and arranged in priority. The estimate includes analysis in the context of the commander's intent for the ongoing and future operations. For more information on running see ADP 5-0. The FSCOORD and FSE produce and maintain the FS running estimate and consider:
 The higher HQ specified and implied tasks.  The task organization of subordinate forces and their missions.  The capabilities and limitations including the status of FA weapons, FA ammunition, FA WLRs,
CAS, and other related fixed wing support, and any other possible asset from the holistic FS system at each echelon of command (SCAR/AI/SEAD).  The position of friendly and enemy fires capabilities.  FA and WLR survey support.  Established and recommended FSCMs.  The impact of rules of engagement and law of land warfare.  The impact of terrain, and weather on friendly and enemy forces (such as smoke, CAS, and AI.)  Information collection plan support and requirements.  Initial HPTL.  FS input to the IPB analysis.  COAs open to the enemy artillery commander, especially the most probable COA. These are
derived from the intelligence estimate and knowledge of enemy artillery doctrine.  The enemy dispositions (including frontage and depth), the degree of protection afforded the
enemy, objectives for subordinate forces or units, the number of phases, and the likely frontage and depth of the assault. These will affect the allocation of fire support resources to subordinate units.  The mobility of the enemy artillery and its speed of movement to contact and withdrawal.  The enemy EW situation.  The identification of high-payoff targets (derived from target value analysis and IPB).  The commander's information requirements (derived from the intelligence estimate).  The availability and condition of roads, trails, and likely position areas. This leads to the coordination of movement and position areas with the operations staff.  Ammunition consumption factors (type and quantity), pre-positioning requirements, and priority of sustainment.  The reliability and range of communications.  Essential fire support tasks (EFSTs) and purposes.  The time required for positioning and technical preparation to engage targets.  The time to be ready to support the operation.
Mission Analysis
3-56. Mission analysis by the FSCOORD and the FA staff, this analysis starts to circumscribe the direction of parallel planning activities. Mission analysis begins with a review of the commander's intent one and two levels higher and focuses on the rapid development of the maneuver's HQ IPB; identification of specified, implied, and essential tasks to include those for FA formations; an initial assessment of FS survivability and employment considerations; and a restatement of the mission. By providing the most current running staff

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estimates after the first warning order, FA CPs can assist in updating the maneuver HQ FS, graphics, facts and assumptions, and staff running estimates.
3-57. A thorough mission analysis is crucial to planning. Mission analysis (see table 3-4) consists of the tasks identified in ADP 5-0. Participation by FS personnel in the IPB is critical to shaping FS tasks and targeting decisions later in the MDMP.
Table 3-4. Fire support element during mission analysis

MDMP STEP 2: MISSION ANALYSIS

Staff Actions

Key FSE Actions

FSE Output

• Analyze the higher HQ plan or order.
• Perform intelligence preparation of the battlefield.
• Determine specified, implied, and essential tasks.
• Review available assets and identify resource shortfalls.
• Determine constraints.
• Identify critical facts and develop assumptions.
• Begin risk management.
• Develop initial commander’s critical information requirements and essential elements of friendly information.
• Determine initial reconnaissance and surveillance synchronization tools.
• Determine initial reconnaissance and surveillance plan.
• Update plan for the use of available time.
• Develop a proposed problem statement.
• Develop a proposed mission statement.
• Present the mission analysis briefing.
• Develop and issue initial commander’s intent.
• Develop and issue initial planning guidance.

• Understand next two higher HQ operations and fire support plans.
• Receive intelligence preparation of the battlefield products including enemy courses of action and highvalue targets by phase or critical events from G-2 and intelligence cell.
• Conduct FS running estimate; organize and analyze facts.
• Identify specified and implied tasks for FS.
• Translate status of FS assets and resources into fire support capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities.
• Analyze the effects of intelligence preparation of the battlefield on fire support.
• Develop draft FS tasks with task, purpose, and effect.
• Identify long-lead time fire support tasks.
• Update the FS running estimate.
• Provide input for restated mission, commander’s intent, guidance and warning including:
Desired effects from fire support.
Tentative high-payoff targets from among the high-value targets.
Attack guidance.
Allocation/positioning of fire support assets.
• Sustainment and protection for FS.

• FS system status.
• Specified targets from higher HQ FS intelligence preparation of the battlefield.
• FS asset range arc depictions.
• FS limitations and constrains.
• FS portion of the mission analysis briefing.
• FS related input to the commander’s critical information requirements.
• Initial fire support FS rehearsal guidance and times.
• Commander’s approval of initial FS tasks or modification.
• Update FS input to the warning order after the mission analysis brief.
• FS input to commander’s planning guidance.
• Updated FS-related operational timeline.

• Develop COA evaluation criteria.

• Issue a warning order.

COA course of action

FS

fire support

FSE fire support element

G-2 assistant chief of staff, intelligence

HQ

headquarters

MDMP military decision-making process

Mission Analysis Briefing
3-58. The mission analysis briefing informs the commander of the results of the staff's analysis of the situation. It helps the commander understand, visualize, and describe the operation. Throughout the mission analysis briefing, the commander, staff, and other unified action partners discuss the various facts and assumptions about the situation. Staff officers present a summary of their running estimates from their specific functional area and how their findings impact or are impacted by other areas. This helps the commander and staff as a whole to focus on the interrelationships among the mission variables and to develop

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a deeper understanding of the situation. The commander issues guidance to the staff for continued planning based on situational understanding gained from the mission analysis briefing.
3-59. A comprehensive mission analysis briefing helps the commander, staff, subordinates, and other unified action partners develop a shared understanding of the requirements of the upcoming operation. Time permitting, the staff briefs the commander on its mission analysis using the following outline:
 Mission and commander's intent of the HQ two echelons up.  Mission, commander's intent, and concept of operations of the HQ one echelon up.  A proposed problem statement.  A proposed mission statement.  Review of the commander's initial guidance.  Initial IPB products, including civil considerations that impact the conduct of operations.
 Weather.  Satellite communication impacts.  Specified, implied, and essential tasks.  Pertinent facts and assumptions.  Constraints.  Forces available and resource shortfalls.  Initial risk assessment.  Proposed themes and messages.  Proposed commander's critical information requirements and essential elements of friendly information.  Initial information collection plan.  Recommended timeline.  Recommended collaborative planning sessions.  Proposed evaluation criteria.
3-60. During the mission analysis briefing or shortly thereafter, commanders approve the mission statement and commander's critical information requirements. They then develop and issue their initial commander's intent and planning guidance.
COMMANDER'S INTENT AND CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
3-61. The commander's intent is a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end state that supports mission command, provides focus to the staff, and helps subordinate and supporting commanders act to achieve the commander's desired results without further orders, even when the operation does not unfold as planned (JP 3-0). FS personnel at all echelons must thoroughly understand the commander's intent and end state in order to design a FS and FA plan that best support the concept of operations and rapidly and effectively make adjustments to exploit advantages that arise. For an example of commander's intent (see table 3-5).

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Table 3-5. Nested Commanders’ intent examples at JFLCC and division levels

Joint Force Land Component Commander's Intent.

Purpose: Is to enable Atropian security and regional stability by defeating any ground forces Ariana employs to attack Atropia.

Key Tasks:

Project combat power into Atropia and rapidly maneuver 23rd Armored Division east of the Agshu River.

Deny enemy seizure of the Atropian capital and critical oil sites; and reinforce the Atropian defenses of their capital.

Defeat enemy forces by synchronizing Joint Fires against Arianan forces in depth and destroying the 17th and 18th DTGs, and the 21st Integrated Fires Command.

Protect long range fires platforms, WLRs, and attack aviation.

Endstate: Arianan aggression has been deterred or defeated and JFLCC forces restore the international border.

52nd Division Commander's Intent.

Purpose: The purpose of this operation is to enable partners, restore the sovereignty of Atropia, and defeat Arianan aggression.

Key Tasks:

Tempo: Anticipate transitions to synchronize fires, maneuver, and sustainment to rapidly cross the Agshu River, seize OBJ TEXAS, and destroy the 17th and 18th DTG.

Aggressive Reconnaissance: Employ heavy advanced guard to enable flexibility and mass combat power at the decisive point.

Fires: Maneuver to emplace fires forward and leverage information collection to detect and destroy division HPTs.

Protection: Disciplined and consistent use of tactical dispersion, camouflage, entrenchment, active patrolling and aggressive counter reconnaissance to protect the force.

Partnership: Partner with Atropian Security Forces to build the capacity for Atropia to exercise its authority within its boundaries.

Endstate:

Friendly.

52nd ID has seized OBJ DAKOTA, COLORADO, and TEXAS allowing the re-establishment of the International Border, creating a zone of separation.

52nd ID is partnered with Atropian forces securing major population centers and critical infrastructure.

Enemy.

17th and 18th DTGs destroyed and 19th DTG defeated. Remnants of OSC 2 have withdrawn from Atropia. 995th Commando BDE (SPF) is neutralized within Atropian borders.

Terrain. A zone of separation between Ariana and Atropia is established.

Civilian.

Conditions are set for the Government of Atropia to exercise its authority within its boundaries.

DTG division tactical group

HPT high-payoff target

ID

infantry division

JFLCC joint force land component commander

OBJ objective

OSC operational strategic corps

SPF special forces

WLR weapons locating radar

3-62. The concept of operations is a statement that directs the manner in which subordinate units cooperate to accomplish the mission and establish the sequence of actions the force will use to achieve the end state (ADP 5-0). The scheme of fires (see table 3-6 on page 3-24) is an integral part of the concept of operations. It describes how to integrate and synchronize the use of FS lethal and nonlethal capabilities to create desired effects and achieve the commander’ objectives.

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Table 3-6. Description of scheme of fires
Scheme of Fires. The scheme of fires describe how fires support the commander’s intent and concept of operations, and establish the priorities of fires to units for each phase of the operation. The scheme of fires must be concise but specific enough to clearly state what fires are to accomplish in the operation. The scheme of fires must answer the “who, what, when, where, and why” of the fires to be provided, but provide enough flexibility to allow subordinate commanders to determine the “how” to the maximum extent possible by ensuring necessary procedural and positive control. The scheme of fires may include a general narrative for the entire operation that should address the fire support task and purpose, allocation of assets, positioning guidance for fire support assets and observers, and attack guidance to include the entire scalable range of effects (lethal to nonlethal effects). Add subparagraphs addressing fire support tasks for each phase of the operation use the following format: task, purpose, execution, and assessment in matrix form. Refer to the base plan or order and Annex C (Operations) as required. (FM 6-0, Annex D)
Commander's Guidance for Fire Support
3-63. Commanders drive the operations process through understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading, and assessing operations (ADP 5-0). The supported commander must provide clear and concise guidance on effects expected from fires. Fire support personnel must thoroughly understand the commander's intent, scheme of maneuver, and guidance for fire support. Commanders must ensure fire support personnel understand the larger picture of the battle. It provides the staff and subordinate units with the general guidance and restrictions for the employment of fires, desired effects and the planning and execution of targeting functions. Commander's guidance for fire support must include the priority of fires. Priority of fires is the commander's guidance to the staff, subordinate commanders, fires planners, and supporting agencies to employ fires in accordance with the relative importance of a unit's mission. Mission orders for FA units should include the supported commander's intent, concept of operations, and priority of fires, fire support tasks, and coordinating instructions.
3-64. The commander's guidance for FS describes the desired effects to be generated by FS attack/delivery systems, both lethal and non-lethal. An effect is 1. The physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect. 2. The result, outcome, or consequence of an action. 3. A change to a condition, behavior, or degree of freedom (JP 3-0). Capabilities associated with one desired effect may also contribute to other desired effects. For example, delay can result from disrupting, diverting, or destroying enemy capabilities or targets.
3-65. The most important part of providing guidance for FS is that the FSCOORD and the commander have a shared understanding of the commander's visualization and description of what FS must accomplish in support of the concept of operations. Some common terms that commanders may use to describe the desired effects when providing their guidance for FS are listed below.
 Deceive in military deception are actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military, paramilitary, or violent extremist organization decision makers, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission (JP 3-13.4). FS supports military deception by misleading the enemy decision makers' understanding of friendly intent. This greatly improves the chances the enemy will assume risks that can expose the enemy to the effects of friendly fires and maneuver. For example preparation fire of a false landing zone may contribute to the belief a friendly attack is about to occur in one place when in fact it is about to occur in another. Deception fires are best employed to reinforce the pre-conceived notion of the enemy commander. Operations security is the foundation of deception. This includes the use of nets, camouflage, communications, and noise and light discipline.
 Defeat is to render a force incapable of achieving its objectives (ADP 3-0). The defeated force's commander is unwilling or unable to pursue that individual's adopted COA, thereby yielding to the friendly commander's will and can no longer interfere to a significant degree with the actions of friendly forces. Defeat can result from the use of force or the threat of its use (FM 3-90-1). Defeat manifests itself in some sort of physical action, such as mass surrenders, abandonment of positions, equipment and supplies, or retrograde operations. A commander can create different effects against an enemy to defeat that force. For example a commander's employment of field artillery fires to attack an enemy force may result in the enemy no longer having sufficient personnel, weapons systems, equipment, or supplies to carry out its mission. Likewise the delivery

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of massed, synchronized and intense fires can cause enemy personnel to lose the will to continue to fight.
 Degrade is to reduce the effectiveness or efficiency of a threat. Strategic effect terms, the standard dictionary definition applies.
 Delay is when a force under pressure trades space for time by slowing down the enemy's momentum and inflicting maximum damage on enemy forces without becoming decisively engaged (ADP 3-90). When enemy forces are delayed, friendly forces gain time. For delay to have a major impact the enemy must face urgent movement requirements or the delay must enhance the effect(s) of friendly operations. When delayed enemy forces mass behind a damaged route segment a more concentrated set of targets and a longer period of exposure to friendly fires results.
 Deny is task to hinder or prevent the enemy from using terrain, space, personnel, supplies, or facilities (ATP 3-21.20). An example of deny is to destroy the threats communications equipment as a means of denying his use of the EMS; however, the duration of denial will depend on the enemy's ability to reconstitute. Denial operations are actions to hinder or deny the enemy the use of space, personnel, supplies, or facilities (FM 3-90-1).
 Destroy is a tactical mission task that physically renders an enemy force combat-ineffective until it is reconstituted. Alternatively, to destroy a combat system is to damage it so badly that it cannot perform any function or be restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt. (FM 390-1).
 Destruction in the context of the computed effects of field artillery fires, destruction renders a target out of action permanently, or ineffective for a long period of time, producing 30percent casualties or materiel damage.
 Destruction fire is an element of the method of engagement portion of the call for fire requesting destruction fire delivered for the sole purpose of destroying materiel. (TC 3-09.81).
 Disrupt is a tactical mission task in which a commander integrates direct and indirect fires, terrain, and obstacles to upset an enemy's formation or tempo, interrupt the enemy's timetable, or cause enemy forces to commit prematurely or attack in a piecemeal fashion. (FM 3-90-1).
 Diversion is the act of drawing the attention and forces of an enemy from the point of the principal operation; an attack, alarm, or feint that diverts attention (JP 3-03). Diversion causes enemy forces to consume resources or capabilities critical to enemy operations in a way that is advantageous to friendly operations. Diversions draw the attention of enemy forces away from critical friendly operations and prevent enemy forces and their support resources from being employed for their intended purpose. Diversions can also cause more circuitous routing along lines of communication, resulting in delays for enemy forces. An option for field artillery employment in support of a commander's diversion is to use high explosives (HE) fires to encourage an enemy to adopt a different route.
 Interdiction is an action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy's military surface capability before it can be used effectively against friendly forces or to achieve enemy objectives (JP 3-03).
 Interdiction fires is employed to disrupt, delay, or destroy enemy forces. Interdiction fires create windows for friendly unit movement and maneuver.
 Isolate to separate a force from its sources of support in order to reduce its effectiveness and increase its vulnerability to defeat (ADP 3-0).
 Neutralization in the context of the computed effects of field artillery fires renders a target ineffective for a short period of time, producing 10-percent casualties or materiel damage.
 Neutralization fire is fire delivered to render the target ineffective or unusable.  Neutralize - A tactical mission task that results in rendering enemy personnel or materiel incapable
of interfering with a particular operation. (FM 3-90-1).
 Preparation fire is a brief, intense bombardment on selected targets or a prolonged effort over time covering a large number of targets. Commanders must be clear on what they hope to achieve by this sort of fire. The effectiveness of preparation fire varies with each situation; and its feasibility depends on such factors as surprise, deployment, ammunition supply, and type of weapons available. Preparation fire is planned by the commander planning the attack. Normally, fire begins before H-hour and may extend beyond it.

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 Counterpreparation fire is the intensive prearranged fire delivered when the imminence of the enemy attack is discovered. It is designed to break up enemy formations; disorganize the enemy's system of command, communications and observation; decrease effectiveness of artillery preparation; and impair the enemy's offensive spirit.
 Defensive fires is surface to surface indirect fires intended to disrupt discovered enemy preparations for an attack. The close defensive battle should start at the longest practicable range. The ideal defensive fire plan is one that disrupts the enemy's preparations to such an extent that the enemy cannot mount an assault. Defensive fire disrupts the enemy's preparations for an attack or a counterattack. It does this by striking him in his assembly areas; breaking up his attack formations; disorganizing his command, control, and communications; impairing his target acquisition efforts; and reducing his morale. Defensive fires are usually scheduled as on call.
 Suppress is a tactical mission task that results in temporary degradation of the performance of a force or weapons system below the level needed to accomplish the mission (FM 3-90-1).
 Suppression is a temporary or transient degradation by an opposing force of the performance of a weapons system below the level needed to fulfill its mission objectives. (JP 3-01). Suppression in the context of the computed effects of field artillery fires, renders a target ineffective for a short period of time producing at least 3-percent casualties or materiel damage.
 Suppressive fire are fires on or about a weapons system to degrade its performance below the level needed to fulfill its mission objectives during the conduct of the fires.
 Counterbattery fire is fire delivered for the purpose of destroying or neutralizing indirect fire weapon systems.
 Harassing fire is fire designed to disturb enemy troops, curtail movement.
3-66. The commander can also provide targeting restrictions as part of his guidance for FS support. Targeting restrictions fall into two categories-the NSL and the restricted target list:
 No-Strike List. The NSL is a list of objects or entities characterized as protected from the effects of military operations under international law and/or ROE. The NSL is not a target list. Deliberately engaging or not taking sufficient precaution to avoid these objects or entities may violate the law of war. (JP 3-09).
 Restricted Target List. The restricted target list is a list of valid military targets that could be on the joint integrated prioritized target list that have restrictions placed upon their engagement by the JFC or directed by higher authorities. (JP 3-09). Examples of possible restrictions are:  Limit collateral damage by a defined amount and do not strike during daytime.  Strike only with a certain weapon.
COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT
3-67. Simultaneously with the maneuver staff, fire support planners develop a fire support execution matrix in conjunction with the MDMP COA development, and HPT refinement (see table 3-7 for general considerations during COA Development). Once target selection standards, HPTs, and the attack guidance matrix are refined, FS planners develop EFSTs from the FS tasks identified during mission analysis. Once EFSTs are completed a FS execution matrix is finalized to create the FS plan. FA planners develop a FA support plan as an annex to the FS plan.

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Table 3-7. Fire support element during course of action development

MDMP STEP 3: COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT

Staff Actions

Key FSE Actions

FSE Output

 Assess relative combat power.
 Generate options.  Array forces.
 Develop a broad concept.  Assign HQ.  Develop COA statements and
sketches.
 Conduct a COA briefing.  Select or modify courses of
action for continued analysis.

 Assist G-2 and intelligence cell in conjunction with the G-3 in developing the information collection plan and its support for targeting.
 Determine where to find and attack adversary or enemy fire support formations.
 Identify high-payoff target in those formations.
 Refine FS tasks.
 Plan assessment for FS tasks, including measures of performance and measures of effectiveness. Quantify the execution for FS tasks.

 For each COA developed include−  Scheme of fires.  Initial FSCMs.  Draft high-payoff target list.  Target list worksheet.(digital or manual)  Draft FS execution matrix.  Target list/overlay.  Draft observer and TA plan.  Draft targeting synchronization matrix or
modified (high-payoff target list, target selection.  Target selection standards and attack guidance matrix).

 Analyze relative fires combat power.
 Ensure staff considers all fire support aspects of combat power.
 Develop scheme of fires for each COA and assess risk, including fratricide.
 Nominate high-payoff targets for each COA.
 Integrate CEMA and other nonlethal input.
 Array FS assets/resources needed to support each COA and propose generic FS organization for combat. Identify planned attack locations and sequence of attacks:
 Allocate assets to acquire targets.
 Allocate assets to attack targets.
 Apportion force protection for FS assets.

 Draft FS input to the unit airspace plan.
 Draft risk management plan.
 FS-related portions of reconnaissance and surveillance plan.
 Initial FS tasks and associated measures of performance and measures of effectiveness.
 Refined asset locations.
 Refined FSCMs.
 Draft Annex D, Fires.
 Begin request of assets for reconnaissance and surveillance, CAS, information operations and cyber electromagnetic activities.
 Determine radar positioning and sector search for all radars.
 Determine radar maintenance and cueing schedule.

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Table 3-7. Fire support element during course of action development (continued)

MDMP STEP 3: COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT

Staff Actions

Key FSE Actions

FSE Output

 Ensure FS is integrated with movement and maneuver and other warfighting functions.

 Integrate triggers with maneuver COA.

 Prepare scheme of fires for each COA and sketch for each COA.

CAS CEMA COA FS FSCM FSE G-2 G-3 MDMP TA

 Develop FSCMs.
close air support cyberspace electromagnetic activities course of action fire support fire support coordination measure fire support element assistant chief of staff, intelligence assistant chief of staff, operations military decision-making process target acquisition

Developing Essential Fire Support Tasks
3-68. The purpose of the EFSTs are to ensure that the maneuver commander's guidance for fires is accomplished. The audience for EFSTs is the maneuver commander and staff. The fire support tasks let the commander know that fires personnel understand and have specific tasks that accomplish the intent for fires. Fire support tasks drive the development of Annex D. The task describes what effects (for example, delay, disrupt, divert or destroy) fires must create on a target. The purpose describes why the task contributes to commander's objective. The effect quantifies successful accomplishment of the task. Once EFSTs are determined the FSCOORD directs the development of EFATs. For more information on the development of EFSTs and EFATs see annex A.

Force Protection
3-69. The MDMP is the initial point to apportion force protection assets for FS assets. This will allow the entire staff to be involved in how it affects the mission. When possible units should standardize force protection packages for planning purposes. Additionally, these attachments must be listed in coordinating instructions and specific tasks to subordinate units, not simply Annex D, for clarity and adherence to survivability standards. Table 3-8 is an example of force protection package minimums:
Table 3-8. Example of minimum force protection package for FA systems

Equipment
Weapons locating radar section
MLRS/HIMARS battalion Ammunition cache
HIMARS High Mobility Artillery Rocket System MLRS multiple launch rocket system

Force Protection Requirement
1 infantry squad or military police section (with transportation).
1 mechanized infantry platoon per battalion
1 infantry squad or military police section (with transportation).

Determine Evaluation Criteria
3-70. Before beginning the war game, FS planners develop evaluation criteria to measure the effectiveness and efficiency of the FS contributions for each COA. They use these to compare courses of action during COA comparison. These criteria are listed in the FS running estimate and become the outline for the COA

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analysis subparagraphs. The FSCOORD and FSE planning personnel develop the criteria for evaluating the effects of fires by using fires-specific criteria that allow them to explain the FS related advantages and disadvantages of each COA. Evaluation criteria that may help discriminate among various courses of action may include:
 Lead time required for implementing FS tasks.  The number of decision points that require FS.  The cost of fires versus the expected benefits.  The risk to friendly assets posed by enemy fires.

COURSE OF ACTION ANALYSIS

3-71. COA analysis or war gaming (see table 3-9) identifies which COA accomplishes the mission with minimum risk of casualties while positioning to retain the initiative. The war game provides detail and refinement, validates capabilities, and synchronizes the FS plan. During war gaming and COA comparison the FSCOORD and DFSCOORD must understand and be able to brief the commander on the strengths and weaknesses of each COA from a fire support perspective.
Table 3-9. Analysis of course of action (wargame)

MDMP STEP 4: COURSE OF ACTION ANALYSIS AND WARGAMING

Staff Actions

Key FSE Actions

FSE Output

 Gather the tools.
 List all friendly forces.
 List assumptions.
 List known critical events and decision points.
 Select the wargaming method.
 Select a technique to record and display results.
 Wargame the operation and assess the results.
 Conduct a war-game briefing (optional).

 Gather fire support running estimate, fire support portions of event templates, target value analysis results. See ATP 3-60.
 Confirm fire support assets for all courses of action.
 Validate fire support relevant facts and assumptions.
 Determine fire support tasks and the field artillery contribution to fire support tasks.
 Develop evaluation criteria to measure the effectiveness of the fire support contributions for each COA.

 Refined scheme of fires.
 Refined draft Annex D (FIRES) and appendices.
 Refined draft fire support execution matrix.
 Refined draft target list worksheet (automated or manual) and target overlay.
 Refined draft targeting synchronization matrix or modified targeting synchronization matrix (highpayoff target list, target selection standards, attack guidance matrix).

 Develop a fire support execution matrix for each COA.
 Provide likely adversary fire support actions to the G-2; determine where to find and attack enemy fire support capabilities.

 Refined draft FSCMs.
 Refined draft named areas of interest and target areas of interest.

 Ensure fire support is integrated into the commander’s emerging concept of operations throughout the war game.

 Formulate a list of advantages and disadvantages of each COA from fire support perspective.

 Identify synchronization requirements including modifications to FS coordination and airspace coordinating measures.

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Table 3-9. Analysis of course of action (wargame) (continued)

MDMP STEP 4: COURSE OF ACTION ANALYSIS AND WARGAMING

Staff Actions

Key FSE Actions

FSE Output

 Identify decision points, named areas of interest, decisive terrain and additional critical events and how these may influence positioning or posturing of FS assets.

 Identify high-value targets, high-payoff targets, the FS portion of event templates, and develop a draft highpayoff target list, target selection standards and attack guidance matrix.

 Integrate information operations and CEMA into these targeting products.

 Provide recommendations for the commander’s attack guidance.

 Actively participate in all phases of wargaming.

CEMA COA FS FSCM FSE G-2 MDMP

cyberspace electromagnetic activities course of action fire support fire support coordination measure fire support element assistant chief of staff, intelligence military decision-making process

COURSE OF ACTION COMPARISON
3-72. During COA comparison (see table 3-10), the corps/division staff compares feasible courses of action to identify the one with the highest probability of success against the most likely enemy COA and the most dangerous enemy COA. The staff evaluates the advantages and disadvantages of each COA and presents their findings. The staff outlines each COA in terms of the evaluation criteria established before war gaming and identifies the advantages and disadvantages of each with respect to the others. The FS staff records this analysis in paragraph three of the FS running estimate.
3-73. After the analysis, the G-3, G-2, and the FSCOORD compares strengths and weaknesses, highlights advantages and disadvantages from the perspective of the fires warfighting function and other warfighting functions. The staff assess risks and determine which COA promises to be most successful.

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Table 3-10. Course of action comparison

MDMP STEP 5: COURSE OF ACTION COMPARISON

Staff Actions

Key FSE Actions

FSE Output

 Conduct advantages and disadvantages analysis.
 Compare courses of action.
 Conduct a COA decision briefing.

 Participate with staff in comparing strengths, weaknesses, advantages, and disadvantages of FS for each COA.
 Update FS and informationrelated capabilities estimates.
 Brief results of FS analysis including best COA from FS perspective.
 Develop draft fires paragraphs and annexes to include EFSTs, FSEM, target list and overlay, TSM or modified (HPTL, TSS, AGM).
 Integrate information collection capabilities and CEMA input into targeting products.

 Final drafts of the:  Scheme of fires.  Annex D (FIRES) and
appendices.
 FSEM  Target list worksheet.  Target overlay  Observer plan  TSM or modified (HPTL, TSS,
and AGM).  FSEMs  NAIs and TAIs.  Airspace requirements and
associated recommended ACMs.

 Provide inputs to the information collection plan.

 Update FS running estimate.

 FSCOORD briefs FS plan for each COA.

ACM

airspace coordinating measure

AGM

attack guidance matrix

CEMA

cyberspace electromagnetic activities

COA

course of action

EFST

essential fire support task

FS

fire support

FSE

fire support element

FSCM

fire support coordination measure

FSCOORD fire support coordinator

FSEM

fire support execution matrix

HPTL

high-payoff target list

MDMP

military decision-making process

NAI

named area of interest

TAI

targeted area of interest

TSM

target synchronization matrix

TSS

target selection standards

COURSE OF ACTION APPROVAL
3-74. The inputs to COA approval and the following step, orders production, are the outputs of COA analysis and comparison. After completing the COA comparison, the corps/division staff identifies its preferred COA (see table 3-11 on page 3-32) and recommends it to commander. The FSCOORD translates the recommended COA into a FS recommendation for approval by the commander. The commander approves a COA (as presented, or with any directed modifications). It is a summary of the concept of operations, the scheme of fires, and associated FS tasks including:
 Priority of fires.  Allocation of FS resources.  FA organization for combat.  Command and support relationships.  Final HPTL, TSS, AGM, or if used the target synchronization matrix.

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Table 3-11. Course of action approval

MDMP STEP 6: COURSE OF ACTION APPROVAL

Staff Actions

Key FSE Actions

FSE Output

 Recommends a COA, usually in a decision briefing.
 The commander decides which COA to approve.
 The commander issues final planning guidance.
 Issues warning order to subordinate HQ.

 Assess implications and take actions as necessary to finalize selected scheme of fires including attendant HPTL, TSS, and AGM.
 Integrated information collection capabilities and CEMA input into these targeting products.
 Participates in COA approval briefing.
 Include scheme of fires and EFSTs.

 For the approved COA:  Refined scheme of fires.  Refined Annex D (FIRES) and
appendices.  FSEM.  Target list worksheet.  Target overlay.  Observer plan.  TSM or modified (HPTL, TSS,
and AGM).  FSEMs.

 The FSCOORD assists the commander in the development of the refined commander’s intent and planning guidance.

 NAIs and TAIs.
 Airspace requirements and associated recommended ACMs.

 Prepare FS portions of warning order including changes to CCIR, risk guidance, time sensitive reconnaissance tasks and EFSTs requiring early initiation.

 Prepare tentative FS portions of OPORD.

 Participate in rehearsals.

ACM AGM CCIR CEMA COA EFST FS FSCM FSCOORD FSE FSEMs HPTL MDMP NAI OPORD TAI TSM TSS

airspace coordinating measure attack guidance matrix commander’s critical information requirements cyberspace electromagnetic activities course of action essential fire support task fire support fire support coordination measures fire support coordinator fire support element fire support execution matrix high-payoff target list military decision-making process named area of interest operation order targeted area of interest target synchronization matrix target selection standards

3-75. During the staff's COA approval briefing to the corps/division commander, the FSCOORD briefs the scheme of fires as a part of each COA brief. The level of detail for this brief, including the portion briefed by the FSCOORD varies depending on the commander's level of participation in the war game and any specific briefing requirements that FSCOORD has issued. Normally, the FSCOORD covers the key details of the OPORD scheme of fires subparagraph 3e, emphasizing each EFST and any critical FS restrictions, limitations, or considerations pertinent to that COA. The FSE generally provide a sketch, map overlay, or terrain model to help convey details of the FS plan more clearly. If the FSCOORD perceives the need, they may request for additions or changes to the commander's intent or guidance for FS.

3-76. Once a COA is approved, the corps/division commander may refine the commander's intent and issue additional planning guidance. The FSCOORD and FSE prepare the FS portions of the order and participate in the required back-briefs and rehearsals. The warning order issued after COA approval contains information

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that executing units require to complete planning and preparation. Possible fires input to this warning order includes:
 FS contributions to the commander's intent or concept of operations.  Changes to the commander's critical information requirements.  Additional or modified risk guidance.  Time-sensitive reconnaissance tasks and EFSTs requiring early initiation.

DEVELOP THE FIRE SUPPORT PLAN AND ORDERS PRODUCTION
3-77. A fire support plan is a plan that addresses each means of fire support available and describes how Army indirect fires, joint fire support, and target acquisition are integrated with maneuver to facilitate operational success. An effective fire support plan clearly defines FS requirements and focuses on accomplishing the commander's FS tasks. The fire support plan is an integral part of the OPLAN or OPORD (see table 3-12) and is normally comprised of the fires paragraph in the OPLAN or OPORD and Annex D, FIRES (if used), and its associated appendices, tabs, or enclosures. The FS Plan reflects a detailed understanding of the commander's intent. The FS Plan also requires the expertise necessary to assemble, to coordinate, and to direct appropriate information collection, TA, and attack/delivery systems toward a common objective. Preparation for and execution of the plan also includes the responsibility for both technical and tactical rehearsals. The fire support plan is refined at the lowest level utilizing top down planning, and bottom up refinement.
Table 3-12. Orders production

MDMP STEP 7: ORDERS PRODUCTION

Staff Actions

Key FSE Actions

FSE Output

 Refines approved course action into clear concise concept of operations and required supporting information.
 Develops OPORD.
 Implements risk controls by coordinating and integrating them into appropriate paragraphs and graphics of the order.
 The commander reviews and approves order.
 Commander briefs subordinate commanders and staffs and conducts confirmation briefings.
 Implement hazard controls.

 Expand scheme of fires into full FS plan, reflecting current events, guidance and capabilities.
 Confirm specific:
 Command and support relationships.
 FA tactical mission assignments.
 HPTL, TSS, AGM, and execution responsibilities.
 Integrate information related capabilities and CEMA input into the targeting products.
 Information collection requirements.
 Assessment requirements.
 Assist subordinate staff/units with planning and coordination.

 Warning order to subordinate and supporting FS assets.
 Scheme of fires subparagraph 3e to OPORD.
 Annex D (FIRES) to division OPORD.
 FSEM.  EFSTs.  FS back brief.  Manage refinement.
 Conduct FS rehearsal.

 Present FS portions of OPLAN or OPORD briefing, including EFSTs.

AGM CEMA EFST FA FS FSE FSEM HPTL MDMP OPORD TSS

attack guidance matrix cyberspace electromagnetic activities essential fire support task field artillery fire support fire support element fire support execution matrix high-payoff target list military decision-making process operation order target selection standards

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SECTION III – FIRE SUPPORT PREPARATION
3-78. Fire support preparation facilitates and sustains transitions, including those to branches and sequels. Preparation requires action by fire support personnel at every echelon. Preparation consists of those activities performed by units and Soldiers to improve their ability to execute an operation (ADP 5-0). Preparation creates conditions that improve friendly forces' opportunities for success. It requires commander, staff, unit, and Soldier actions to ensure the force is trained, equipped, and ready to execute operations. Preparation activities help commanders, staffs, and Soldiers understand a situation and their roles in upcoming operations. Mission success depends as much on fire support preparation as on fire support planning and coordination.
REHEARSALS
"Unrehearsed plans are like brand new boots, you can use them, but you won't go far." Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower, March 1944.
3-79. Rehearsals allow leaders and their Soldiers to practice key aspects of the concept of operations. These actions help Soldiers orient themselves to their environment and other units before executing the operation. Rehearsals help Soldiers build a lasting mental picture of the sequence of key actions within the operation. A rehearsal is an effective organizational tool in gaining support, improving strategic and operational understanding, and fostering mutual trust within a commander's sphere of control. The commander and staff are able to visualize the terrain, and enemy and friendly units arranged by military action in time, space, and purpose. For more detailed information on rehearsals see FM 6-0.
3-80. Each rehearsal type achieves a different result and has a specific place in the preparation timeline. The four types of rehearsals are the:
 Backbrief.  Combined arms rehearsal.  Support rehearsal.  Battle drill or SOP rehearsal.  Conduct CP displacement rehearsals.
3-81. Fire support personnel are involved in every type of rehearsal. Multiple rehearsals ensure that maximum integration and synchronization in supporting the scheme of maneuver with fires. When time is limited, the number and scope of rehearsals are reduced. In these cases, rehearsals may focus on FS tasks or particular aspects of the maneuver plan and the associated FS plan. The FS rehearsal, in coordination with the FA technical rehearsal, should be conducted prior to the combined arms rehearsal and if possible, include members of the operations and intelligence staff and other members of the targeting team.
3-82. Rehearsals are based on a completed OPORD. Units may rehearse a contingency plan to prepare for an anticipated deployment. The rehearsal is a coordination event, not an analysis. It does not replace wargaming. Commanders avoid making major changes to OPORDs during rehearsals. They make only those changes essential to mission success and risk mitigation. Risk management is the process to identify, assess, and control risks and make decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits (JP 3-0). For more information on risk management see ATP 5-19.
BACKBRIEF
3-83. A backbrief is a briefing by subordinates to the commander to review how subordinates intend to accomplish their mission (FM 6-0). These briefs allow commanders to clarify the commander's intent early in subordinate planning. Commanders use the backbrief to identify any problems in the concept of operations and to increase understanding and synchronization through the passage of information. At a minimum the FSCOORD should cover the following items during the backbrief:
 Commander's guidance for fires.  Initial scheme of fires.  Priorities of fires by phase.  High-payoff targets.

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 Initial FSCM recommendations.  Command and support relationship recommendations.
3-84. Backbriefs should not be confused with confirmation briefs that commanders use immediately after issuing a plan to determine how well a subordinate commander understands the mission, task, and/or directive. It differs from a confirmation brief in that leaders are given time to complete their plan rather than briefing the commander immediately following receipt of an order. Typically, the confirmation brief occurs at the conclusion of the orders or OPLAN brief when all subordinate commanders are available. The commander adjourns the session only when they are confident their subordinates understand their mission, and assigned task and purpose, the commander's intent and the higher commander's intent, the concept of operation, scheme of maneuver, priorities, the time plan, and type and location of rehearsals.
COMBINED ARMS REHEARSAL
3-85. The fire support plan must be integrated into the combined arms rehearsal. Key fire support personnel representing or supporting the fire support system at the combined arms include the FSCOORD, DFSCOORD, DIVARTY or FAB FSE, JAGIC personnel, BCT FSOs (as available), ADAM and brigade aviation element, ALO, weather officer, subordinate and supporting unit FSE representatives, SOF representative, targeting officers, chief of staff, FAB and DIVARTY S-2s, S-3s, S-4s, S-6s. Assigned and attached combined arms units that comprise or support the command will participate when possible. Normally, the chief of staff directs the rehearsal using a synchronization matrix or execution checklist; the FSCOORD or DFSCOORD, should use the fire support execution matrix.
3-86. Usually, the combined arms rehearsal takes place after the Joint Targeting Cycle and Army Targeting Process have commenced. Much of the FS Plan for the operation will be refined based on the ongoing Targeting Cycle to include HPTs, TAIs, ISR plan and allocation, AI nominations, CAS allocations, Priorities of Fire, FSCMS ACMs, and overall scheme of fires.
3-87. For each phase or time period discussed at the combined arms rehearsal, the FSCOORD should ensure the following are integrated:
 EFSTs.  HPTs and TAIs.  Trigger points for each target and the target engagement criteria.  Target Acquisition resources and allocation for each HPT/TAI.  Communications plan for each TA resource.  Attack guidance, such as unit(s) to fire, shell and fuze combination, and number of volleys,
specified for each target.  Alternate method of attack when GPS enabled weapons are primary and the area becomes denied,
degraded, and disrupted.  FSCMs and ACMs including triggers for moving FSCMs.  Priorities of fire.  Fire support attack/delivery systems (lethal and nonlethal) available and allocated for each
HPT/TAI.  Consolidation Area FS plan.  CAS, AI, and SCAR apportionment, allocation, and request processes.
FIRE SUPPORT REHEARSAL
3-88. The FS rehearsal is a support rehearsal. It should occur before the combined arms rehearsal and ensure the integration and synchronization of the fire support effort with the intelligence collection plan and the maneuver plan. As with the combined arms rehearsal, the FS rehearsal likely occurs after the initiation of the targeting process. Fire support rehearsals are more detailed than the combined arms rehearsal and serve to refine the fire support plan and fire support execution matrix with the maneuver and prove the feasibility of executing fire support tasks. If it is held before the combined arms rehearsal, changes from the combined arms rehearsal may require a second FS rehearsal. A fire support rehearsal may include all key maneuver and

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fire support personnel involved in planning and executing the fire support plan, to include the supporting FA unit CPs, the corps or division commander or his deputies, FSCOORD, DFSCOORD, JAGIC personnel, chief of staff, the G-3, the G-2, the G-4, the G-6, staff judge advocate (SJA), targeting officer, ALO, TACP representative, the FAIO, and liaison officers. There is also a requirement for SOF representation, FSOs, and unified action partners as necessary. For more information on FS rehearsals see FM 6-0 and ATP 3-09.23, ATP 3-09.42, ATP 3-09.90.
3-89. The FSCOORD ensures the following are discussed during the FS rehearsal:  A clear understanding of the maneuver commander's intent and guidance for FS.  Establishment of TAIs, named area of interests (NAI)s, and HPTs that allow for targeting against specific enemy formations in accordance with the commander's targeting guidance (intelligence collection plan).  Allocated primary and alternate TA and FS attack and delivery capabilities for each TA.  A clear understanding of the scheme of fires.  A clear understanding of the ROE and procedures for clearing fires.  PACE plan.  Alternate attack systems to be used in the engagement of specific targets.  Positioning of munitions, observers, and weapon systems.  Execution of fire support tasks.  Fire support execution matrix.  Practicality and functionality of FSCMs.  Purpose and triggers of FSCMs.  Clear understanding of attack guidance matrix and target selection standards.  Priority of fires.  FS procedures in the consolidation area.
FIELD ARTILLERY TACTICAL REHEARSALS
3-90. FA tactical rehearsals are support rehearsals that ensure the FA unit OPLAN or OPORD properly plan and synchronize FA tactical fire control. An FA tactical rehearsal may include the FSCOORD/FA Commander, supporting and subordinate firing unit commanders (and staffs), FSOs, key firing unit staff to include the S-2, S-3, S-4, S-6, SJA, Fire Control and Fire Direction personnel, select observers, and the radar platoon leader. These personnel must be thoroughly familiar with clearance of fires procedures, restrictive and permissive FSCMs, FA target lists and schedules, trigger points and events, movement and displacement plans, combat service support provisions, and C2, and communications handover requirements. The FA Commander also ensures the following are discussed during the FA tactical rehearsal:
 Scheme of maneuver, friendly, and enemy actions that initiate each phase.  Enemy situation.  Concept of operations.  Commander's guidance for fires.  FS tasks.  FA organization for combat and command and support relationships.  RSR and CSR implications.  Tactical execution of FA essential tasks, the FA support matrix, schedules of fires, and schedules
of targets - primary and backup methods.  Tactical fire control and mission routing procedures.  Clearance of fires requirements and procedures.  Commander's attack criteria and priority of fires considerations.  Effectiveness of FA movement and positioning plans, primary and alternate, for firing, control,
and sustainment elements.  Targeting, counterfire, and suppression enemy air defense (SEAD) operations.  WLR positions and zones.

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 Mutual support and continuity operations.  Communications requirements - use and positioning of retransmission equipment, use of voice
versus digital. Utilizing a PACE plan.  Survey requirements.  Timing and synchronization of FA efforts with maneuver and airspace operations.  Clear understanding of ROE and procedures for clearing fires.  MET requirements.  Resupply triggers, especially for low-density munitions.  CBRN decontamination locations.  Protection requirements for FA units (infantry, ADA, engineer, military police).  Ensure protection battle drills are developed and rehearsed to account for reaction to enemy air,
ground, CBRN, indirect fire, jamming, or CEMA attacks.  Reconstitution procedures.
FIELD ARTILLERY TECHNICAL REHEARSALS
3-91. FA technical rehearsals are support rehearsals that ensure the supported higher HQ' fire support plan will be executed by the FSEs, fire control elements, the JAGIC, and subordinate FA unit's OPLAN or OPORD properly addresses FA technical fire direction and exercise the technical fire direction process. It is a network rehearsal technique. FA technical rehearsals focus include:
 Technical execution of FA essential tasks and the FA support matrix - digital links and primary and backup methods. Integration of voice and digital operations. Rehearsal of backups includes evaluation of reactions to catastrophic loss of digital or voice capability.
 Integration of tactical and technical fire control processes and computation of firing solutions, to include the communication and interaction among the FSEs, fire direction, and firing elements.
 Identification of technical fire direction issues - site to crest, high-angle fire, minimum safe distance, target, ammunition, range, FSCM and ACM conflicts.
 Digital database verification - setup, communications, positions, FSCMs, ACMs, target and attack guidance, mission routing and intervention points, target list, and scheduling data.
 Digital continuity of operations - actions for minor and catastrophic failure.  Digital interface requirements -fire direction system, digital version differences, and any other
digital systems, including Air Force, Navy, Marine, and multinational unified action partners.  Technical rehearsal of the echelons above brigade TA capability sensor-to-shooter links.
3-92. Safeguards must be taken to prevent live rounds from being fired at technical rehearsal targets while maintaining the capability to react to real threats. Units must retain the ability to terminate or postpone rehearsals instantly when an actual fire mission needs to be processed.
FIRE SUPPORT BATTLE DRILL OR STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES REHEARSALS
3-93. FS related battle drills or SOPs should be rehearsed either independent from the above rehearsals or preferably, integrated as vignettes into the combined arms rehearsal and FS Rehearsal. Examples include:
 Clearance of fires (air and ground).  Cross boundary fires.  Unplanned SCAR procedure and coordinated attack.  Counterfire.  FSCM movement triggers.  Reconstitution operations.
SECTION IV – FIRE SUPPORT EXECUTION
3-94. FS execution begins when the maneuver commander issues the execute order for the operation to commence and continues until the operation is terminated or the mission is accomplished. FSCOORDs and

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their staffs simultaneously support the maneuver commander's plan while continuing the planning process for subsequent operations.
PRINCIPLES OF FIRE SUPPORT EXECUTION
3-95. The FSCOORD uses the principles of FS execution to anticipate the dynamics of large-scale ground combat operations, maintain situational awareness of the OE, and leverage interoperable FS C2 systems and attack/delivery capabilities. FS planners utilize the memory aid AWIFM-N to remember the FS execution principles and communicate their status to the maneuver commander:
 Adequate Fire Support for the Committed Units. FS personnel use the allocation of CAS, attack aviation and nonlethal capabilities to ensure adequate FS for committed units. In large-scale ground combat operations, the minimum adequate FA support for committed units is considered to be one FA BN in DS of each committed brigade. In no instance can there be more than one FA unit in DS of a maneuver unit.
 Weight to the decisive operation or main effort. The decisive operation is the operation directly accomplishes the mission (ADP 3-0). The main effort is a designated subordinate unit whose mission at a given point in time is most critical to overall mission success (ADP 3-0). The purpose for weighting the decisive operation or main effort is to concentrate the effects of combat power at the most advantageous place and time. The main effort or the decisive operation can be weighted in a variety of ways. The main effort or the decisive operation can be weighted in a variety of ways with FS:
 Allocation of additional lethal and nonlethal FS attack/delivery systems.  Command and support relationships designated to expedite execution of attack.  Ammunition allocation.  Focused TA assets.  Priorities of fires.  Immediately available fire support for the commander to influence the operation. This can be
accomplished through proper allocation of CAS, armed UAS, and attack aviation retained by the appropriate commander. Sufficient FS resources to include FA are normally retained under centralized control to concentrate fires at the decisive place and time. Establish FA support relationships of GS and GSR (discussed in Chapter 4) to enhance flexibility and facilitate the ability to provide immediately responsive fires. The maneuver commander lifts or shifts the priority of fires to exploit opportunities as they are presented. This is essential to ensure success in the face of unforeseen events.  Facilitate future operations. To ensure smooth transition from one phase of an operation to another during execution and planning. This principle can be implemented through the assignment of command and support relationships, positioning of artillery, positioning of ammunition, and positioning of TA assets. The assignment of an on-order mission or command and support relationship allows a unit to anticipate FS attack/delivery system support need in a future situation. Applying limitations on ammunition expenditure in an earlier phase of an operation in order to support the future decisive operation is another way of facilitating future operations.  Maximum feasible centralized control. The optimum degree of centralized control varies with each tactical situation. A higher degree of centralized control may be appropriate in a defensive situation, since the enemy has the initiative and it is difficult to accurately predict where and when they will attack. The FSCOORD must anticipate and plan for the transition to offensive operations for a lesser degree of centralized control because the supported force has the initiative.  Never leave artillery in reserve. In large-scale ground combat operations, commanders (advised by their FSCOORDs) ensure FA units (MLRS, HIMARS, and cannons) always remain in the fight. This is accomplished by continuously adapting command and support relationships and also by continuously repositioning fires capabilities to create desired effects. Refer to the principle of "facilitate future operations" when applying this execution principle.

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INTEGRATION OF FIRE SUPPORT AND AIRSPACE CONTROL DURING EXECUTION
3-96. Airspace control is the capabilities and procedures used to increase operational effectiveness by promoting the safe, efficient, and flexible use of airspace (JP 3-52). The methods of airspace control vary from positive control of all air assets in an airspace control area to procedural control of all such assets, or any effective combination of the two, depending on the operation. Procedural control overcomes positive control and identification shortcomings. It relies on techniques such as segmenting airspace by volume, or time, or using weapon control statuses. Procedural techniques are usually more restrictive than positive techniques, but are less vulnerable to degradation from electronic or physical attack. Army forces use airspace over an AO to collect information, conduct air operations, deliver direct and indirect fires, conduct air and missile defense and conduct sustainment. Fires should be cleared with other airspace users.
3-97. Army components of the theater air-ground system (see ATP 3-52.2[FM 3-52.2]/MCRP 3-25F/NTTP 3-56.2/AFTTP 3-2.17), who collectively coordinate and integrate airspace use and are organic to Army brigades and higher are described chapter 2 and, include:
 Airspace Elements.
 JAGICs.
 FSEs.
 ADAM cells.
 Brigade aviation elements.
 Air and missile defense cells.
 BCDs.
4-98. Airspace elements do not routinely manage the flight path or trajectory of individual airspace users. Rather, airspace elements integrate airspace use for flight paths and trajectories in planning and execution to manage risk. When two or more airspace users conflict, the airspace elements direct changes in flight path of manned or unmanned aircraft, or coordinate with the FSE to alter the trajectory or timing of fires. In some cases, the re-routing of aircraft flight paths is appropriate to accommodate the delivery of fires. These changes are based on the commanders' mission priorities and risk guidance. Pilots, UAS operators, and weapon system controllers (FSE, FDC) still maintain the responsibility to make the directed changes to their flight path or trajectory. See FM 3-52. It is important for the operational planners to account for airspace user risk and weight the cost of positive control. This includes moving an UAS to execute a priority one fire mission (due to a violation of a critical friendly zone [CFZ]). Staffs need to identify this risk during COA development and apply mitigation techniques to include the use of integrating ACMs and FSCMs from position area for artillery to TAIs. This reduces risk to airspace users and communicates the agreed to level of risk in the maneuver plan.
3-99. The FSE coordinates FSCMs with ACMs through close interface with airspace elements and the TACP. The airspace element works with the FSE to integrate FSCMs with the airspace plan. The airspace element and the FSE review the ACO to ensure integration between fire support coordination measures and ACMs. FSCMs are normally sent to higher, lower, and adjacent HQ through fire support channels. In some cases, both the FSE and the airspace element send related control or coordination measures through their respective channels. The airspace element and the FSE ensure the SOPs and the airspace control annexes address the procedures for forwarding FSCMs and associated ACMs through appropriate coordination channels. The airspace element and the FSE review the ACO to ensure that ACMs avoids interfering with fires. If a conflict exists between the fire support plan and the ACO, the airspace element coordinates with the higher airspace elements to correct or modify the appropriate airspace coordinating measure.
3-100. Army planners at the senior tactical and operational levels must actively assist in the development of the airspace control plan. This is critical if the divisions intend to request the authority to control divisionassigned airspace using the JAGIC technique. Division-assigned airspace is a volume of airspace in which the airspace control authority has delegated the responsibility for control of that volume, in accordance with the airspace control plan and ACO, to the division. Division-assigned airspace is typically between the lateral boundaries of the division's AO, and up to the coordinating altitude. A JAGIC enabled division is suitably manned and equipped to procedurally control the tactical airspace over the division AO up to the coordinating altitude. Using planning data from the fires and aviation planners Army airspace planners can integrate Army

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airspace requirements into the overall airspace control plan. Integrated planning ensures that the location and altitude of key ACMs, that define division assigned airspace such as the coordinating altitude, balance both air component and Army force requirements for airspace. Fires planning data would include planned field artillery positions, max ordinate for artillery, mortar, rocket and missile systems, planned target locations, primary counter fire weapon system and units, and GS artillery weapon systems.
SECTION V – FIRE SUPPORT ASSESSMENT
3-101. Assessment is a continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing capabilities during military operations (JP 3-0). It is also used to determine progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective. Assessment involves continuously monitoring the situation and evaluating progress of an operation. Assessment precedes and guides the other activities of the operations process and concludes each operation or phase of an operation. However, the focus of assessment differs during planning, preparation, and execution. During planning, assessment focuses on gathering information to understand the current situation and developing an assessment plan. During preparation, assessment focuses on monitoring the progress of readiness to execute the operation and helps to refine the plan. Continuous assessment during execution is essential to adjusting operations based on changes in the situation. Assessment during execution involves a deliberate comparison of forecasted outcomes to actual events, using criterion to judge operational progress toward success.
3-102. Assessment is commander-centric. Commanders maintain a personal sense of the progress of the operation, shaped by conversations with senior and subordinate commanders and battlefield circulation. Operation assessment complements the commander's awareness by methodically identifying changes in the OE, identifying and analyzing risks and opportunities, and formally providing recommendations to improve progress toward mission accomplishment. Assessment should be integrated into the organization's planning and operations battle rhythm to best support the commander's decision cycle.
3-103. As an essential part of the overall operation assessment, the staff will assess FS. Staffs should assess how effectively the joint FS system supports forces in contact, supports the concept of operations, and associated FS plan, synchronizes FS, and sustains/protects the FS system. Positive indicators include a continuous flow of targeting information up and down the chain of command; availability of capabilities that can create both lethal and nonlethal effects; access to the requested type of FS; consistent use of the most effective FS; patterns of avoiding unnecessary duplication; civilian casualties and collateral damage; efficient use of airspace; and prompt fire support for troops in contact, along with rapid coordination methods. Negative indicators include insufficient creation of effects or achievement of objectives, patterns of friendly fire incidents, or unanticipated or unacceptable amounts of civilian casualties or collateral damage.
3-104. Assessment Indicators. The staff should identify the specific pieces of information needed to infer changes in the OE supporting them. These pieces of information are commonly referred to as indicators. Indicators are relevant, observable or collectible, responsive, and resourced. Assessment plans should include both quantitative and qualitative indicators. An example of a fire support assessment indicator could be the speed with which important information is communicated to, and acknowledged by, elements of the FS system.
3-105. Operation assessments are an integral part of planning and execution of any operation, fulfilling the requirement to identify and analyze changes in the OE and to determine the progress of the operation. Assessments involve the entire staff and other sources such as higher and subordinate HQ, interagency and multinational unified action partners, and other stakeholders. They provide perspective, insight, and the opportunity to correct, adapt, and refine planning and execution to make military operations more effective. Operation assessment applies to all levels of warfare and during all military operations. An operation assessment is a continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing capabilities during military operations in achieving stated objectives (JP 5-0).
3-106. Ultimately, operation assessment is a process that measures progress toward mission accomplishment. The commander may direct the formation of a cell, whose primary function is to develop and execute the assessment plan and to conduct assessments. The assessment cell is a cross-functional organization with representatives from all staff sections, the SJA, subordinate units, and multinational and interagency unified action partners. The assessment cell operates during both planning and execution phases

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of an operation. FS may have a subordinate assessment team or working group that feeds the command's assessment cell. For detailed example of developing and executing a FS assessment plan, refer to JP 3-09.
3-107. Combat Assessment. Combat assessment is the fourth phase of the Army targeting process decide, detect, deliver, and assess, and the sixth phase of the joint targeting process. It is conducted at all levels of warfare. Combat assessment evaluates the results of weapons and target engagement and thus provides data for fires and the Army and joint targeting processes at all levels. Combat assessment is composed of three related elements: BDA, MEA, and reattack recommendation. Combat assessment is the determination of the overall effectiveness of force employment during military operations (JP 3-60). Combat assessment is composed of three major components: (a) battle damage assessment; (b) MEA; and (c) reattack recommendation.
3-108. BDA is an element of combat assessment and is the estimate of target damage or effect, which is based on physical damage assessment, change assessment, and functional damage assessment, as well as target system assessment, resulting from target engagement.
3-109. MEA is conducted concurrently and interactively with BDA and is the assessment of the military force applied in terms of the weapon system and munitions effectiveness to determine and recommend any required changes to the methodology, tactics, weapon system, munitions, fuzing, and/or weapon delivery parameters to increase force effectiveness. MEA is primarily an operations responsibility, with support from intelligence as documented in the MEA concept of the operation.
3-110. Reattack recommendation is an assessment derived from the results of BDA and MEA that provides the commander systematic advice on reattack of targets and further target selection to achieve objectives. The reattack recommendation is a combined operations and intelligence function. Refer to ATP 3-60 and JP 3-60, for further information on combat assessment.

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Chapter 4
Field Artillery Operations
This chapter provides a brief overview of the FA and its role and employment in largescale ground combat operations. Section I describes the role of the FA. Section II covers FA organizations at echelons above brigade Section III covers FA capabilities in depth, Section IV covers FA organization for combat, Section V discusses key considerations for combat and Section VI covers fire direction.
The Guns, Thank God, The Guns. . .
– Rudyard KiplingChapter Intro
SECTION I – THE ROLE OF THE FIELD ARTILLERY
4-1. The role of the FA is to suppress, neutralize, or destroy the enemy by cannon, rocket, and missile fire and to integrate and synchronize all FS assets into operations.
4-2. The FA, as an integral part of the FS system, is responsible for participating in the planning, preparation, and execution of lethal and nonlethal FA fires delivered by FA cannons, rockets, and missiles at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. This often includes simultaneous FA fires in support of decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations, including counterfires. Deep fires, beyond the boundaries of tactical operations under joint force control, may involve the delivery of operational-level fires directly supporting the JFCs campaign plan. Such fires may have potential strategic effects.
4-3. Field artillery contributes to unified land operations by massing fires in space and time on single or multiple targets with precision, near-precision, and area fire capabilities. The synchronized use of massed or selectively applied FA fires in support of simultaneous decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations is intended to weaken the enemy at all echelons and deny them the opportunity to hide or rest. FA can rapidly shift fires throughout the AO in support of the scheme of maneuver, and to counter unforeseen enemy reaction to achieve the maneuver commander's desired effects. FA cannons are classified according to caliber as millimeter (mm):
 Light - 120-mm and less.  Medium - 121 to 160-mm.  Heavy - 161 to 210-mm.  Very heavy - greater than 210-mm.  Rockets - 298-mm.  Missiles - 607-mm.
4-4. FA is the maneuver commander's principal means for providing continuous and responsive indirect fires in support of large-scale ground combat operations. It can achieve surprise with the instantaneous delivery of high volumes of fire without warning. As such, it is the most potent and responsive, 24-hour, all weather combat multiplier available to maneuver commanders.
4-5. Organic, assigned, attached, or placed under the operational control (OPCON) FA delivery assets include cannon, rocket, missile and hypersonic systems that range from tactical to strategic areas. FA provides continuously available fires under all weather conditions and in all types of terrain. FA can shift and mass fires rapidly without having to displace.
4-6. FA limitations include a firing signature that makes firing units vulnerable to detection by enemy target acquisition assets, limited self-defense capability against ground and air attacks, and limited ability to engage moving targets.

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4-7. Field artillerymen, from company FIST through fires commands, integrate all means of FS – FA, mortars, CEMA, and joint fires. FA personnel integrate and synchronize FS within the commander's scheme of maneuver.
4-8. FA supports ground and air operations by attacking the enemy force throughout the depth of its formations and provides specific target engagement such as SEAD. FA fires can provide simultaneous precision strikes of targets at long ranges that other means cannot attack without significant risk. Strike is an attack to damage or destroy an objective or a capability (JP 3-0). FAs ability to quickly attack enemy forces on key terrain, flanks, and in dead space, enables the maneuver commander to economize and concentrate to exploit advantages that arise.
4-9. As an element of the FS system TA is key to FA effectively providing timely and accurate artillery fires. FA specific TA is accomplished by FOs and WLRs. In addition, maneuver commanders must also integrate maneuver, UAS, other joint and national collection assets into the information collection plan.
SECTION II – FIELD ARTILLERY ORGANIZATIONS AT ECHELONS ABOVE BRIGADE
4-10. To meet the JFC's objectives, the joint force synchronizes diverse fires assets from US and multinational forces. Joint FS requires planning and detailed coordination to integrate and synchronize the supporting commander's joint FS into the supported commander's operation.
4-11. FA HQ provide the theater, corps, and division commanders with the C2 functions to integrate fires. These HQ at echelon are TFC, multi-domain task force, FAB, and the DIVARTY. For more information referencing FA BNs and below organizations are ATP 3-09.23, ATP 3-09.50, ATP 3-09.60, and ATP 3-09. 70.
THEATER FIRES COMMAND
4-12. A TFC will command and control organic assigned strategic fires capabilities, and serve as the senior HQ assigned to an ASCC/Theater Army to integrate theater fires assets, and execute critical fires functions. The TFC will develop, nominate and integrate effects on joint targets across the theater. The TFC supports joint targeting by continuously setting the theater and shaping to enable JFLCC/Field Army and corps operations in conflict.
FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE
4-13. A FAB's primary tasks are conducting corps-level strike operations and augmenting division level shaping operations. Strike is an attack to damage or destroy an objective or a capability (JP 3-0). The FAB provides the corps with the capability to mass effects during shaping operations in the conduct of large-scale ground combat operations. The FAB can be task organized with delivery and sensor systems to support mission requirements. A division, corps, JTF or other force may have a FAB or its units attached or placed under OPCON. The FABs BNs are fully capable of providing DS to joint, SOF and other joint units. When operating under the control of the JFC or another Service, the ASCC or Army Forces commander exercises administrative control over the FAB. The FAB, when designated by the JFC or corps commander, can serve as a counterfire headquarters or be assigned a counterfire mission. For more information on the FAB see ATP 3-09.24.
DIVISION ARTILLERY
4-14. DIVARTY controls the divisions' organic and attached FA units and indirect FS operations, coordinating closely with the division FSE for continuous operations to the division main, tactical, and SACP. To win in large-scale ground combat operations quickly, decisively and with minimum friendly causalities, each division must be supported with the fires of additional FABs equipped with long range precision fires capability. The DIVARTY can provide the counterfire headquarters for the division. If allocated the necessary firing units, the target processing section of the TA platoon, in conjunction with the DIVARTY

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command post, can be designated to coordinate the counterfire fight for the division. For more information on DIVARTY organization and operations see ATP 3-09.90.
4-15. The primary role of the DIVARTY is to facilitate shaping operations within the division AO. The DIVARTY serves as the FFA HQ for the division. Additionally the DIVARTY commander, as the senior artilleryman in the division, is responsible for standardizing training for FA units that are assigned, attached, or placed under the OPCON of the division. The DIVARTY commander will mentor the commanders and leaders of these FA units and typically be assigned other key responsibilities on behalf of the division commander. Those responsibilities could include management of the assigned or attached 13-series career management field Soldiers, training oversight, and certification programs.
4-16. The DIVARTY is not currently allocated organic firing units, but is task organized with additional units based on mission requirements. Task organization may include a combination of MLRS, or HIMARS, or cannon BNs as well as other enablers. The DIVARTY, when allocated appropriate rocket and cannon units, brings a long range and precision FS capability to the division. In large-scale ground combat operations, allocating an FAB to a DIVARTY in an R role is appropriate. Regardless of the circumstances or mission assigned to FAB, DIVARTY commanders remain the division's FSCOORD.
FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE AND DIVISION ARTILLERY ROLE IN COUNTERFIRE OPERATIONS
4-17. The corps or division commander can assign the role of counterfire HQ to a FAB, DIVARTY, or a separate FA BN. The counterfire HQ must be allocated the necessary assets to conduct the counterfire fight. The counterfire HQ will coordinate with the G-2 to integrate all available units into the counterfire fight in a proactive manner. The counterfire HQ will require sensor tasking authority from higher HQ, SJA, intelligence analysis augmentation, additional CAS and attack helicopter allocation to include JTAC support. The counterfire HQ duties include:
 Plan and coordinate sensor management.  Conduct pattern analysis of enemy indirect fire systems.  Based off pattern analysis conduct zone management in support of the counterfire fight.  Recommend positioning of counterfire delivery systems.  Write the target acquisition tab to Annex D.  Recommend counterfire TTP to facilitate permissive fires.  Participate in the targeting process.  Establish counterfire mission procedures and communications architecture.
4-18. FAB contributions to the overall counterfire effort include the responsibility to:  Implement the organization for combat of corps counterfire assets by retaining FA assets at corps level or allocating them to subordinate divisions in accordance with guidance issued by the corps HQ.  Supervise preparations and execution of counterfire responsibilities by subordinate corps elements within counterfire sectors of responsibility established concurrently with the designation of maneuver boundaries and AO for subordinate divisions. This includes targets within a division's or adjacent unit's AO, if requests for such support have been submitted and approved by corps. Within capability, corps may also respond to requests for additional fires from adjacent units.  Detect multiple rocket launcher battalions, helicopter forward operating bases, and other counterfire targets with FA organic assets, reinforced by collectors from the corps' supporting, attached, or OPCON military intelligence units, and SOF.  Attack threat FS systems with MLRS/HIMARS, Army aviation, Air Force sorties, and ground maneuver forces that may be available for target attack.  Recommend the acquisition of additional sensor and attack assets from higher, the JTF commander, or other services.
4-19. In some situations, and after careful consideration, corps commanders may temporarily draw on division assets to support corps counterfire operations. However, diversion of limited divisional acquisition, processing, and attack assets entails the risk of their destruction and non-availability to support division

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operations during critical phases. Equally important is the timing of their return to divisional control. The return must be carefully planned and coordinated.
4-20. The DIVARTY can provide the counterfire HQ for the division. If allocated the necessary firing units, the target processing section of the TA platoon, in conjunction with the DIVARTY CP, can be designated and coordinate the counterfire fight for the division.
4-21. WLRs organic to the FAB and DIVARTY send acquisitions acquired by the radar to the FDC at the designated FA BN. Counterfire targets are usually generated from CFZs or CFFZs. If the situation warrants, a quick-fire channel can be established from a radar directly to a firing battery or platoon. Quick-fire channels, when directed, are established for a specified period to achieve specific mission requirements. Pre-clearance of such targets needs to be defined in precise terms that identify the conditions under which the target is precleared for engagement.
SECTION III – FIELD ARTILLERY CAPABILITIES IN DEPTH
4-22. Deep and simultaneous attacks, executed at increasingly longer range and with precision, are key elements for division, corps, and JFCs in shaping the battlefield and accelerating the enemy's defeat. In both offense and defense, deep operations are conducted to isolate, immobilize, and weaken the enemy in depth, using fire, maneuver, or a combination of the two. Deep offensive FA fires may be used to limit the enemy's ability to shift forces to meet attacking friendly maneuver forces and to sustain the momentum of the attack. Deep fires limit, delay, or disrupt the enemy's attacking echelons and FS, C2, communications, and logistics. They are intended to reduce the enemy's rate of arrival in the close area to a level manageable by maneuver commanders.
4-23. FA systems are fully capable of conducting deep precision strikes and massing fires under all weather conditions, day or night. They provide joint and land component commanders the capability to engage HPTs when and where required. Precision strikes are also important factors in consolidation of gains and stability operations where the threat of collateral damage is often of primary concern. Collateral damage is a form of collateral effect that causes unintentional or incidental injury or damage to persons or objects that would not be lawful military targets in the circumstances ruling at the time (JP 3-60).
4-24. As part of deep operations, proactive TA and FA counterfires can affect threat indirect fire systems before they have a major influence on the battle. Similarly, deep attack can interdict or attrit enemy maneuver forces, surface-to surface missile systems, and logistic units/facilities; alter combat power ratios; and limit an opponent's freedom of action while simultaneously enhancing friendly options and force protection. FA fires, either separately or as part of joint and combined arms missions, assist with SEAD and SCAR.
4-25. At corps and division levels, close operations during the offense or defense are undertaken to win the current battle or engagement. Close battle occurs where, when, and against whom commanders choose to commit assault forces. FA fires, in the form of preparations, counterfires, and SEAD support friendly schemes of maneuver by assisting in denying the enemy favorable avenues of approach, helping maneuver forces control terrain, and defeating attacks. Counterfires engage enemy artillery and other indirect fire systems to preserve friendly fighting forces and combat capabilities. They give supported elements the freedom to maneuver, while obscuration smoke hides friendly movements and illumination exposes enemy formations at night. Obscuration is the employment of materials into the environment that degrade optical and/or electrooptical capabilities within select portions of the electromagnetic spectrum in order to deny acquisition by or deceive an enemy or adversary (ATP 3-11.50). The electromagnetic spectrum is the range of frequencies of electromagnetic radiation from zero to infinity. It is divided into 26 alphabetically designated bands (JP 313.1). Close fires are normally the main concern of DS FA battalions whose fires in support of forces in contact may be augmented by fires from DIVARTY and FAB units. Commanders and planners must ensure that maneuver forces receive an appropriate share of available FS to include security forces and reserves upon commitment.
4-26. Consolidation and support area operations are conducted to ensure that friendly forces retain freedom of action to support combat forces engaged in deep and close operations. FA assets are seldom sufficient to dedicate firing units to consolidation and support area as their sole or primary mission. FA commanders, in the role as FSCOORD, may assign on-order support relationships to support corps or division consolidation area operations. They can also meet consolidation area FA support requirements by assigning GS and GSR

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support relationships to cannon units to range consolidation and support areas while continuing to perform their primary support relationships in support of deep and close operations.
SECTION IV – FIELD ARTILLERY ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT
4-27. Successful execution of large-scale ground combat operations requires careful planning of limited FA resources and the coordinated employment of TA and assessment means. For example the FSCOORD recommends to the division commander, to facilitate the rapid establishment of support relationships of FA units in large-scale ground combat operations, division commanders should consider assigning the BCT organic FA BNs as OPCON to the DIVARTY prior to execution of operations. FSCOORDs and FSEs on corps and division staffs ensure adequacy in support of operations by varying allocation and control of available FS resources to include FA formations.
4-28. The FA commander recommends to the supported commander the command and support relationships of FA units supporting the operation, regardless if they are organic or assigned. This information is vital to planning fire support for tactical operations
4-29. Task-organizing is the act of designing a force, support staff, or sustainment package of specific size and composition to meet a unique task or mission (ADP 3-0). Characteristics to examine when taskorganizing the force include, but are not limited to, training, experience, equipment, sustainability, operating environment, enemy threat, and mobility. For Army forces, task-organizing includes allocating available assets to subordinate commanders and establishing their command and support relationships. The objective of FA task-organization is to ensure that each FA unit has an established command relationship or support relationship that best supports the maneuver commander's concept of the operation. Dynamic task-organizing during operations is one way to ensure FA assets are never in reserve.
4-30. The FSCOORD, chief of fires and brigade FSO analyze the mission variables of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (referred to as METT-TC), evaluate the FA assets available and recommend a command or support relationship for each FA unit to the supported commander. The supported commander approves the FA task organization, which is subsequently reflected in the OPLAN/OPORD and FS plan. Commanders never place artillery in reserve.
4-31. Commanders consider mutual support when task-organizing FA. Mutual support is that support which units render each other against an enemy, because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, and their inherent capabilities (JP 3-31). Mutual support exists when positions and units support each other by direct and/or indirect fire and/or nonlethal activities. Mutual support increases the strength of all defensive positions, prevents defeat in detail, and helps prevent infiltration between positions. Supporting range is the distance one unit may be geographically separated from a second unit yet remain within the maximum range of the second unit's weapons systems (ADP 3-0). Although a FA unit may be in supporting range of a supported unit, the communications capability must also be considered. If the unit needing support cannot communicate with the supporting unit, the range capability of a weapon system or its proximity to the supported force has no effect on the outcome of an operation. For more on mutual support see ADP 3- 90 and FM 3-90-1.
THE PRINCIPLES OF FIRE SUPPORT EXECUTION APPLIED TO FIELD ARTILLERY ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT
4-32. Commanders and staffs must consider the principles of FS execution referred to as the memory aid AWIFM-N when planning the integration of fires into an operation. FS execution principles AWIFM-N considerations are:
ADEQUATE FIRE SUPPORT FOR THE COMMITTED UNITS
4-33. In large-scale ground combat operations the minimum adequate FA for committed units is considered to be one FA BN for each committed brigade. If a brigade is not committed, commanders must consider assigning a support relationship of the uncommitted brigade's artillery BN to a committed unit.

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4-34. Commanders never place artillery in reserve. Commander's utilize command and support relationships to weight the main effort.
WEIGHT TO THE MAIN EFFORT OR THE DECISIVE OPERATION
4-35. The main effort can be weighted by a variety of ways:  R or GSR support relationships can be assigned to provide additional responsive fires to the maneuver forces in contact.  FA units can be positioned and assigned directions of fire to concentrate their fires in the appropriate AO. In this manner, units in a GS support relationship can add weight to the main attack or strength to the most vulnerable area.  FA ammunition may be allocated to provide for more support in a specific area.  Priority of FA fires given to the main effort (decisive operation).
4-36. Support relationships from GS to DS provide increasing responsiveness to the main effort's commander. Minimal essential FS can be allocated to shaping operations.
IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE FIRE SUPPORT FOR THE COMMANDER TO INFLUENCE THE OPERATION
4-37. The force commander should establish command or support relationships for available artillery with which the commander can immediately influence the operation. The practice of establishing FA support relationships of GS and GSR enhances flexibility and facilitates ability to provide immediately responsive fires for the force as a whole.
4-38. The artillery commander maintains the capability to shift fires rapidly and add weight when enemy vulnerabilities are detected or the force is threatened. As the engagement unfolds, the maneuver commander may shift the priority of fires to exploit opportunities as they are presented.
FACILITATE FUTURE OPERATIONS
4-39. Future operations can be facilitated by the assignment of a command or support relationship, the positioning of FA, and the allocation and positioning of ammunition (to include combat configured loads and ammunition issued for immediate consumption).
4-40. The assignment of GS and GSR support relationships, as well as on-order command or support relationships enables the transition to a future mission. Another way to facilitate future operations is to modify the current command or support relationship in accordance with anticipated requirements. Commanders can apply CSR to FA units to ensure planned future operations are adequately supported.
Maximum Feasible Centralized Control
4-41. The optimum degree of centralized control varies with each tactical situation. A high degree of centralized control is preferred in a defensive situation. Since the enemy has the initiative, it is difficult to accurately predict where and when the enemy will attack.
4-42. The commander cannot afford to dissipate fires capabilities on secondary priorities before determining the enemy's main effort. A lesser degree of centralized control is essential in an offensive situation, because the supported force has the initiative and unforeseen opportunities require responsive fires to exploit.
Never Place Artillery In Reserve
4-43. Commanders should not place artillery in reserve but may give a change to its support relationship ensuring artillery is not held in reserve and adequate support is provided to the main effort. These changes in support relationships can be identified by an on-order mission. An example of an on-order mission is "1-52 FA: GSR 1-50 FA; on-order R 1-50 FA."

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4-44. In addition to never leaving FA in reserve and the FS execution principles of AWIFM-N, FA commanders and FS personnel also consider mission, ammunition, and positioning when planning for FA system employment. Considerations are:
 Mission. Appropriate FA unit command support relationships assigned based on the commander's intent and the overall situation.
 Ammunition. Allocate ammunition to provide more support for the main effort. Ensure adequate ammunition for future operations through positioning, ammunition restrictions, or CSR parameters during execution and planning.
 Positioning. Continually re-position FA units, ammunition, TA resources, CPs, and assets to best support the plan as it is being executed. Assign direction of fire to mass fires in the appropriate AO.
FIELD ARTILLERY INHERENT RESPONSIBILITIES IN ARMY COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
4-45. FA cannon, rocket, and missile systems that are organic, assigned, attached to, or under the OPCON of FABs, DIVARTY, and BCTs provide commanders with continuously available, adjustable, and tailored fires under all weather conditions and in all types of terrain. These organizations can be task-organized with maneuver to provide the right combination of indirect fires capabilities for a given situation.
4-46. Command relationships provide the basis for ensuring unity of command and unity of effort in operations. Command relationships are used in Army force generation, force tailoring, and task-organizing. Command relationships define superior and subordinate relationships between unit commanders. By specifying a chain of command, command relationships unify effort and enable commanders to use subordinate forces with maximum flexibility. Army command relationships identify the degree of control of the gaining commander. The type of command relationship often relates to the expected longevity of the relationship between the HQ involved and quickly identifies the degree of support that the gaining and losing Army commanders provide:
 Organic is assigned to and forming an essential part of a military organization as listed in its table of organization for the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps, and are assigned to the operating forces for the Navy. (JP 1).
 Assign is to place units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively permanent, and/or where such organization controls and administers the units or personnel for the primary function, or greater portion of the functions, of the unit or personnel (JP 3-0).
 Attach is the placement of units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively temporary (JP 3-0).
 Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission (JP 1).
 Tactical control is the authority over forces that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned (JP 1).
FIELD ARTILLERY INHERENT RESPONSIBILITIES IN ARMY SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS
4-47. In the past, DS, R, GSR, and GS were referred to as field artillery tactical missions. These tactical missions are now referred to as support relationships and are used by the rest of the Army to task-organize forces.
4-48. Army support relationships are not a command authority and are more specific than the joint support relationships. Commanders establish support relationships when subordination of one unit to another is inappropriate. Commanders assign support relationships when: the support is more effective if a commander with the requisite technical and tactical expertise controls the supporting unit rather than the supported commander; the echelon of the supporting unit is the same as or higher than that of the supported unit; or the

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supporting unit supports several units simultaneously (ADP 5-0). Organic FA BNs can be assigned a support relationship by the FFA HQ of the supported command.
4-49. Support relationships allow commanders to employ their units' capabilities to achieve the desired results required by supported commanders. Support relationships are graduated from an exclusive supported and supporting relationship between two units-as in DS-to a broad level of support extended to all units under the control of the higher HQ-as in GS. Support relationships do not normally alter administrative control. Support relationships are used to task-organize for a mission. FA units may be assigned a support relationship of DS, R, GSR, or GS.
4-50. The seven FA inherent responsibilities (see table 4-1) supplement the inherent responsibilities of an Army support relationship. See FM 3-0 for a detailed description of command and support relationships.
DIRECT SUPPORT
4-51. Direct support is a mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force's request for assistance (JP 3-09.3). Direct support is a support relationship requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force's request for assistance (FM 3-0). A FA unit in DS of a maneuver unit is concerned primarily with the fire support needs of only that unit. The FSE of the supported maneuver unit plans and coordinates fires to support the maneuver commander's intent.
4-52. The commander of a unit in DS recommends position areas and coordinates for movement clearances where his unit can best support the maneuver commander's concept of the operation. When FA units are able to habitually support the same maneuver force, coordination and training are enhanced. DS is the most decentralized support relationship.
REINFORCING
4-53. Reinforcing is a support relationship requiring a force to support another supporting unit (FM 3-0). Only like units (for example artillery to artillery) can be given an R support relationship. An R support relationship requires one FA unit to augment the fires of another FA unit.
4-54. When an organic or DS FA BN requires more fires to meet maneuver force requirements, another FA BN may be directed to reinforce it. An organic or DS FA BN may be supported by up to 2 R BNs. A FA unit assigned an R support relationship retains its command relationship with its parent unit, but is positioned by the reinforced FA unit and has priorities of support established by the reinforced FA unit, then the parent unit.
GENERAL SUPPORT-REINFORCING
4-55. General support-reinforcing is a support relationship assigned to a unit to support the force as a whole and to reinforce another similar-type unit (FM 3-0). The first priority of a FA unit assigned a GSR support relationship is to furnish artillery fires for the maneuver force as a whole; the second priority is to reinforce the fires of another FA unit.
4-56. A GSR unit remains under the control of the supported maneuver commander or his force field artillery HQ. The GSR support relationship offers the commander the flexibility to meet the requirements of a variety of tactical mission tasks.
GENERAL SUPPORT
4-57. General support is support which is given to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof (JP 3-09.3). A FA unit assigned in GS of a force has all of its fires under the immediate control of the supported commander or his designated FFA HQ.
4-58. Among Army support relationships, GS provides the highest degree of centralized control of fires. This provides the commander flexibility to facilitate ongoing operations.

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Table 4-1. The Seven Field Artillery inherent responsibilities in Army support relationships

Army support relationship

Answers calls for fire in priority from:

Has as its zone of fire:

Furnishes fire support team (FIST):

Furnish liaison officer:

Establishe s COMM with:

Is Positioned by:

Has its fires planned by:

Direct Support
Reinforcing
General Support Reinforcing
General Support

1.Supporte d unit
2. Own observer1
3. FA HQ2
1.Reinforce d FA
2. Ownobserv ers1
3. FA HQ2
1. Supported unit. 2. FA HQ.2 3. Reinforced unit. 4.Own observers.1
1. Supported unit
2.FFA HQ 2
3. Own Observers

AO of supported unit.

Provides temporary
REP for casualty losses as required

Zone of fire of Reinforced FA.

No Requireme nt

AO of supported unit to include zone of fire of reinforced FA unit.

No.
Requireme nt

AO of Supported unit.

No Requireme nt

No Requireme nt
To reinforced FA unit HQ or as required.
To reinforced FA unit HQ or as required.
No Requireme nt

Supported HQ and FSO as required
Reinforced FA unit HQ or as required
Reinforced FA unit HQ or as required
No Requireme nt

Supported unit or FFA HQ

Supported unit or FFA HQ

Reinforced Reinforced FA unit HQ. FA unit HQ

1. Support unit. 2. FFA HQ.2

1. Support unit.
2. FFA HQ.2

1. Support unit. 2. FFA HQ.2

1. Support unit.
2. FFA HQ.2

Note: (1). Includes all target acquisition means not deployed with the supported unit. In NATO, the gaining unit may not task-organize.

Note: (2). If designated by the support commander.

AO

area of operation

COMM communications

FA

field artillery

FFA

force field artillery

FIST

fire support team

FSO

fire support officer

HQ

headquarters

NONSTANDARD FIELD ARTILLERY SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS
4-59. Commanders sometimes use a nonstandard support relationship. In many cases, this is simply a variation of a standard support relationship (DS, R, GSR, or GS) when there are not sufficient FA assets to cover all the contingencies, or if a FA unit is assigned more than one support relationship over a time period.
4-60. A nonstandard support relationship is also a means by which the commander can tailor his FA assets in anticipation of future operations. A nonstandard support relationship may involve limitations or guidance concerning ammunition, positioning, or other critical factors. Examples of nonstandard FA support relationships include:
 110 FAB: GSR 7 FAB; do not exceed 25 percent of the CSR in support of 7 FAB.  1-89 Field Artillery (MLRS, M270A1): GS; provide liaison officer to the corps FSE.

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SECTION V – KEY CONSIDERATIONS FOR FIELD ARTILLERY EMPLOYMENT
4-61. FA organizations employ indirect fire capabilities which are versatile and responsive, to create desired effects. In order to create effects, FA units employ and integrate joint fires, cannons, rockets, missiles, and TA assets. FA units are as mobile and deployable as the maneuver forces they support. Indirect fires include anything from a single precision munition, precision-guided munition, to a multiple BN mass mission.
4-62. A precision munition is a munition that corrects for ballistic conditions using guidance and control up to the aimpoint or submunitions dispense with terminal accuracy less than the lethal radius of effects. (Excalibur, GMLRS, ATACMS) A precision-guided munition is a guided weapon intended to destroy a point target and minimize collateral damage (JP 3-03). In order to deliver fires, FA units must:
 Meet the five requirements for accurate predicted fires.  Be proactive and responsive to create the desired effects.  Mass fires.
FIVE REQUIREMENTS FOR ACCURATE PREDICTED FIRES
4-63. The goal of any indirect firing unit is to achieve accurate first-round fire for effect (FFE) on a target. Fire for effect is a command to indicate that fire for effect is desired; fire that is intended to achieve the desired result on target (TC 3-09.81). In order to accomplish this goal an artillery unit must compensate for nonstandard conditions as completely as time and the tactical situation permit. There are five requirements for achieving accurate first-round FFE. These requirements are accurate target location and size, accurate firing unit location, accurate weapon and ammunition information, accurate MET information, and accurate computational procedures. If these requirements are met, the firing unit will be able to deliver accurate and timely fires in support of the ground-gaining arms. If the requirements for accurate fire cannot be met completely, the firing unit may be required to use adjust-fire missions to engage targets. Adjust-fire missions can result in reduced effect on the target, loss of surprise, increased ammunition expenditure, and greater possibility that the firing unit will be detected by hostile TA assets.
 Accurate Target Location and Size. Establishing the range from the weapons to the target requires accurate and timely detection, identification, and location of ground targets. Determining their size and disposition on the ground is also necessary so that accurate firing data can be computed. Determining the appropriate time and type of attack requires that the target size (radius or other dimensions) and the direction and speed of movement are considered. Target location is determined by using TA. Target location error is the difference between the coordinates generated for a target and the actual location of the target (JP 3-09.3). The following are the target location error categories expressed by circular error (CE) on ground expressed in feet (ft) and meters (m):  CAT I : CE 0-20 ft/0-6 m  CAT II: CE 21-50 ft/7-15 m  CAT III: CE 51-100 ft/16-30 m  CAT IV: CE 101-300 ft/31-91 m  CAT V: CE 301-1000 ft/92-305 m  CAT VI: CE > 1000 ft/>305 m
 Accurate Firing Unit Location. Accurate range and deflection from the firing unit to the target requires accurate weapon location. Survey techniques and on-board navigation systems are used to determine the location of each weapon. See the following survey section and ATP 3-09.02.
 Accurate Weapon and Ammunition Information. The actual performance of the weapon is measured by the weapon muzzle velocity (velocity with which the projectile leaves the muzzle of the tube) for a projectile-propellant combination. The firing battery can measure the achieved muzzle velocity of a weapon and correct it for nonstandard projectile weight and propellant temperature; this is done through use of the muzzle velocity systems. The corrections that the muzzle velocity system makes are similar to those found in the muzzle velocity correction table. Calibration should be conducted continuously by using the muzzle velocity system. Firing tables and technical gunnery procedures allow the unit to consider specific ammunition information

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(projectile square weight, fuze type, and propellant temperature); thus, accurate firing data are possible.  Accurate Meteorological Information. The effects of weather on the projectile in flight must be considered, and firing data must compensate for those effects. Firing tables and technical gunnery procedures allow the unit to consider specific weather information (air temperature, air density/pressure, wind direction, and wind speed) in determining accurate firing data.  Accurate Computational Procedures. The computation of firing data must be accurate. Manual and automated techniques are designed to achieve accurate and timely delivery of fire. The balance between accuracy, speed, and the other requirements discussed in this chapter should be included in the computational procedures.
Note: Nonstandard Conditions. If the five requirements for accurate predicted fire cannot be met, the FDC needs to take steps to improve firing data. For more information see TC 3-09.81.

SURVEY
4-64. FA survey is critical to the first two requirements for accurate predicted fire. FA survey must provide indirect fire assets and target locating assets with a common grid. The common grid refers to all firing and target-locating elements within a unified command located and oriented to prescribed accuracies with respect to a single three-dimensional datum (ATP 3-09.02). Common survey allows the maneuver commander to employ FS resources with a guarantee of accurate and timely FS. Common control is the horizontal and vertical map or chart location of points in the target and position area, tied in with the horizontal and vertical control in use by two or more units (ATP 3-09.02). Survey planning within the force is based on the following tactical considerations:
 The commander's target adjustment policy (that is, if the element of surprise is an important aspect of his tactical plan).
 The requirement for transfer of adjusted target locations to higher and lower echelons.  The required attack of HPTs onto which fire cannot be adjusted (or if surprise is a factor).  The planned positioning of indirect fire units during each phase of the operation.  The planned tasking of TA sensors and the processing of targets to an attack system.
4-65. The maneuver headquarters establishes survey time lines and accuracy requirements in the initial planning stages of an operation based on the commander's guidance. The maneuver commander gives the FA battalion commander targeting priorities and the effects required on HPTs. This information translates into survey requirements for the TA sensors and the designated attack systems, which must be on a common grid by the time required. The effects on the target and inherent system inaccuracies determine the survey accuracy requirement (hasty, fourth-order, or fifth-order survey).
4-66. There is no longer a military occupational specialty dedicated solely to survey. This creates a need to train non-survey soldiers on how to operate the survey equipment. The commander designates the personnel to train and form the survey team. The survey team provides survey for the unit. The survey equipment is assigned to the FA BN. See ATP 3-09.02 for more information on survey.
PROVIDE PROACTIVE AND RESPONSIVE FIRES THAT CREATE DESIRED EFFECTS
4-67. Effective gunnery, TA, weapons, munitions, C2 are essential for proactive and responsive FA fires to maneuver forces. Procedures must be streamlined to minimize the time between the proactive acquisition of a target, the call for fire, and the responsive delivery of fires. A call for fire is a standardized request for fire containing data necessary for obtaining the required fire on a target. Unnecessary delay can result in a failure to have desired effects on the target. Responsiveness can be achieved by:
 Training especially digital sustainment training.  Streamlining the call for fire through use of digital systems.  Planning fire support requirements in advance.

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 Establish a permissive battlefield design, to include airspace.  Establish permissive FSCMs.  Rehearsals.  Time on target.  Continually training observers in all aspects of fire support.  Limiting radio transmissions on fire nets to time-sensitive, mission-essential traffic only.
4-68. The effectiveness of fires on a target will depend, in part, on the method of fire and type of ammunition selected to attack the target. The desired effects are created through proper weaponeering, accurate initial fires, and massed fires. Weaponeering is the process of determining the specific means required to create a desired effect on a given target (JP 3-60).
4-69. The FA has the ability to deliver effects on a target from multiple formations to engage a target simultaneously. An essential capability to disrupting the enemy's A2/AD systems is our ability to mass fires.
MASSED FIRES
4-70. Massed fire is fire from a number of weapons directed at a single point or small area (JP 3-02). The FSCOORD needs to maximize the number of units massing across the fires formation to create the required effect in the specified EFAT. For more information on EFATs see appendix A. Massing fires within a firing unit distributes ammunition consumption and lessens the sustainment problem for the FA unit. Further, synchronized mass fires increase the lethality of the delivered munition by preventing the adversaries' ability to react to multiple volleys.
4-71. Massed fires maximize effectiveness of the initial volley on the intended target. Massing all available fires enables the supported commander to maximize the effect of fires on a target or targets. Fires can also be massed in time (striking multiple targets at the same time) to overwhelm the enemy's ability to react. The desired effect is created through fires delivered in an instant; since these fires limit the enemy's time to react and seek protection. Massed fires ensure maximum effect in attacking targets that can easily change their posture.
Operation Desert Storm.
In a 15 May 1991 letter to the Commandant of the FA School, Major General Raphael J. Hallada (1987–1991), about the US VII Corps’ 24 February 1991 breaching operation, the Commanding General of the 1st Infantry Division, Major General Thomas G. Rhame, related: The performance of the FA in combat has caused all of us to remember what we had perhaps forgotten, namely its incredible destructive power and shock effect. The preparation fires I witnessed prior to our assault on the breachline were the most incredible sight I have seen in 27 years of service. On 24 February 1991 Commander of the US VII Corps Artillery, Brigadier General Creighton Abrams Jr., and the Commander of the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) Artillery, Colonel Michael L. Dodson assembled the FA force. In support of the US VII Corps assault, General Abrams allocated the 42d, 75th, and 142d FA Brigades, two division artilleries, and 10 Multiple Launch Rocket System batteries to create a Soviet-style attack at the breach area. General Abrams positioned approximately 22 artillery pieces for each kilometer of the attack zone. More than 350 FA pieces fired 11,000 rounds while M270 Multiple-Launch Rocket Launchers shot 414 rockets in a FA preparation of 30 minutes. Besides crushing Iraqi morale, this massed fires destroyed 50 tanks, 139 armored personnel carriers, and 152 FA pieces.
SECTION VI – FIRE DIRECTION
4-72. Fire direction is the tactical employment of firepower exercising the tactical command of one or more units in the selection of targets, the concentration and distribution of fire, and the allocation of ammunition

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