2402 lines
134 KiB
Plaintext
2402 lines
134 KiB
Plaintext
PENGUIN BOOKS
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MOST SECRET WAR
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Reginald Victor Jones was an English physicist and scienti c
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military intelligence expert who played an important role in the
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defence of Britain in the Second World War. He died in 1997.
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Most Secret War
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R.V. JONES
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PENGUIN BOOKS
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PENGUIN BOOKS
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Published by the Penguin Group
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Penguin Books Ltd, 80 Strand, London WC2R 0RL, England
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Penguin Group (USA) Inc., 375 Hudson Street, New York, New York 10014, USA
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Penguin Group (Canada), 90 Eglinton Avenue East, Suite 700, Toronto, Ontario, Canada
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M4P 2Y3
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(a division of Pearson Penguin Canada Inc.)
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Penguin Ireland, 25 St Stephen’s Green, Dublin 2, Ireland (a division of Penguin Books Ltd)
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Penguin Group (Australia), 250 Camberwell Road, Camberwell, Victoria 3124, Australia
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(a division of Pearson Australia Group Pty Ltd)
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Penguin Books India Pvt Ltd, 11 Community Centre, Panchsheel Park, New Delhi – 110
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017, India
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Penguin Group (NZ), 67 Apollo Drive, Rosedale, North Shore 0632, New Zealand
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(a division of Pearson New Zealand Ltd)
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Penguin Books (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd, 24 Sturdee Avenue, Rosebank, Johannesburg 2196,
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South Africa
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Penguin Books Ltd, Registered O ces: 80 Strand, London WC2R 0RL, England
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www.penguin.com
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First published in Great Britain by Hamish Hamilton 1978
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Reissued in Penguin Books 2009
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Copyright © R. V. Jones, 1978
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All rights reserved
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The moral right of the author has been asserted
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Except in the United States of America, this book is sold subject to the condition that it
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shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, re-sold, hired out, or otherwise circulated
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without the publisher’s prior consent in any form of binding or cover other than that in
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which it is published and without a similar condition including this condition being
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imposed on the subsequent purchaser
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ISBN: 978-0-14-195767-8
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Contents
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PART ONE
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CHAPTER ONE: The Men Who Went First
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CHAPTER TWO: Friends and Rivals
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CHAPTER THREE: The Clarendon Laboratory 1936–1938
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CHAPTER FOUR: Inferior Red 1936–1938
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CHAPTER FIVE: Exile
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CHAPTER SIX: The Day Before War Broke Out
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CHAPTER SEVEN: The Secret Weapon
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CHAPTER EIGHT: The Oslo Report
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CHAPTER NINE: A Plan For Intelligence
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CHAPTER TEN: The Phoney War
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CHAPTER ELEVEN: The Crooked Leg
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CHAPTER TWELVE: Re ections
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN: The Fortunes of Major Wintle
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CHAPTER FOURTEEN: The Fifth Column
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CHAPTER FIFTEEN: The Edda Revived
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CHAPTER SIXTEEN: Knickebein Jammed—And Photographed
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CHAPTER SEVENTEEN: The X-Apparatus
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CHAPTER EIGHTEEN: Coventry
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CHAPTER NINETEEN: Target No. 54
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CHAPTER TWENTY: The Atrocious Crime
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CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE: Wotan’s Other Eye
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CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO: Retrospect and Prospect
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PART TWO
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CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE: Freya
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CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR: Beams On The Wane
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CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE: ‘Jay’
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CHAPTER TWENTY-SIX: Würzburg
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CHAPTER TWENTY-SEVEN: The Bruneval Raid
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CHAPTER TWENTY-EIGHT: The Baedeker Beams
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CHAPTER TWENTY-NINE: El Hatto
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CHAPTER THIRTY: Pineapple
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CHAPTER THIRTY-ONE: The Kammhuber Line
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CHAPTER THIRTY-TWO: Lichtenstein
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CHAPTER THIRTY-THREE: Window
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CHAPTER THIRTY-FOUR: Hamburg
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CHAPTER THIRTY-FIVE: Heavy Water
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CHAPTER THIRTY-SIX: Revelations From The Secret Service
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CHAPTER THIRTY-SEVEN: Full Stretch
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CHAPTER THIRTY-EIGHT: Peenemünde
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CHAPTER THIRTY-NINE: FZG 76
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CHAPTER FORTY: The Americans Convinced
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CHAPTER FORTY-ONE: ‘Flames’: Problems Of Bomber Command
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CHAPTER FORTY-TWO: The Baby Blitz
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CHAPTER FORTY-THREE: D-Day
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CHAPTER FORTY-FOUR: V-1
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CHAPTER FORTY-FIVE: V-2
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CHAPTER FORTY-SIX: V-3
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CHAPTER FORTY-SEVEN: Bomber Triumph
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CHAPTER FORTY-EIGHT: Nuclear Energy
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CHAPTER FORTY-NINE: A.D.I. (Science) Overseas
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CHAPTER FIFTY: The Year Of Madness
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CHAPTER FIFTY-ONE: German Generals And Sta Colleges
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CHAPTER FIFTY-TWO: Swords Into Ploughshares, Bombs Into
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Saucers
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CHAPTER FIFTY-THREE: Exeunt
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Epilogue
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Notes
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Glossary of Abbreviations and Code Names
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Index
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PART ONE
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CHAPTER ONE
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The Men Who Went First
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I
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N 1939 I was a Scienti c O cer on the sta of the Air Ministry in
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London, and for the past four years I had been involved in problems
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of defending Britain from air attack. For reasons that will later
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become evident I had been exiled since July 1938 to the Admiralty
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Research Laboratory at Teddington; and it was there in May 1939
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that I received a telephone call that changed the course of my life,
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and perhaps that of many another. It came from the Secretary of Sir
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Henry Tizard’s Committee for the Scienti c Survey of Air Defence,
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A. E. Woodward-Nutt: he said that he would like to see my work,
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and we agreed on a visit a few days later.
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As I showed him the work, I sensed that there might be some
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deeper reason for his visit, and I told him so. He replied that there
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was indeed another reason: Tizard and his colleagues did not know
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what the Germans were doing in applying science to air warfare,
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and our Intelligence Services were unable to tell them. So it had
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been agreed that a scientist should be attached to these Services for
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a period to discover why they were producing so little information,
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and to recommend what should be done to improve matters. ‘I
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thought of you,’ said Woodward-Nutt, ‘and I wondered whether you
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would be interested.’ My reply was immediate: ‘A man in that
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position could lose the war—I’ll take it!’ We agreed that we ought to
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give the Admiralty Research Laboratory time to replace me and so
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the date for my move over to Intelligence should be 1st September
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1939.
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It turned out that we had hit the very day on which the Second
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World War started. This book is primarily an account of my part in
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that war, which was to attempt to anticipate the German
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applications of science to warfare, so that we could counter their
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new weapons before they were used. Much of my work had to do
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with radio navigation, as in the Battle of the Beams, and with radar,
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as in the Allied Bomber O ensive and in the preparations for D-Day
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and in the war at sea. There were also our e orts against the V-1
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( ying bomb) and V-2 (rocket) Retaliation Weapons and—although
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fortunately the Germans were some distance from success—against
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their nuclear developments. In all these elds I had the ultimate
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responsibility for providing Intelligence, and my main object now is
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to describe how we built up our pictures of what the Germans were
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doing. But Intelligence is of little use unless it leads to action, and so
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I must in some vital instances also describe what went on in
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Whitehall before action was nally taken. These episodes brought
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me into contact with many of those responsible for the conduct of
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the war from Winston Churchill downwards. Also coming naturally
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into my narrative will be examples of the heroism of some of our
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Serving personnel and of those many helpers who joined the cause
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of Allied Intelligence in the Nazi-occupied territories.
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As with many others who played a part in 1940, my own
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preparation for the Second World War started years earlier; without
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the experience that we had gained then, we could have done little
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until too late in the war. I must therefore recall some of the
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incidents from my earlier days that sensitized me to the work that I
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was about to do.
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I was born on 29th September 1911; and in a sense, my earliest
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background was that of the Grenadier Guards. My father had served
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from Guardsman to Sergeant in the South African and First World
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Wars, and had been in the King’s Company in the last stages of the
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Retreat from Mons. O ered a Commission, he refused to leave his
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friends; he survived Neuve Chapelle, where the battalion lost sixteen
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out of its twenty-one o cers and 325 of its men, and where he
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himself was to have been recommended for the Victoria Cross; two
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months later he was very badly wounded at Festubert in May 1915.
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In hospital and convalescent home for a year, he became a guard at
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M.I.5 headquarters and later a Drill Sergeant at Aldershot. My
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childhood was steeped in the Regimental tradition of discipline,
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precision, service, endurance, and good temper. It was steeped, too,
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in the experiences of the air raids on London, all of which I went
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through with my mother and sister. The shattered houses that I saw
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then, and the suspense of waiting for the next bomb, remained in
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my memory as the Second World War approached.
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In 1916 I went to my rst school, St. Jude’s, Herne Hill in South
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London. It was a Church school, and religion was of course a
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prominent feature: the war had plenty of examples of self-sacri ce
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to which our teachers could point, and I particularly remember
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being told of an o cer who had saved his men by throwing himself
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onto a grenade that was about to explode. From St. Jude’s I went in
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1919 to the one elementary school in the neighbourhood to which
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my mother prayed I should not be sent, Sussex Road, Brixton,
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because it was so rough. It certainly was tough, the future of my
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contemporaries encompassing everything from barrow boy to
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millionaire scrapmerchant and trade union peer. But I found
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genuine friendship and decency, and I can still talk on equal terms
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with some of the stallholders in London street markets. And we had
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devoted teachers like E. C. Samuel, a great Welshman who had
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taught one of my uncles before me; and despite the fact that his
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class numbered 55 he found time to give me personal tuition in
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algebra, so that I was solving simple simultaneous equations before I
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was ten. He told me that he himself had been to college, but that all
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his swans had turned out to be geese, and that he would like to see
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me go far. Thanks to his help, I won a London Junior County
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Scholarship in 1922, and went to Alleyn’s School, Dulwich.
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But before I left Sussex Road a trivial incident occurred that
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helped to shape the course of my life. It was the rst Boat Race after
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the war. However partisan the undergraduates of Oxford and
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Cambridge might have felt about the outcome, they were almost as
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conscientious objectors compared with the belligerent boys of the
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typical London school of the period, which temporarily split into
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violently opposed factions. My rst acquaintance with the strife,
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having previously never heard of either Oxford or Cambridge, was
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when an older boy asked me ‘Which are you, Oxford or Cambridge?’
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Perhaps because he had put Oxford rst, I replied ‘Oxford’. It turned
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out that he was Cambridge, so he promptly punched me on the nose
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and knocked me down. From that moment I swore undying enmity
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to Cambridge, and the incident may have been at least as signi cant
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as any other in the course of my subsequent career.
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For me, the move to Alleyn’s meant a new era of discipline. We
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were forbidden to run anywhere in the school except on the playing
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elds. Many of our masters had been in the Army, and the O cers’
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Training Corps was one of the strongest activities in the school. I
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was in it, or its predecessor, the Cadet Corps, for the next seven
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years. Even now, we still drink at the annual dinner to the memory
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of the Old Boys who fell in the Wars.
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As for my own career in the O.T.C., my father expected me to be
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turned out as smartly as a Guardsman, with such details as puttees
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nishing not more than one half inch beyond the top of the bula.
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The incident that probably gave him most satisfaction and most
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annoyance was when I was in summer camp and the parade was
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inspected without warning by a colonel in the Coldstream Guards. It
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happened that I had not had time to clean my brass that day, and I
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expected to be in trouble. To my surprise, the colonel complimented
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me on the smartness of my turnout and my father was as pleased
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with the fact that even with a day’s unpolished brass I had
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impressed a Coldstream colonel as he was annoyed by the fact that I
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had not cleaned it.
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When it came to qualifying for a Commission by taking Certi cate
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A in 1928, I decided to put the power of prayer to the test.
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Previously I had been taught to pray for anything that I hoped
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would come about, and this of course included passing
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examinations. By now my doubts were being aroused and since it
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did not particularly matter whether I passed Certi cate A or not, I
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decided to experiment by not praying. I thought that I had made a
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mess of the papers, so it was ‘one up’ for God. When the results
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came out I did not even trouble to look at the noticeboard, and was
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surprised when one of my contemporaries grasped my hand and told
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me that I had broken the school record. It was about the only school
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record that I ever held and, although I readily acknowledge my debt
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to a most Christian upbringing, I have never prayed since.
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Our headmaster, R. B. Henderson, was a strong in uence. After
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morning prayers he would address the whole school on any topic of
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his choice, but it generally lay either in the direction of service to
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the school, community, or country, or in the importance of being
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good at cricket. In fact, his instructions ruined my cricket, because
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he taught us that by far the most important thing when batting was
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to have your bat in the twelve o’clock high position as the ball left
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the bowler’s arm, and that you should then bring the bat down in a
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vertical swing. The result, as far as I was concerned, was that I could
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hardly ever get the bat down before the ball was past my crease and
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I had been clean bowled. It was only after I went to Oxford and gave
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up the twelve o’clock fetish that I managed to make many runs.
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Others of his admonitions were more e ective. On 21st March he
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would remind us that this was the anniversary of the Germans’ last
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great o ensive in 1918 which had occasioned Haig’s ‘backs to the
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wall’ order. He stressed how much we owed to our fathers who had
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stood fast at that time, and how the time could come again when we
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should have to follow their example. In a sixth form lesson on the
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theory of forgiveness he elaborated this theme, arguing that
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forgiveness could only take place when a sinner had repented. We
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could therefore not forgive the Germans because they had never
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expressed regret for the war and, he added, ‘Mark my words, as
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soon as they’re strong enough they’ll be at us again!’
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He exerted considerable pressure on the brightest boys to get
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them to study classics. It turned out that I was rather better at Latin
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than I was in science, but I had already decided that science was
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what I wanted to do. Fortunately, he did not regard his budding
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scientists as completely lost, and he provoked us with a weekly
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lesson on anything ranging from Greek tragedy to Gothic
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architecture, with Aristotelian philosophy thrown in. The e ect that
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he had on us by opening cultural windows—because some of us
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looked through them with the hope of proving him wrong—was out
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of all proportion to the amount of time that his lessons occupied.
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One incident in my rst year of physics at the age of 12 will show
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how well taught we were, and indicate one of the factors that
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sensitized me, years later, to what was going to happen at Coventry.
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We had a new and enthusiastic physics master who set us more
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homework than I could manage; and at the end of more than two
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hours when the supposed allocation was 45 minutes, I had to solve a
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problem in speci c heats. I worked the answer out to thirteen places
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of decimals, knowing perfectly well that this was quite unjusti ed,
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and in fact getting the answer wrong. The master promptly sent for
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me, saying that surely I knew better than to work out an answer to
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that degree of meaningless precision. I replied that I did, but that I
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thought he would like an answer matching the length of the
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homework that he had set us. The result was that he moderated his
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demands, but the point of the story in this context is that as fourth
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form schoolboys we already well knew how many places of decimals
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were justi ed in particular measurements: its signi cance was to be
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evident at Coventry in 1940.
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Life was not easy. I sometimes felt like giving up, when I
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contrasted my situation with that of some of my classmates who
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could turn to their parents for help. All that my mother could say,
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now that I was beyond her academic attainment, was ‘Stick it!’, and
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somehow I stuck. In retrospect, such encouragement was far more
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valuable than any detailed help. Too many parents are super cially
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solicitous over their children, and I have come to appreciate Edward
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III’s restraint over the Black Prince at Crecy: ‘Let the boy win his
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spurs!’
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My main hobby in my schooldays was, as with many other boys
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of my generation, the making of radio receiving sets. There has
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never been anything comparable in any other period of history to
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the impact of radio on the ordinary individual in the 1920’s. It was
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the product of some of the most imaginative developments that
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have ever occurred in physics, and it was as near magic as anyone
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could conceive, in that with a few mainly home-made components
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simply connected together one could conjure speech and music out
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of the air. The construction of radio receivers was just within the
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competence of the average man, who could thus write himself a
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passport to countries he could never hope to visit. And he could
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always make modi cations that might improve his aerial or his
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receiver and give him something to boast about to his friends. I
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acquired much of my manipulative skill through building and
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handling receivers: when at last I could a ord a thermionic valve in
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1928, I built a receiver that picked up transmissions from
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Melbourne, which that station acknowledged by sending me a
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postcard carrying the signatures of the English Test Team.
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My interest in radio, coupled with an instinct that physics was the
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most basic of the sciences, permanently biased me in that direction.
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I had originally intended to be a chemist, but by the time I went to
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Oxford, my choice had nally settled on physics. Actually, the
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school had wanted me to try for a scholarship at Cambridge in
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mathematics, but to the astonishment of my masters I refused to
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enter, remembering my experience at the rst Boat Race and saying
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that I had been Oxford ever since (although we had been defeated
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nearly every year) and I was not going to change now. Had someone
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pointed out to me that if I got to Cambridge I might have a chance
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of working with Rutherford, my blind loyalty to Oxford might have
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been sorely tried—if I had believed him, for to work with
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Rutherford seemed beyond dreams. As it was, I was happy to be
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tutored by a new Oxford graduate in physics who had just joined
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the school and who was to do much for it over the next forty years,
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‘Inky’ Incledon, and I was awarded an Open Exhibition at Wadham
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College in 1929.
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I immediately came to appreciate the atmosphere of Wadham.
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Built of soft Cotswold stone, its frontage on Parks Road was trim, its
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hall and quadrangle beautifully proportioned, and its garden
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delightful. If incense were needed for Matthew Arnold’s ‘Last
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Enchantments of the Middle Ages’ it could well be the autumn smell
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of burning twigs in Wadham garden.
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T. C. Keeley was my tutor; and in addition to physics he o ered
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wisdom. He warned us that if another war broke out there would be
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a disastrous period for six months while those who had reached
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high positions on inadequate abilities in peacetime would have to be
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replaced. He also introduced us to some of the comic achievements
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of administrators. He had been at the Royal Aircraft Establishment
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at Farnborough during the First War, and apart from their unhappily
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naming their rst airship ‘The May y’, which didn’t, they had at
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one stage changed the method of packing bombs into crates, with
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the result that a crate arrived at Farnborough bearing the legend
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‘Caution! The bombs in this crate are packed in a di erent manner
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from that formerly used. Compared with the old methods the bombs
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are now packed upside down, and the crate must therefore be
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opened at the bottom. To prevent confusion, the bottom has been
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labelled “Top”.’
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Keeley had been brought from Farnborough to Oxford by the
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Professor of Experimental Philosophy, Frederick Alexander
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Lindemann, who had succeeded to that Chair and to the Headship of
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the Clarendon Laboratory in 1919. A natural physicist, he was also a
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champion tennis player, and a man of great courage. At
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Farnborough during the war he had worked out the method of
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recovering an aircraft from a spin, which had hitherto been a nearly
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fatal condition, and despite defective vision in one eye he had
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learned to y to put his theory to the test. It developed into a
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manoeuvre that has been standard ever since.
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I rst came to Lindemann’s notice at the end of my rst term of
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physics in 1931, somewhat accidentally. At the Terminal
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Examination I found that the paper was divided into two parts, the
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questions in the rst part being di erent and much more
|
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challenging than those in the rest of the paper. The rubric advised
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candidates to spend at least an hour on the rst part, and I became
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so interested in them that I failed to notice that my watch had
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stopped. Only in the last quarter of an hour of the three hours
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allocated did I realize that time had passed, and I could only
|
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scribble brief answers for the second part. It turned out that the
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questions that had so interested me had been set by Lindemann
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himself, and that he was looking much more for physical insight
|
||
than for the retailing of existing knowledge. A few days later he told
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me that he had never had his questions answered so e ectively; and
|
||
even though I told him this was partly because I had spent nearly
|
||
three times as long on them as I ought to have done, he talked of a
|
||
possible Fellowship after I had taken Finals.
|
||
I was duly awarded a First in 1932, and was granted a Research
|
||
Studentship to work for a doctorate. Again, the subject of my
|
||
research was somewhat accidental. There was a spectrometer for
|
||
examining infrared radiation in the laboratory. It was an extremely
|
||
|
||
|
||
tricky instrument, and the man who had been using it previously
|
||
was now so tired of it that he persuaded Lindemann that someone
|
||
else ought to take it over. As it seemed to o er a prospect for both
|
||
theory and experimental work, I agreed to take it on, and found
|
||
within the rst week that its infra-red detector was broken.
|
||
Lindemann suggested that I should therefore make a new one, and I
|
||
became involved in designing and making new infrared detectors
|
||
an activity which on and o I was to pursue over the next thirty
|
||
years. This quickly brought me into con ict with Lindemann, who
|
||
had novel ideas on how infra-red detectors should be made, but
|
||
after some time I found that he had been leading me up a garden
|
||
path because he had made some erroneous assumptions he had not
|
||
troubled to check. When I told him so, he accused me of a defeatist
|
||
attitude, and, stung by his comments, I began to follow my own
|
||
ideas.
|
||
At the same time, he continued to talk to me about more general
|
||
matters, perhaps because he realized that in several directions we
|
||
had similar interests. I can recall walking back to Wadham one
|
||
evening in 1933 from the Clarendon, just after Hitler came to
|
||
power. He pointed out to me that the world was heading towards
|
||
dictatorships, with Stalin in Russia, Mussolini in Italy, Hitler in
|
||
Germany; and Roosevelt had just won the Presidential Election in
|
||
America. He wondered whether we should be able to survive
|
||
without becoming a dictatorship ourselves.
|
||
Within a few weeks the Oxford Union Society passed its notorious
|
||
resolution which had been either proposed or supported by C. E. M.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Joad, that ‘Under no circumstances will this house ght for King and
|
||
Country’. I was not a member of the Union, but I was disgusted. The
|
||
news of the motion reverberated round the world. A. J. P. Taylor in
|
||
his English History 1914-1945 says that there is no documentary
|
||
evidence that it had any e ect on the dictators; but Churchill in The
|
||
Gathering Storm said that Lord Lloyd, who was on friendly terms
|
||
with Mussolini noted how the latter had been struck by the
|
||
resolution and ‘In Germany, in Russia, in Italy, in Japan, the idea of
|
||
a decadent, degenerate Britain took deep root and swayed many
|
||
calculations’. And in the Daily Telegraph of 4th May 1965, Erich von
|
||
Richthofen wrote, ‘I am an ex-o cer of the old Wehrmacht and
|
||
served on what you would call the German General Sta at the time
|
||
of the Oxford resolution. I can assure you, from personal knowledge,
|
||
that no other factor in uenced Hitler more and decided him on his
|
||
course than that “refusal to ght for King and Country”, coming
|
||
from what was assumed to be the intellectual elite of your country.’
|
||
I wrote my next letter home in the light of a comment that I once
|
||
heard my mother make to someone else during the First War that
|
||
much as she would hate me to go, I would not be a son of hers if I
|
||
were not ghting. I told her not to judge Oxford by the aspiring
|
||
politicians in the Union, and although most of my colleagues were
|
||
at that time paci sts, I thought that many of us would ght. I
|
||
certainly would, although it might not be quite in the front-line way
|
||
that she and my father would be expecting, because it was quite
|
||
possible that there would be essential jobs that only physicists could
|
||
do.
|
||
|
||
|
||
I must have felt more strongly than most of my contemporaries,
|
||
none of whom can I recall being particularly worried about the rise
|
||
of Hitler, or about the need to develop our defences. Lindemann was
|
||
the only man I can recall talking to me about it, and in that respect
|
||
we were clearly fellow spirits. Many of my contemporaries thought
|
||
that a paci st approach could be e ective in resisting dictatorships,
|
||
and there was much enthusiasm for a silly play that was broadcast
|
||
more than once which pictured a small bu er state between two
|
||
much larger states preventing a war by massing unarmed on their
|
||
frontiers to resist the passage of tanks from the opposing sides. The
|
||
tank commanders were supposed to have refrained from driving
|
||
their tanks over the bodies of the unarmed pickets. These were the
|
||
days of the well-intentioned but unrealistic League of Nations
|
||
Union.
|
||
I took my doctorate in 1934 at the age of 22. My di erences with
|
||
Lindemann over research work had reached the point where it
|
||
seemed that I could no longer continue in the Clarendon, and I was
|
||
awarded a Senior Studentship in Astronomy in Balliol, with the
|
||
objective of henceforward working in the University Observatory
|
||
with H. H. Plaskett on the infra-red spectrum of the Sun. To my
|
||
surprise Lindemann then told me that he regretted that our
|
||
di erences had been so great, and even though I was now formally
|
||
on the Observatory sta , he would be glad for me to continue
|
||
working in his laboratory as long as I pleased. My prospects looked
|
||
good: my doctorate was out of the way, and by the time the Balliol
|
||
Studentship terminated there was the likelihood of a
|
||
|
||
|
||
Commonwealth Fellowship to Mt. Wilson for two years, after which
|
||
there was to be a Travelling Fellowship with half my time being
|
||
spent in Oxford and the other in South Africa, to which the Radcli e
|
||
Observatory was moving. The money had been provided by Lord
|
||
Nu eld’s purchase of the Observatory site in Oxford for the new
|
||
medical school, and the Fellowship had been specially instituted
|
||
with me in mind.
|
||
At this same time, July 1934, I had one of my greatest strokes of
|
||
fortune. For a month that summer I became tutor to a Christchurch
|
||
undergraduate, Mark Meynell, who came from Hoar Cross, a stately
|
||
home in Sta ordshire. His parents were Colonel and Lady Dorothy
|
||
Meynell. The family very quickly accepted me, starting with the
|
||
younger daughter, Rachel, followed by her elder sister Dorothy and
|
||
brother Hugo. These were the last days of the traditional English
|
||
country house, with weekend parties full of gracious living and good
|
||
company. Over the years I have been much indebted to the Meynells
|
||
for this experience of their way of life, and for very warm
|
||
friendship. I had now, as it were, seen everything of English life
|
||
from the street market to the stately home, and it left me with none
|
||
of the class bitterness that has since so bedevilled English politics.
|
||
My England was that of Rupert Brooke and Robert Falcon Scott who
|
||
wrote in the last pages of his diary as he was dying in the tent in
|
||
Antarctica: ‘I do not regret this journey which shows that
|
||
Englishmen can endure hardships, help one another and meet death
|
||
with as great fortitude as ever in the past.’ If the time came, this
|
||
England would be worth ghting for.
|
||
|
||
|
||
So the stage was now set for the events of 1935. But this chapter
|
||
may properly end with an incident from 1919 which will serve as
|
||
both paradigm and parable. It was the 22nd of March and the
|
||
Victory Parade of the Brigade of Guards. My mother and I were
|
||
standing somewhere in the great crowd near Hyde Park Corner, and
|
||
I had my rst experience of an individual perceiving a truth that
|
||
was staring the crowd in the face, and yet all the rest failing to see it
|
||
until it was spelled out for them. As Company after Company came
|
||
by, the crowd burst into cheer after cheer. And then there came a
|
||
company that was di erent—all its men were in civilian clothes.
|
||
The cheering died away, the crowd was subdued. What were
|
||
civilians doing in a parade like this? Were they recruits who had
|
||
joined in time to miss the war? I shared the disappointment that
|
||
these drab men should interlope among the splendid Guardsmen.
|
||
And then the hush was broken by the indignant voice of a woman
|
||
crying ‘Cheer the men in civvies—they were the men who went rst’.
|
||
It was absolutely true, for these were the survivors of the ‘Old
|
||
Contemptibles’, already demobilized on the rule of ‘ rst in, rst
|
||
out’.
|
||
The shamed crowd apologized with thundering cheers. Although I
|
||
have not spoken of it in the fty years since, I remember because
|
||
the voice had been my own mother’s. And one of the men in civvies,
|
||
marching unmistakably as a Guardsman even though, thanks to
|
||
Festubert, his left arm was three inches short, was my father.
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
CHAPTER TWO
|
||
Friends and Rivals
|
||
T
|
||
HE WEEK that I went to Hoar Cross, The Times published on
|
||
8th August a letter from Lindemann headed ‘Science and Air
|
||
Bombing’. This read:
|
||
Sir, In the debate in the House of Commons on Monday on the
|
||
proposed expansion of our Air Forces, it seemed to be taken for
|
||
granted on all sides that there is, and can be, no defence against
|
||
bombing aeroplanes and that we must rely entirely upon
|
||
counter-attack and reprisals. That there is at present no means
|
||
of preventing hostile bombers from depositing their loads of
|
||
explosives, incendiary materials, gases, or bacteria upon their
|
||
objectives I believe to be true; that no method can be devised to
|
||
safeguard great centres of population from such a fate appears
|
||
to me to be profoundly improbable.
|
||
If no protective contrivance can be found and we are reduced
|
||
to a policy of reprisals, the temptation to be ‘quickest on the
|
||
draw’ will be tremendous. It seems not too much to say that
|
||
bombing aeroplanes in the hands of gangster Governments
|
||
might jeopardize the whole future of our Western civilization.
|
||
|
||
|
||
To adopt a defeatist attitude in the face of such a threat is
|
||
inexcusable until it has de nitely been shown that all the
|
||
resources of science and invention have been exhausted. The
|
||
problem is far too important and too urgent to be left to the
|
||
casual endeavours of individuals or departments. The whole
|
||
weight and in uence of the Government should be thrown into
|
||
the scale to endeavour to nd a solution. All decent men and all
|
||
honourable Governments are equally concerned to obtain
|
||
security against attacks from the air and to achieve it no e ort
|
||
and no sacri ce is too great.
|
||
Once again, he was using his favourite ‘defeatist attitude’ but there
|
||
was great force to what he said. Baldwin had stated in Parliament
|
||
on 10th November 1932 that ‘the bomber will always get through’
|
||
and the summer air exercises of 1934 had seemed to provide ample
|
||
con rmation.
|
||
Lindemann was very strongly supported by his friend Winston
|
||
Churchill, who was some twelve years his senior. They had rst met
|
||
in 1921 when Lindemann had partnered Mrs. Churchill in an
|
||
exhibition tennis tournament for charity at Eaton Hall, the home of
|
||
the Duke of Westminster. At rst sight so di erent, the two men
|
||
quickly saw each other’s qualities. Churchill, who counted eating,
|
||
drinking, and smoking among his pleasures, valued Lindemann’s
|
||
keenness of mind and his bravery as a test pilot. Lindemann, the
|
||
non-smoking and abstaining vegetarian, valued Churchill’s supreme
|
||
quality of action inspired by warm humanity and lively imagination.
|
||
|
||
|
||
The anchor points of their friendship were courage, patriotism and
|
||
humour; in these each matched the other. Love of good language
|
||
and prowess in sport, Lindemann in tennis and Churchill in polo,
|
||
were also matters of common ground.
|
||
Over the ten years following their rst meeting, Churchill came to
|
||
depend on Lindemann for advice ranging from the future of science
|
||
in warfare to the design of the fountains in his gardens at Chartwell.
|
||
From 1932 onwards, when Lindemann lost his other political friend,
|
||
Lord Birkenhead, he and Churchill were drawn much closer together
|
||
in the alarm they both felt about the rise of Nazi Germany. They did
|
||
their utmost to awaken the country in general and the politicians in
|
||
particular. They had even gone to visit Stanley Baldwin during his
|
||
holiday at Aix les Bains in 1934 and had mooted the idea of forming
|
||
a special subcommittee of the Committee of Imperial Defence.
|
||
As often happens, someone else had a rather similar idea. He was
|
||
a scienti c civil servant, A. P. Rowe, the Personal Assistant to H. E.
|
||
Wimperis, the Director of Scienti c Research in the Air Ministry. In
|
||
June 1934 Rowe had warned the Ministry that ‘unless science
|
||
evolved some new method of aiding our defence, we were likely to
|
||
lose the next war if it started within ten years’. In the resulting
|
||
discussions Wimperis in November 1934 proposed the formation of
|
||
a Committee for the Scienti c Survey of Air Defence, and Henry
|
||
Tizard was selected as Chairman.
|
||
Henceforward both Lindemann and Tizard were to be major
|
||
factors in my life; and since much has been made of their
|
||
di erences, it is interesting to compare their careers up to this point
|
||
|
||
|
||
in the story. Lindemann had been born in 1886 at Baden-Baden, his
|
||
father being a wealthy engineer of Alsatian origin but who left
|
||
Alsace after it was ceded to Germany in 1871 and became a British
|
||
citizen. Tizard had been born in 1885, his father being Captain T. H.
|
||
Tizard of the Royal Navy and of Huguenot descent; in fact, on
|
||
hearing the Tizards described as ‘more English than the English’
|
||
Henry had remarked, ‘With a name like mine, you have to be!’
|
||
Lindemann had been at preparatory school in Scotland, and then
|
||
went to Darmstadt and thence to university in Berlin, where he
|
||
became a research student under Walther Nernst and took his Ph.D.
|
||
in 1910. There he met Tizard as a fellow research student, Tizard
|
||
having been at Westminster School and at Magdalen College Oxford,
|
||
where he read Chemistry. While Tizard returned to Oxford,
|
||
Lindemann stayed in Berlin for further research with Nernst, and
|
||
produced some very distinguished work. At the outbreak of war in
|
||
1914 both men were abroad—Lindemann still in Germany, Tizard
|
||
with the British Association in Australia. Both hurried home,
|
||
Lindemann nding his niche in the Royal Aircraft Establishment at
|
||
Farnborough and Tizard in the Royal Flying Corps. Both became test
|
||
pilots, although each had defective vision in one eye. At the end of
|
||
the war Tizard returned to Oxford, and successfully canvassed for
|
||
Lindemann to be elected to the vacant Chair of Experimental
|
||
Philosophy. So far they had been the best of friends.
|
||
It is di cult to be sure regarding the rst rift in their relations.
|
||
They could always argue vehemently on simple questions of science,
|
||
such as the most e cient way of packing oranges into a box
|
||
|
||
|
||
whether the oranges in adjacent layers should lie with each orange
|
||
directly over the one below, or should instead nestle as closely as
|
||
possible into the spaces between the oranges in the layer below.
|
||
Retrospectively, Tizard thought that Lindemann may have resented
|
||
not being put onto government committees because Tizard had not
|
||
given him su cient support after Tizard himself had become
|
||
Secretary of the Department of Scienti c and Industrial Research.
|
||
But whatever real or imaginary grievance Lindemann may have
|
||
harboured, he now—in 1935—felt that he had plenty. He and
|
||
Churchill had made all the political running for something drastic to
|
||
be done about Air Defence; they did not think that the Air Ministry
|
||
was to be entrusted with it, for the Ministry had given Baldwin the
|
||
advice that ‘the bomber will always get through’. Lindemann and
|
||
Churchill therefore wanted the problem to be considered at the
|
||
higher level of the Committee of Imperial Defence which should
|
||
form a special Sub-Committee for Air Defence. As recently as 27th
|
||
November 1934 Lindemann had met Tizard at the Royal Society and
|
||
solicited his aid in pressing for this Sub-Committee to be formed.
|
||
Whether or not Tizard had already been informally approached
|
||
by Wimperis is not clear, but on 12th December he was formally
|
||
asked to Chair the Air Ministry’s own Committee. On 10th January
|
||
1935 the Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald, agreed with
|
||
Lindemann and Churchill that a C.I.D. Sub-Committee for Air
|
||
Defence should be formed, only to nd afterwards that the Air
|
||
Ministry had just set up its own Committee which it was claimed
|
||
would be su cient. When Lindemann and Churchill were informed
|
||
|
||
|
||
of this fait accompli, it seemed to them that the Ministry had
|
||
prevaricated so as to gain time to form its own Committee and so
|
||
forestall any move at a higher level. Lindemann found himself left
|
||
out and his old friend Tizard preferred, along with A. V. Hill and P.
|
||
M. S. Blackett. He would have had to be almost superhuman not to
|
||
feel resentful. So an erstwhile friendship was succeeded by an
|
||
acrimonious rivalry—I can recall Lindemann parodying Omar
|
||
Khayyam with something along the lines of ‘The Blackett and the
|
||
Tizard keep the courts where Trenchard once did sleep’.
|
||
At the outset, Tizard and his Committee—and Britain—had a
|
||
tremendous stroke of luck, for on 18th January 1935 Wimperis saw
|
||
R. A. Watson-Watt of the Radio Research Station at Slough, and
|
||
asked him to advise ‘on the practicability of proposals of the type
|
||
colloquially called “death ray” ’, the idea being the creation of a
|
||
su ciently strong beam of electromagnetic waves which would heat
|
||
up anything in their path to the point where living tissue would be
|
||
destroyed or bombs automatically exploded. Watson-Watt had given
|
||
the problem of calculating the amount of power employed to his
|
||
assistant A. F. (‘Skip’) Wilkins, and the latter quickly calculated that
|
||
the power involved would be far beyond current technology. When
|
||
he handed the calculation to Watson-Watt the latter said, ‘Well,
|
||
then, if the death ray is not possible, how can we help them?’
|
||
Wilkins replied that he knew that Post O ce engineers had noticed
|
||
disturbances to radio reception when aircraft ew in the vicinity of
|
||
their receivers, and that this phenomenon might be useful for
|
||
detecting enemy aircraft.
|
||
|
||
|
||
The Post O ce observations had been made in 1931, and indeed
|
||
rather similar observations had been made at H.M. Signal School in
|
||
1923. Moreover, Marconi had proposed in 1922 to detect ships by
|
||
means of re ected radio waves and in 1931 W. A. S. Butement and
|
||
P. E. Pollard of the Signals Experimental Establishment at Woolwich
|
||
had devised and made a pulsed radio system on a wavelength of
|
||
about 50 centimetres for detecting ships, and a rather similar system
|
||
was in course of being installed on the French liner Normandie for
|
||
detecting icebergs. As regards air defence in Britain, though, it was
|
||
Wilkins’ remark to Watson-Watt that started the serious
|
||
development of radar.
|
||
A brief note from Watson-Watt was available to the Tizard
|
||
Committee at its rst meeting on 28th January 1935 and by 14th
|
||
February Tizard had received a more detailed memorandum. On
|
||
26th February the rst test was held near Daventry, using radio
|
||
waves from one of the transmitters there in the 49 metre band, and
|
||
with a Heyford bomber as a target ying at a height of ten thousand
|
||
feet and piloted by Squadron Leader R. S. Blucke. The test was
|
||
immediately successful, and the British development of radar could
|
||
now start in earnest. So from the very rst, the Tizard Committee
|
||
had been presented with the basic solution to the greatest of the
|
||
problems that it had to face.
|
||
On the same day, 14th February, that Tizard had discussed with
|
||
Watson-Watt and others over lunch at the Athenaeum the paper
|
||
Watson-Watt had produced, Lindemann and Churchill were joined
|
||
by Austen Chamberlainin meeting Ramsay MacDonald, who nally
|
||
|
||
|
||
agreed that an air defence sub-committee of the Committee of
|
||
Imperial Defence should be formed, notwithstanding the existence
|
||
of the Tizard Committee. It appears from Lindemann’s notes that the
|
||
Prime Minister even agreed to get the Tizard Committee wound up.
|
||
The C.I.D. Sub-Committee met for the rst time on 11th April under
|
||
the Chairmanship of Lord Swinton, who suggested that Churchill
|
||
should be made a member. Churchill agreed, provided that
|
||
Lindemann would be made a member of the ‘Technical Sub
|
||
Committee’, which was how Churchill regarded the Tizard
|
||
Committee.
|
||
I knew very little of all this, and was brought into the eld in a
|
||
manner which involved neither Lindemann nor Tizard. It started
|
||
with a ring on the bell of my lodgings at 10 St. Michael’s Street on
|
||
the morning of Saturday 16th February 1935. My landlady informed
|
||
me that I had visitors, and these turned out to be Commander Paul
|
||
H. Macneil, a retired o cer of the U.S. Navy, and his wife, Ruth.
|
||
They had come to England in the hope of selling to the Air Ministry
|
||
a detection system for aircraft based on the infra-red or heat
|
||
radiation emitted by aircraft engines. They were due to give a
|
||
demonstration at the Royal Aircraft Establishment on the following
|
||
Thursday, and at the last moment the vital detecting element in
|
||
their apparatus had broken down. Resourcefully, Macneil had
|
||
contacted the Institute of Physics in London and asked whether
|
||
there was anyone in England who could make him a replacement
|
||
detector in a hurry.
|
||
|
||
|
||
It happened that a few months before I had published a paper on
|
||
the design of infra-red detectors, and the Institute of Physics
|
||
suggested that Macneil should get in touch with me. I was
|
||
fascinated with Macneil’s ideas, and told him that I would try. I
|
||
thought that at worst I could only waste four days of my life,
|
||
because he said that it would be no good unless the detector could
|
||
be made by Wednesday evening. I therefore evolved a new design
|
||
on Sunday, and spent the next three days and nights with very little
|
||
sleep, only to fail. At about 2 a.m. on the day xed for the trial I
|
||
telephoned Macneil to tell him that I had failed, but he replied that
|
||
this did not matter because the trial had been postponed for a
|
||
fortnight, so perhaps I would try again. Over the next few months I
|
||
saw a good deal of the Macneils in their at above Prunier’s, from
|
||
which we viewed the 1935 Jubilee Procession. I was with Macneil
|
||
at Croydon aerodrome at about this time when he undoubtedly
|
||
detected the Imperial Airways aircraft as they taxied for take-o .
|
||
So at just about the same time that radar was at the nascent stage,
|
||
I became involved with infra-red at a similar stage. Lindemann did
|
||
not come into my room for a week or two; but when he did, and
|
||
asked me what I was doing, I told him that this very interesting job
|
||
had come up, and that I was seeing what I could do to detect
|
||
aircraft by infra-red. His immediate comment was ‘You ought not to
|
||
be doing that for an American inventor, you ought to be doing it for
|
||
the Government!’ He went on to say that he had proposed the idea
|
||
himself in 1916 but that no one had done anything about it.
|
||
Unwittingly, I had presented him with an argument that he could
|
||
|
||
|
||
use against the Tizard Committee, for he could now say that while
|
||
Tizard and his friends were sitting around a table talking, he,
|
||
Lindemann, had a man in his laboratory actually doing something
|
||
about air defence. Towards the end of April I had a long talk with
|
||
him, and as a result he may well have begun to press for something
|
||
to be done o cially about infra-red, for the minutes of the Tizard
|
||
Committee for 16th May contained the following entry: ‘The
|
||
Committee considers that the detection of heat radiation from an
|
||
aircraft engine or of energy radiated by an aircraft engine magneto
|
||
o er no prospect of success; each of these methods has been the
|
||
subject of experiments’. Indeed, A. B. Wood, a distinguished
|
||
physicist on the Admiralty sta , had made trials with infra-red at
|
||
Farnborough in 1927 which indicated that infra-red was
|
||
unpromising, and his ndings could be supported by the argument
|
||
that the infra-red radiation coming out of an aircraft engine could
|
||
easily be screened by an extra cowling, and that even if it did get
|
||
out, it would not penetrate cloud. Finally, whereas radar gave an
|
||
indication of the range as well as the direction of the target, infra
|
||
red could at best give direction only.
|
||
As usual when faced by opposition, Lindemann produced a
|
||
plausible counter-argument. Although engines could be screened,
|
||
there was far more heat energy coming out in the exhaust gases
|
||
than that which would be radiated by the engine, and these gases,
|
||
too, would radiate and so they should be detectable. To satisfy
|
||
Lindemann the Committee then agreed that some trials should be
|
||
made at Farnborough. The trials were to be undertaken by an
|
||
|
||
|
||
impartial body, the National Physical Laboratory, but even then
|
||
Lindemann said that he would only accept them if I were present as
|
||
an expert observer on his behalf. I was therefore surprised when Dr.
|
||
J. S. Anderson of the N.P.L. telephoned me and asked if he could
|
||
borrow my infra-red aircraft detector. He explained that the N.P.L.
|
||
had no suitable equipment but that Mr. Wimperis had told him that
|
||
Lindemann had said I had an infra-red detector which ashed lights
|
||
whenever an aircraft ew in front of it. I explained that I had no
|
||
such thing and Anderson seemed so crestfallen, saying he now had
|
||
no hope of doing the trials, that I o ered to help him out by at least
|
||
making a detector that should be capable of settling the point about
|
||
exhaust gases.
|
||
I realized that Lindemann had made what I subsequently came to
|
||
recognize as a characteristic overstatement. I had sometime before
|
||
told him that, from what I had seen of Macneil’s experiments, it
|
||
should be possible to make a much better system by oscillating the
|
||
detector mirror so that any hot source in the eld of view was
|
||
alternatively focused on and o the detector element, giving rise to
|
||
a rhythmic signal which could easily be recognized against its
|
||
background. For this a fast detector would be required, and if one
|
||
could be made its rhythmic uctuations could be used to generate
|
||
an alternating current which could be ampli ed electronically,
|
||
rather than detected by a galvanometer. Once we had the possibility
|
||
of electronic ampli cation, we could begin to give visual warning of
|
||
the presence of an infra-red source, and could even make a pattern
|
||
of lights which would indicate the direction of the source. These
|
||
|
||
|
||
were all ideas that I considered feasible but which no one had
|
||
pursued, and which Lindemann must in his mind have converted
|
||
into a ctitious reality before he told the other members of the
|
||
Tizard Committee about them.
|
||
There would be no time to build such an apparatus before the
|
||
Farnborough trials. So I spent most of October 1935 making
|
||
something much simpler that should resolve the question
|
||
Lindemann had raised. On 4th November I set the equipment up on
|
||
the roof of the Instrument Building at Farnborough to examine
|
||
aircraft suitably staked on the ground as their engines were raised to
|
||
full revolutions. Whereas Anderson was to have done the trials and I
|
||
was to have been the observer, our roles were reversed. It quickly
|
||
became evident that although there was ample infra-red radiation
|
||
being emitted by a hot engine, this could be easily screened, and by
|
||
interposing a movable aircraft spare wing in front of the engine I
|
||
showed that there was little infra-red getting out from the hot gases
|
||
in the exhaust. After a few days I returned to Oxford and wrote the
|
||
report, sending it to Anderson for his agreement before I showed it
|
||
to Lindemann. The latter was understandably annoyed that he had
|
||
had no chance to question our ndings before they had received the
|
||
authority of the National Physical Laboratory, but I thought that this
|
||
would be the end of the matter. His argument had been so plausible
|
||
that there must be a factor he had overlooked: this turned out to be
|
||
the fact that the gases had indeed radiated infra-red as he expected,
|
||
but they radiated it in the very bands of wavelength that are
|
||
strongly absorbed by the carbon dioxide and water vapour in the
|
||
|
||
|
||
Earth’s atmosphere, and so become almost undetectable at more
|
||
than very short ranges. With current technology, as opposed to that
|
||
of forty years ago, the small amounts of energy that do get through
|
||
can now be detected, and in any event engines are much more
|
||
powerful and therefore emit much more, but the exploitation of the
|
||
technique lay far in the future.
|
||
My report to the Tizard Committee had the opposite e ect to that
|
||
which I expected. Instead of the Committee deciding that nothing
|
||
further should be done about infra-red, they asked me to see
|
||
whether I could develop an airborne infra-red detector so that it
|
||
could be mounted on a night ghter and thus detect bombers. Quite
|
||
possibly their engines would not be screened, and quite often they
|
||
would be ying in clear conditions without cloud; and although
|
||
airborne radar was possible, it might not work at short ranges owing
|
||
to the fact that the pulse coming back from the bomber would be
|
||
swamped by the pulse still emitted by the ghter. There could thus
|
||
be an awkward gap in the interception technique over the last
|
||
thousand yards or so, which infrared detection might ll. It seemed
|
||
that the Tizard Committee had been so surprised by the objectivity
|
||
of the report coming out of Lindemann’s laboratory that they were
|
||
ready to support further work there.
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
CHAPTER THREE
|
||
The Clarendon Laboratory 1936–1938
|
||
M
|
||
Y WORK on the airborne infra-red project was to start on 1st
|
||
January 1936, and I was to receive an honorarium of £100 for four
|
||
months’ work and an extra £50 for equipment. If the latter seems a
|
||
paltry sum now, it was large compared with what many of us in
|
||
laboratories in the ’30’s were accustomed to. And since these
|
||
laboratories were the cradles for most of the scientists who were
|
||
later to contribute so substantially to World War II, it may be worth
|
||
giving some impression of the Clarendon as a typical laboratory.
|
||
When Lindemann took it over in 1919 it had long been moribund.
|
||
Perhaps because he had found his activities in World War I so
|
||
absorbing, he never again settled down to serious research, although
|
||
with F. W. Aston he proposed a method of separating isotopes, and
|
||
with G. M. B. Dobson diagnosed the existence of a high temperature
|
||
layer in the upper atmosphere, and with T. C. Keeley devised a new
|
||
form of electrometer. These were the most successful examples of
|
||
the diversity of his mind, and he started o his relatively few
|
||
research students over a wide range of projects where they had no
|
||
expert help, so it was very much a matter of ‘sink or swim’ for them.
|
||
Two or three graduates would start research each year, and roughly
|
||
|
||
|
||
the same number leave after two years; since there were no more
|
||
than six Fellowships in physics in the whole university, there was
|
||
little chance of one of these becoming vacant for a new worker to
|
||
ll. The Cavendish under Rutherford at Cambridge obviously had
|
||
much greater attractions for serious physicists, and so for
|
||
Lindemann’s rst fteen years he had rather an odd assortment to
|
||
choose from. Even so, his was a lively laboratory where not only
|
||
was good physics done but also its fteen to twenty members had a
|
||
number of other achievements to their credit. Derek Jackson, later
|
||
to be Chief Airborne Radar O cer in Fighter Command, for
|
||
example rode in the Grand National. James Gri ths, subsequently
|
||
President of Magdalen, was a member of Leander. Two others,
|
||
‘Snooks’ Gratias and Jack Babbitt, were ice hockey blues, and Hylas
|
||
Holbourn was Laird of Foula in the Shetland Islands. And for some
|
||
years T. C. Keeley and E. Bolton King made the best photoelectric
|
||
cells in the world.
|
||
It is not clear how long it would have taken the Clarendon to
|
||
establish its reputation unaided, for in 1933 there occurred the
|
||
exodus of Jewish and other scientists from Germany, and
|
||
Lindemann was among the rst to o er them refuge. We thus had
|
||
an invigorating in ux of physicists including Erwin Schrödinger, the
|
||
London brothers, Leo Szilard, Franz Simon, Nicholas Kurti and Kurt
|
||
Mendelssohn; especially in low temperature research they rapidly
|
||
advanced the Clarendon to a world reputation.
|
||
By way of technical help, we had just two mechanics in the
|
||
workshop, A. H. Bodle and W. Stonard. I owed much to both of
|
||
|
||
|
||
them. Bodle lived with his wife and daughter in a lodge just outside
|
||
the laboratory, and I was often invited in for a late night cup of tea.
|
||
Frequently in the evenings would come the sounds of trios being
|
||
played with Mrs. Bodle at the piano, Marion with the violin and
|
||
Bodle with the viola. Physically a little man with Napoleon as his
|
||
hero, Bodle had largely taken refuge in books as an escape from the
|
||
bu eting of the world. He urged me not to remain as uneducated as
|
||
he believed the typical physicist to be, and he recounted with awe
|
||
once hearing Lindemann quote Herodotus. I promptly read
|
||
Herodotus, and was impressed by his penchant for good stories, and
|
||
with his honesty as an historian when he told that, while he himself
|
||
found it hard to believe, the Phoenicians who claimed to have sailed
|
||
round the south of Africa said that the sun then rose on the other
|
||
side. This observation simultaneously established Herodotus as
|
||
honest and added to the credibility that the Phoenicians had really
|
||
gone as far south as they claimed—a point of narrative technique
|
||
that I was later to use in trying to get the Germans to accept some of
|
||
our deceptions as genuine. Encouraged by Bodle I went on to read
|
||
Plutarch and Thucydides, and even the Icelandic Sagas, all of which
|
||
were to be sources of inspiration during the coming war.
|
||
Besides the Jewish refugees, we now had a German physicist of
|
||
much my own age, Carl Bosch, working in the laboratory. His father
|
||
was also Carl Bosch, a very ne man who had shared the Nobel
|
||
Prize in 1931 for high-pressure chemistry. He was President of I.G.
|
||
Farben Industrie, and his prestige was so great that he was elected
|
||
by his fellow scientists as President of the Kaiser Wilhelm
|
||
|
||
|
||
Gesellschaft, as one of the few men big enough to stand up to the
|
||
Nazis.
|
||
I rst heard about Bosch from some of the others in the
|
||
Clarendon, who told me that he was a great practical joker. There
|
||
was something challenging about their tone, and I wondered
|
||
whether they had said similar things about me to Bosch, with the
|
||
object of getting us to play practical jokes on one another.
|
||
Fortunately for me, and perhaps unfortunately for the rest of the
|
||
Clarendon, he happened to be in the Laboratory a few evenings
|
||
later. Since ‘the Prof’ himself tended to set the pattern by not
|
||
arriving before 11 a.m., not a great deal of work was done during
|
||
our mornings, and it was customary for a few of us to come back
|
||
after dinner and work well past midnight, and sometimes all night.
|
||
On this particular evening when Bosch and I rst met, we started to
|
||
chat and the subject worked round to the tricks that one could do
|
||
with a telephone. Bosch told me that he had worked on an upper
|
||
oor of a laboratory from which he could see into the windows of a
|
||
block of ats, and he had found that the occupant of one of them
|
||
was a newspaper reporter. The telephone in the at was visible
|
||
through the window, and Bosch telephoned the reporter pretending
|
||
to be his own professor. He said that he had just invented a
|
||
marvellous instrument that could be attached to any ordinary
|
||
telephone, and which would enable the user to see what was going
|
||
on at the other end. This was around 1933, when the possibilities of
|
||
television were just being mooted. The reporter was, of course,
|
||
incredulous, and the supposed professor o ered to give him a
|
||
|
||
|
||
demonstration. He told the reporter to point the telephone towards
|
||
the middle of the room and to stand in front of it and assume any
|
||
attitude he liked, such as holding one arm up, and when he returned
|
||
to the telephone he would be told exactly what he had done. Bosch,
|
||
of course, could see perfectly well what he had done simply by
|
||
looking through the window. The reporter was appropriately
|
||
astonished, with the result that the following morning there
|
||
appeared a most enthusiastic article about Bosch’s professor and his
|
||
marvellous invention, together with a detailed description of the
|
||
demonstration.
|
||
Bosch and I then happily discussed variations on the telephone
|
||
theme and ultimately I said that it ought to be possible to kid
|
||
somebody to put a telephone into a bucket of water. I outlined to
|
||
Bosch the various moves, and we were laughing about the prospect
|
||
of their success and wondering whom we should select as a victim
|
||
when one of my colleagues, Gerald Touch, came into the Laboratory
|
||
and asked why we were so amused. He shared our amusement at
|
||
the prospect of the bucket of water, and he o ered to return to his
|
||
digs, where several research students resided, and to watch while
|
||
one or other of them answered the telephone, so as to report
|
||
whether my plan had been successful.
|
||
We therefore waited about twenty minutes and then I telephoned
|
||
Gerald Touch’s digs. Before anyone could answer I rang o again,
|
||
and repeated this procedure several times, in order to create the
|
||
impression that someone was trying to ring the number but that
|
||
something must be wrong. After this spell of induction, I dialled the
|
||
|
||
|
||
number again, and heard a voice which I recognized as belonging to
|
||
a very able research student in chemistry—in fact he had won the
|
||
Senior Scholarship in Chemistry in the whole University that year.
|
||
Reverting to the tongue that was my second language, the Cockney
|
||
that came from my early schooling, I explained that I was the
|
||
telephone engineer and had just received a complaint from a
|
||
subscriber who was trying to dial the number and who had failed to
|
||
get through. From the symptoms that he described I would say that
|
||
either his dial was running a bit too fast or there was a leak to earth
|
||
somewhere at the receiving end. I added that we would send a man
|
||
round in the morning to check the insulation, but it was just
|
||
possible that the fault could be cleared from the telephone exchange
|
||
if only we could be quite sure what it was. A few simple tests would
|
||
check whether this were so, and if the victim would be good enough
|
||
to help us with these tests, whoever it was who wanted to get
|
||
through might be able to do so the same evening. Would the victim
|
||
therefore help with the tests? Immediately, of course, he expressed a
|
||
readiness to do so, and I explained that I would have to keep him
|
||
waiting while I got out the appropriate manual so that we could go
|
||
through the correct test sequence.
|
||
I realized that he was so rmly ‘hooked’ that I could even a ord
|
||
to clown, and I persuaded him to sing loudly into the telephone on
|
||
the pretext that its carbon granules had seized up. By this time, of
|
||
course, all the residents of the household had now been alerted, and
|
||
watched with some amazement the rest of his performance. I told
|
||
|
||
|
||
him that his last e ort had cleared the microphone and that we
|
||
were now in a position to trace the leak to earth.
|
||
I explained that I would put on a testing signal, and that every
|
||
time he heard the signal that particular test had proved okay. The
|
||
appropriate signal was very simply generated by applying my own
|
||
receiver to its mouthpiece, which resulted in a tremendous squawk.
|
||
As I had also asked him to listen very carefully for it, he was nearly
|
||
deafened the rst time I did it. I then asked him to place the
|
||
receiver on the table beside him and touch it. I could, of course,
|
||
hear the noise of his nger making contact, and immediately I
|
||
repeated the squawk. When he picked up the receiver I told him
|
||
that that test had been satisfactory and that we must now try some
|
||
others, and I led him through a series of antics which involved him
|
||
holding the receiver by the ex, and as far away from his body as
|
||
possible, at the same time standing rst on one leg and then on the
|
||
other. When I had given him time to reach each position I duly
|
||
transmitted the squawk, and thus got him engrossed in listening for
|
||
it. After this series of tests I told him that we were now getting fairly
|
||
near the source of the trouble, and that all we now needed was a
|
||
good ‘earth’.
|
||
When he asked what that would be I said, ‘Well, sir, have you got
|
||
such a thing as a bucket of water?’ He said that he would try to nd
|
||
one, and within a minute or two he came back with the bucket.
|
||
When he said, ‘Well, what do we do now?’ I told him to place the
|
||
bucket on the table beside the telephone and to put his hand into
|
||
the water to make sure that he was well earthed and then to touch
|
||
|
||
|
||
the telephone again. When he did this, he duly heard the
|
||
appropriate squawk; and when he picked up the receiver again I
|
||
told him that there was now only one nal test and we would have
|
||
it clinched. When he asked what this was I asked him to pick up the
|
||
receiver gently by the ex, and hold it over the bucket and then
|
||
gently lower it into the water. He was quite ready to do so when
|
||
Gerald Touch, who had been rolling on the oor with agonized
|
||
laughter, thought the joke had gone far enough, and struggled to his
|
||
feet. While not wishing to give the game away, he thought that he
|
||
ought to stop our victim from doing any further damage, and he
|
||
started to remonstrate, saying that putting the telephone into the
|
||
water would irretrievably damage it. Our victim then said to me,
|
||
‘I’m very sorry about this but I’m having some di culty. There is a
|
||
chap here who is a physicist who says that if I put the telephone
|
||
into the water it will ruin it!’ I could not resist saying, ‘Oh,
|
||
aphysicist is he, sir. We know his kind—they think they know
|
||
everything about electricity. They’re always trying to put telephones
|
||
right by themselves and wrecking them. Don’t you worry about him,
|
||
sir, it’s all in my book here.’ There was a great gu aw at the other
|
||
end of the telephone while the victim said to Gerald Touch, ‘Ha, ha,
|
||
you hear that—the engineer said you physicists are always ruining
|
||
telephones because you think you know all about them.’ ‘I’m going
|
||
to do what he tells me.’ As he tried to put the telephone into the
|
||
water Gerald Touch seized his two wrists so as to try to stop him.
|
||
They stood, swaying in a trial of strength over the bucket and the
|
||
victim being the stronger man was on the point of succeeding. I
|
||
|
||
|
||
heard Touch’s voice saying ‘It’s Jones, you fool!’, and our victim, a
|
||
manifest sportsman, collapsed in laughter.
|
||
Bosch and I collaborated on several further occasions. On one we
|
||
had Leo Szilard go to call on the Daily Express in Fleet Street because
|
||
I had faked a telephone call from the editor asking Szilard to
|
||
con rm that he had recently invented a radioactive death ray. We
|
||
were astonished at the strength of Szilard’s reaction—it was not
|
||
until long after World War II that I found that he had just taken out
|
||
a secret patent on the possibility of a uranium chain reaction and
|
||
had assigned the patent to the British Admiralty. Telephone hoaxes
|
||
were easy to play because one had only to produce a convincing
|
||
impression in the single communications channel of the telephone: a
|
||
hoax which had to appear genuine to the victim’s eye as well as his
|
||
ear was much more di cult. Telephone hoaxes were so easy, in
|
||
fact, that I ultimately graduated from the practical joke to the
|
||
theoretical, being content to work out the various moves without
|
||
trying them on the prospective victim, in the near-certainty that he
|
||
would have fallen for them. Moreover, it was not very sporting to
|
||
play jokes which had no chance of rebounding; and I sometimes
|
||
aimed at creating a comic situation from which I could only
|
||
extricate myself by thinking more quickly than the victim. Trobridge
|
||
Horton, my lodgings mate, once remarked that he could not
|
||
understand why I took such risks: my reply was that an academic
|
||
life gave us no exercise in quick thinking, and that I had a hunch
|
||
that the practice that jokes gave in quick thinking would one day
|
||
come in useful.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Arising from my friendship with Carl Bosch, an opportunity for
|
||
quick thinking soon arose. He was as much interested in military
|
||
matters as I was myself, and he told me that the Maginot Line was
|
||
not as impregnable as it was supposed to be because corrupt
|
||
contractors had put in considerably less concrete than they had been
|
||
paid for. On Friday 1st November 1935 he told me that he was o
|
||
to London for the weekend. I was staying in Oxford until Monday,
|
||
when I would have to go to Farnborough for the vital infra-red trials
|
||
about the exhaust gases, but of course I did not tell him about this.
|
||
My Saturday was normal up to teatime, which I spent with others
|
||
from the Clarendon, as usual, in Elliston and Cavell’s. On our return
|
||
we found a tall stranger, a German, in the Laboratory and he
|
||
explained that he was looking for Carl Bosch; he himself was Dr.
|
||
Hans W. Thost, the correspondent of the Völkische Beobachter (the
|
||
People’s Observer). I said that I was pretty sure that Bosch had gone
|
||
to London, but that I would telephone his digs. Returning from the
|
||
telephone I found that one of my colleagues had taken Thost into
|
||
my room, where my infra-red detecting equipment was assembled
|
||
ready for packing. Now a newspaper correspondent might easily be
|
||
a cover-occupation for a spy, and here he was in the room along
|
||
with equipment which was about to be used in a secret trial. If he
|
||
spotted it, and started to ask questions, it could be awkward. I
|
||
therefore thought that it would be a good idea to give him
|
||
something to think about, and generally distract his attention. So on
|
||
the spur of the moment I invented a preposterous story which
|
||
|
||
|
||
seemed harmless enough at the time, but could have had unforeseen
|
||
and unhappy consequences if we had lost the coming war.
|
||
I told Thost that I had a certain amount of sympathy with Hitler,
|
||
and could see why he had pushed out the Jews. Thost almost clicked
|
||
his heels together with an ‘Ach, so!’ and said that if it were not for
|
||
the Nazis he would not have his present job. But I went on to
|
||
wonder whether Hitler had done such a good thing for Germany
|
||
after all. ‘What do you mean?’ asked Thost. ‘Well’, I replied, ‘they
|
||
are very clever and if they started to plot against Germany there
|
||
could be trouble. For example’, I added, ‘I know that there is a great
|
||
anti-Nazi organization run by the Jewish refugees in Britain.’ With a
|
||
highly sibilant ‘Sso!’ Thost pulled out a pencil, stretched his arm to
|
||
expose a sti white cu and started to write notes upon it. ‘Oh yes’,
|
||
I went on, ‘I thought everyone knew about it. Why, the headquarters
|
||
are here in Oxford!’ ‘So, here in Oxford!’ repeated Thost at the same
|
||
time inscribing it on his cu . ‘Not only that’, I added, ‘but here in
|
||
this Laboratory. The headquarters is in that room over there, and
|
||
Franz Simon is the head of it.’ ‘Franz Simon’ wrote down Thost. I
|
||
then said that any friend of Bosch’s was a friend of mine, and since
|
||
Bosch was away I would be delighted to o er him dinner. ‘No, no’,
|
||
said Thost, ‘I must get back to London at once!’ And o he went.
|
||
Three weeks later I read on the placards as I went to dinner
|
||
‘R.A.F. SPY SCARE’. Being interested in both spies and the R.A.F., I
|
||
bought a paper but the story conveyed nothing to me—it concerned
|
||
a Dr. Goertz who had been arrested for making a sketch of the
|
||
aerodrome at Manston in Kent. Two days later I had a letter from
|
||
|
||
|
||
my mother, who had the same interest in spies, saying how glad she
|
||
was that they had got Dr. Goertz and how sorry she was that Dr.
|
||
Thost had got away. I was puzzled because there was no mention of
|
||
Thost in my paper, and I could not remember having told her that
|
||
he had visited me in Oxford. So I wrote home asking her how she
|
||
knew about Thost.
|
||
She replied that if only I would read a decent paper like the Daily
|
||
Sketch instead of The Times, I should be better informed. She sent me
|
||
the article from The Sketch and there undoubtedly was Thost’s
|
||
photograph alongside that of Goertz. It turned out that Thost was
|
||
one of Goertz’s acquaintances, at the least, and that he had been
|
||
made persona non grata by the Home O ce, because the security
|
||
authorities were convinced that he was a spy without having
|
||
enough evidence to convict him. So this was round No. 2 of the
|
||
escapade—I really had had a German spy in the room, and had
|
||
distracted him from the infra-red apparatus with this cock-and-bull
|
||
story about the anti-Nazi organization.
|
||
We thought no more of it for the next two years; but in August
|
||
1937 there was a bout of expulsion of newspaper correspondents
|
||
between Britain and Germany. We had expelled three
|
||
correspondents, the Germans retaliated, and this had raised the
|
||
question of whether newspaper correspondents were really spies or
|
||
not. As I later heard the story Simon and Nicholas Kurti were over
|
||
in Paris doing some low temperature experiments with the big
|
||
electro-magnet at Bellevue, when they were astonished by an article
|
||
in a paper published by the Jewish emigrés (probably the Pariser
|
||
|
||
|
||
Tageszeitung), which said that the British had been thoroughly
|
||
justi ed in their action. One of their own reporters had somehow
|
||
obtained a copy of Thost’s report back to his masters on how he had
|
||
come to be so unsuccessful as to be expelled from Britain. In it he
|
||
said that while he was in London he had obtained evidence of a
|
||
great anti-Nazi organization run by the Jewish refugees in Britain,
|
||
with its headquarters in Oxford and headed by the Jew Simon.
|
||
Thost had gone up to Oxford to investigate the matter and had
|
||
succeeded in penetrating the headquarters where he had spoken to
|
||
two Englishmen. One had immediately gone to the telephone to
|
||
warn the Jew Simon of Thost’s presence, and Simon had clearly
|
||
used his in uence with the English police to get Thost thrown out of
|
||
the country.
|
||
Simon and Kurti came back to Oxford with this astonishing story,
|
||
having no idea of the true explanation. At least, this is how I heard
|
||
the story at the time, although it must be mentioned that Nicholas
|
||
Kurti has no recollection of reading the newspaper in Paris. But
|
||
Thost certainly published in 1939 a book A National Socialist in
|
||
England 1930-1935 in which he stated that he had reported on the
|
||
activities of Jewish emigrés in England. Fortunately, all ended very
|
||
well; but when, at the end of the war I was shown a list of all the
|
||
men to be rounded up by the Nazis if their invasion was successful,
|
||
there was Simon’s name.
|
||
Carl Bosch left Oxford on 31st July 1936; as we said goodbye at
|
||
Oxford station, I remarked that we might next meet again in our
|
||
respective front lines. We were not in fact to see one another again
|
||
|
||
|
||
for forty years, but in a way we were to meet long before that, for
|
||
Bosch was to design the radio beam system that guided some of the
|
||
V-2 rockets, and he was frequently to be called in by the German Air
|
||
Force to help unravel the latest radio devices that we had tted to
|
||
our bombers.
|
||
The next member of the Clarendon who was subsequently to
|
||
a ect my own career in World War II was James Tuck, who joined
|
||
the Laboratory from Manchester in October 1937, and who at that
|
||
time was a remarkable combination of social naϊveté and technical
|
||
astuteness. In the later stages of the war he was to work at Los
|
||
Alamos, and one of his American colleagues told me that without
|
||
Tuck’s contribution to the fusing mechanism it is doubtful whether
|
||
the atomic bombs of 1945 could have been exploded. But in 1937,
|
||
he seemed to be an innocent who had unwittingly strayed into a den
|
||
of practical jokers. At rst, with his attempts to be ‘more Oxford
|
||
than Oxford’ with coloured shirts and corduroy trousers, we did not
|
||
know whether he was genuinely sophisticated or not. And then he
|
||
almost took our breath away by asking us at tea time whether any
|
||
of us had ever made any money at horse racing. We were so taken
|
||
aback that we said ‘No’ and he proceeded to tell us why he had
|
||
asked. It turned out that he had recently married, and was trying to
|
||
keep himself and his wife on a normal research studentship. This
|
||
was obviously going to be di cult, but he had been following a
|
||
tipster in the Daily Express with some such name as ‘Jubilee’ or
|
||
‘Captain Juniper’ and the newspaper from time to time published
|
||
details of his score for the season, from which it appeared to Tuck
|
||
|
||
|
||
that all he had to do was to distribute his grant on ‘Jubilee’s’ various
|
||
tips and he would make a very useful pro t by the end of the year.
|
||
Unfortunately, Tuck said, as soon as he had started to do this, the
|
||
tipster’s rate of success had fallen o , and he was rapidly getting out
|
||
of pocket.
|
||
By now, we realized that he was dead serious, and I told him that
|
||
we had said ‘No’ because we knew that this was likely to happen to
|
||
any of us who started betting without a deep study of the subject.
|
||
However, with the Prof it was di erent. He, too, faced Tuck’s
|
||
problem on a larger scale in that the University gave him much too
|
||
small a grant on which to run the Clarendon. As a result, the Prof
|
||
had taken to betting, and the reason that he was never in the
|
||
Laboratory before 11 a.m. was that he was in his rooms in Christ
|
||
Church studying the form for the day, and the reason that he was
|
||
closeted with Keeley for half an hour or so before noon was that
|
||
they were on the telephone to various bookmakers laying out their
|
||
bets. To our delight, Tuck swallowed this completely and over the
|
||
next two or three days we gradually enlarged the story, each
|
||
succeeding detail becoming more outrageous.
|
||
Finally, the story spread to the workshop, who overdid it. They
|
||
told Tuck that the Prof had made so much money out of the Turf
|
||
that he had had a t of conscience, and had decided that he ought
|
||
to plough some of the money back, with the result that he had
|
||
founded the Linde-mann Stakes of fty guineas with two thousand
|
||
added. At that point, Tuck saw that he was having his leg pulled,
|
||
and he came into tea this time saying, ‘Ha, ha, you chaps. Jolly
|
||
|
||
|
||
funny! It was a good story while it lasted, but now I have seen
|
||
through you, and you’ll never catch me again!’ I now agreed that he
|
||
had had his initiation and was therefore one of us from now on, and
|
||
that it would be quite useless of us to try and pull his leg again.
|
||
However, within a few minutes I had worked the subject round to
|
||
what an unusual lot we were. Douglas Roaf was Eastern Counties
|
||
Ballroom Champion (which was untrue) and the Prof had been
|
||
Tennis Champion of Sweden. Tuck said, ‘Now you are at it again,
|
||
but you don’t catch me this time—I am going to call your blu !’
|
||
Now Lindemann used to come in to tea, in which he never partook,
|
||
but usually stood somewhat aloo y away from the main party. I had
|
||
the impression he felt he ought to be there but somehow could not
|
||
quite join in. On this occasion, though, he was dragged in by Tuck
|
||
who went up to him and said, ‘I say, Professor, these silly asses are
|
||
trying to tell me that you were Tennis Champion of Sweden!’ The
|
||
Prof was taken aback by Tuck’s familiarity, and more or less froze
|
||
him with a restrained, ‘As a matter of fact, I was.’ Tuck thereupon
|
||
recoiled, and decided that perhaps some of our tall stories were
|
||
true.
|
||
So we could now put him through the same cycle until he had
|
||
reached a suitable stage of disbelief again, and I then told him that
|
||
Derek Jackson owned nearly half of The News of the World and rode
|
||
in the Grand National every year. Tuck promptly tackled Jackson. It
|
||
was hardly fair, in that it was indeed highly improbable that a
|
||
distinguished spectroscopist should also be a Grand National rider,
|
||
but it was quite true. I once asked Derek why, with all his money,
|
||
|
||
|
||
he took spectroscopy so seriously. ‘Why, man,’ he replied, ‘you must
|
||
have something to do in the summer when you can’t hunt!’ With his
|
||
a uence he was accustomed to privileged treatment, one of the
|
||
privileges being a rst class corner seat with its back to the engine.
|
||
Whenever he failed to nd one he simply pulled the communication
|
||
cord. The rst time he did this, at Paddington, he got away with it
|
||
by writing a straightforward apology. The second time, he pulled
|
||
the cord so violently that it broke. He was then sent up to Oxford in
|
||
a specially cleared compartment with a frightened little guard, who
|
||
thought he was mad, all to himself. That time he got away with it
|
||
by threatening to bring an action on behalf of the public, pointing
|
||
out that the train had been sent out of Paddington in a defective
|
||
condition, because it had no communication cord, and there might
|
||
be some unfortunate woman about to be ravished who would in her
|
||
distress tug at the communication cord, to no avail. The third time,
|
||
his defence was that the train had been sent out of Paddington one
|
||
minute early and, knowing the reputation of the Great Western
|
||
Railway for punctuality, he had thought of all those regular
|
||
travellers who would have been expecting to catch the train in the
|
||
last minute and who would now nd it gone; but this time he was
|
||
ned. His response to Tuck’s incredulity that he rode in the Grand
|
||
National is better imagined than described.
|
||
The atmosphere in the Laboratory was gradually changing, as to
|
||
some extent I was myself. The Laboratory boy, Basil, even asked me
|
||
what was happening—I seemed so much more serious than I had
|
||
been two years before. The reason was simple enough—I was
|
||
|
||
|
||
engrossed in the air defence problem. And despite the fact that
|
||
Lindemann himself clearly felt the same way, I had to endure
|
||
ragging from my contemporaries as a militarist for switching from
|
||
pure research to air defence. They, along with most of our
|
||
countrymen, seemed blind to what was happening in Germany; and
|
||
yet the sight of a cinema newsreel of a Nazi rally should have been
|
||
enough to open their eyes. These were the days when the Socialist
|
||
controlled London County Council suppressed the Cadet Corps in
|
||
the London schools. While retrospectively we may sympathize with
|
||
the anti-war feelings of those who knew the horrors of trench
|
||
warfare in World War I, with all the doubts that these threw on the
|
||
higher leadership, it should have been obvious that their actions
|
||
were encouraging the very danger that they hoped to avoid.
|
||
In 1936 and 1937 the predominant feeling in Oxford was still
|
||
paci st, as far as the University was concerned. But it was di erent
|
||
among working men; I knew a number of them through the City of
|
||
Oxford Ri e Club, which I had joined, and they warmly supported
|
||
my suggestion that we should try to form an anti-aircraft battalion. I
|
||
therefore wrote on 1st November 1937 to the First Anti-Aircraft
|
||
Division at Hillingdon:
|
||
I can o er to form a committee of representatives of
|
||
municipal bodies and local rms, to consider the problem of
|
||
raising, say, 1,000 men in Oxford, provided that the War O ce
|
||
would provide equipment and instruction. Presumably the way
|
||
would be to establish a Territorial battalion here. Before we can
|
||
|
||
|
||
start a recruiting campaign, we must be able to tell people what
|
||
obligations they entail by joining, and we must also have some
|
||
indication that the War O ce will take the matter seriously. I
|
||
believe that we can get the men—perhaps not a thousand
|
||
(although Oxford has a population of 80,000), but at any rate
|
||
enough to make it worth while. Despite the paci st reputation
|
||
of the university, the spirit in the town is good....’
|
||
The war broke out before anything was done. Another of my e orts
|
||
may have been more fruitful. Shortly before I left Oxford in March
|
||
1938 the Germans annexed Austria, and the scales at last fell from
|
||
the eyes of my contemporaries. They were now almost anxious to do
|
||
something for defence, but there was no organization ready if their
|
||
enthusiasm ever materialized to the point of action. I therefore
|
||
wrote to D. R. Pye, the new Director of Scienti c Research, at the
|
||
Air Ministry on 18th March. After discussing some minor details of
|
||
my work, I went on:
|
||
The main purpose of this letter is to raise a far more
|
||
important question: it seems very obvious, but since I have not
|
||
heard it considered perhaps you will forgive me for mentioning
|
||
it.
|
||
The events of the past week have made the research people
|
||
here realize that the position is more serious than they had
|
||
thought. Yesterday one of them asked me what he should do in
|
||
the event of war: he wanted to do something active, and
|
||
|
||
|
||
pointed out there was nobody to tell him what to do. In the
|
||
past, most scientists have tended to be conscientious objectors;
|
||
following this spontaneous move, I investigated the feelings of
|
||
other members of the laboratory, and found that out of eighteen
|
||
people questioned, only two were now conscientious objectors.
|
||
Most of the remainder wanted to do scienti c military research,
|
||
while one or two of the more pugnacious would prefer to take
|
||
more vigorous measures....
|
||
The point is this: if war were to break out tomorrow the
|
||
scienti c directorates of the services would nd themselves
|
||
overwhelmed by volunteers, and much valuable time would be
|
||
wasted in nding out what posts they were best suited for, and
|
||
the necessary—and as far as I know unforeseen—expansion
|
||
would have to be e ected.
|
||
I am suggesting therefore that the research workers in the
|
||
universities should be asked what they want to do, and to state
|
||
their lines of specialization, should they elect to join the
|
||
scienti c sta s during wartime. You would then know your
|
||
prospective personnel, and could arrange your necessarily
|
||
expanded programme accordingly. The men could then be
|
||
informed where they were to be stationed, and laboratory
|
||
accommodation arranged. They could start practically at the
|
||
outbreak of war, and no time would be wasted.
|
||
I received an interim reply from Pye saying that he would later
|
||
reply more fully, but he never did. Fortunately, Tizard took the
|
||
|
||
|
||
matter up; and by the outbreak of war many university physicists
|
||
had been told where their services could best be applied.
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
CHAPTER FOUR
|
||
Inferior Red 1936–1938
|
||
T
|
||
HE SEQUENCE of events that led to my leaving Oxford in March 1938
|
||
had started in January 1936 with my work on infra-red detection of
|
||
aircraft for the Tizard Committee. Within two months I had made
|
||
some new detecting elements and had designed and built an
|
||
electronic ampli er that caused a spot of light to broaden into a
|
||
band whenever a faint source of heat came into the eld of view of
|
||
the detector, the breadth of the band increasing as the source grew
|
||
stronger. Besides serious measurements, the equipment could do
|
||
two ‘party tricks’: one was to scan a rack of tools, from which I had
|
||
asked a visitor to withdraw one and then replace it, and I could then
|
||
tell him which one it had been, because the few seconds’ contact
|
||
with his hand had warmed it slightly. The other demonstration was
|
||
to shine a torch at a black screen and then switch it o . The
|
||
detector could then be made to scan the screen and discover where
|
||
the spot of light from the torch had previously fallen, even up to a
|
||
minute afterwards, because the light had been converted into heat,
|
||
in an amount imperceptible to the senses, and this heat was now
|
||
being re-radiated.
|
||
|
||
|
||
The rst visitor to see the demonstration was Watson-Watt, who
|
||
came to talk to Lindemann on 24th February 1936. He was looking
|
||
for recruits for the Air Ministry Research Establishment that he was
|
||
setting up at Bawdsey Manor on the Deben Estuary just north of
|
||
Felixstowe. Lindemann had recommended Gerald Touch, who was
|
||
just nishing his doctorate, and who had been our reporter for the
|
||
telephone-in-the-bucket-of-water incident. He was to be a signi cant
|
||
in uence in my career over the next few years, and a lifelong friend.
|
||
Although he was not exactly like the research student of whom
|
||
Edward Appleton said, ‘He was the kind of man for whom no
|
||
experimental di culty was too great to be thought of’, Gerald could
|
||
usually see trouble ahead. Even when things were going well he
|
||
would say, ‘That’s all very well, Reginald, but, you see, the trouble
|
||
is...’ But he was an able experimenter of complete honesty, and
|
||
Watson-Watt wisely accepted Lindemann’s recommendation.
|
||
Watson-Watt may well have discussed other matters with
|
||
Lindemann on this visit; they had known one another since the
|
||
Farnborough days of World War I, and it would be natural for them
|
||
to discuss the whole air defence problem. Lindemann seemed to
|
||
conclude that Watson-Watt needed more support than the Tizard
|
||
Committee was giving him, for on 12th June 1936, he arranged to
|
||
take Watson-Watt to meet Churchill. As could be expected,
|
||
Lindemann had not been an easy member of the Tizard Committee,
|
||
and had been pressing some of his own schemes, such as aerial
|
||
mines supported on parachutes. His association with politicians was
|
||
resented by other members of the Committee, and his introduction
|
||
|
||
|
||
of Watson-Watt to Churchill behind the backs of the Committee was
|
||
almost the last straw. Following what Watson-Watt told him,
|
||
Churchill was critical of the Tizard Committee at the C.I.D. Sub
|
||
Committee meeting on 15th June. The Tizard Committee was due to
|
||
write a progress report within a few weeks, and Lindemann insisted
|
||
on writing a minority report, which went into the O cial Records
|
||
dated 20th July.
|
||
Among the conclusions from which Lindemann dissented was one
|
||
not to give aerial mines a highest priority. In the event he appears to
|
||
have been wrong, for the mines were a failure when tried in 1940,
|
||
but they were hardly less realistic than several of the schemes
|
||
backed by the Committee, including one to oodlight the whole of
|
||
southern England. As for the mines, they were not just a debating
|
||
point as far as Lindemann was concerned, for when the work on
|
||
mines had been held up because a ‘Queen Bee’ pilotless aircraft
|
||
could not be made available by the Air Ministry, Lindemann o ered
|
||
to pilot the plane himself to see what happened when planes ran
|
||
into wires from which mines could be suspended, just as he had also
|
||
done during World War I. As for radar, he agreed with the
|
||
Committee that it should have the highest priority, but he made the
|
||
sensible point that this would only be e ective if a similar priority
|
||
were given to develop the communications system by which the
|
||
radar data would be transmitted to ghter controllers and by which
|
||
instructions could be sent to our ghters. Such points might have
|
||
been listened to in a less charged atmosphere, but by now the other
|
||
members of the Tizard Committee were exasperated, partly because
|
||
|
||
|
||
of Lindemann’s communicating his ideas to Churchill when their
|
||
defects had already been pointed out at the Tizard Committee, and
|
||
partly because he was now standing for Parliament, on the air
|
||
defence issue. After the Tizard Committee meeting of 15th July,
|
||
Blackett and Hill o ered their resignations. Swinton, the Air
|
||
Minister, refused to accept them, and instead dissolved the
|
||
Committee in order to reform it again without Lindemann.
|
||
Much has been made of the di erences between Lindemann and
|
||
the Committee. In retrospect, there was some right on both sides: far
|
||
from holding up radar in favour of infra-red, as has sometimes been
|
||
suggested, Lindemann earned Watson-Watt’s gratitude, and the
|
||
latter afterwards wrote, ‘He gave to the radar team support, at the
|
||
highest level, which was indispensable both psychologically and
|
||
organizationally.’ Personally, if I had had to discuss with anyone on
|
||
the Tizard Committee a problem requiring physical insight, I would
|
||
have valued Lindemann’s judgement most. I can recall an incident
|
||
from those days when an inventor had put up a proposal to the
|
||
Committee of what is now called inertial navigation. It was
|
||
dismissed by the Committee because the members said that it was
|
||
well known that you could not establish the speed of an aircraft
|
||
other than by measuring relative to the air in which the aircraft was
|
||
moving and the wind would therefore always cause errors. This is
|
||
true enough of a pitot tube but, as Lindemann pointed out to me,
|
||
the proposal was perfectly sound if one used, as the inventor
|
||
suggested, accelerometers. One could then integrate all the
|
||
accelerations to which the aircraft had been subjected since it left
|
||
|
||
|
||
the ground; this would give velocity, and a further integration
|
||
would give position relative to the point of take-o .
|
||
Tizard had more common sense than Lindemann, but to some
|
||
extent he also had luck. Not only was radar presented to him, as it
|
||
were, on a plate, but also he was dealing with a body of serving
|
||
o cers in Fighter Command who realized they would be in grave
|
||
di culty if the Germans attacked. They were therefore prepared in
|
||
their predicament to look at any ideas coming from the scientists.
|
||
True, Tizard had done as much as anybody, and perhaps more, to
|
||
persuade the Royal Air Force to be receptive, but even he could not
|
||
succeed if the o cers concerned were complacent. Following the
|
||
success of his original committee for surveying air defence, it was
|
||
proposed that he should head a similar committee to look into
|
||
problems of air o ence. This second committee was set up towards
|
||
the end of 1936, and some members were common to both
|
||
committees. And yet, despite the brilliant example in defence, the
|
||
work for o ence was, as Tizard himself said, a failure. The basic
|
||
explanation was that the o cers concerned with bombing
|
||
operations were complacent and convinced that they could hit their
|
||
targets without scienti c aids, and so they were not prepared to
|
||
listen even to Tizard.
|
||
Most of the Tizard Committee arguments were of course far above
|
||
my head. While it was in turmoil in June 1936 I had been at Farn
|
||
borough trying out my infra-red equipment on the ground. It
|
||
satisfactorily detected aircraft in ight—the speeds make odd
|
||
reading now, a Westland Wapiti ying past at 70 m.p.h. With its
|
||
|
||
|
||
small size the detector seemed worth taking a step further, at least
|
||
to the stage of designing an airborne version. I was now in my
|
||
second four months of work for the Tizard Committee. Churchill
|
||
had commented at the C.I.D. Sub-Committee that he had understood
|
||
that a man in Oxford had been paid £100 for four months work, and
|
||
was shortly to receive another £100 for another four months, and he
|
||
asked whether something more ought not to be done.
|
||
My own position was that the Balliol post ran out at the end of
|
||
September, and had my astronomical career been continuing I
|
||
should have gone to Mount Wilson for the next two years. I applied
|
||
for a Commonwealth Fellowship with Mount Wilson in mind, but I
|
||
was worried that war might break out within the following two
|
||
years, and if this happened I wanted to be in England rather than
|
||
America. I told the Commonwealth Committee that there was a
|
||
chance that even if I were o ered a Fellowship I would feel that I
|
||
had to give air defence the rst priority, if the Air Ministry decided
|
||
that it wanted me to continue the work after September 1936. This
|
||
in fact happened, and I was appointed as a Scienti c O cer and a
|
||
full-time member of the Air Ministry sta from 5th October 1936,
|
||
and accredited to the Royal Aircraft Establishment at Farnborough
|
||
even though I was still to work in Oxford. My salary was £500 per
|
||
annum which, low though it may seem now, was higher than that of
|
||
any other scientist of my age in Government service.
|
||
In the meantime three of my friends had left Oxford. The rst was
|
||
Carl Bosch; the second was Gerald Touch, who left to join Watson
|
||
Watt at Bawdsey on 8th August. The third was F. C. Frank, my exact
|
||
|
||
|
||
contemporary, in the Chemistry School. I had rst seen Charles
|
||
Frank when we tried for Scholarships in December 1928, his
|
||
cherubic and intellectual countenance prominent among those at
|
||
the top of the Balliol Hall steps, anxious to get at the examination
|
||
papers as quickly as possible. In our rst year I had seen him
|
||
coming away from Blackwell’s clutching a great textbook of
|
||
chemistry with an air of anticipatory delight, and also on the river
|
||
as cox of one of the Lincoln torpids. We hardly met until we were
|
||
postgraduates, when he shared lodgings with one of my friends, and
|
||
we discovered that we had much in common. Although he was a
|
||
theorist, he clearly appreciated experimental dexterity, and
|
||
although I was an experimenter I found that he could expound
|
||
theory in terms that I could understand. We grew closer together
|
||
with each year and so, when on 13th July 1936 he left to work with
|
||
Peter Debye in Berlin for two years, I could tell him my thoughts
|
||
about the prospects of war, and ask him to watch for anything that
|
||
might a ect our ideas about defence.
|
||
The next stage of the infra-red work was to make a detector
|
||
capable of operating in an aircraft. On 16th October I attended a
|
||
meeting of the Tizard Committee for the rst time, and outlined
|
||
what I saw of the possibilities, including a device for converting
|
||
infra-red into visible radiation so that one could form in e ect a
|
||
thermal picture of a scene in which the warmer regions would show
|
||
up as brighter. The Committee appeared reconciled to the fact that
|
||
despite their di erences with Linde-mann I should continue to work
|
||
in his Laboratory. He was in the middle of his Election campaign for
|
||
|
||
|
||
Parliament, and on 30th October Winston Churchill came to Oxford
|
||
to speak in his support. On the following morning Lindemann
|
||
brought him to the Clarendon, and showed him my work. This was
|
||
the rst sight that I had of Churchill, and I remember well the
|
||
impression that he created on all of us. He looked so tired and orid
|
||
that our general verdict was ‘Poor old Winston—he can’t last much
|
||
longer!’
|
||
During the winter I constructed a new infra-red detector for
|
||
mounting in an aircraft, the main di culty being to render it
|
||
su ciently immune from the vibration to which all aircraft of that
|
||
period were susceptible; besides simple detection, it was capable of
|
||
giving an indication of whether the target was to the right or left,
|
||
and up or down. I was at this time joined by George Pickard, who
|
||
had just completed his doctorate in low temperature physics and
|
||
who, like me, now became a member of the Air Ministry sta . We
|
||
took the detector to Farnborough in April 1937, and on 27th April I
|
||
ew with the equipment, and managed to detect another aircraft in
|
||
ight. As far as I know, this was the rst occasion on which one
|
||
aircraft was detected from another in ight by infra-red means.
|
||
Over the next few months we made good progress. I showed that
|
||
even if the engines of an aircraft were screened it could still be
|
||
detected because of the heating of its wings and fuselage caused by
|
||
the compression of the air in front of it (aerodynamic heating) and I
|
||
also started to grow large crystals of materials that would transmit
|
||
infra-red radiation. When it seemed that, if we developed the
|
||
detector to the operational stage, it would have to be mounted in
|
||
|
||
|
||
single seater ghters (for these were what the Air Sta intended to
|
||
use at night) there would obviously be a di cult stage where the
|
||
pilot of the trial aircraft would need to know a good deal about
|
||
infra-red. I thought that the simplest method of dealing with this
|
||
stage would be for me to learn to y ghters, and I therefore
|
||
suggested to D. R. Pye that I join the Oxford University Air
|
||
Squadron with this in mind. It came to nothing because the
|
||
Commanding O cer found that he was up against a regulation that
|
||
allowed him to take only undergraduates as cadets; and although I
|
||
was still only 24 I was a doctor with two years’ seniority. The Air
|
||
Sta were not worried—I was told that they had plenty of men who
|
||
could y aeroplanes.
|
||
In June 1937 I paid my rst visit to Bawdsey at Gerald Touch’s
|
||
invitation and with Watson-Watt’s approval. I had already guessed
|
||
what they were doing, since the radar equipment on the liner
|
||
Normandie had been described in the press. The technique of
|
||
detecting aircraft by echoes arising from re ected radio waves was
|
||
obviously much more powerful than the infra-red method that I had
|
||
been asked to pursue, although there might be a possible gap at
|
||
short range which infra-red would serve to cover. At the same time,
|
||
radar had some disadvantages. One was that with its relatively long
|
||
wavelength of 1.5 metres it would be di cult to obtain accurate
|
||
indications of the direction of the target, and these would certainly
|
||
be needed for a satisfactory interception. Another weakness
|
||
occurred to me when Gerald Touch said that the method was so
|
||
sensitive that it could detect a wire hanging from a balloon at forty
|
||
|
||
|
||
miles. All one might therefore need to do to render the system
|
||
useless would be to attach wires to balloons or parachutes at
|
||
intervals of half a mile or a mile, and the whole radar screen would
|
||
be so full of echoes that it would be impossible to see the extra echo
|
||
arising from an aircraft.
|
||
The Air Defence Research Sub-Committee had recorded in its
|
||
minutes of 2nd July, regarding infra-red: ‘Considerable progress has
|
||
been made. Work should continue in view of the possible
|
||
application of the results to other problems.’ I was not informed of
|
||
this comment and its cryptic signi cance, but a month or two later
|
||
Lindemann told me that Churchill had said that he understood from
|
||
the Sub-Committee that they were going to shut down my infra-red
|
||
work. I replied that infra-red certainly had its limitations of not
|
||
being useful through cloud and of not giving an indication of range,
|
||
but that radar, too, was vulnerable, especially to a ‘smoke screen’ of
|
||
spurious radar re ections which only need be lengths of wire half a
|
||
wavelength long. Lindemann told me that he would get Churchill to
|
||
raise this point at the Sub-Committee. When I subsequently asked
|
||
him what had happened he said that Tizard and Watson-Watt had
|
||
rather ‘looked down their noses’ at the suggestion. My conversation
|
||
with Lindemann about ‘smoke screen’ re ections was e ectively the
|
||
beginning of what came to be known in Britain as ‘Window’ and in
|
||
America as ‘Cha ’ but for many years I had no evidence other than
|
||
my own memory, which I could not expect others to accept.
|
||
However, when Alfred Price was writing Instruments of Darkness he
|
||
|
||
|
||
found a memorandum in Lindemann’s les, dated 8th March 1938,
|
||
which ran:
|
||
Lest too much reliance be placed upon the R.D.F. methods, it
|
||
is perhaps worth pointing out that certain di culties may
|
||
easily be encountered in actual use.
|
||
Though undoubtedly excellent for detecting single aircraft or
|
||
squadrons thereof, ying together, it seems likely that great
|
||
di culties may be encountered when large numbers of
|
||
aeroplanes attacking and defending are simultaneously in the
|
||
air, each sending back its signals.
|
||
This di culty may be very materially increased if the enemy
|
||
chooses to blind the R.D.F. operator by strewing numbers of
|
||
oscillators in the appropriate region. Such oscillators need
|
||
consist merely of thin wires fty to a hundred feet long which
|
||
could easily be suspended in suitable positions from toy
|
||
balloons or even, if only required for half-an-hour or so, from
|
||
small parachutes. As far as the R.D.F. detector is concerned,
|
||
each one would return an echo just like an aeroplane.
|
||
The rst formal indication that I had that our work might close
|
||
was when I was summoned to a meeting of the Tizard Committee on
|
||
21st October 1937, when the Committee at least seemed anxious
|
||
that the work should be removed from Oxford. Tizard invited me to
|
||
lunch on 8th November, to discuss the future in more detail, and I
|
||
received dire warnings from Lindemann as to the artfulness to
|
||
|
||
|
||
which I might be subjected. To my surprise, Tizard started in the
|
||
most friendly manner by saying to me, ‘I don’t suppose that you can
|
||
remember the last war!’ I replied that not only could I remember the
|
||
war, and its air raids, but that I could remember my father leaving
|
||
for France on 11th November 1914, and that I could recall incidents
|
||
from 1913 when I could not have been more than eighteen months
|
||
old. ‘In that case’, said Tizard, ‘you have the longest memory of any
|
||
man I know—except myself. Do you know, I can distinctly
|
||
remember having had a bottle!’
|
||
There could hardly be much guile in a man starting an
|
||
acquaintance in such an informal manner, and we had a very
|
||
cordial discussion. He referred to ‘this ridiculous quarrel between
|
||
me and Lindemann’ and went on to tell me that Lindemann had
|
||
been godfather to his sons. At the same time, he thought that it
|
||
would be better if I would break with Lindemann, and come to
|
||
Imperial College, of which he was Rector, and continue the infra-red
|
||
work there. I was not anxious to leave Oxford for London, and so in
|
||
that respect the discussion was fruitless.
|
||
On 3rd December I again visited Bawdsey, and this time was put
|
||
under pressure by Watson-Watt regarding the relative merits of
|
||
infrared and airborne radar. Gerald Touch actually worked in the
|
||
Airborne Radar Group whose head was E. G. Bowen and which
|
||
included an outstanding young electrical engineer, Robert Hanbury
|
||
Brown. They had achieved a tremendous feat in getting airborne
|
||
radar to work, and there was no question that it was going to be
|
||
superior to infra-red. I had the impression, however, that Watson
|
||
|
||
|
||
Watt was not a good enough physicist to realize how slender a
|
||
threat infra-red had always been to him, and something about his
|
||
tactics aroused my resentment. Our discussion, which he had
|
||
assured me was ‘o the record’, was reported back to the Air
|
||
Ministry, and it seemed that somehow he wished to get me under
|
||
his direct control. He seemed unwilling to face the fact that radar,
|
||
too, had its weak points. This suspicion, which could be attributed
|
||
to my highly personal viewpoint, was many years afterwards
|
||
con rmed by A. P. Rowe, who succeeded Watson-Watt as
|
||
Superintendent at Bawdsey. Writing to me in 1962 of the ‘Window’
|
||
episode, Rowe said, ‘When I took over from W-W at Bawdsey, I
|
||
found that it was “not done” to suggest that the whole idea would
|
||
not work.... What I want to emphasize is that from no one at no
|
||
time did I hear a breath of anything like window.’
|
||
In the meantime, I continued to work at infra-red, and proposed a
|
||
pulsed searchlight in which the range of an aircraft could be directly
|
||
measured by optical pulses, and the glare of the light scattered back
|
||
by the lower atmosphere could be eliminated. This subsequently
|
||
was developed as ‘Lidar’ the optical analogue of radar. But on 28th
|
||
January 1938 I received a letter from D. R. Pye saying, ‘I have
|
||
decided that in view of the urgency of some of our other defence
|
||
problems, the Air Ministry programme as a whole will best be
|
||
served by employing yourself and Pickard elsewhere. I have
|
||
suggested 31st March as a suitable date for the termination of the
|
||
Air Ministry research work at the Clarendon.’
|
||
|
||
|
||
I was very annoyed, not so much at the justice of the decision, but
|
||
of the way it had come about. The Tizard Committee had
|
||
encouraged me to work on infra-red at the expense of my own
|
||
career, and only two months before Tizard himself had been inviting
|
||
me to continue the infra-red work at Imperial College. I had burnt
|
||
my academic boats, for while my contemporaries had been
|
||
continuing with their normal researches, I had been working to my
|
||
utmost on developments which could not be published, on security
|
||
grounds, even though we ourselves did not intend to use them. I had
|
||
lost my chances of an academic appointment and was now a civil
|
||
servant. At the same time, convinced that war was almost
|
||
inevitable, I did not wish to leave the defence eld, although I
|
||
certainly wanted to get well away from Watson-Watt, Tizard and the
|
||
rest, where I felt that I had been a pawn in a distinctly unpleasant
|
||
game. I had almost made up my mind to join my father’s old
|
||
regiment, the Grenadiers.
|
||
At that very time, my father lost the sight of one eye, and there
|
||
was a danger that the other would go too, and I had to face the
|
||
problem of his being unable to work and therefore of my helping
|
||
him and my mother. I could not do this on a guardsman’s pay, and
|
||
the most sensible thing would be to continue on some work that
|
||
would maintain my relatively high salary, even if it meant working
|
||
with Watson-Watt. I therefore saw Watson-Watt on 4th February,
|
||
and told him frankly my personal position and also my dislike of his
|
||
method of approach. On his side I must admit that I must have
|
||
seemed an even more problematic ‘handful’ than will have so far
|
||
|
||
|
||
appeared from this account. For, having decided that I was selling
|
||
myself, I was determined to get the best price I could, not so much
|
||
for myself as for the men who were already working at Bawdsey.
|
||
I had, of course, seen Bawdsey mainly through the eyes of Gerald
|
||
Touch, who was not given to taking a rosy view of anything.
|
||
Undoubtedly, they had had to start in the old manor house at
|
||
Bawdsey in very uncomfortable circumstances, and the Air Ministry
|
||
had done very little to provide reasonable amenities. I thought that
|
||
by drawing attention to all my prospective discomforts, I might help
|
||
to get the amenities improved; but it must have made me appear a
|
||
very awkward personality to Watson-Watt and Rowe.
|
||
However, it was agreed that I should go to Bawdsey, and I
|
||
received a formal letter from the Superintendent of Farnborough
|
||
instructing me to report for duty at Bawdsey on 1st April. Pickard
|
||
was not to go with me, but instead to Farnborough; and I saw our
|
||
mechanic, W. S. Driver, into another job. As for my own
|
||
preparations, I knew that Bawdsey had a lawn some three hundred
|
||
yards long and so I thought that I would take up archery. I would,
|
||
perhaps, acquire a rather exotic dog such as a Saluki; and since
|
||
there would be plenty of secluded time I would buy many of the
|
||
books that I knew I ought to have read. Of all the books that I
|
||
acquired, the one which I have valued most was Bartlett’s
|
||
Quotations. Years afterwards I found that Churchill at Bangalore had
|
||
done exactly the same thing: ‘It is a good thing for an uneducated
|
||
man to read books of quotations. Bartlett’s Familiar Quotations is an
|
||
admirable work, and I studied it intently. The quotations when
|
||
|
||
|
||
engraved upon the memory give you good thoughts. They also make
|
||
you anxious to read the authors and look for more.’
|
||
Just as I was leaving for Bawdsey I received a telegram instructing
|
||
me not to report to Bawdsey but instead to Air Ministry
|
||
Headquarters in London. Watson-Watt had now been promoted from
|
||
being Superintendent at Bawdsey to take charge of a new
|
||
Directorate of Communications Development in the Air Ministry,
|
||
and as such he would have control of infra-red work as well as of
|
||
radar and communications generally. There was therefore no need
|
||
for me to be posted to Bawdsey to be under his control, and in any
|
||
event both he and Rowe were apprehensive about the disruptive
|
||
in uence I would represent. He had therefore arranged a meeting
|
||
with the other two Services, and had persuaded them that infra-red
|
||
should be continued, after all, on an inter-Service basis. The
|
||
Admiralty Research Laboratory at Teddington was suggested as a
|
||
suitable establishment, and I was to be posted there as the Air
|
||
Ministry representative and placed directly under a Principal
|
||
Scienti c O cer in the Admiralty Service. I was thus to be removed
|
||
as far as possible from any place where I could cause trouble and to
|
||
be disciplined in the tradition of the Senior Service. Actually, the
|
||
complete volte face by Watson-Watt took the Admiralty so much by
|
||
surprise that they could not be ready for some months, and I was
|
||
therefore attached to the new Directorate in Air Ministry to cool my
|
||
heels.
|
||
In preparation for the move to Bawdsey my car was already
|
||
loaded with my books and other possessions and so I drove instead
|
||
|
||
|
||
to my parents’ home in Herne Hill and reported for duty at the Air
|
||
Ministry the following morning. I can remember my feelings on
|
||
leaving the Clarendon and Oxford for the last time. It would be easy
|
||
to be sorry for myself. My prospects, which had appeared so bright
|
||
in 1934, with Mount Wilson and South Africa in view, were now,
|
||
less than four years later, completely shattered. Instead of a pleasant
|
||
academic life I now faced a relatively dull one in a Government
|
||
establishment, where I would be subservient to men who knew far
|
||
less about infra-red than I did, and only my father’s situation had
|
||
stopped me from breaking out of it. This was a rotten reward for
|
||
three years of desperate work, from which I could not even recover
|
||
the kudos of papers in scienti c journals. I wanted never again to
|
||
become involved with Lindemann, Tizard, or Watson-Watt.
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
CHAPTER FIVE
|
||
Exile
|
||
M
|
||
Y EXILE from active research in air defence did not start exactly as
|
||
planned, for instead of being at the Admiralty Research Laboratory I
|
||
was attached to Group Captain H. Leedham, the Assistant Director
|
||
of Instrument Research and Development in Air Ministry
|
||
Headquarters. A Regular o cer of high principles, he was also a lay
|
||
preacher; and I had already appreciated his friendly support in my
|
||
arguments with Watson-Watt. Although o ce work was not really
|
||
to my taste, the experience could be useful—and so it was to prove.
|
||
I found myself being given a widening range of jobs. Occasionally,
|
||
I had something practical to do such as the acceptance trials of the
|
||
rst airborne television equipment for the R.A.F. Sometimes I would
|
||
put up ideas myself. One that was to have later importance was a
|
||
method by which a bomber could locate itself by receiving radio
|
||
pulses sent out simultaneously by three ground stations. From the
|
||
time interval between the pulses from any two of the stations being
|
||
received by the bomber, it could tell that it was on a particular
|
||
hyperbolic curve about the two stations as foci, and from the
|
||
intersection of this hyperbola with another similarly determined
|
||
from the interval between the pulses from one of the rst two
|
||
|
||
|
||
stations and the third one, the bomber could determine precisely
|
||
where it was. The idea was turned down because the radio
|
||
engineers said that the radio waves used would have to be short
|
||
ones, and that these would not curve su ciently round the earth to
|
||
give a useful range. I found this surprising, but was not in a position
|
||
to contradict them.
|
||
I was, incidentally, astonished by the complacency that existed
|
||
regarding our ability to navigate at long range by night. The whole
|
||
of our bombing policy depended on this assumption, but I was
|
||
assured that by general instrument ying, coupled with navigation
|
||
by the stars, Bomber Command was con dent that it could nd
|
||
pinpoint targets in Germany at night, and that there was therefore
|
||
no need for any such aids as I had proposed. I was not popular for
|
||
asking why, if this were true, so many of our bombers on practice
|
||
ights in Britain ew into hills.
|
||
The job that a orded me most interest was to examine the reports
|
||
that occasionally came in from the Air Intelligence branches. These
|
||
were usually very slight, but I tried to extract every possible item of
|
||
information out of them, and I started to interact with Air
|
||
Intelligence. Finally, a report came in that the Germans were
|
||
undertaking some very high frequency radio developments on the
|
||
Brocken, a well-known mountain in the Harz. Now I already knew
|
||
something about the Brocken, because of the optical phenomenon
|
||
known as the ‘Brocken Spectre’ or ‘Brocken Ghost’ which arises if
|
||
you stand on the summit and the sun throws your shadow on a
|
||
cloud below. If the conditions are right, you see your shadow with a
|
||
|
||
|
||
saintly rainbow-coloured halo around its head. I decided that I
|
||
would see if I could beat the o cial Intelligence Service in
|
||
discovering more about whatever was happening on the Brocken,
|
||
and so I wrote to Charles Frank explaining my interest in
|
||
meteorological phenomena of the optical variety, and that I would
|
||
be grateful for a rst-hand account of the Brocken ghost. Before I
|
||
heard from him, my time at the Air Ministry came to an end. I had
|
||
in the meantime found so many jobs to do that ve new Sections
|
||
were set up to take them over; the Sections thus set up were to
|
||
continue throughout the War.
|
||
On 2nd July I went to Teddington, and parked my car in the
|
||
grounds of the National Physical Laboratory. I knew that the
|
||
Admiralty Research Laboratory adjoined it, but was not certain of
|
||
the way. A mild-looking man passed me and I enquired if he could
|
||
tell me the way. He said that he was going there himself, and so we
|
||
walked chatting pleasantly on a ne summer morning. He told me
|
||
where I would nd Dr. E. G. Hill, who was to be head of the Infra
|
||
Red Group, and so I made my way to Hill’s o ce. Hill said that he
|
||
had instructions to take me to the Superintendent, who wanted to
|
||
see me before I started work. So we went together to the
|
||
Superintendent’s o ce, and he turned out to be the very man of
|
||
whom I had asked the way. He then surprised me by more or less
|
||
reading the riot act to me, and saying that he understood that I had
|
||
hitherto worked in a university laboratory, and that I would nd
|
||
things di erent in a Government establishment, and that in
|
||
particular I would be under direct orders from my superior o cer,
|
||
|
||
|
||
Dr. Hill. It struck me that he was overdoing things a bit, and I could
|
||
very easily have exploded. However, his attitude did not altogether
|
||
accord with what I would have expected of the very pleasant man
|
||
who had guided me to the Laboratory, and I guessed that something
|
||
must have happened. If indeed I lost my temper, this would con rm
|
||
the suspicions that he obviously had. I therefore took the dressing
|
||
down as meekly as I possibly could, and he nally ran out of steam.
|
||
Hill and I then departed, and as we were walking back, Hill said,
|
||
‘I’m sorry about that. Someone has been talking about you—do you
|
||
know a man called Watson-Watt?’
|
||
I intended to lie as low as possible, but within the hour an
|
||
opportunity occurred that I could not resist. The next step in the
|
||
disciplinary process was to overawe me with the O cial Secrets
|
||
Act. I was shown the Laboratory copy of the Act and asked to sign a
|
||
certi cate to the e ect that I had read the O cial Secrets Act
|
||
(1911) and understood it. I could not resist adding a postscript to
|
||
my signature: ‘The 1920 Act is also worth reading.’ Actually, having
|
||
been interested in o cial secrets I had some time before purchased
|
||
from the Stationery O ce copies of both Acts to see how they
|
||
applied to my work and to anyone who might try to reveal it. It was
|
||
almost incredible that the security authorities in the Admiralty had
|
||
not been aware of the later Act, and I awaited results. The certi cate
|
||
was duly taken back to the Laboratory o ce and a little later a
|
||
despatch rider was sent up to the Admiralty to check whether there
|
||
really was an Act in 1920. The upshot of the a air occurred on the
|
||
following afternoon when the Superintendent, whose name I now
|
||
|
||
|
||
knew to be Cha er, sent for me and said that now that I had been
|
||
with them for two days they had seen quite enough to realize that
|
||
what they had heard about me was entirely unjusti ed, and that he
|
||
wished to apologize for what he had said at our rst interview, and
|
||
that he hoped I would have a happy time at A.R.L. Cha er was a
|
||
gentleman, and this was true generally of his sta . They made me
|
||
very welcome, and I much enjoyed my time with them.
|
||
Curiously, before he became a civil servant Cha er had been a
|
||
mathematics schoolteacher, and among his pupils had been E. A.
|
||
Milne, one of our professors at Oxford. An interesting brush thereby
|
||
occurred between Milne and an o cer at A. R. L., Colonel Kerrison,
|
||
who had been seconded to the Laboratory for the development of
|
||
predictors for A.A. gun re. Kerrison was a very able mathematician,
|
||
but Cha er thought that some of his mathematics ought to be
|
||
checked, and had sent the calculations to Milne. The latter replied
|
||
saying that Kerrison was wrong, and that this was only to be
|
||
expected from someone who knew no more mathematics than a
|
||
colonel in the army. The story was that Kerrison had thereupon
|
||
written to Milne saying, ‘Dear Milne, With reference to what you
|
||
were saying about colonels, you may recall that in 1941 you gained
|
||
the second scholarship at Trinity, Cambridge. The rst scholar did
|
||
not take up his scholarship but went to ght for his country. He
|
||
was, Yours sincerely, A. V. Kerrison.’ I once asked Kerrison whether
|
||
the story was true: he told me that he had not sent the letter but the
|
||
facts were correct.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Another impressive character at A.R.L. was Stephen Butterworth.
|
||
He was one of a small class of applied mathematicians with a strong
|
||
practical outlook that this country produced in his generation, the
|
||
most notable instances being, of course, G. I. Taylor and A. A.
|
||
Gri th. Butterworth modestly held that his one claim to fame was
|
||
that as an Examiner he had once failed Captain P. P. Eckersley, the
|
||
Chief Engineer of the B.B.C. Despite his retiring nature he opened
|
||
up warmly to me, and I was sorry to observe that more than one
|
||
careerist in the Admiralty had climbed on Butterworth’s back by
|
||
exploiting his work. Happily, his true merit and their defects were
|
||
to show up in 1939.
|
||
The head of Group E, as the Infra-Red Group was known, was E.
|
||
G. Hill, who too was a gentleman. He was then aged about forty
|
||
ve, and had graduated at Bristol. Having been in the R.A.M.C. in
|
||
the First War, he had a pronounced interest in physiological
|
||
phenomena, and had spent a long time at H.M. Signal School at
|
||
Portsmouth on various problems of signalling, especially with infra
|
||
red. I learned a great deal of wisdom and naval lore from him,
|
||
including a comment by Admiral Burmister that, ‘There is not, there
|
||
never has been, and there never will be a completely satisfactory
|
||
system of recognition. For you have to take grave positive action on
|
||
a negative result,’ i.e. you have to shoot your opponent out of the
|
||
ocean, the grave positive action, if he does not make the right
|
||
recognition signal, which is a negative result that may also have
|
||
been caused by a breakdown in whatever device that he has been
|
||
provided with to identify himself. As it was not unknown for sailors
|
||
|
||
|
||
painting ship to also paint over the infra-red recognition lights, the
|
||
force of the Admiral’s dictum was easy to appreciate.
|
||
And then there was the Head Porter, generally known as Deputy
|
||
Superintendent, whose name happened to be Reginald Jones. He
|
||
was accorded his second title because this accurately re ected his
|
||
function—he was an indispensable factotum who looked after the
|
||
a airs of the Laboratory far more e ectively than any of the rest of
|
||
us. In 1938, when the Laboratory was given a fairly palatial new
|
||
building, the design was left to one of the Principal Scienti c
|
||
O cers and a Ministry of Works architect. The building was almost
|
||
ready for occupation when the Deputy Superintendent, performing
|
||
one of his other functions, took in the Superintendent’s usual tray of
|
||
afternoon tea, with the comment, ‘I suppose that you will be
|
||
wanting tea when we move over to the new building, sir?’ ‘Of
|
||
course’, replied the Superintendent. ‘Well, then, sir, you are not
|
||
going to get it!’ ‘Why not. Are you going on strike?’ ‘Certainly not,
|
||
sir—but there’s no electric point to boil my electric kettle!’ And then
|
||
as the extent of this peculiarly civil service disaster sank in, he
|
||
added, ‘And what’s more, sir, there is no electric point in the whole
|
||
building.’ ‘How do you know this?’ asked the Superintendent. ‘I’ve
|
||
looked at the plans, sir, and what’s more there’s no gas and no
|
||
running water except in the lavatories.’ And he was absolutely right.
|
||
The scientist and the architect between them had omitted all
|
||
services except electric light, and water for the lavatories. The
|
||
concrete oors were already set, and their lordships asked us to do
|
||
with an absolute minimum of facilities for the rst six months, after
|
||
|
||
|
||
which the necessary alterations could be counted as dilapidation.
|
||
Even so, the conduits had to be chipped into the concrete oors so
|
||
that electric cables could be laid. My namesake was one of the
|
||
towers of strength on which the rest of humanity depends. He had
|
||
been a Chief Yeoman of Signals in the Battleship Malaya at Jutland,
|
||
and I vowed that if ever I had a laboratory of my own I would try to
|
||
nd another Chief Yeoman as Head Porter; and when the time
|
||
came, twenty- ve years later, I did.
|
||
But even with all the gentlemanliness of A.R.L., I could not help
|
||
feeling the di erence in tempo from that which I had been
|
||
accustomed to in Air Defence. I felt rather like Winston Churchill
|
||
did when he was removed from his post as First Lord in 1915: ‘Like
|
||
a sea-beast shed up from the depths, or a diver too suddenly
|
||
hoisted, my face threatened to burst from the fall in pressure. I had
|
||
great anxiety and no powers of relieving it; I had vehement
|
||
convictions and small power to give e ect to them.’ Where he took
|
||
to painting, I took to glass-blowing, at which I was already fairly
|
||
good. I spent much energy in constructing an elaborate vacuum
|
||
system, but I had still plenty left, and some of it almost inevitably
|
||
went into practical jokes of one form or another.
|
||
In fact, when the Superintendent heard of some of my e orts he
|
||
let it be known to me uno cially that he would be grateful if a new
|
||
member of sta , who was being unduly inquisitive, could be kept
|
||
away from the true scent of what Group E was doing. He was an
|
||
enthusiastic optician, and there really was no harm in his enquiries
|
||
—it was just that he took a lively interest in everything around him.
|
||
|
||
|
||
But it could be an opportunity for entertainment, and a few days
|
||
after I had been apprised of the Superintendent’s desire, I happened
|
||
to meet the optician in another laboratory, and he clearly treated
|
||
me as an authority. In the middle of one conversation about
|
||
technological possibilities, the question had come up of how useful
|
||
it would be if one had a material that was both transparent to light
|
||
and a conductor of electricity. Turning to me he said, ‘But we
|
||
haven’t got transparent metal, have we doctor?’ ‘No,’ I replied and
|
||
then after a thoughtful pause, ‘Well, no, not o cially.’ He jumped
|
||
with enthusiasm and said, ‘So that’s what Group E is doing.’ It was
|
||
not di cult then to lead him on to discovering that what we were
|
||
trying to do was to build a transparent and invisible battleship. We
|
||
had produced enough metal to make an invisible torpedo boat, but
|
||
were having di culty because the crew were still visible, as was the
|
||
wake.
|
||
The summer of 1938 wore on to Munich time. I had arranged a
|
||
visit to Bawdsey, and had now received a letter from Charles Frank
|
||
to say that he did not believe in ghosts but would be glad to discuss
|
||
their nature with me at any time. Since he was home in Ipswich, it
|
||
was possible to see him on my way back from Bawdsey, where I had
|
||
found A. P. Rowe in a state of some alarm in case the Germans
|
||
raided his establishment as soon as the War started. When I met
|
||
Charles Frank he told me that he had immediately grasped the
|
||
signi cance of my letter about the Brocken, and had burned it at
|
||
once. He had taken a trip to see what was going on, and had
|
||
brought back a picture postcard of the new television-tower that
|
||
|
||
|
||
had been erected on its summit. German Air Force personnel were
|
||
generally around the area, and one thing that he observed neither of
|
||
us has been able to explain. It was an array of posts rather like
|
||
Belisha beacons with wooden pear-shaped objects at the top.
|
||
There was also, incidentally, the story that whatever was in the
|
||
tower at the summit was able to paralyse internal combustion
|
||
engines. As usually reported, the phenomenon consisted of a tourist
|
||
driving his car on one of the roads in the vicinity, and the engine
|
||
suddenly ceasing to operate. A German Air Force sentry would then
|
||
appear from the side of the road and tell him that it was no use his
|
||
trying to get the car going again for the time being. The sentry
|
||
would, however, return and tell him when he would be able to do
|
||
so. The sentry appeared in due course, and the engine started.
|
||
Incidentally, we did not believe the story, the explanation of which I
|
||
was to nd later, but we thought that it might be a good idea to
|
||
start the same tale going in England to see whether it would puzzle
|
||
the Germans. The story spread rapidly, and we heard of it from time
|
||
to time, with ever increasing detail. The last I heard of it was a
|
||
family of Quakers, who of course never lie, driving across Salisbury
|
||
Plain when the engine of their car stopped. In due course a soldier
|
||
appeared and told them that it would now start again, and so they
|
||
were able to continue on their way.
|
||
I returned to London on the evening of Monday 26th September,
|
||
and felt the tense calm of the London streets as people braced
|
||
themselves for the seemingly inevitable war. There was something
|
||
of the feeling that reached its culmination after Dunkirk. I was
|
||
|
||
|
||
unhappy in not having more to do at Teddington, and spent my
|
||
evenings distributing gas masks—more than two thousand in three
|
||
days.
|
||
Then came Chamberlain’s return with his pathetic scrap of paper
|
||
and his ‘Peace in our time’ speech. I was as angry as a cat which has
|
||
just been robbed of its mouse. Those who felt like that were a
|
||
minority among the almost hysterical majority who thought that
|
||
Chamberlain had done a great thing, but when I went into the Air
|
||
Ministry with Charles Frank’s information about the Brocken the
|
||
following morning I found that the Air Sta were convinced that
|
||
Chamberlain had only postponed the reckoning. As it happened, the
|
||
o cial Intelligence Service, which I had also briefed about the
|
||
Brocken while I had been stationed at Headquarters, came up with
|
||
some further information, but Charles and I between us had beaten
|
||
them by a day, and his description of activities on the Brocken was
|
||
much more detailed. This, as it turned out, did not go unnoticed.
|
||
On my return to A.R.L., I found some general laughter over what
|
||
had happened at the height of the crisis. Someone had thought that
|
||
in case of air raids some shelter trenches ought to be dug, and there
|
||
had been a general call for volunteers. A large squad of physicists
|
||
had therefore been assembled and they had sallied forth on to the
|
||
playing elds armed with spades and sandbags. A little while later
|
||
they were observed trudging sadly back, driven by an irate little
|
||
woman. She was Vera Cain, the captain of the Women’s Hockey
|
||
team, and they had chosen to try to dig their trenches in the middle
|
||
of her pitch. She had heard of their intentions, and had gone to the
|
||
|
||
|
||
Director, Sir Charles Darwin, and had convinced him that there
|
||
were many more sensible places to dig trenches. But even if she had
|
||
not had his authority I doubt whether anyone could have stood up
|
||
to her. I know, for we were married in 1940.
|
||
We became engaged on St. Patrick’s Day 1939, and began to pay
|
||
various social visits, particularly to Oxford. One Saturday evening in
|
||
the summer we had met Jim and Elsie Tuck, and I can remember
|
||
standing at a bus stop in the High while Jim told me about the
|
||
discovery of nuclear ssion, and the possibility that an atomic bomb
|
||
might one day be made. He said that it looked as though the idea
|
||
had already been conceived in Germany and that, indeed, from one
|
||
paper it appeared that one of the German physicists was trying to
|
||
warn the rest of the world.
|
||
I would have been interested in the matter anyway, but what now
|
||
made my interest acute was the visit I had had a few weeks before
|
||
from A. E. Woodward-Nutt, which I have described in the opening
|
||
chapter. Tizard had found there was little information coming
|
||
through from Germany, and so it had been proposed that a scientist
|
||
of some standing (Tizard may have had in mind Thomas Merton,
|
||
who had worked with M.I.6 in World War land who was an eminent
|
||
spectroscopist) should be appointed to conduct an enquiry into our
|
||
Intelligence Services, and recommend what should be done to
|
||
improve them. The Treasury, however, had refused nancial
|
||
support, saying that science was international and that British
|
||
scientists should be able to tell how their opposite numbers were
|
||
thinking by talking to them at conferences, and that this should cost
|
||
|
||
|
||
nothing. Faced with this frustrating reply, Woodward-Nutt had
|
||
remembered my interest in Intelligence matters with the Thost and
|
||
Brocken stories, and so he suggested that I could be transferred to
|
||
Intelligence, and that this would cost the Air Ministry nothing. This
|
||
was the main reason that I found myself in my war post.
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
CHAPTER SIX
|
||
The Day Before War Broke Out
|
||
M
|
||
Y LAST few months at the Admiralty Research Laboratory went
|
||
quickly, and I began to think about my new work. On 15th March
|
||
Hitler had invaded Czechoslovakia and on 7th April Mussolini had
|
||
taken over Albania. The treachery of the Munich Agreement was at
|
||
last obvious, even to Chamberlain; he now gave a guarantee to
|
||
Poland, and so all would depend on whether the Germans would be
|
||
satis ed with their present gains. By early August this seemed
|
||
increasingly unlikely, and then on 23rd August came the astonishing
|
||
news of the non-aggression pact between Germany and Russia. The
|
||
invasion of Poland appeared to be only a matter of time, and for me
|
||
it seemed now or never for a short holiday. Ever since 1934 I had
|
||
spent early September at Hoar Cross, and this year my visit could be
|
||
conveniently sandwiched between leaving Teddington and starting
|
||
in Air Intelligence. Moreover, the Meynells had invited Vera as well,
|
||
so with some misgivings we left Teddington shortly after the news
|
||
of the German pact with Russia came through.
|
||
If the next few pages seem to hold up my narrative of the war,
|
||
they may serve to provide a moment of comedy before a cataclysm
|
||
|
||
|
||
of high tragedy, for they give a glimpse of a carefree and gracious
|
||
life that the war was to sweep away for ever.
|
||
Life at Hoar Cross was as pleasant as it had always been. I took
|
||
my pistols with me; these were something of a joke with the
|
||
Meynells because I would disappear for hours and they never knew
|
||
what I was going to bring back. My bag was mainly rabbits but over
|
||
the years I had also shot hares, stoats, pigeons, crows, and jays. On
|
||
the rst Sunday of this particular holiday, which happened to be the
|
||
last Sunday in August, I was reconnoitring a copse to assess the
|
||
prospects for the week. I saw a great deal of wild life in this way,
|
||
since it was necessary to stand completely still for perhaps half-an
|
||
hour at a stretch before an animal or bird would timidly come into
|
||
view, and in the meantime I often saw things that I would have
|
||
missed on an ordinary walk.
|
||
That particular morning a rabbit loped across a footpath not more
|
||
than fteen yards from where I was standing, and its leisurely pace
|
||
completely misled me as to what was to happen next: a full-grown
|
||
fox came trotting, equally leisurely, after the rabbit. My thoughts
|
||
during the two or three seconds that the fox was visible were very
|
||
mixed. First, I had never shot a fox, a di cult target for a pistol;
|
||
indeed, this was the rst time I had ever seen a fox within range.
|
||
Secondly, it was Sunday morning, and thirdly, this was the ancestral
|
||
home of Hugo Meynell, known the world over as the father of
|
||
English foxhunting. I had the pistol in my hand and the fox in my
|
||
sights, just to see whether I could hit it, but I nally controlled
|
||
myself enough not to pull the trigger. When I returned to lunch I
|
||
|
||
|
||
told Vera, but she refused to believe that I had deliberately not
|
||
red. She said that it was much more likely that I had been so
|
||
surprised by the fox that I had been paralysed.
|
||
The following day I was out with the pistol when, about eighty
|
||
yards away, I saw something peering at me from behind a bush.
|
||
This was a fox’s head in silhouette, and all I could think of was
|
||
showing Vera that I could shoot foxes if I wanted to. Foxhunting or
|
||
not, I took careful aim and red: the fox slumped over dead. Then,
|
||
of course, came the reckoning. I was quite pleased with myself to
|
||
have shot such a wary animal, and at this range, but it would
|
||
require some explaining. When I went back to tea I quietly
|
||
confessed to Colonel Meynell who—instead of being annoyed—was
|
||
much amused. He told me, regretfully, that perhaps I ought to bury
|
||
the body quietly, since the Hunt had been over that very ground
|
||
during the morning and had failed to draw any foxes or cubs at all.
|
||
So that was the end of my fox.
|
||
On the following Thursday, 31st August, Lady Dorothy asked Vera
|
||
and me if we would mind going with her to another country house
|
||
in the afternoon, since a neighbouring Earl was holding an ‘at
|
||
home’, and she felt obliged to take a party across. Moreover, there
|
||
was to be some tennis; she knew that Vera was good at the game
|
||
and it would help if our party was strengthened in this respect. I
|
||
myself was unable to play since I had been badly stung on the ankle
|
||
while out shooting the previous day, but if Vera went I obviously
|
||
had to go too. No sooner had Lady Dorothy told us about the party
|
||
than her elder son, Hugo, started to warn us against going. ‘I’ll tell
|
||
|
||
|
||
you exactly what will happen. People will be standing about and
|
||
then someone will say, “What about tennis?” and (mentioning the
|
||
Earl’s Viscount son, by now in his forties) will say, “Ah yes, tennis!”;
|
||
then he will go and get his racquet, which is an old triangular one
|
||
with a great knob on the handle, and he will bring out two odd-job
|
||
men who will start to put the net up. But the net rope won’t be long
|
||
enough and they’ll have to go and get a bit of string. When he starts
|
||
to play, he’ll hit a ball hard into the net and the string will break
|
||
and things will have to start all over again. And at some stage in the
|
||
game he will trip over a manhole in the middle of the court.’
|
||
We laughed at this obvious caricature of a country tennis party,
|
||
but he insisted it was a truthful picture. Indeed, Colonel Meynell
|
||
seemed to give it some support for he told us that the Viscount had
|
||
been an o cer in his battery during the 1914-18 War. He was so
|
||
untidy that Colonel Meynell in an e ort to shame him into
|
||
smartening himself up had said, ‘Look here, if you will get yourself a
|
||
new pair of breeches I’ll pay half the cost!’ The Viscount duly
|
||
appeared in a new pair of breeches and a few months later the
|
||
Colonel received a bill from a rm of west-end tailors ‘To one half
|
||
the Viscount Blank’s breeches’.
|
||
We left with Lady Dorothy in high curiosity. I was enjoying the
|
||
prospect much more than Vera, because she was attired in a way
|
||
not altogether suitable for tennis, despite the fact that she had often
|
||
preached to me that if you were playing a sport you ought to be
|
||
properly dressed for it. She had indeed brought tennis dress to Hoar
|
||
Cross, but it included shorts rather than a skirt. At lunch she had
|
||
|
||
|
||
mentioned the fact, fearing that shorts were perhaps a little too
|
||
modern for the kind of party that we appeared to be in for, and
|
||
Colonel Meynell agreed. In that case, there was nothing for it but to
|
||
wear a party dress, actually an attractive dark blue American dress
|
||
with rather a long skirt. Her ensemble was completed by gloves and
|
||
a large oppy hat.
|
||
When we arrived we found that Hugo was not quite right, in that
|
||
tennis had already started and two formidable girls were thumping
|
||
the ball about the court more in the spirit of a County match.
|
||
Moreover they were attired in very brief shorts. When their game
|
||
was over, the Viscount suggested that a four should be made up,
|
||
and Lady Dorothy said that Vera would like to play. Vera was very
|
||
apologetic, saying that she had not come dressed for tennis because
|
||
she thought that shorts might be out of place. ‘You are quite right,
|
||
my dear,’ said the very positively voiced daughter of the house. ‘We
|
||
never wear shorts here!’ Perhaps the general embarrassment caused
|
||
by this remark, for it was surely within earshot of the two Amazons,
|
||
may have contributed to the subsequent course of a airs.
|
||
I watched Vera miserably go on to the tennis court to partner the
|
||
Viscount against the two girls who had obviously assessed the
|
||
amount of tennis that she had played by her blue dress. She seemed
|
||
to be about half their size. I have rarely enjoyed myself so much. I
|
||
knew how annoyed Vera was having to play in this habit, and I also
|
||
suspected that the Amazons were in for a surprise. Moreover, there
|
||
was enough already right about Hugo’s predictions to make me
|
||
hope that the rest might well come true. The Viscount’s racquet was, |