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War 30 , 18 (47 , no . 7-12)
HARVARDIAN VERI TAS V N O
barvard College Library FROM
The Institute.

VOL. 47

JULY 1921

No. 221 War 30.18

United States

Naval Institute Proceedings

N IAVAL

U T I T S
ACADEMY

1873✩

ཐུག EX SCIENTIA TRIDENS

། ttttttt te

The writers only are responsible for the contents of their respective articles.

CONTENTS

PAGE

The Relation of Personnel to Matériel.-

Pond

991

Leadership of Men.-Good .

1013

An International Outlook.-Knapp

1023

Europe Since the Armistice. - Creighton 1029

A Labor Saving and More Efficient Method

of Dally Analysis of Engineering Per-

formance. -Moore

. 1049

Fleet Radio Communication in War.-Kent 1059

PAGE

Venus as a Day Sight. - Carney

1069

Specialization Versus Amalgamation.-

Ziegler .

• 1073

Discussion

1083

Secretary's Notes

. 1086

Professional Notes

• 1089

Notes on International Affairs

. 1139

Review of Books · •

. 1145

Information Index

1088

Copyright, 1921, by J. W. Conroy, Trustee for U. S. Naval Institute

Entered at the Post Office at Annapolis, Maryland, as Second Class Matter

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Vol. 47, No. 7

July, 1921

Whole No. 221

United States
Naval Institute
Proceedings PUBLISHED MONTHLY
EDITED BY H. K. HEWITT

L A V A

I N S T I

U.S.N

ITUTE

* 1873

U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE ANNAPOLIS — MARYLAND

A War 20 , 18 (14, 1019-12 ),
HARVARD COLLEGE JUL 30 1921 LIBRARY
TheInstitute
COPYRIGHT, 1921 By J. W. CONROY TRUSTEE FOR U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE
The Bord Baltimore (Press BALTIMORE, MD., U. 8. A.

-120

The writers only are responsible for the contents of their respective articles

CONTENTS

THE RELATION OF PERSONNEL TO MATÉRIEL. By Commanilor John E.

Pond, U. S. Navy....

991

LEADERSHIP OF MEN. By Ensign R. F. Good, U. S. Navy ..

..1013

AN INTERNATIONAL OUTLOOK. By Rear Admiral H. S. Knapp, U. S.

Navy .....

.1023

EUROPE SINCE THE ARMISTICE. A Condensed Review of the Political

and Military Movements Abroad. By Lieut. Commander J. M.

Creighton, U. S. Navy .....

..1029

A LABOR SAVING AND MORE EFFICIENT METHOD OF DAILY ANALYSIS OF

ENGINEERING PERFORMANCE. By Lieut. Commander W. L. Moore,

U. S. Navy ......

..1049

FLEET RADIO COMMUNICATION IN WAR. By Lieutenant (J. G.) H. D.

Kent, U. S. Navy..

.1059

VENUS AS A DAY SIGHT. By Lieutenant R. B. Carney, U. S. Navy ... 1069

SPECIALIZATION VERSUS AMALGAMATION . Zeigler, Jr. ( C. C. ) , U. S. Navy ....
DISCUSSION SECRETARY'S NOTES

By Lieut. Commander S. J. ..1073 ..1083 .1086

PROFESSIONAL NOTES NOTES ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS .. REVIEW OF Books INFORMATION INDEX

..1089 ..1139 .1145 .1088

OFFICERS OF THE INSTITUTE
President REAR ADMIRAL BRADLEY A. FISKE, U. S. NAVY
Secretary and Treasurer COMMANDER H. K. HEWITT, U. S. NAVY
Board of Control REAR ADMIRAL BRADLEY A. FISKE, U. S. NAVY (ex officio) BRIGADIER GENERAL GEORGE RICHARDS, U. S. M. C. CANTAIN JOHN HALLIGAN, JR., U. S. NAVY CAPTAIN T. L. JOHNSON, U. S. NAVY CAPTAIN E. J. KING, U. S. NAVY CAPTAIN W. G. DU BOSE, CONSTRUCTION CORPS, U. S. NAVY COMMANDER J. O. RICHARDSON, U. S. NAVY COMMANDER H. K. HEWITT, U. S. Navy ( ex officio)
PAST PRESIDENTS
ADMIRAL DAVID D. PORTER, U. S. NAVY, 1873 REAR ADMIRAL JOHN L. WORDEN, U. S. NAVY, 1874 REAR ADMIRAL C. R. P. RODGERS, U. S. Navy, Jan. 1875-Jan. 1878 COMMODORE FOXHALL A. PARKER, U. S. Navy, Jan. 1878–Jan. 1879 REAR ADMIRAL JOHN RODGERS, U. S. Navy, Jan. 1879-JAN. 1882 REAR ADMIRAL C. R. P. RODGERS, U. S. NAVY, JAN. 1882-JAN. 1883 REAR ADMIRAL THORNTON A. JENKINS, U. S. NAVY, JAN. 1883-Oct.
1885 • REAR ADMIRAL EDWARD SIMPSON, U. S. NAVY, OCT. 1885-OCT. 1887
REAR ADMIRAL STEPHEN B. LUCE, U. S. NAVY, OCT. 1887-OCT. 1898 REAR ADMIRAL WM. T. SAMPSON, U. S. NAVY, OCT. 1898-OCT. 1902 REAR ADMIRAL H. C. TAYLOR, U. S. Navy, Oct. 1902–OCT. 1904 REAR ADMIRAL C. F. GOODRICH, U. S. NAVY, OCT. 1904- OCT. 1909 REAR ADMIRAL RICHARD WAINWRIGHT, U. S. NAVY, OCT. 1909-OCT
1911

SPFH,U.EOLINASNGTSYLVANIA

UNITED STATES

NAVAL INSTITUTE

PROCEEDINGS

Vol. 47 , No. 7

JULY , 1921

Whole No. 221

[ COPYRIGHTED ] U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE , ANNAPOLIS , MD.

THE RELATION OF PERSONNEL TO MATÉRIEL By COMMANDER JOHN E. POND, U. S. Navy

FOREWORD
During the past ten years I have given much thought to the subject of this paper, and have long held the beliefs set forth in regard to the status of reserve ships and the organization of the reserve force.
I am fully aware that some of my ideas are rather radical, and would entail legislative changes if adopted ; but I am fully convinced that I am right in my premises, and I feel that the time is now ripe to set them forth on paper.
I do this with the knowledge that many officers to whom I have presented these ideas have expressed agreement and some have requested me to write them down and submit them to the service for discussion ; so if this paper proves worthy of discussion, whether of criticism or approval, I shall feel that I have accomplished my purpose and have rendered a service to the navy and to my country.
For the sake of brevity I have purposely avoided going into many of the essential details of administration and organization, contenting myself with setting forth the main features of my plan and trusting the reader to answer for himself, or bring forth in discussion, any collateral questions that may arise.
My desire is to obtain efficiency with economy, and to see the country get some adequate return for the enormous amount of money it now spends on maintaining the personnel of the navy and the Naval Reserve Force.
If the reorganization I have outlined for the Naval Reserve in the last pages of this paper could be effected, we would never again witness such a spectacle as is going on now-recruiting the navy up to 138,000 on January 21, about facing and inviting acceptance of discharges " without

992

THE RELATION OF PERSONNEL TO MATÉRIEL

regard to rate, length of service, vacancies in complement, etc., in order to reduce to 100,000 ; and then about facing again today ; all in the short space of one short month.

I do not know yet how many men have been discharged ; but I do know that it costs an average of about $100 per man to discharge them, and that those who were discharged from training stations were a total loss to the government, to say nothing of the effect on the morale of those

who were expecting discharge when the order to stop was received. Under the proposed organization of the reserve force, practically all
of those desirable men would have transferred to the second reserve with-

out further cost to the government.

JOHN E. POND.

U. S. Naval Training Station , San Francisco, California, March 2, 1921.

THE RELATION OF PERSONNEL TO MATÉRIEL A PLEA FOR A POLICY

It is generally understood and conceded by those who give the subject any thought that armaments are the inevitable result of conflicting national policies .
It is also generally understood by legislators in Congress that some of our own national policies such as Monroe Doctrine , Oriental Immigration, Fisheries, Shipping Laws , etc. , do conflict with the policies of other nations , and that at the present time we do need a very powerful armament .
In times of peace the desire and necessity for economy in government expenditures always lead some otherwise sane men into the folly of pacifism, and the military services are always the first to suffer when cuts in appropriations are deemed necessary.
There is a tendency in that direction now, but the lessons of the World War are still fresh and strong enough to offset it despite the great necessity for economy.
The problem of the day is to find a way to cut down the expense of our military establishments and at the same time maintain our relative strength in the face of existing conflicting national policies.
The consensus of opinion born of our experience in the World War seems to be (a ) we do not need a very large standing army (b) we do need a very powerful navy.
But there is a very strong feeling against militarism in this country which expresses itself in opposition to any vast military

THE RELATION OF PERSONNEL TO MATÉRIEL

993

establishment, particularly from the standpoint of personnel as is especially evidenced concerning the army.
In spite of this feeling against militarism there seems to be a disposition on the part of Congress to provide an adequate navy from the standpoint of matériel, an adequate force of regular officers, and a large Naval Reserve of trained men from which we can quickly draw in time of need.
The navy should immediately take advantage of this disposition and formulate a definite policy for itself along these lines :—a plan of organization to maintain a large matériel in the highest possible state of efficiency and readiness with the reduced personnel that Congress is disposed to provide, together with a reserve organization that will bear a proper relation to the remaining unmanned matériel.
If the navy should adopt such a policy, and stick to it, and lay its plans in accordance with it, there would be no difficulty in indoctrinating Congress to the navy's needs.
At present there is a habit in the navy of blaming our lack of policy on our form of government and therefore being content with a hand to mouth policy for ourselves.
When the Congress is inclined to favor us we get enthusiastic and take everything we can get Congress to give, oftentimes overreaching along one line of activity without regard to its relation to the whole or to the future.
The present personnel situation is a case in point . It is the navy itself, the navy's lack of continuing policy, and not the form of government, that is to blame for the ups and downs resulting from the changes of administration and whims of Congress . The policy outlined below is entirely practical and in the long run will prove more efficient and decidedly more economical than the present " Policy of No Policy ." It requires not only reorganization of our Naval Reserve Force, but the establishment of reserve bases. We do not now possess any such reserve bases . However, with plans already under way for the development of Pacific Coast naval bases, with a new administration about to enter office, and considering the existing urgent demand for economy and the disposition of Congress to favorably consider any proposition that might lead to reducing the cost of the navy, the time is most pro-

994

THE RELATION OF PERSONNEL TO MATÉRIEL

pitious for the navy to get together and put such a policy into practice.
The federal administration is chiefly concerned with the maintenance of a navy of sufficient strength to back up its immediate foreign policies and to show the flag in foreign ports, with a reserve capable of expansion to meet any national emergency that might arise from a combination of such powers as may be opposed to its policies .
The Secretary, with the advice of the General Board , informs Congress of the administration's naval requirements ; but the responsibility for providing the personnel and matériel and appropriating the funds for construction , maintenance and operation , rests entirely with Congress .
Aside from the General Board's duty and responsibility to properly advise the administration as to its naval requirements for carrying out its foreign-policies, the navy's chief concern is the efficiency of the personnel and matériel provided.
EFFICIENCY OF THE ACTIVE PERSONNEL
Since the maximum efficiency of the active navy can only be attained by operation with full complement, it follows that the navy's policy should first require that all ships in active commission be fully manned.
It also follows that only such ships should be kept in commission as can be fully manned with the personnel provided.
If this policy were adhered to we could depend upon the administration to obtain from Congress the authority for the necessary increase of enlisted personnel whenever its foreign policies require an increase in the strength of the active navy.
Since the personnel of the active navy would thus be subject. to sudden expansion and since efficiency depends to a great extent on trained officers and chief petty officers, it follows that the navy's policy should next require that its excess officers and chief petty officers be kept in training by being actively employed in naval duties.

EFFICIENCY OF Reserve PerSON NEL
Since the main purpose of an organized reserve force is to man the reserve ships in case of national emergency, and since effi-

THE RELATION OF PERSONNEL TO MATÉRIEL,

995

ciency requires not only training of personnel in navy duties and customs but familiarity with the material to be manned, it follows that the navy's policy should next require that the Reserve Force be organized in ship units and definitely assigned to reserve ships , and that the reserve ships be kept in condition of readiness for active service .

TO SUM UP PERTINENT FACTS, THE NAVY'S POLICY SHOULD BE
With Respect to Personnel : (1) To keep the ships in commission fully manned at all times ; (2 ) To keep excess regular officers and chief petty officers actively engaged in naval duties ; ( 3 ) To organize the Reserve Force in ship units and definitely assign them to reserve ships. With Respect to Matériel: (4 ) To keep only such ships in active commission as can be fully manned with the enlisted personnel provided by Congress ; (5) To lay up in reserve all ships for which Congress has not provided regular enlisted personnel ; (6) To provide facilities on shore for keeping reserve ships. in such condition of readiness that they can be promptly placed in active service when needed, either in case of national emergency or to replace a unit of the active fleet.

NAVAL BASES AND THE NAVAL RESERVE
I believe that our greatest naval need to-day is suitable bases for laying up ships in reserve.
We do not now possess any such suitable bases and we cannot completely carry out the above outlined policy until they are provided .
But now is the time to make a start-with the projected Pacific Coast Naval Base at Alameda, California.
There is a conception in the public mind (and apparently in the naval mind as well, to judge from the loose way in which the term is used ) as to the meaning of the term " naval base ."
A naval base is a port in which naval activities and facilities for the maintenance and supply of a fleet are located .
Repair yards, dry docks, coaling stations, oil storage depots , supply depots , naval magazines, torpedo depots , receiving ships.

996

THE RELATION OF PERSONNEL TO MATÉRIEL

hospitals, marine posts, small arms target ranges, drill grounds , recreation fields, etc. , are merely attributes of a naval base, any number of which may go to make up the base, depending upon the character, purpose and strategic position of the base and the composition of the fleet or unit it is intended to serve.
There should be one main naval base on each coast to serve the
entire fleet, and they should be located in Chesapeake Bay and in San Francisco Bay, respectively.
The main naval bases should, in addition to facilities for repair, docking and supply of the entire fleet, include reserve bases for the capital ships of the Atlantic and Pacific fleets.
On the Atlantic coast there should be secondary naval bases at New York and at Pensacola, Florida ; with operating bases for destroyers , submarines and aircraft at such other strategic points along the coast line as Portsmouth, Boston (Squantum) , Long Island Sound ( New London ) , Charleston , Key West and New Orleans .
On the Pacific coast we should have one secondary naval base at Puget Sound ; and operating bases for destroyers , submarines and aircraft at such other strategic points along the coast line as Port Angeles, Astoria, Sausalito , San Pedro and San Diego.
The secondary naval bases should , in addition to facilities for repairing, docking and supply of any one of the units of the fleet, include reserve bases for the cruisers, gunboats , special types and auxiliaries of the reserve fleets.
The destroyer, submarine and aircraft bases in the continental U. S. should, in addition to supply facilities , include reserve bases for destroyers, submarines or aircraft as the case may be.
Fleet operating bases should be located at Guantanamo, Panama, Pearl Harbor and Manila Bay ; with destroyer, submarine and aircraft operating bases at strategic points in Alaska ( Dutch Harbor and Seward ) , West Indies ( St. Thomas or Porto Rico ) , Panama, Hawaii, Guam and the Philippines.
The fleet operating bases should each include facilities for repair, docking and supply of the entire fleet.
The destroyer, submarine and aircraft operating bases outside the continental limits of the United States should include only supply facilities for the units they are intended to serve.
All the attributes of a great naval base need not , and I believe should not, be grouped in one place.

THE RELATION OF PERSONNEL TO MATÉRIEL

997

For instance, take San Francisco Bay. The effort to bring about the establishment of a real naval base in San Francisco Bay would never have met with such wilful opposition if there had been a proper conception of the meaning of " a great naval base," not only on the part of the local public affected but of the personnel of the various boards and committees that have been engaged in determining upon the site. The site of Alameda has finally been chosen ; but has the Navy Department any very definite plan as to just what activities or attributes of a great naval base are to be established at this site ? The usual practice in such cases in the past has been to locate a site for a naval station , and then decide what activities to establish there, and let the future needs of the navy determine from time to time what activities shall be added . Such locations have sometimes been selected through purely political expediency ; and, in some cases, even the activities established at naval stations have been established to gratify local political desires and not primarily to fulfil the requirements of the navy, as should be the case. The result is obvious. These stations in time become obsolete or inadequate for all the navy's requirements, and incapable of expansion to meet those requirements . Yet the vested interests of the immediate locality work to prevent abandonment and removal to a better site, or the establishment of additional activities at other sites ; and good money continues to be thrown after bad.
This has been especially true in the case under discussion . The vested interests and jealousies of the city of Vallejo have been able to muster sufficient political power to balk all attempts to establish a naval base in San Francisco Bay capable of handling the Pacific Fleet.
And the country now finds itself in a dangerous state of unpreparedness for war in the Pacific.
Our shore facilities are incapable of handling the entire Pacific Fleet even in time of peace.
Let us therefore avoid past mistakes and first decide on what facilities and activities are required at each strategic point of our coast line before deciding on any definite sites for those activities .

998

THE RELATION OF PERSONNEL TO MATÉRIEL

We are now considering San Francisco Bay as a strategic point *
in which a main naval base should be established.
As I have said before in this paper, I believe that the navy's greatest need to-day is suitable bases for laying up ships in reserve, and that each main base should include a reserve base for the capital ships of the reserve fleet.
I will go into details later as to the exact facilities that should be provided at a reserve base ; but suffice it to say now that the first requirement is suitable water frontage, with finger piers to berth the reserve ships , with warehouses on shore for storage of their equipment and supplies, and with sufficient room for expansion of water frontage.
The site at Alameda is admirably situated and wisely chosen for this purpose.
Of the other attributes of a great naval base the repair yards and dry docks are next in importance to be considered.
Except for its distance from the natural center of naval activities in San Francisco Bay, its inaccessibility for both freight and passenger transportation, and the inadequacy of its fresh water supply, there is no reason why Mare Island should not be retained as a ship-building yard, a repair and docking yard for small vessels, a marine regimental post, and a naval hospital .
It is a most suitable site for a naval magazine. Hunter's Point on the San Francisco shore, directly opposite the Alameda site, appears to be the best location for docking and repair facilities.
These last are purely industrial activities and I can see no logical reason for grouping such purely industrial activities with other purely military activities.
I would therefore suggest that the dry docks and repair yards for the capital ships be located at Hunter's Point and not at Alameda .
The fleet supply department should be located at the Alameda site.
The reason is obvious, the considerations being accessibility to overland transportation, wharfage, proximity to the fleet's anchorage ground in San Francisco Bay, and the fact that fleet supply is a military activity.

THE RELATION OF PERSONNEL TO MATÉRIEL

999

The coaling station is suitably located at California City, overland transportation not being involved, as steaming coal is carried to this port in floating bottoms by way of Panama Canal and in the future probably from Alaska .
The oil fueling and storage depot should be located in the vicinity of Richmond, where the present pipe lines come in from the California oil fields ; with a distributing line from Richmond to the Alameda Base.
The receiving ship ( station ? ) is suitably located at Yerba Buena Island, and should be retained there.
The best location for a destroyer and submarine operating base is in Richardson's Bay, between Sausalito and Belvidere.
This is a long shallow bay, admirably protected and handy to deep clean water and the Golden Gate entrance.
By dredging the lower part between Sausalito and Belvidere Island, and filling the upper part with dredged material, it would provide not only an ideal site for a destroyer and submarine operating base but an ideal field for an aircraft operating base as well.
Suitable locations for small-arms target ranges, accessible by existing rail transportation, can be found in Marin County and in the country back of the Contra Costa Hills.
Navy Department General Order No. 372 of February 28, 1918, recognizes the necessity of removing " from the navy yard organizations , as now operated, certain activities which have no relation to the actual work of the yards, which is industrial, such as receiving ships , marine barracks, naval hospitals, medical supply department, electrical schools , ammunition depots , armed guard activities, and, in order not to unduly tax the storage facilities at the industrial yard, all supply activities and provision for storage designed to meet the requirements of overseas and district patrol activities rather than the actual needs of the yards for work to be undertaken by them ."
This general order segregates the activities in each district into the following groups : Military, industrial, supply, transportation.
A perusal of the various general orders and changes in Naval Regulations that have been issued from time to time in regard to Naval Districts , will show that the present organization of Naval Districts is the result of a gradual development through necessity,

1000

THE RELATION OF PERSONNEL TO MATÉRIEL

and not the result of any well defined preconceived policy at the time of their first establishment.
That being the case, why not at least start right this time, and segregate the purely military from the industrial activities in our new naval base in San Francisco Bay?

NAVAL DISTRICTS AND THE NAVAL RESERVE
The country was at war when General Order No. 372 of February 28 , 1918, was promulgated, and at that time, of course, there was no immediate necessity for providing for the organization and maintenance of the reserve matériel and personnel on a peace basis.
In General Order No. 519 of March 10 , 1920, with certain exceptions, all naval activities outside of Washington are grouped in Naval Districts, and the areas comprised within the various Naval Districts are redefined by " political subdivisions " " in order to facilitate the organization and administration of the Naval Reserve Force."
In General Order No. 522 of March 25, 1920 , " The Naval Reserve Force on inactive duty shall be organized in the Naval Districts and assigned to various units in accordance with instructions from the Bureau of Navigation from time to time." This order goes on to define the general organization in " Divisions , Battalions, and Brigades, " " depending upon the number of men available ."
The whole scheme is very indefinite, and vague, even as regards personnel, and indicates a woeful lack of a policy.
No definite provisions are made for practical training while on inactive duty.
Apparently the idea of organizing the inactive reserve matériel has not even been considered .
Certainly no attempt is made to consider it in connection with the organization of the inactive personnel, else the organization ordered for the Naval Reserve Force on inactive duty would be along the lines of ship units, divisions, and squadrons, instead of " Divisions," " Battalions," and " Brigades."

THE RELATION OF PERSONNEL TO Matériel

ΙΟΟΙ

OUR FORMER POLICIES WITH RESPECT TO RESERVE MATÉRIEL
Sometime in the latter part of the year 1915 , the Navy Department announced a policy in regard to placing ships in reserve about as follows :
To complete the repairs recommended by the Board of Survey before detaching excess personnel-in other words, to put ships in a first-class condition of readiness before actually placing them in reserve.
Although these ships were detached from the fleet and assigned to the reserve fleet immediately after their arrival at the navy yard, they were not to be considered " in reserve " until their repair or overhaul periods were finished ; the idea being to insure proper following up and inspection of the repair work by the officers and men who had cruised in the ship and were familiar with her material condition, and to leave some of these officers and men as her reserve complement to care for her while in reserve .
While in command of the Pacific reserve torpedo flotilla, based at Sausalito and Mare Island from 1912 to 1914, I was able, in some instances , to persuade the Bureau of Navigation to revoke its usual orders and permit one officer and the leading petty officers of a destroyer joining the reserve flotilla to remain with their ship.
The usual orders provided for the exchange of crews bodily between the newcomer and her relief.
From 1914 to 1916 I was on duty at Puget Sound Navy Yard, and later in one of the armored cruisers of the Pacific reserve fleet based at that yard .
I do not recall one single instance in all that time, from 1912 until our declaration of war in 1917, in which the Department carried out the policy it announced in 1915 as described above.
I do recall many instances where it was not carried out. The usual practice was to detach all the officers and most of the old crew within a few weeks after arrival at the navy yard, In some cases, when a reserve ship was designated to replace one in full commission, practically the entire crews were exchanged bodily, bag and baggage. The effect of this practice was not only detrimental to matériel, but was most discouraging to the personnel.

1002

THE RELATION OF PERSONNEL TO MATÉRIEL

The young officers and petty officers of the reserve organization could not hope to retain their temporary responsible positions, even if they were fortunate enough to go with their ship when she was placed in full commission.
There was never a prospect, for them, of being able to enjoy the fruits of the hard work they had performed while in reserve.
It is to the everlasting credit of those officers and men who worked so hard to keep up the material condition of readiness of the reserve ships, in spite of the discouraging conditions described above, that those ships were able to stand up so well in the arduous duties assigned them during the war.
After demobilization we began to drop back into the old rut . But instead of re-establishing the old reserve fleet we tried to keep up the fleet organization with inadequate personnel , by operating a few capital ships and destroyers with full crews, and the rest " in commission with reduced complement." Finally the older battleships and armored cruisers were placed out of commission , owing to lack of personnel to man them even with reduced complements. It is doubtful if these old ships will ever have to be placed in commission again, but on the other hand it is also more than likely that other more modern ships will soon have to be similarly placed out of commission for lack of personnel.
These ships deteriorate rapidly while out of commission . Their spare parts will deteriorate, be misplaced and lost, or become obsolete. Their control systems will become obsolete. Their outfits of equipment will become depleted in store, and the reserve of expendable supplies and dry provisions necessary for recommissioning will disappear and be forgotten. Then, when the national emergency does arise, these ships will have to be recommissioned at tremendous expense , after great delay, and with a green crew, and they will be of very little fighting value until they have had a long shakedown cruise. Under present and past policies ( or lack of policy ) ships in reserve deteriorate almost as rapidly as if out of commission, principally because the work of moving coal and stores and overhauling machinery is beyond the capacity of the small ship's force to perform, and the interiors of bunkers, storerooms and

THE RELATION OF PERSONNEL TO MATÉRIEL

1003

machinery are therefore neglected in the everlasting effort to keep the visible portions of the ship clean.
This applies as well to ships " in ordinary " under the old system . Placing ships in reserve instead of out of commission at the end of a cruise also results in an ever increasing accumulation of obsolete material in their equipment storerooms .

STATUS OF SHIPS
Section 2, Article 650 , of Chapter 17, U. S. Navy Regulations,
1920, defines the " Status of Ships " as either " in commission " 66
or out of commission ."
Vessels in commission may be in any one of four conditions, as follows : (a) In Full Commission .- Vessels in this condition are fully officered and manned, and ready in all respects for service, and under orders or liable to orders for service without previous notice. They may be temporarily disabled for repairs by orders of the department, however, without changing their status. Such vessels will ordinarily be attached to fleets, special service squadrons, detachments or naval districts. (b) In Reduced Commission .- Vessels in reduced commission are officered and manned with less than 80 per cent of their full complement, but with sufficient complement to maintain the vessel in material readiness for service and to perform such operations as may be necessary to insure efficient performance of the material and to train the personnel. Such vessels will ordinarily be attached to fleets, or naval districts. (c) In Commission in Reserve.-Vessels in this condition shall be maintained at some designated navy yard or other suitable place, and shall be kept ready for sea on short notice. They shall have reduced complements of officers and men on board including, if practicable, an engineer officer and such engineer and artificer personnel as may be required to maintain the material in condition for operation. The provision that they shall be ready for sea on short notice shall not be construed to prevent the carrying on of such repairs as may be necessary to keep them ready for sea, or as may be authorized by the Department, but no work shall be undertaken on any of them that will render them unable to move upon the expiration of four working days after the receipt of orders, without first obtaining permission from the Department. Such vessels will ordinarily be attached to fleets or naval districts. (d) In Commission in Ordinary.- Vessels in this condition shall be maintained at some designated navy yard under the commandant in such manner as will best tend to keep them in condition for service if needed, under detailed instructions from the Department. They shall have complements of officers and men on board only large enough to enable them to be properly cared for in the condition in which ordered to be maintained ; their complements shall include, if practicable, an engineer officer and such artificer personnel as may be required. Necessary repairs shall be con-
40

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THE RELATION OF PERSONNEL TO MATÉRIEL

ducted on them, but no work shall be undertaken on any of them without special permission from the Department which would delay them longer than would be necessary to change them from the condition in ordinary to that of readiness for sea service were no repairs in progress. Such vessels ordinarily will not be attached to fleets but will be maintained in ordinary independently.
Ships Out of Commission.- Ships in this condition shall have no personnel on board, and shall be under the full control of the commandant of the navy yard at which they lie. Repairs and alterations shall be carried on on board them as may be authorized by the Department, or they may be held out of commission and not under repair awaiting the Department's instructions to commission or otherwise dispose of them.
The controlling factor in determining whether a ship shall be in condition (a) , ( b ) , or ( c ) , is available personnel.
The controlling factor in determining whether a ship shall be in the status of condition (d) or " out of commission," is condition of material and naval value.
I believe that ships in active service should be fully manned, and that all others that are of any naval value whatever should be kept in reserve.
I believe further than no naval ship should ever be placed out of commission, except for the purpose of extensive alterations or to await disposal as of no further naval value.
I would therefore redefine the " Status of Ships " as follows : The status of each vessel of the navy will be definitely ordered either as ( a ) " in active service," (b ) " in active reserve, " ( c ) " in ordinary reserve," ( d) " out of commission for alterations ," or (e) " condemned."
(a ) Ships in Active Service.- Vessels in this condition are fully officered and manned, and except when temporarily disabled for repairs, ready in all respects for service, and under orders or liable to orders for service without previous notice. Such vessels are ordinarily attached to fleets, special service squadrons, detachments, or naval districts.
(b) Ships in Active Reserve. - Vessels in this condition are fully officered, but with reduced crew sufficient only to maintain the vessel in material readiness for service and to perform such operations as may be necessary to insure efficient performance of the material. Such vessels are attached to the active fleets and are available to replace vessels of the active fleets on short notice . They are also available as practice ships for the Naval Reserve Force, the Naval Academy, and other training purposes .

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(c) Ships in Ordinary Reserve .-All other vessels in commission shall be maintained in this condition at designated reserve bases.
Upon going into ordinary reserve, and before any of the officers or men are detached , all coal must be removed, all portable equipment (except guns, search lights, control installations, furniture, Fighting fixtures, and " title A " spare parts ) and supplies must be inventoried, tagged and properly stowed in the storehouses provided on shore, and all structural parts, machinery, and appliances must be properly cleaned, painted and otherwise preserved.
Ships in this condition will have sufficient personnel to properly care for the material and to form a nucleus for the Reserve Force when the ship is needed in case of national emergency.
They will be attached to the reserve base under the commandant and their personnel will be suitably quartered and messed on shore.
(d) Ships Out of Commission for Alterations.- Ships in this condition shall have no personnel, and shall be under the full control of the superintendent of the dock yard at which they lie.
Repairs and alterations shall be carried out on board them as
may be authorized by the Department . (e) Condemned Ships. - Orders for placing ships in this con-
dition will be issued by the Chief of Naval Operations, and such. ships shall thereafter be preserved in their present condition at such stations within a district as the commandant of the district may direct, pending further instructions from the Department as to their final disposition.
Naturally these ships will be placed in the condition of " ordinary reserve " before being placed out of commission or condemned.
Vessels maintained in commission shall fly the flag and commission pennant regardless of their service status as defined above.
Vessels out of commission shall not fly the flag or commission pennant.

ADMINISTRATION AND ORGANIZATION OF NAVAL BASES It will be sufficient for the purpose of this paper to merely mention a few of the points involving changes in Chapter 41 of

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THE RELATION OF PERSONNEL TO MATÉRIEL

Navy Regulations, 1920, without going into details of administration and organization .
Should the policy I have outlined be adopted , such changes as may be necessary will be apparent to those in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations who are charged with the preparation and revision of the Navy Regulations.
These points are : ( 1 ) A naval base should be considered as one of the administrative groups or units of a Naval District. ( 2 ) The headquarters of the commandant of the naval base within the continental United States should be at the reserve base.
(3 ) The principal administrative establishments that may be included within a naval base, their character, and their administrative officers, should be as indicated in the following table :

ADMINISTRATIVE ESTABLISHMENTS WITHIN A NAVAL BASE

Designation

Character

Administrative Officer

Reserve Base

Military .... Commandant-Line.

Supply Depot Ammunition Depot

Military ....Director- Supply Officer , Military ....Officer- in- Charge-Line.

Small Arms Target Range ....Military Officer-in-Charge-Line.

Receiving (Ship ) Station ......Military Commanding Officer-Line.

....

Base Hospital

Military .... Commanding Officer- Medical

Officer.

Dock Yard

.Industrial . .Superintendent-Constructor.

Coal Depot

Industrial .. Superintendent- Line Engineer

Fuel Oil Depot

Industrial .. Superintendent-Line Engineer

Destroyer and Submarine

Operating Base

Military ....Commanding Officer-Line.

Air Station

Military ....Commanding Officer- Line

Aviation.

(4) The activities of a reserve base should include the following principal units :
Naval base headquarters. Branch War College. Technical trades schools. Reserve ordnance depot. Reserve torpedo depot . Reserve ship units. Officers club (including mess ) . Warrant officers club (including mess ) .

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Chief petty officers club (including mess ) . Enlisted men's club. General mess hall. Parade grounds. Recreation field. Naval hospital.

RESERVE SHIP UNITS
Facilities. Reserve ship units should comprise the following facilities for maintaining them in the condition of " Ordinary Reserve ."
1. Berthing space at finger pier with railroad track leading to storehouses .
2. Equipment storerooms . 3. Boat storage shed. 4. Supply storerooms. 5. Reserve Force outfit storeroom. 6. Crew's dormitory. 7. Offices, with officer of the day sleeping room . 8. Executive officer's quarters.
ADMINISTRATION AND ORGANIZATION
The regular personnel of a capital ship in " ordinary reserve´´ should include the following :
1. A commanding and executive officer of suitable rank to continue in the office of executive if the ship should be called to active service.
2. As navigator, a line officer of suitable rank to take the duties. of senior watch in active service .
3. As engineer officer, a chief machinist or other line officer of suitable rank and experience to assume the duties of assistant engineer in active service.
4. As gunnery officer, a chief ordnance gunner or other line officer.
5. As first lieutenant, a chief carpenter or carpenter. 6. As electrical officer, an electrical gunner or other suitable line officer. 7. As boatswain, a chief boatswain's mate .

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THE RELATION OF PERSONNEL TO MATÉRIEL

8. As ship's writer a chief yeoman capable of taking the duties of captain's yeoman in active service.
9. As supply officer, a supply officer of suitable rank and experience to continue in the duties of general storekeeper in active service .
10. A chief yeoman for the general storekeeper. 11. Such other ratings as may be necessary for watch duty and for preservation of the equipment, supplies, machinery, and structural parts of the ship. The regular personnel of other ships in this status should include an executive and an engineer and such other officers and men as the type and size of the ship may require. Men with from sixteen to twenty-five years service should be assigned to ships in ordinary reserve whenever practicable. The accounts of officers and men regularly attached to ships in ordinary reserve should be carried by the disbursing officer of the reserve base.
The complete outfit of equipment and spare parts should be kept on hand in the equipment storerooms on shore, all properly inventoried, grouped, and suitably tagged with the name and location of the storeroom in which they are to be stowed when on board ship.
The usual allowance of expendable supplies (except ammunition and fuel , which should be kept on hand at the ammunition and fuel depots, respectively) , clothing and small stores, and such dry provisions as are not likely to deteriorate, should be kept on hand in original packages in the supply storerooms on shore ; all properly inventoried, grouped, and suitably tagged with the name and location of the storeroom in which they are to be stowed when on board ship.
The bag, hammock, and ditty box of each reservist detailed to a ship in ordinary reserve should be numbered, tagged with the owner's name, and stowed in suitable racks in the Reserve Force qutfit storeroom on shore.
The service records of the reservists detailed to a ship in ordinary reserve should be kept by the executive officer in the same manner as those of the regular crew.
The executive officer should keep in touch with all members of the Reserve Force detailed to the ship, and should furnish each

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1009

of them with a station billet, a roster of officers and men, and other pertinent information in regard to their ship and their duties .
The head of each ship department should likewise keep in touch with the reserve personnel detailed to his department.
The mobilization orders for the members of the reserve force detailed to a ship in ordinary reserve should be issued by the executive officer.
The station billets should include individual instructions as to procedure in case of mobilization or call to active duty,
REORGANIZATION OF NAVAL RESERVE FORCE
The Naval Reserve Force should be reorganized and separated into first reserve and second reserve .
The first reserve should comprise those detailed to ships in ordinary reserve and should be organized in ship units.
The second reserve should comprise the Reserve Force general detail list of the naval district , and should not be organized.
The records of members of the first reserve should be carried at the reserve base.
The records of members of the second reserve should be carried at the district headquarters.
Members of the second reserve should be transferred to the first reserve to fill vacancies in ship units.
Members of ship units should be selected as far as practicable from the same locality.
Members of the first reserve should be permitted to wear the uniform with the cap ribbon of their ship, on official and social occasions. For this purpose they will be required to retain one blue dress uniform and cotton undershirt. The remainder of their
full bag outfit will be kept at the reserve base. Members of the second reserve should not be required to have
the uniform , although they may be permitted to wear it on official occasions .
Members of the first reserve should be paid adequate retainer pay.
Members of the second reserve should not receive retainer pay.
Transfer to the second reserve from the active navy should be substituted for the present " Furlough without pay." ( Special Order discharges should be abolished . )

ΠΟΙΟ THE RELATION OF PERSONNEL TO MAtériel

Men so transferred should be placed at the foot of the list of their rating in the general detail, and should not be eligible for transfer to the first reserve until their " number is made."

Transfer from the reserve to the active navy involves losing a place on the list of the general detail should the man desire to

return to the reserve before expiration of enlistment.

Men honorably discharged from the active navy are eligible for

a place at the head of the list of their rating in the general detail ,

should they desire to join the reserve.

Ex-members of the first reserve are not entitled to a place on

the list of the general detail unless while disenrolled they have completed an enlistment in the active navy.

They must otherwise start again at the foot of the list of the general detail.

Members of the first reserve should be eligible for entrance ,

at their own request and provided they have the necessary pre-

liminary educational qualifications, to any of the technical trades

L

schools maintained at the reserve bases in their district . Trans-

portation to and subsistence while attending such schools should be at their own expense.

Ships " in active reserve " should be detailed for training the first reserve.

At least two such ships should be detailed to this duty at each reserve base. If the number of first reserves applying for training require it, two groups of such ships should be detailed for this purpose.
These ships should be employed alternately throughout the year in cruises of about one month's duration .
The itinerary and schedule of operations for each of these cruises should be published well in advance by the commander-inchief of the fleet to which attached .
Each member of the first reserve should be entitled , but not required, to take one of these cruises at government expense each year.
Each member of the first reserve should be permitted to take as many more of these cruises as he may desire at his own expense.
Each member of the second reserve should be permitted to take as many of these cruises as he may desire at his own expense.
Original enrollment in the second reserve should be limited to United States citizens and native-born minors over fifteen years of

THE RELATION OF PERSONNEL TO MATÉRIEL IOII
age, but such minors are not eligible for advancement to the first reserve until they have reached the age of seventeen with parents' consent or eighteen without parents' consent.
Membership in the first reserve would thus be a coveted priv ilege that could only be obtained by going through the second reserve or by completing an enlistment in the active navy.
NOTE.- Most of this paper was prepared before receipt of U. S. Navy Regulations, 1920. Attention is invited to the definitions given in Section 2, Article 2050, of Chapter 52, U. S. Navy Regulations, 1920, which coincide in substance with the definitions in this paper.
Attention is also invited to the article by Captain Reginald R. Belknap, U. S. Navy, on " Squantum, the Victory Plant," in the February 1921 number of the PROCEEDINGS of the United States Naval Institute.

·
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[COPYRIGHTED] U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE, ANNAPOLIS , MD.
LEADERSHIP OF MEN
By ENSIGN R. F. GOOD, U. S. Navy We should guarantee to every man his full rights, and exact from every man the full performance of his duty.-THEODORE ROOSEVELT.
In attempting the preparation of a treatise on the subject of " Leadership of Men " it has been necessary for the writer to view the subject from the standpoint of a young officer in charge of a division on board ship , for , to state frankly a fact which will appear to an older reader only too evident, that has been the extent of his experience.
It is not illogical to assume, however, that there are certain fundamental principles of procedure, modified of course by the degree of education and training to which applied, which will prove equally efficient, whether used by a division officer to gain the loyal co-operation of the petty officers and men under his charge or employed by a commander-in-chief to indoctrinate his force commanders. Furthermore, the mental habits acquired by an officer during his first tour of sea duty are apt to be life-long ; and for that reason it is all the more important that during these years an officer should come to understand and observe the principles of true leadership.
It is true that some men are " born " leaders ; that is, they inherit the essential qualities of leadership. A far greater number acquire leadership by careful study and industrious application . But no man ever had leadership " thrust upon him." Command, yes, but leadership never. Unless a man be heir to the elements of what Napoleon called " the sacred fire " he can win it to himself only by painstaking effort.
It is, therefore, with the aim of presenting the fundamentals and ideals of leadership to the younger generation of officers, not from the pinnacle of senior officer who has fought and won his

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battle, but from the standpoint of one actually engaged with his own problem, that this article is undertaken .

LEADERSHIP DEFINED
Webster briefly defines leadership as "the ability to lead. " From a military point of view, however, this is scarcely explicit. A more comprehensive definition is arrived at by " putting the cart before the horse." As the object of all leadership is " the achievement, through the acts of men, of a definite purpose or result," so leadership is the means to the end, the procedure by which the leader brings his men, not as individuals alone, but with unified hearts and minds, to direct their efforts toward the attainment of the desired goal.
In this, leadership and morale are inseparably joined. Morale has been broadly defined as the spirit of an organization- its courage, its pride, its loyalty, its stamina. In high morale these qualities (and many others ) are found in the superlative degree. Since leadership can operate only through a high morale it is saddled with the two- fold duty of first creating this esprit de corps and then administering the force thus created to the accomplishment of the desired end. Some authorities point out that of leadership and morale the latter is the more important, as proof citing instances in which organizations possessing high morale have accomplished much under mediocre leaders. But it must be remembered that such organization was not endowed with this high morale in its infancy. Rather, it will be found that this very morale was conceived and nourished by one who understood the cardinal principles and virtues of leadership.
In a recent address delivered before the Naval War College, Admiral Sims made the following statement : " A fleet of the most powerful vessels would be of little use in war without a personnel at least as efficient as that of our possible enemies." We have, then, in a word, both the meaning and object of leadership ( so far as it applies to the military services at any rate) ; namely, by the creation of a high morale and its scientific administration, the
bringing of our personnel to the topmost peak of efficiency. And to do this we must start at the bottom , begin with the relations existent between the division officer and the men under his com-
mand. The rest follows as an ascending scale of natural sequence .

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STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF LEADERSHIP
The physical structure of leadership (if such a structure is assumed to exist for purposes of analysis ) corresponds closely to the erection of a permanent building. The wise architect first selects a firm foundation . Next the component parts are manufactured from the raw material. Lastly these various parts are combined in their proper relation to form the completed whole. So it is with leadership. The foundation on which the leader must build is military character. The component parts to be fashioned from the rough are the individuals with whom he works. and the product, if the work be well planned and carefully performed, is a skilled organization of superior morale .

MILITARY CHARACTER THE FOUNDATION OF LEADERSHIP
Character is an intangible attribute, composed of all the virtues and vices of the human race, and broadly classified good or bad as the virtues or vices predominate. The point that must be constantly remembered, however, is that character, like small-pox, is contagious, and if the organization is to possess a good character it must be exposed to that which it is expected to contract. Military character is to the leader that which by force of example will inculcate in the followers the military characteristics which the leader himself exhibits. Military character is to the leader as morale is to the organization. If the leader has a strong military character his command will have high morale.
The measure of military character is, to a certain extent , its very intangibility. But for purposes of exposition it may be assumed to consist of a number of virtues in military character the vices have no place.
Among the prime requisites of military character (the word among is used here because no effort is made to list these requisites in order of their rightful priority) is knowledge. This knowledge is of two kinds . First the officer who aspires to leadership must " know his job." He must know just what is expected of his unit in the larger organization and the most expeditious and efficient way of carrying it out . If he does not know his division work his leading boatswain's mate can do a better job than he can, and even in a division where spirit is excellent a petty officer who thinks he knows more than his division officer will not hesitate

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to confide this opinion to his shipmates. By this it is not meant that a division officer must burden himself needlessly with the myriad details of ship's work. But he must " know how," so that when he is appealed to for specific instructions he can give them clearly, concisely, and without hesitation. Otherwise he must inevitably sacrifice the respect of his petty officer and men for his ability, and loss of respect in any way, shape, or form means lowered morale and decreased efficiency.
In the second place, the successful officer must have a knowledge of men. A superficial knowledge is not sufficient, and in this instance an ounce of actual contact is worth a pound of book psychology. The officer has ever before him the goal of increasing the value of the personnel . This can only be done by elevating the value of the individual. As Von der Goltz puts it : " A general must be a discerner of men. He must look into the hearts of his soldiers , in order to be able to perceive rightly, at each moment, what he can acquire of them." The division officer should know every man under his command by name, surely, for nothing lowers a man's self-respect quite so much as to be called
say you," to be made to feel that he is just one of a lot , that he sunk his individuality when he donned his first suit of work whites. More than this even, the real " discerner of men " will know, in a general way at least, where the man's home is and something of his early environment. In a country as large as ours sectional peculiarities, many of them decades old, are very pronounced, and if the leader would know at each moment what he can acquire of his men a knowledge of what a man's ancestors or associates did under similar circumstances and what characteristics have been handed down to him by years of physical proximity will prove invaluable in forming the estimate.
The second essential of military character is loyalty. Being loyal one's self and having the power to instil loyalty in others is a necessity for the leader. Criticism of superiors or the orders of higher authority breeds disloyalty, and it is only too often that young officers forget this and discuss these matters in the hearing of their men. Many are intensely loyal in obeying orders which meet with their approval but either actually disloyal or passively so through indifference in carrying out instructions which do not appeal to them. Initiative is another matter, and should be encouraged, but initiative does not bestow the prerogative of ques-

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1017

tioning an order, once it has been given. Rather, initiative consists. of accomplishing to the fullest extent not only what the letter but the spirit of the order dictates . Only by sincere and complete loyalty can that quality be ingrained in others. As one authority expresses it :
Leaders may look without hesitation to their subordinates for true loyalty to their plans when they have shown by example that they themselves are loyal and capable.
Energy, earnestness , thoroughness, and perseverance are four qualities which, if not inherent, must be cultivated . Unless an officer, and especially a division officer who is much in the sight of his men, attacks his work with energy and earnestness and sticks to it until it is finished in a thorough manner he can look for nothing better than a lackadaisical and slovenly performance of duty on the part of his men.
Too much stress cannot be placed on the item of self-control. No man can expect to control others and bend them to his will unless that will is invincible, unless he is master of himself. An order shouted and embellished with profanity will gain less quick obedience than one delivered in a clean, clear-cut manner, just loud enough to insure its reaching the ears of all who should hear it. The officer who loses his temper will either provide amusement for his subordinates or earn their resentment under ordinary circumstances and in a real crisis will not find the faith and confidence so necessary to success.
Courage, both physical and moral, is indispensable to the man who would be a successful leader. There is perhaps no other quality so much admired in one man by another as sheer physical courage. Even in the face of this, however, courage must be distinguished from foolhardiness . The brave man does not needlessly take long chances for the sole purpose of displaying his courage. Under ordinary conditions on board ship an officer has ample opportunity to demonstrate whether or not he can remain. cool and self-possessed in an emergency, and the officer who can do that without ostentation will find that his men have a quiet but all-abiding trust in him when real danger impends . Moral courage is of a higher order than physical courage, and more difficult to obtain and maintain . Yet its recognition is just as prompt and its response more enduring. Under the heading of moral courage is properly classified readiness to bear responsibility. Of this so-

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called courage of responsibility, Von der Goltz says : " It is strength of mind in high development, schooled to endure the severest trials without swerving from the end in view." It fosters initiative in subordinate leaders and loyalty of the highest order in all who follow.
Last and most important, no one may aspire to leadership who has not the " common " attributes of a gentleman-courtesy , justice, mercy, and a high sense of personal honor. These are all elements of good character in general and form the basis of military character as well. For it follows that unless a leader be courteous he will meet with a surly response ; unless he be just and at the same time temper justice with mercy he will not be
"" entitled to and will not receive a square deal " when his own success depends upon it ; and finally, unless his own personal honor is above reproach he can never attain frankness and truthfulness in his relations with others, without which success is and can be only ephemeral .
LEADING THE INDIVIDUAL
Having laid the foundation of leadership in military character, the leader must next direct his energies toward fashioning the component parts of the organization he is to build and control when
completed . No more simple and direct statement of the official relation which
should govern between officer and enlisted man can be found than in this brief sentence from the pen of Theodore Roosevelt : " We should guarantee to every man his full rights, and we should exact from every man the full performance of his duty."
In a recent order issued from headquarters of the U. S. Marine Corps , Major General Commandant Lejeune characterizes the ideal relation between officers and enlisted men as comparable to that of teacher to scholar and father to son. In connection with this two late orders from Admiral Wilson, commanding the Atlantic fleet, merit careful attention, one regarding absenteeism in the navy and the other requiring division officers to be present at mast when men from their divisions are on report. In addition to the general knowledge of his duties which an officer should impart to his men in the rôle of teacher is instruction in the dishonor attached
to absence over and without leave , a conspicuous phase of dis-

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loyalty. One writer scores official personnel on the grounds that while all officers deplore desertion few, if any, ever do anything to prevent it . Many a good man has been lost to the service when a little advance understanding and sympathy might have saved him. Requiring division officers to be present at mast is an amplification of the father to son relationship. There are many arguments for and against an offender that do not appear on his enlistment record, and unless the division officer is on hand with the facts concerning each individual the commanding officer is unquestionably handicapped in dealing out the impartial and withal merciful justice so essential to discipline and to a real understanding between the offender and the authority he has sinned against.
Certain it is that the average enlisted man responds more readily to the mutual square deal than to any other angle of approach. There is something ingrained in every American youth that makes him passionately fond of the spirit of fair play. He doesn't want to be coddled and scoffs at favoritism . But guarantee to him his full rights, share his hardships, commend his efforts to better himself and increase his value to ship and service, deal justly, firmly, impartially, and yet mercifully with his misdeeds ; in short, open to him the gates of comradeship based on common loyalty to a common cause-do these things and you have won his respect for you, placed his own self-respect on a pedestal to which he must ever look up, and planted the seeds of a devotion to duty that will make exaction of the full performance of that duty unnecessary. He will " deliver the goods " cheerfully and unfailingly in the face of any adversity.
LEADING THE DIVISION
As the strength of the service is the ship, so the strength of the ship is the division. A young officer taking charge of a division composed of green men (as it is almost certain to be in these days of depleted personnel ) is confronted with one of the severest trials of his naval career. He must attack his problem carefully and
thoughtfully, gradually developing an organization possessing the spirit and knowledge that will make it appreciate its share in mak-' ing its ship the best in the fleet and its fleet the best in the world .
If the analogy between leadership and building is still followed it is immediately evident that the petty officers form the framework which gives strength and stability to the organization, and to

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them the division officer must devote his first and most earnest efforts. Having decided of what leadership consists, he must strive just as diligently to make his petty officers in a true sense leaders of their sections as he does to make himself their leader. He should foster the spirit of initiative and willingness to assume responsibilities in them , and make them in all things the connecting link between the command and its final execution .
" Every group of men working together soon comes to have a soul of its own. " The leader who learns to know that spirit has acquired a grip that is invaluable . Having once learned it, he has three means of bending it to his own will in the accomplishment of ordained ends ; namely, pride, competition , and faith. Appeal to the pride of an organization, its pride in its good name and its past achievement, and its ensuant endeavor to sustain that pride will prove relentless . Competition is but a species of pride , a pride that is injured when its owner is forced to admit inferiority. The desire to excel is inherent in every individual ; no less is it true in any organization. The officer who can intelligently direct this spirit of competition, in athletics, in drill, in all things seamanlike, has a lever at his disposal of incalculable advantage. Finally, let an officer convince his division that he has unbounded faith and confidence in its ability and willingness and it will work long hours under the most trying circumstances to justify that trust. In the face of perfect belief in it on the part of its leader no organization can fail to give a good account of itself.
ACQUIRING LEADERSHIP
To acquire leadership the aspirant must first recognize his problem and face it. By introspection he should make a frank inventory of his qualifications and make every effort to develop those he possesses and to win for himself those he does not. Much can be learned from a study of the lives and characters of famous military and naval leaders, Alexander, Cæsar , Napoleon , Nelson, Farragut, Dewey, and adapting such of their methods as are applicable to present day conditions. More still can be learned by observing superiors who, under conditions more similar to those which now confront us, have established their right to be acknowledged as successful leaders.
To conclude, no officer can set himself a higher or yet more workable standard of leadership than that of the officer who be-

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queathed to the United States Navy its greatest legacy of leadership, a standard so perfect that it has been placed on every fitness report as an inspiration to and a measure of attainment. It is
embodied in these words of John Paul Jones :
It is by no means enough that an officer in the navy should be a capable mariner. He must be that, of course, but also a great deal more. He should be, as well, a gentleman of liberal education , refined manner, punctilious courtesy, and the nicest sense of personal honor. . . . . He should be the soul of tact, patience, justice, firmness, and charity. No meritorious act of a subordinate should escape his attention or be left to pass without its reward, if even the reward be only one word of approval. Conversely, he should not be blind to a single fault in any subordinate, though, at the same time, he should be quick and unfailing to distinguish error from malice, thoughtlessness from incompetency, and well-meant shortcoming from heedless or stupid blunder. As he should be universal and impartial in his rewards and approval of merit, so should he be judicial and unbending in his punishment or reproof of misconduct.

[COPYRIGHTED]
U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE , ANNAPOLIS , MD .
AN INTERNATIONAL OUTLOOK.
By REAR ADMIRAL H. S. KNAPP, U. S. Navy
The charge may fairly be laid at the door of the people of the United States as a whole that they know little about, and care less for, affairs outside their own country unless they themselves be directly affected . The reasons for this unfortunate indifference, for it is unfortunate, are not difficult to discover. They derive partly from tradition and partly from the conditions and situation. of the country in the world. As a young nation, sparsely settled over a long stretch of coast, weak in the face of strong European nations, beginning the national life at a time when weak peoples were the prey of the strong, when the world was full of war and only bginning to admit the right of national groups to a separate national existence, it was natural and proper that the United States should be wary of foreign entanglements and very much on its guard against the suspected or real designs of foreign nations . Nor was the world in that day so interdependent as it is now. Life was then more simple ; human needs were simpler ; while commerce existed , home production sufficed for most necessities in the United States ; the country was practically self- sufficient . This self-sufficiency is to-day more nearly our good fortune than that of any other nation, due to our great extent of territory and
diversity of climate and resources ; but even we are not self- sufficient. To mention only one important raw material , we do not produce rubber ; and how long could we get on without rubber? During the war we found other and very vital needs outside of our own resources.
During the years of our separate national existence the conditions of life of civilized peoples have changed more than during any similar period of the world's history. The steam engine has revolutionized communications and transportation . Of equal or

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AN INTERNATIONAL OUTLOOK

even greater importance, the steam engine has made possible the great manufacturing establishments that mark the industrial age in which we live. In the more highly civilized nations the trend is distinctly away from agricultural and rural life toward industrial and urban life, and such a change can not fail to modify greatly the characteristics of peoples and the aims of governments. Again, in 1776 verbal communication with persons at a distance was by letter, and letters went over seas by sailing vessels or by slow animal transport over land . Now we have the telegraph and the radio, and it is within immediate possibilities that we may have telephone communication as a regular thing over thousands of miles of land and sea. In verbal communication New York is nearer to -day to Shanghai or Constantinople than it was to Philadelphia during our early days . We are on the eve of regular communication through the air. The whole world-certainly the whole civilized world—is more closely knit together now in the exchange of commodities and information than Georgia and Maine were after the Revolution .
The position and influence of the United States in the world have changed no less remarkably than have the conditions of life of civilized peoples. Our population has increased many fold until now there are only two self-governing countries whose population is greater. Our continental territory is settled from the Atlantic to the Pacific, whereas our independence was achieved at a time. when only the Atlantic fringe east of the Alleghenies was settled. Our form of government, never before tried upon so great a scale and regarded with any but friendly sentiments by the monarchical governments of Europe existing when it was inaugurated, long ago passed the experimental stage and justified itself ; it has withstood the shocks of time from without and within, and now it is firmly established and held in high respect by the rest of the world. Outside of our solid continental territory we have acquired Alaska, the Hawaiian Islands, Tutuila, Guam, the Philippines , Porto Rico and the Virgin Islands, and have built the Panama Canal and guaranteed the independence of Panama, while.with Cuba we have peculiarly close relations that involve both rights and obligations . These external possessions and interests are liabilities from the viewpoint of national defense, and in any event

AN INTERNATIONAL OUTLOOK

1025

it is plain that they bring with them additional points of contact with the rest of the world.
These trite facts are instanced to show that a habit of thought that fitted our early conditions is not applicable to the circumstances of our present national life. Young ladies planning for a ball do not plan their costumes on the romper styles of their mud-pie days. Yet I believe that it is a melancholy fact that great numbers of the American people are in the romper stage of thought regarding our place in the world . They live on tradition instead of intelligent appreciation of modern conditions ; on catchy phrases adapted to the conditions of our national infancy instead of on the realities of the present day. This was the general national attitude until the Spanish War ; that brought to many people the realization that the United States was grown up and had a part to play in the world suitable for an adult nation . More have come to hold a similar belief by the Armageddon through which the world has just passed and the effects of which will be felt by the children's children of the entire world. Many- very many-have not been touched . They believe in isolation as a policy, and believe ( or profess to believe ) that such a policy is a possibility. They see no responsibility towards other peoples except to sign a check when some " drive " appeals to them. They are apparently afraid that the United States may be " done " if she goes out into the society of the world.
This attitude is no doubt honestly held, even by some who are well informed about conditions outside of the United States and of
our points of contact with foreign nations. It is my belief, however, that the great reason for any large mass of opinion in this sense is a lack of information of foreign affairs- or, worse, a lack of any interest in them-and a consequent failure to understand how we are affected . Much too small a proportion of our people have any real, well- founded appreciation of our present-day relationship with foreign nations : one based upon knowledge and not upon phrases uttered by men of great wisdom in our early days but not applicable now. This conviction has been growing with me for many years, and the statement in my opening sentence is one I believe fully justified. Compare the items of foreign news in our press and periodical literature with similar items in the corre-
sponding publications abroad . A writer on the position of foreign

1026

AN INTERNATIONAL OUTLOOK

securities in the American market in the March ( 1920 ) Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science says :
For this (the familiarity of American investors with foreign investments ) it will be necessary to have the newspapers and other publications of this country give a great deal more space and attention to foreign conditions than they have heretofore. One of the results of the Great War has been to arouse the interest of the American people in the doings of other lands and to increase their fund of information regarding various foreign governments and the conditions prevailing in other countries.
The March number of the Annals is a symposium on Bonds and the Bond Market, and the quoted words did not fall under my eye until this paper had been drafted in the rough . The observations of the writer from a rather restricted viewpoint are what I would stress here from the general and political viewpoint . It has long been in my mind that, while the nation is grown up in size and power, it has not grown up in its knowledge of the rest of the world , nor in an appreciation of its relation to the rest of the world—the political relation that it ought to occupy.
What has all this to do with naval officers ? Everything. The navy is the military instrumentality of the government that is always in touch with foreigners . Not infrequently officers have to act in matters abroad without opportunity to seek instructions from the government at home. If it is too much to say that naval officers are responsible for naval policy, it is not too much to say that they are responsible for expert advice upon naval policy. Naval policy depends upon national policy, and national policy necessarily must take cognizance of external relations . If it is to be formulated as befits our place in the world it must be founded upon broader than parochial considerations. From every point of view it is the duty of naval officers to be well informed about foreign nations, and the broader that information and the opinion founded upon it the better able to serve their country in their chosen profession they will be. It is a source of satisfaction that the officers of the navy saw from the first the practical certainty that the United States would be drawn into the recent war if it proved to be at all prolonged. For a time their voice was as that of one " crying in the wilderness "; their justification came in due course. Had their views been accepted the reproach of unpreparedness might have been spared to the country in large measure.

AN INTERNATIONAL OUTLOOK

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I have been moved to write this paper, not because I feel that the navy as a class has failed in the past to study and understand our foreign relations, but to urge upon all to go on to a greater proficiency in this particular. As a class naval officers should yield to none in an international outlook that is broad and understanding. No officer can come to high command fully prepared for any contingency of service who does not have an intelligent conception of at least the great questions involving the relations of the United States with foreign nations. Naturally and properly the principal interest of the younger officers is in the material of the navy and the training of the personnel ; but no officer is too young or too much occupied with his immediate duties to form the habit of knowing what is going on abroad and how it affects us, and of reaching his own intelligent conclusions about our foreign policy in the past and what it should be under the conditions of to-day.

[COPYRIGHTED ] U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE, ANNAPOLIS , MD.
EUROPE SINCE THE ARMISTICE A CONDENSED REVIEW OF THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY
MOVEMENTS ABROAD
By LIEUT. COMMANDER J. M. CREIGHTON, U. S. Navy
Except for the period just following the downfall of Napoleon, there has been never so complete an alteration of the maps of the world, such a crashing of kingdoms, such a delivery to new commonwealths of the lands of the old, and such a partition among the victors of the wealth of the vanquished as is now in progress in the capitals of Europe . As the end of the Napoleonic wars left the Republican ideas of the French to disturb the permanence of the adjustments of the Congress of Vienna, so the downfall of the Central Empire leaves in the air those upsetting ideas of "Racial Equality," " the Rights of Minorities," and " the Rights of Small Nations,"
The details of readjustments of lands abroad have filled the press daily for nearly two years , and, unless they have been closely followed, a recount of them would be confusing and uninteresting. The endeavor has been made in this review to present the situation in a very general fashion, with no great pains taken in the matter of the precise dates involved, nor the record of many events which, while apparently of moment at the time of their occurrence, proved to be only manifestations of a general development which made its appearance later on.
Whether the agreements arrived at after so many months of inquiry, honest investigation, misrepresentation, bickering , parleys and displays of force will endure is yet to be seen, and a review of the possibilities of disturbance leaves much to be desired in the way of confidence in the stability of all the balanced structures erected at Paris. Russia has yet to be accounted for ; the little nations in Central Europe have still to learn their business

1030

EUROPE SINCE THE ARMISTICE

of government and settle down ; Germany is bound to recover a great measure of her strength, and the questions involving Turkey and all the Mohammedan countries of the east furnish problems as great as they did before 1914.
GREAT BRITAIN
The armistice was declared on November 11 , 1918 , and on December 3 the first British troops entered Germany. There followed the normal after-war situation ; the occupation of the enemy's territory, the release and return home for demobilization of great portions of the armed forces, and the discussion between the victors of what should be the items of the peace.
As has always happened, the disturbances in peoples ' lives caused by a great war made the normally- satisfied populations harbor new and disturbing ideas. In the spring of 1919 the first news of widespread outbreaks in Ireland and Egypt, and of unrest in India began to appear in the press . In England , the war's most distinct political aftermath was the rise to power of the labor party.
On March 14 and 15 , 1919, there were extensive riots in Egypt, where the Committee of Union and Progress, whose active members had been expelled from Constantinople when the Allies took that city, had been busy in fostering anti-British ideas . Indian , Egyptian and British soldiers were killed in the streets. The police and the army and the native officials remained loyal, and though there was severe fighting in some places the agitation was finally suppressed. In seeking the source of the trouble we find that at the outbreak of the war, the Egyptians were alarmed at England's declaration that her normal supervision of the country had ceased, and that she henceforth would regard Egypt as a distinct British protectorate. The Egyptian idea of independence was not new, but the great garrisons kept there during the war had prevented there being any possibility of a success for it while the conflict was on.
At the peace conference the Egyptian delegates were especially active in endeavoring to obtain a hearing before the Council, but they were prevented from doing so . Upon the continued agitation of the native leaders in Egypt, the English seized them and interned them in Malta. This led to fresh riots in the valley of the Nile, and the arguments of the Egyptians were strengthened by the news

EUROPE SINCE THE ARMISTICE

1031

that Syria and Palestine, which had made comparatively slight efforts to obtain their freedom, had been granted a sort of autonomy by the French and British respectively. General Allanby, the conquerer of the Holy Land, was sent from Jerusalem to take charge of the situation in Egypt, while a special commission headed by Lord Milner came out from England to investigate and to make recommendations to the Crown. Upon the return of Lord Milner to England it was rumored that a modified independence was to be given to Egypt, and in August of 1920 England made it known that she intended to adopt in that country a condition of affairs very much like the one the United States established in Cuba. The British are to hold a district on each side of Suez Canal and will garrison it as we do our own district at Panama ; the British officials in Egypt will be practically eliminated in the details of local administration, but no treaties are to be made, and no engagements with any foreign interests are to be entered into, without British approval.
In this yielding before the necessities of the situation , the British , while apparently retreating, are yet holding fast to the original idea which caused them to take charge of that portion of the world ; that is, to hold in their hands all the steps on the road between England, India and the East. It is apparent that if the Suez district were in the hands of an enemy, or of anyone they should be unable to control, the British hold upon India and affairs in the Orient would cease, and it is to be expected that they will resolutely refuse to compromise their holdings here or in Aden, or at any of the other points where their guarding of the trade routes might be in danger.
In India there has been no such complete lessening of the British authority, but the normal preludes of change have appeared in severe riots, culminating in what has come to be known as the " Massacre of Amritzar," where General Dyer fired upon a large crowd of natives who had assembled contrary to his orders and killed about six hundred of them. At the time it appeared that the effective reverence in which the British have been held in their great native provinces was about to be lost. British officers and men had been killed in the streets in both Egypt and India, and in Amritzar the culmination of the disrespect of the natives came when an English woman was pursued through the streets by a native mob, thrown from her bicycle, and injured. The situation has been described as being similar to that which preceded the

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EUROPE SINCE THE ARMISTICE

great massacre of the whites in the days of the Sepoy Mutiny, and General Dyer proceeded to firmly suppress all signs of disturbance . He was later called to England and had a severe time of it defending himself for his actions in this emergency.
In the Pathan lands to the north and west of the peninsula there has been severe and persistent fighting for two years, and this is still in progress. In Persia and Afghanistan the British influence has been upset by the Bolsheviks, operating from their propaganda base for the east at Tashkend. A great deal of submerged political conflict had its evidence in the murder of the Emir of Afghanistan and of his being followed by another prince more favorable to the British . There was announced, shortly after the war, a British treaty with Persia which practically gave to them the entire supervision of the country. This has been more or less compromised by the landing of the Bolsheviks at Enzeli on the Caspian Sea and of their penetration south from that point.
Farther to the west the English have taken over the mandate for Mesopotamia , established their headquarters at Bagdad, and assumed control of the rich oil region at Mosul.
It has been necessary to maintain a very large British army in this district ever since the armistice. The fighting of the natives for independence has been no less active here than in the French district of Syria or farther north around the Greek port of Smyrna . The British line from Basra , the entry port at the mouth of the Euphrates river, to Bagdad has been repeatedly cut, and in response to objections in the Parliament to the expenses of the campaign. the British have decided to abandon the country, except for a small district around the mouth of the river called the Vilayet of Basra. However they have created in their rear the " Kingdom of Irak," which is the name given to the district about Bagdad , and have given the kingship to a native chief loyal to them, named Emir
t Abdullah .
The entire situation in the Near East is extremely complicated, and if you will take the map which accompanies this article in your hand, and patiently endeavor to find all the strange names on it, I shall try to make clear the different spheres which the various powers have taken in the lands of the old Turkish Empire, and what has been happening there since the war ended .
Following up the British zones of supervision, you will see on the border of the Red Sea the Kingdom of Hadjez . The erection of

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1033

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THE SPHERES OF CONTROL OF THE POWERS IN ASIA- MINOR.

1034

EUROPE SINCE THE ARMISTICE

this kingdom under King Hussain , a prince friendly to the British , and the father of Abdullah of Irak, was the counter to the Turkish declaration of a holy war. Mecca, the Mohammedan holy city, lies within it , and in securing the adhesion of King Hussain the British promised him, that if the war was successful for them, the Arab state should extend well into the north and include the country about Damascus.
To the northward , along the western side of Arabia, we come to the British district of the Canal and Palestine, and then, at Akka , advance into the French district of Syria, including the ports of Alexandretta and Beirut.
Adjoining the French district on the north is a district allotted to Italy, centering about Konia, and containing the coal fields of Heraclea. Then comes a stretch of coast line to which none of
the Europeans has laid definite claim. The Greek district comes next, centered at Smyrna and including a number of islands off the coast.
The Supreme Council created the Zone of the Straits, administered by an allied commission on which England , France, Italy and Greece are represented, and which controls Constantinople, the Sea of Marmora, the Straits and the islands lying off its mouth .
These districts were apportioned to the various countries at the conference of San Remo in April, 1920, and the subjugation of the country was left to the nations concerned. In Palestine the Brit-
ish, with their usual success in dealing with native people, have so far managed to operate with very little apparent trouble. To the north of them the French have declared the independence of the district of Lebanon , which, ever since France defended the inhabitants from massacre at the hands of the Turks in 1864, has been a district loyal to her. Elsewhere, when they have attempted to extend their authority they have been met by both the opposition of the Arabs, led by Emir Feisal, another son of King Hussain of Hadjez, and that of the Turks, under Mustapha Kemel Pasha. The French armed the native Armenians, who have plenty of reason to fight the Turks, and very severe massacres of these people have marked the progress of the occupation of this district of AsiaMinor.
Emir Feisal had his headquarters at Damascus. The French proclaimed that they wished the native population to choose their own leader for the local government, and on March 8, 1920 , they

EUROPE SINCE THE ARMISTICE

1035

did so, and Emir Feisal was elected King of Greater Syria by the Pan-Syrian Congress at Damascus. He immediately declared the independence of Syria and invited the French and English to leave the country. In the conflict which followed , the French under General Gauraud occupied Damascus, killed Feisal's Minister of War, and expelled Feisal from the country. At present the French are holding the district but fighting almost constantly on the outskirts , and planning to vacate Cilicia in an endeavor to placate the Turks under Kemel Pasha.
In the conference at San Remo in April, 1920, the decision was reached between France and Great Britain to prosecute the war against the Turkish Nationalists, and as they were both too occupied elsewhere to undertake the necessary operations , they granted the request of the Greek Premier , Venizelos , to be allowed to undertake the work with the Greek army. In addition to the district about Smyrna, Greece was also given all of Thrace up to the Tchataldja lines, just outside Constantinople, where the Balkan armies were stopped in the war of 1912. She promptly landed two large armies , one in Thrace and one in Smyrna, and both started east. The investment of Thrace was carried out with very little trouble, the Greeks defeating the Turkish- Bulgarian force at Adrianople and capturing the leader. East of Smyrna there was heavy fighting. The British assisted by bombarding the Turkish fortifications along the south shores of the Sea of Marmora, and especially at Ismid, where the battleships were reported to have killed a thousand Turks in their shelling of the trenches. To assist the Greek army east of Smyrna another Greek force came south from the Sea of Marmora , and later on a third army started from Ineboli on the Black Sea for the Nationalist capital at Angora . The fighting everywhere went against the Turks, who retreated farther into the interior. For a long time the news of the Greek army. became scarce in the papers, and it was only in November of last year that the disintegration of the Greek morale resulting from the contest at home between the followers of Venizelos and ex-King Constantine became known.
As the result of the Turkish Peace Treaty (the Treaty of Sèvres) , signed August 10 , 1920, Greece has been greatly enlarged, but England and France have kept control of the Dardanelles and
41

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EUROPE SINCE THE ARMISTICE

the islands off its mouth by creating the " Zone of the Straits," administered by an allied commission.
As this is written ( March, 1921 ) , the premiers of England, France and Italy are in conference in London, in an endeavor to

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www THE NEW SITUATION AT THE DARDANELLES.

change the Turkish treaty to make it more agreeable to those nations who participate in its provisions. In the modifications which are forecast, it is expected that Greece will suffer a reduction of the territory whcih was given to her premier, Venizelos, at San Remo last year, and that the Turks will correspondingly gain in the alterations to the treaty.

EUROPE SINCE THE ARMISTICE

1037

FRANCE
The domestic history of France has been strangely at contrast with that of her neighbors in that it has been almost free from internal dissension . Within six months after the war there were several serious disturbances of labor, but they were very firmly handled and no serious results occurred . When the Third Internationale met at Moscow there was a determined effort on the part of the radicals of the French labor parties to secure a public declaration of their adherence to the Moscow meeting, but the moderate elements in the French conference were in the majority. France has had no local disturbances in any way as diverting as those of England, Germany, or Italy, and her peace at home has allowed her to take a prominent part in all the important operations outside her boundaries, and these have brought her a great prestige. on the continent.
In the settlements of the details of the peace treaty she has , for several reasons, been forced to fight against the opposition of England and Italy, while assisted in a slight measure by Belgium. France and her little neighbor on her north have been driven into a mutual foreign policy of determining that the Germans shall remain weak now that their desperate defence is over, and they have signed an armed agreement to assist each other in case either is attacked again.
There have been various meetings of the premiers of Italy, France and England to determine upon the details of the carrying out of the treaty of Versailles, and both sides have been forced to make concessions. The French point of view was vigorously and determinedly defended by Premier Millerand, now the president. At one time it appeared that the Germans were planning to break the agreement concerning the number of troops to be placed in the neutral zones along the Rhine and, failing to secure the English cooperation, the French resolutely went ahead without them and occupied Frankfort, Darmstadt and Hanau, on April 6, 1919. The troops stayed in these important cities until the Germans withdrew all excess troops from the district and then , on May 17, marched out. This strong and determined action on the part of the French markedly enhanced their position in all subsequent operations of European politics, but their great success was yet to come in their assistance to Poland on the east, when they held her together in her hours of danger from the Red armies of Russia.

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EUROPE SINCE THE ARMISTICE

In the old days before the war, an alliance with Russia was the normal means of weakening Germany by strengthening the power to the east of her, and now, with Russia down and Poland up, the French are determined to strengthen and stabilize the latter.
The great mineral wealth of Germany lay in the deposits of potash, coal and iron in Alsace-Lorraine, and other deposits of coal and iron , no less important than the first, in upper Silesia. The first of course, has gone to France, and the second is to go either to Poland or to Germany according to the result of the plebiscite to be held there. Both French and British troops were sent into the district to supervise the election, but a great many of the English officers have resigned, and it is generally conceded that the situation lies in the hands of the French. The district is one of the richest in Europe and the Germans are desperate to keep it ; to weaken them, and to assist the Poles, the French are just as determined that they shall not have it, and the elections, already twice delayed , are expected to take place in April.
Taking advantage of Bolshevik weakness in the Spring of 1920, the Poles made an alliance with the Ukranian opponents of the Reds in South Russia, and in April started east with them in a wide sweep of conquest. In early May they took the important city of Kiev and started south for Odessa. For a few days the news from the front was indefinite , and then came report after report of Polish defeats as the Reds took advantage of their thinned-out defenses in the north, broke through them and drove straight for Warsaw. There followed three weeks of headlong retreat and equally rapid advance, with stories of armies wiped out and great areas overrun and ruined. Just as the world was prepared for the news of the downfall of the Polish capital, a remarkable rally of the defenders occurred , coincidentally with the arrival of fresh Polish troops from the south (and of a French military mission under command of General Weygand, Foch's chief of staff) . There resulted an almost miraculous saving of Warsaw, and an overwhelming defeat of the Russians, with the capture of about a hundred thousand prisoners . The Poles promptly took up the pursuit and drove the Russians before them some three hundred miles to the points which they occupy at present. These are the same lines at which the Germans stopped after their victories over the Russians in the

EUROPE SINCE THE ARMISTICE

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world's war, and represent the only feasible line of defence for Poland from the attack from the east.
The success of the Polish war has put France in her old place in political and military supremacy among all the nations on the continent, and in the Polish victory she has not only saved her own ideas of having a strong friend to the east of Germany, but has

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practically saved Europe from what might easily have been an overwhelming flood of the Soviet idea . The radical elements of Germany were only awaiting the arrival of the Russians in East Prussia to join with them, and as Germany had nothing but desperation ahead in carrying out the present treaty, and at least a distinct chance of relief if they joined with victorious Russians,

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EUROPE SINCE THE ARMISTICE

this upsetting of Germany and Hungary, and perhaps disturbed Italy on the side, might have gone ahead in the flood of success if Warsaw had gone down . The French interests in Asia-Minor have already been mentioned , and she now occupies, with England, that intimate Inner Chamber where most of the affairs of Europe are being discussed and decided .

ITALY
The Italian situation has been a confused jumble ever since the end of the war. Italy lost a great many men and spent a great deal of money in her campaigns, and in addition to having very few vivifying successes to cheer her on, she has felt that she was very badly treated , both at the peace conference and since. In the north, however, she has finally acquired all that it was possible to give her. Her old cry of " Italia Irredenta " has now little basis in fact . The end of the Austrian wars in the 19th century left most of the commanding positions and the mountain passes in the hands of her enemies, and her efforts in this war were hampered in every way by fighting against the tremendous obstacles which the old Austrian generals planned for her when they framed the peace treaties . Now Italy occupies all these mountain passes herself, and controls all the strategic paths into her country, including the whole district of South Tyrol, where some five hundred thousand German-Austrians are brought under their authority. By the treaty of Rapallo, signed with the Jugo- Slavs in November of 1920, the Italian territory is carried around the north of the Adriatic, almost touching the free city of Fiume, and including the islands lying off that port, which to all intents and purposes control its operation. There is very little endeavor made to conceal the fact that the declaration of the status of Fiume as a free city is only a step on its way to becoming actual Italian territory. The original Italian demand was for the whole Dalmatian coast, but after negotiations extending over a year, and a number of small local fights between the Italians and the JugoSlavs, including the spectacular performances of d'Annunzio, they have apparently arrived at a satisfactory agreement with their eastern neighbors.
By the provisions of the Treaty of Rapallo , Fiume was given the status of an independent state, whose territory joined that of

EUROPE SINCE THE ARMISTICE

1041

Italy on the west. The islands of Cherso, Unie and Lussin go to Italy, as well as the detached city of Zara and the southern islands of Lissa and Lacosta. Mount Nevoso is a commanding elevation

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The line agreed upon between Italy and the Jugo - Slavs at Rapallo, November 10, 1920.
in this region, and that too is in Italy's territory. About 500,000 Serbs are included in these new Italian lands.
Italy has been hampered in her foreign policy by a most dangerous lack of stability at home. There have been repeated strikes, with railroads stopped and factories shut up ; with martial law,

1042

EUROPE SINCE THE ARMISTICE

soviets set up in the cities, and great manufacturing districts forcibly taken over by the workers. In the elections in the autumn of 1919 the radical socialists had a great increase in strength and captured nearly one-third of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies. It was rumored that the king would fail to address the deputies because of the socialists' threats to upset the chamber if he appeared, but he made his address in spite of them on December I. The chamber was not disrupted, but the objecting deputies refused to take the customary oath of allegiance to the crown , and left the chamber in a body.
The socialist effort has always been distinctly against sending the army abroad to assist in further expansion, and Italy's efforts outside her own country have not been as successful as her participation in the war might have warranted . She secured her title to a number of small islands in the Aegean and to a small district in Asia- Minor near Adalia, but in Albania her occupying forces were driven out of the country at all points excepting at Avlona, where the warships sustained them, and in Lybia, in northern Africa, a number of Italian officers were captured bythe native chiefs and held for ransom. However, she was allowed to extend her boundaries in her province in Eastern Africa across from Aden, called Eritria, and will no doubt receive some distinct benefits in Asia Minor if the British and French withdraw their support from the Greeks.
GERMANY
In reviewing the condition of this country it is necessary to realize the density of the population . The number of people per square mile in Germany is about ten times as great as that in the United States, and it is throughout its whole area almost as thickly settled as New Jersey. This brings out the necessity for her intense cultivation of the land and the development of manufactures in order to support such a large population , and her consequent demand for raw materials with which to feed the factories.
Though the actual territorial losses (and the ones which will result if all the plebiscites go against Germany) amount to only 14 per cent of her area, this land includes over 20 per cent of her former agricultural region and practically half of her coal and iron. Before the war the Germans produced twice as much iron and steel as did Great Britain, and they also imported a great deal
of ore from Sweden , Spain and Algeria . Of her great fields ,

EUROPE SINCE THE ARMISTICE

1043

80 per cent of the iron ore lay in Lorraine, and the 20 per cent left to her is of inferior quality and distributed in small beds.
Coal has always been the heart of business. In all the wars of the past, excepting those of a religious character, it is generally to be found that under the covering of high-minded utterances some iron and coal fields were the center of the disturbance, and in the future we may expect the same, with the added pursuit of late years furnished by the need of oil. Germany had by far the largest coal beds in Europe. She used to mine every year 55 per cent of all the coal that was produced in that continent ; twice as much as Great Britain, and twice as much as all the rest of Europe, minus Great Britain , combined .
The German coal lay in three fields. Of these, two were in the Sarre region and in Upper Silesia . Together they comprised just half her supply. The first of these is to be exploited by the French for fifteen years to repay them for the German destruction of their big mines at Lens during the war, and at the end of that time a vote shall be taken to decide whether or not the Germans will
regain control. Whether Germany or Poland will get the iron and coal and the manufacturing cities of Upper Silesia is to be determined by the plebiscite there, and French, British and Italian troops are supervising the election. Even if Germany loses both of these districts she will still have more coal than Great Britain , and is besides in possession of rich fields of lignite, a brown coal of low calorific value, but converted by dry pressure into an excellent fuel. Germany formerly produced 100,000,000 tons of this annually.
In potash this country used to have a world monopoly, but this is now gone- the potash fields were in Alsace-Lorraine. It is to be
remembered that manufacturing districts stay close to coal and iron, and with the loss of her great fields have gone the cities and factories which used to live by them.
During the war the expenses of the German government were piled up with the utmost extravagance. It was planned to have the Allies pay the cost of the war as France did , twice over, in 1870 . After the armistice there was no let-down in the uncurbed dispersion of the country's money. The new government tried to please everybody, and pleasing everybody meant subsidizing them to ease the cost of their living . So the government's debts piled to the skies, the value of the mark went lower and lower, and the country went deeper and deeper into its troubles. With the coal and the

1044

EUROPE SINCE THE ARMISTICE

iron have gone her ships, and the great merchant fleets which six years ago were pushing the British hard for first place in the world are now completely obliterated . Her once fine railroad equipment has been cut to pieces by the delivery of hundreds of locomotives and thousands of cars to the French and Belgians, and the floating docks, and derricks, and barges, which were to assist her in rebuilding her merchant shipping, have been taken away to repay for the piece of work which made June 23, 1919, such a big day for salvage parties at Scapa Flow.
The republican government which brought a harness maker in to take the place of the departed Hohenzollern has weathered many desperate storms and is still in the saddle. In January, 1919, there were severe Spartacan, or radical, riots over the entire country and it appeared at times that the government would be overthrown . On the 15th of that month Rosa Luxemberg and Karl Liebknecht , the principal radical disturbers , were killed in a fight in the streets of Berlin. On February 6 the new government was established at Weimar, with Ebert as president .
During February and March the disorders continued, with idleness, no trains, and general food shortage helping things along. The coal production in the Ruhr district dropped to 10 per cent of normal, while the railroads were already operating but a small number of trains because of the lack of fuel .
In February, Bavaria broke out in revolt. An officer shot Kurt Eisner, the premier, and was in turn killed at once by a sailor. Munich was in a riot, the crowd searching for all opponents to the Soviet, and in the course of the operations Prince Joachim was arrested and ex-King Ludwig left during the night for Switzerland. The Soviet took control.
On March 3 a general strike was declared in Berlin . The Prussian government proclaimed a state of siege, and Noske came into power. During the night of March 3 , 28,000 men under General Von Luttwitz entered Berlin. On March 5 there was fighting all over the city and its environs, and on the 8th the government troops had cleared the center of the area. On the 11th the Spartacans asked for an armistice, upon which the government forces cleared the suburb by attack.
On April 7, 1910, a Soviet was set up in Munich, Bavaria, and the central government openly defied . Then Saxony went down

EUROPE SINCE THE ARMISTICE

1045

with widespread strikes in all her industries. There was extreme violence in Dresden. Noske's troops finally attacked and took the city, and on May 2 the Soviet in Munich was also ended .
By August the internal conditions had settled down to a milder character, disturbed perhaps , instead of revolutionary. The government was unavoidably facing conditions which were bound to make it unpopular. It was very easy to blame everything unpleasant on the party in power and very unlike human beings to credit it with any effective or sincere effort. Tides of refugees from the areas given over to Poland began to pour into the district about Berlin with all the miserable Tales of the Dispossessed . The actual signing of the peace treaty was still to be met, and every item of it meant a fresh groan from the German people at home.
In late January of 1920 Berlin was again in the hands of a mob, and their disturbances culminated in an attack upon the Reichstag building. The police seem to have been very reluctant to fire on the crowd, but, having decided to do so , did the job with true German thoroughness and killed forty-two and wounded over a hundred in something less than a minute of firing. This ended the demonstration for that particular afternoon .
With the arrival of the official peace, Germany was filled with widespread despair. The shops were in the hands of Councils of Workmen. There was a paralyzing lack of any raw material from which goods were manufactured. The transportation was even worse than in the fall, and the production of that great essential, coal, had increasingly fallen down.
Up in the northwest part of Old Russia, a large German army of about fifty thousand men had been maintaining themselves in the region called Courland, ever since the armistice. They had persistently neglected to obey the summons of the Supreme Council at Paris to return inside their own borders, and the government at Berlin was forced to confess that they had repeatedly ordered them home but had no means of making them obey. They were finally driven back into Russia by the native Letts, backed by the French and English, and became the forces which in March, 1920, under General Kapp, attempted a restoration of the Monarchists. This revolt lasted three days. President Ebert left Berlin as the troops entered. That afternoon a general strike throughout Germany stopped all work in the country, and on the 16th of March General Kapp, unable to swing the people in behind him, marched his army out of the city.

1046

EUROPE SINCE THE ARMISTICE

On March 27 the Spartacan revolt in the rich district of the Ruhr broke out and the Reichwehr, the government army, advanced to crush it. There followed heavy fighting between the armed workmen and the government forces, and as the soldiers continued to pour in, the French called attention to the fact that only a definite number of German troops were allowed in this section by the peace treaty and that the number agreed upon was being exceeded . Upon the continued increase of the Reichwehr forces, France, driven by the fear that the Germans would break all the provisions of the treaty if they could establish a precedent by breaking this one, and unable to secure cooperation from any of her Allies, moved her troops into the Rhine cities of Frankfort, Darmstadt and Hanau. By the middle of April the Germans put down the disturbances in the Ruhr and withdrew the excess troops , and on the 17th of May the French moved out of these cities on the east bank of the Rhine.
In early June there was severe fighting between German civilians and the French troops in Upper Silesia, the latter being there to supervise the elections which were to decide whether this rich territory was to belong to Poland or Germany. The Poles moved heavy forces to the Silesian border and the French declared martial law in the district under their charge.
On July 5 the first conference at which the Germans were admitted to a discussion with the Allies opened at Spa, with representatives from England, France, Belgium, and Italy. Previous to this there had been a number of meetings between the premiers of the four allied countries to determine upon a common platform at Spa , and in spite of the vigorous efforts to have some of the terms of the treaty modified, the Germans got very little out of this conference to add to their comfort.
They had been repeatedly failing to carry out the provisions of the treaty relating to the reduction of their forces, the delivery of war material to the Allies and the monthly allotments of coal to France . It was due to the firm and relentless attitude of the French premier that the conference ended with a German agreement to go about immediately with the reduction of their troops, to guarantee a steady monthly delivery of two million tons of coal to France, and to proceed at once with a trial of those persons designated by the Allies as war criminals. On September 22, it was announced that the Germans had finished the delivery to the

EUROPE SINCE THE ARMISTICE

1047

Allies of two million tons of steamers and sailing craft, virtually all that was agreed to at Versailles .
Politically, the German effort may be taken as follows : It is to be assumed that her expansion and influence are entirely blanked off in the west. In the south, however, there are millions of Germans in old Austria whom she seeks to get under her colors , and one may expect her to maintain a steady effort to have these racially-allied people brought into her political sphere. Germany's best chance of alliance and expansion thus lies to the east, and this means that she will work day and night to pull down the newly-established and sorely-tried country of the Poles. In this she will be met by the assistance of the Russians, with whom it will be logical for Germany to join herself when the Soviet ideas have become sufficiently normal to relieve the Germans of the fear that their own government will be carried away by the alliance.
RUSSIA
On March 12, 1917, the revolution began, and the Czar abdicated on the 15th. An army of 12,000,000 men was then organized by the revolutionary leaders, and on July 8 Kerensky led it into Galicia. In a battle with the Germans, the way for the attack had been successfully opened by the artillery, but before going over with the infantry the war was held up while a plebiscite was taken in the trenches to determine whether or not the majority wished to advance. In the midst of this genial discussion the Germans attacked on their own hook and started a panic and retreat which was terminated only by the fact that the pursuers were unable to advance as far as the Russians retired .
The German agents in Petrograd now succeeded in undermining the authority of the Kerensky faction and formed in opposition to it the famous Red Guard, which finally proved the undoing of its creators.
On July 3 , Kerensky repulsed the first attempt by the Guard to come into power, but his measures to prevent a repetition of the effort were too weak, and in October he was overthrown and fled to England.
The Germans were at this time in Helsingfors , Pskov and Kiev , and their faction , led by Lenine and Trotsky, now executed the treaty of Brest-Litovsk and thus released the German troops for operations on the western front. Count Mirbach ( afterward assassinated ) was sent to Moscow as the German representative ,

1048

EUROPE SINCE THE ARMISTICE

and the great quantities of munitions, food , grain, explosives and coal which had been stored for the Russian armies, began to take the road west to Germany. Russia , deserted by her old allies, despoiled of her supplies, shorn of her strength, and in the grip of the Bolshevik reign of terror, passed into the darkness of the revolt.
From that day to this the intricate history of Russia is one long series of attempts by the old Czarist factions, assisted by England and France, to overthrow the power of the Bolshevik government in Russia. The Japanese also took an important part in this operation and extended their influence at various times as far west in Siberia as Lake Baikal . Probably the most romantic picture of the many campaigns is that of the Czech army, taken prisoners by the Russians during the war, arming themselves after the breakdown of Russia, taking charge of the Siberian railroad and advancing, fighting all the way, to Vladivostok, where American ships finally took them out and back to their old home country. Our own participation in Siberia was not extensive , and as the situation became tense there and the demand grew at home for the return of the soldiers , our troops were withdrawn.
The Soviet forces have defeated in succession the armies of Kolchak in Siberia, Judenitch in the northwest , Denekin (backed by French and Rumanian troops ) in the district north of Odessa, and after him , the revived remnants of this former army under Baron Wrangel. In the spring of 1920 the Poles advanced deep into South Russia with their allies, the Ukranians, and advanced as far as Kiev. They were driven clear back into Poland however, in May, and the capital was saved only by the timely arrival of French officers and munitions. Following this the Poles severely defeated the Russians and exacted from them armistice conditions which left their boundaries advanced to the lines formerly occupied by the Germans after their great defeats of the Russians in 1915.
At present the Bolsheviki are in undisturbed control of most of the territory formerly belonging to the old Russian Empire, excepting in Poland and Eastern Siberia. Their ideas are seriously threatening the lands of the English and the French in Asia-Minor, Mesopotamia, Persia and India, and it is expected that spring will witness a determined attack upon the Poles . Meanwhile there is a growing tendency, led by the English, to establish commercial relations with them, and it is not denied that this is a natural and logical prelude to their recognition.

[COPYRIGHTED ] U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE , ANNAPOLIS , MD.
A LABOR SAVING AND MORE EFFICIENT METHOD OF DAILY ANALYSIS OF ENGINEERING PERFORMANCE
By LIEUT. COMMANDER W. L. MOORE, U. S. Navy
The need for some form of daily analysis of the performance of the engineering plant of a ship is well recognized , but the use of such an analysis is not so universal as it should be.
Among the reasons for this condition, the following three ( 3) may be counted as probably the most important :
(a) Lack of necessary data. (b) Time and labor required to pick off the data from performance curves. (c) Lack of understanding of the use and value of the analysis after the form given in the Rules for Engineering Performances. Reasons ( a ) and (b ) may be traced largely to the universal practice of presenting performance data in the form of curves. It is true that much data can best be recorded in the form of curves and that curves are indispensable in many cases, yet practically all of the data needed by the operating engineer can be given in the form of the simple algebraic equations which are simpler and easier to use than the curves giving the same data . This is for somewhat the same reason that in many cases the azimuth tables are more convenient than Weir's Diagram. The data needed to make an analysis is contained in the curves of total steam consumption per hour vs. H. P., or vs. some other fundamental reading of the performance of the machine. Examine the curves for a number of auxiliaries and it will be noted that these lines , the " Willans Lines ," are straight within the work- · ing range of the machine, or so nearly straight that with only slight inaccuracy a straight line may be drawn through all the plotted test points which located the curve.

1050 DAILY ANALYSIS OF ENGINEERING PERFORMANCE

Any straight line can be expressed by an equation of the form y =a + bx
where a is a constant- the intercept on the y -axis . and b is a constant - the slope of the line.
y and the variables. Applying this to the consumption curves of auxiliaries , there cau be obtained the following equations :
For a reciprocating engine : W =A + Bh
where W Pounds steam per hour ( total ) h = H. P.

This in some cases may be written

For a pump :

W₁ = A₁ + B₁R where R = R. P. M.
W = A + BS

where S Double strokes per minute.

For a generator :

W = A + BK

where K Kilowatts output

or W₁1 = A₁ + B₁I where = Load in amperes.

For a turbine with first stage pressure less than .58 inlet

pressure :

W = A + BP

where P = Steam chest pressure absolute A= 0.

( This formula corresponds to that for a flow through an orifice W per sec = AP/70 ) .

A number of equations derived in this way for destroyer auxil-
iaries are given at the end of this article. Several are taken from curves given by Lieutenant Commander Osgood in an article on 44
Daily Analysis ." in the August 1920 number of the Institute PROCEEDINGS . These equations should be checked against the corresponding curves to check the validity of the assertations made herein.
It is to be noted that all the equations represent actual test data and are not theoretically derived. Also, that an equation is ap-

DAILY ANALYSIS OF ENGINEERING PERFORMANCE 1051
plicable over only the same conditions that the corresponding curve is applicable, i. e ., if the equation is given for the consumption of a pump at 300-pound discharge pressure, and 5-pound back pressure, another equation would be necessary for 100-pound discharge pressure or 15 -pound back pressure, just as another curve would be required.
Note also that the equations for the consumption of turbines based on inlet pressure are independent of H. P. , R. P. M. , Discharge Pressure, Air Pressure, and within the ordinary range of pressures of Back Pressure.
Consideration of the equations at the end of this article will show the following advantages over curves :
(a ) They are so simple that they can be worked out in many cases by mental arithmetic.
(b) They are very compact. A number can be included in very small space.
(c ) They give data in a form which can be duplicated and disseminated by the typewriter or printer. This eliminates the need of tracings and blue prints and the expense and labor of making them. The Department could compile a great amount of data in a small pamphlet, and keep this pamphlet up to date through the confidential bulletins, a service of which the cost would be prohibitive if curves were used. Each engineer officer of a ship, when he conducted a water-rate test, could report his results in a form which would be immediately available for dissemination to the service .
(d) For reasons ( a ) , (b ) , and (c ) , the data for all auxiliaries can be printed on one form for the daily analysis as illustrated in the sample form appended . This relieves the engineer officer of the necessity of thumbing through a sheaf of blueprints each time he makes an analysis .
This idea of presenting data in the form of equations for the use of the operating engineer can be carried further than is attempted here and probably for all classes of machinery.
As an example , take the boiler test curves given in Lieut. Commander Osgood's article :
Curve C, page 1229, " Equivalent evaporation lbs. water per gallon oil per hour vs. gallons of oil burned per hour," and curve , page 1230, " Factor of Evaporation vs. F. W. Temperature."

1052 DAILY ANALYSIS OF ENGINEERING PERFORMANCE
From Curve C , it may be assumed that for port use the equivalent evaporation per gallon of oil is constant at 120. Combining this amount with the data from curve, page 1230, the equation is derived :
E = 93 + .1 T
where E is the actual evaporation per gallon oil burned , and T is the Feed water temperature.
This equation gives the actual amount of water which would have been evaporated had the boiler been in the same state of cleanliness and upkeep, and had been operated under the same conditior's and with the same skill as on test.
A further line of development leading from this may be shown using a Sturtevant forced draft blower turbine-equation W = 9.8 P. Assume port service feed temperature 220° , then E = 93 +22 = 115 lbs. water per gal. oil. Then the gallons of oil required to run the blower per hour is
G = 9.8 P/ 115 or 085 P ( roughly 1/12 P) . A scale can be made out of this equation showing the fuel consumption of the blower and pasted on the dial of the throttle gauge for the instruction of the fireroom force in economical operation .
Returning to the point ( c) mentioned in the second paragraph where lack of understanding of the application of the analysis was given as one reason for the non-universal use of daily analysis . This is perhaps natural when it is considered that the final result of the form as given in the Rules is a percentage scarcely more informing than the per cent obtained by dividing fuel allowance by fuel used.
The daily analysis can and should be carried much farther toward a definite determination of the location of faults. The sample form for a destroyer port analysis attached takes it a few steps along this line . Even the best analysis merely affords the foundation upon which the engineer officer can base his efforts to eliminate causes of inefficiency.
The quantities which are required to be determined for this more complete analysis are
(a) Pounds of water which would have been used had all machinery operated at its test efficiency.
This is determined by adding up all individual consumptions calculated by the equations discussed above.

DAILY ANALYSIS OF ENGINEERING PERFORMANCE 1053
(b) Pounds of water actually used. Determined by actual measurement - timing given quantities of water collected in feed tank and from that calculating the total amount used in the day. (c) Gallons of oil burned. (d) Pounds of water which should have been evaporated, had boilers operated at test efficiency . Calculated from oil burned using boiler formula given above. ( e) Pounds of water actually evaporated . Add make-up feed to pounds of water actually used. (f) Gallons of oil allowed by Engineering Competition Rules. From these quantities the following percentages are obtained : (a ) divided by (b) gives the relative efficiency of the steam ends of steam-using machinery compared to their test performances .
(e ) divided by (d) gives the relative efficiency of the boilers compared to their test performances ,
(b ) divided by ( e ) gives the relative efficiency of the whole plant including boilers and auxiliaries.
(f) divided by ( c ) gives an " Efficiency of Operation " which, although dependent upon the suitability of the competition allowance, takes into account not only the efficiency ( b ) / ( e ) but whether machinery is run too fast, too many auxiliaries are operated, or for too long a time , and such operating features.
The difference between ( a ) and (e ) is a measure of leaks inside the steam systems ; through leaky valves, traps , piston rings , drain seals, heating systems , etc. , where the water is not lost, just as the make-up feed is a measure of leaks where the water is lost.
With all thse efficiencies worked out the engineer officer's task of locating each cause of lowered efficiency is much simplified , and more so as he has each day an itemized list of test consumptions for each piece of machinery for comparison with other days. The results he obtains are thereafter dependent upon his engineering ability.
The daily analysis has here been worked out for port use only, and the equations for auxiliaries. Both have been used underway, however, involving a few more complications but none that are prohibitive.

1054 DAILY ANALYSIS OF ENGINEERING PERFORMANCE
It is hoped that the ideas presented in this article will be found of value to the service and by facilitating a wider dissemination of information and reducing the drudgery of analysis contribute to raising the level of Engineering Efficiency.

EQUATIONS DERIVED FROM CURVES IN AUGUST UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS
(Check Against These Curves to Prove the Validity of the Formula) Back Pressure in All Cases , 10 Pounds Gauge
Boiler. E = 93 + .1 T.

Main air pump. 15x30x30x24 at 28″ vacuum . W = 350 + 90 S.

Auxiliary air and circulating pump. 53x6x8x7 at 2″ vacuum. 15 pounds press.

W = 90 + 4.25 S , or roughly, W = 100 + 4 S.

Main feed pump. gauge .

Blake 16x24. Disch. press . 500 pounds W = 500 +220 S.

Auxiliary feed. gauge.

Blake 16x11X18. Disch. press . 300 pounds W = 400 + 150 S.

F and B pump 7x7x12 . Disch. press. 75 pounds gauge. W = 120 + 13 S.

When pumping bilges or when used as flushing pump ( DS = 35 to 40 and disch . press. 15 pounds ) allow 75 lbs./hr.
F. O. Booster. 64x7x8. Disch. press . 30 pounds . W = 70 + 4.5 S.
F. O. Service. 6x41x12 . Disch. press. 150 pounds. W 80 + 11 S.

Lubricating oil pump. 7x8x12. Disch. press . 40 pounds . W = 100 + 10.5 S.
Oil cooler circulating pump. 8x9x12 . Disch. press. 35 pounds. W = 100 + 11 S.

DAILY ANALYSIS OF ENGINEERING PERFORMANCE 1055
Air compressor Westinghouse. W =25 × Pressure.
Fresh water pump. 31x4x4. Disch. press. 30 pounds. W = 40 + 1.5 S.
Evaporator feed pump. Disch. press. 60 pounds. W = 110 + 5.5 S.
FORMULE FROM Curves FURNISHED BY NEW YORK SHIPBUILDING CO. WITH 16TH DIVISION Back Pressure o Pounds Gauge
Main air pump. Warren 11x32x21 . Between 10 and 25 DS. 28" vacuum. Add 21% for each 5 pounds back pressure.
W = 1800 + 100 S
Main feed pump. 300 pounds discharge pressure. Warren 16x12x24. Add 2 % for each 5 pounds back pressure.
W = 1000 + 225 S. Auxiliary feed . 300 pounds disch. press. Warren 15x10x16. Add 21% for each 5 pounds back pressure.
W =800 + 100 S. Augmenter condenser throat 13 inch.
32 W = 6.67 +P where P = absolute pressure. Fuel oil service pump. Disch. press. 150 pounds. Warren 6x41x12. Add 4% for each 5 pounds back pressure.
W = 70+ 12 S. Lubricating oil pump. Warren 6 x 8 x 12. Disch. press , 40 pounds. Add 33% for each 5 pounds back pressure.
W = 20 + 22 S.
Oil cooler circulating pump. Warren 6x7x8. Disch. press. 35 pounds. Add 51% for each 5 pounds back pressure.
W = 0 + 10 S.
F. & B. pump . Warren 7x7x12. Disch. press . 100 pounds . Add 3 % for each 5 pounds back pressure.
W = 160 + 21 S.

1056 DAILY ANALYSIS OF ENGINEERING PERFORMANCE
Evaporator feed pump. Warren 4x6x6. Disch. press . 160 pounds. Add 23% for each 5 pounds back pressure.
W =20 +9 S.
Distiller F. W. pump. Warren 3x4x4. Disch. press . 30 pounds. Add 6% for each 5 pounds back pressure.
W = 20 +9 S. Auxiliary air and circulating pump. 6x8x8x7. Water press . 15 pounds. Vacuum 20" Hg. Add 51% for each 5 pounds. back pressure.
W = 25 + 10 S. Westinghouse air compressor. Steam pressure 200 pounds.
W = 3180 +6 P where P = disch. press.
Generator 25 KW . Back pressure 10 pounds gauge. Wf00 + 46 KW.
Note that this is lbs./hr. and that KW is not KWH.' Fuel oil heater.
W.3 gals. oil/hr.
Forced draft blower. Terry turbine. W = 33 P with all hand valves closed . W -41.5 P with one hand valve open. W = 50.5 P with two hand valves open . W = 59 P with three hand valves open . W = 67.5 P with four hand valves open.
Note that these figures are independent of RPM back pressure or air pressure so long as throttle pressure ( abs ) is more than 1.7 back pressure ( abs ) , i. e. , about 35 pounds gauge.
The figure for oil consumption by the blower with all hand valves closed is 33 P/ 115 or .287 P gal./hr.
FORMULE FROM TEST DATA, JOURNAL A. S. N. E., AUGUST, 1918. STURTEVANT TURBINE
P Inlet Pressure Absolute
W = 9 .. 8 P with all hand valves closed . WI = 14.2 P with one hand valve closed . W2 =18.8 P with two hand valves closed.

DAILY ANALYSIS OF ENGINEERING PERFORMANCE 1057

FORMULE FROM CURVES FROM BU. ENGINEERING (FOR BETHLEHEM DESTROYERS )
Auxiliary Air Pump- Simplex Featherweight, 6x10x8 W = 90 +4 S. Estimated.

Generator 25 KW, G. E. turbine 3600 R. P. M. Steam at 200 pounds, o° superheat.
On 28" vac.

On 25" vac.

W = 300 + 32 KW.

W = 320 + 34 KW. On o pounds gauge

W = 410 + 35 KW.

On 10 pounds back pressure

W = 500 + 48 KW.

Auxiliary condenser circulating pump 3x3 reciprocating. W = 50 +.3 RPM. Estimated.

Main air pump. 15x30x30x24. Worthington . W = 100 + 100 S. Estimated.

Main auxiliary F. & B. pump. 7x7x12 . Worthington . W = 140 + 15 S.
Lubrication oil pump. 7x8x12 V. S. Worthington. W = 290 + 7 S Estimated.

Distiller fresh water pump. 31 × 4x4 V. S. Worthington.
W = 20 + 1 S. Estimated. Oil cooler circulation pump. 8x9x12 V. S. Worthington .
W = 420 + 8 S. Estimated . Main and auxiliary feed pump. 161x11x16 V. S. Worthington.
W =250 + 125 S. Estimated. Evaporator feed pump. 41x6x6. Worthington.

W = 5 +2 S. Estimated. Fuel oil booster pump. 61x7x8 V. S. Worthington.
W = 140 + 3 S. Fuel oil service pump. 54x4x8 V. D. Worthingtor..
W = 340 + 19 S.

1058 DAILY ANALYSIS OF ENGINEERING PERFORMANCE

FORM FOR DAILY ANALYSIS AT ANCHOR

(Bethlehem Destroyers) S - D. S. PER MIN . P - INLET PRESS . ( ABS ) . R - RPM

Unit

Formula (H)

DS or Hrs. Por R Lbs./Hrs.

Lbs. total

Remarks

Feed pump M.orA . 500 + 150 S F. D. Blower .... 10 Р

F. & B. pump .

F. & B. pump . Service pump Booster pump .

100+ 13.5 S 340+ 19 S 140+ 3.S

Evap. feed pump . 5 +2S

Fresh water pump 20 +1 S

Aux. air pump . 90 +4 S

Aux. circ. pump . 50+ 3 R

Lub. oil pump.. 100 + 11 S.

Fuel oil heater . .3 X gal. oil.

Air comp. West .. 25 X press.

Generator.. Generator .

300 + 32 KW . 410 +35 KW .

Generator .

500 +48 KW .

Main air pump ... 100 + 100 S

Evaps. S. E.

15 lbs. per gal.

Evaps. D E. .8 lbs. per gal.

Evaps. Aug. Exh.o lbs. per gal .

Dis.pr.300 lbs

75

Dis. pr. 15 lbs.

Dis. pr. 75 lbs.

Dis . pr. 40 lbs.
At 28" vac. At o lbs. At 10 lbs. B.P.

( 1 ) Total steam accounted for in 24 hrs ... . .

Make up feed ...... gals ...... lbs .

Oil by account ... ..Gals.

Feed water temp ..

Oil to galley... ... Gals .

(4) Rate evap. ( 93 + .1 T )

(2 ) Oil burned ......... Gals . 24 hrs.

....Lbs/gal. oil.

(3 ) Oil burned/hr ...... Gal.

( 5 ) Total computed evap.

(11)Oil allowance ...... Gal./hr.

(4 ) x (2 ) ...... Lbs .

...... Gals. water collected in feed tank in......minutes.

(6 ) Actual water used ...........Gals./hr ......Lbs./hr.

(7) Actual water used ....

..Lbs. total per day.'

( 8 ) Actual water evaporated ....Lbs . total per day ( adding make-up feed ) .

Overall efficiency of plant ( 1 ) / ( 5 ) . .... . %

Boiler efficiency

(8 ) / (5 ) ...... %

Efficiency auxiliaries

( 1) /(7) .

%

Competition ratio for day ( 11 ) / ( 3 ) . .... .%

CHECKS .

(9 ) Feed pump piston displacement per hour 7400 S ...... Lbs. Water end efficiency ( 6 ) / ( 9 ) ......%
( 10) Service pump piston displacement / Hr. 105 S ....... Gals . Oil end efficiency ( 3 ) / ( 10 ) ......%

[ COPYRIGHTED]
U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE , ANNAPOLIS , MD.
FLEET RADIO COMMUNICATION IN WAR
By LIEUTENANT (J. G. ) H. D. KENT, U. S. Navy
The battle efficiency of any fleet is vitally dependent upon the state of efficiency of fleet radio communications. This is a fact, not an opening argument. The late World War removed all doubts about the effectiveness of radio as a weapon . To-day we are inclined to measure its scope of usefulness and effectiveness by standards set up five years ago . The battle of Jutland gave us proof of radio communication's effectiveness and dependability and on that day it ceased to be an innovation or experiment. In view of subsequent development, we can now consider the radio equipment and organization of communications possessed by each side in that battle as crude. The real development of radio was brought about after the battle of Jutland . It was as much a development of organization as of material. It is the organization features that I propose to discuss herein . Boilers will steam even though inefficiently fired ; engines will turn over and propel ships even though not attended by expert mechanics . Likewise guns can be fired by untrained crews and an occasional hit scored. Communications cannot be employed in war time unless highly organized. Prior to contact with the enemy our plans would be revealed and during battle our fleet would be confused by inefficient communications. In these days of immense fleets and central command, it is questionable whether or not these fleets could be coordinated and directed in battle except through the medium of radio communication and, even though it might be possible, it is obvious that an enemy who could utilize radio would place us at a tremendous disadvantage-all other things being equal. It will never be the lack of efficient apparatus which will handicap us on the day

гобо

FLEET RADIO COMMUNICATION IN WAR

of battle but lack of organization . It will not be the fault of present communication and radio officers if we lack organization but rather lack of foresight and sympathy on the part of officers in high command, afloat and ashore.
To promote cooperation and understanding between high ranking officers, we have a Naval War College. The courses there are designed to correct the individual perspectives to the prevailing doctrines, principles of strategy and tactics. Many of the detached ideas of officers who attend this school may be sounder than those advanced in the course but he subordinates his own views to the ensemble of ideas of the whole because the general assembly of the latter is closer fitting and less conflicting.
In war it remains to the commander-in-chief to originate the strategy to be employed. If his plans are sound, they will contain certain reflections of the war college influence and his subordinates will be able to undertake the details of execution understandingly. The main component of strategy is secrecy. Sooner or later the plans of the highest in command must be entrusted to radio. It cannot be avoided in these days of express speed and " thousandship " navies. Unless the organization of communications is extremely efficient, some parts of those plans will be revealed to the enemy and the " prior contact " strategy evaporates . Should this revelation betray our outlines bold and our units unsurprised and ready, all is well. We are building a big navy. If we are not preparing to meet another nation of great sea power, what then are we doing ? The people of our country are giving us the weapons . Shall we assume we are only to use them against greatly inferior sea powers ? No ! Our communications must be organized upon the principle that eventually we will meet an enemy as strong as ourselves. All of which comes back to the fact that we must endeavor to organize for the purpose of handling fleet radio traffic as accurately, expeditiously and secretively as possible.
There is a significant relationship which always exists, to a certain extent, between the plans and movements of a fleet and the radio work carried on between ships of that fleet. The commander-in-chief is dependent to a certain extent upon radio communication for the information upon which he bases his estimate of a situation. After orders are formulated, he must distribute some of them by radio. Later he receives from his scouts information confirming his estimate or requiring readjustment of

FLEET RADIO COMMUNICATION IN WAR

1061

plans. His main body may be ordered under way by radio and be maneuvered by radio until physical contact with the enemy is made. At the last minute he may be required to rearrange his line or improvise quickly to compensate for unexpected distribution of strength. Radio offers the most flexible means of doing this. In battle tactical maneuvers can be directed by radio when smoke screens, fog or haze would render signals useless. Fire discipline and fire concentration can be effectively carried out by radio and aeroplane spotting will be essential, using radio to report fall of shot.
To make all this possible, radio material must be installed so that radio communication can be maintained from each ship as long as she is able to stay in the line . Duplication of antennæ is the main requisite. Apparatus can be kept behind maximum thickness of armor.
Assume that the events outlined above are logical and do occur. Is it not obvious that we have confided enough to provide an enemy with a solution of our plans, provided he has intercepted all of the radio traffic of our fleet and can interpret it ? Of course he will not be expected to accomplish this easily or quickly but a careful and intelligent study of our work by communication and strategical experts would certainly reveal some parts of our plans which, if correctly interpreted, would advertise the general objective. Even when radio work is most carefully handled, if it is intercepted by the enemy, it will give negative information which would
limit his conjectures to a narrower field. The layman is prone to believe that codes and ciphers, if care-
fully used, will insure secrecy. Most naval officers are informed to the contrary but most of them place too much confidence in codes and ciphers . Codes and ciphers, no matter how elaborate or intricate, only delay the ultimate receipt of the coded information by the enemy. The fact must be constantly remembered and the consciousness of it will place us on a pinnacle from which a true perspective can be obtained . Only a few moves can be obscured from an alert enemy and therefore the order of succession should never be indicative of the real objective. Sometimes, though, it may be policy to interpolate with " fakes " or to use a program of ""
fakes," a sort of a " radio feint," so to speak. The time element or life of a code is an important consideration. No fixed rules can be laid down . Any code or cipher devised by

1062

FLEET RADIO COMMUNICATION IN WAR

one human brain can be interpreted eventually by another. If several experts attack the problem scientifically, the solution is hastened. No cipher or code should be given a factor of safety greater that ten days if vital information is being confided to it.
The " breaking " of a code or cipher is much easier if the conditions under which it was sent are known. It is therefore desirable that code and cipher experts be expert operators also. The indications intuitively sensed by a radio operator very seldom can be correctly conveyed to him by another party. Other operators might not perceive significant conditions which would be obvious to the expert.
The above facts do not justify any carelessness or relaxation on the part of officers and men having custody of secret and confidential codes because a diagnosis of traffic has an element of uncertainty, but if we present to the enemy a solution he has hard facts.
More code and cipher organizations are undermined in peace than in war time. During peace there are always a few persons who are careless and compromise codes because they assume disinterestedness on the part of potential enemies . The first few moves of a war may determine the outcome. If our codes are compromised at the start, it is terrible indeed. Even though new codes are substituted the evil cannot be thus remedied . The ' en clair " side of a code book is as important as the code. The order of appearance of the " en clair " side will be unique and characteristic of our nation . If the enemy possesses this alone, his difficulties are greatly reduced . For this reason too great care cannot be observed in the destruction of obsolete code books.
In peace time when a potential enemy or even a friendly nation comes into possession of our codes through the diagnosis of intercepted traffic , the damage may not be in the information contained by those messages, but in the fact that he can decipher previous messages which might be very embarrassing . Regardless of the nature of the information contained in a coded message, indifferent or careless coding is most culpable. Even though we could devise an infallible code which the enemy could not break, we could not be indifferent in using it or in handling traffic.
Variation in fleet radio traffic is most significant also. Sudden increase in traffic is invariably an indication of coming fleet activity and therefore fluctuations must be avoided. This can be

FLEET RADIO COMMUNICATION IN WAR

1063

done by careful use of " dummy " messages, which are coded from a " dummy " code book but are devoid of meaning-in other words a " blank." However, such messages appear to be bona fide to the enemy. " Dummy codes " should be prepared in three, four, five and six-letter combinations. A definite system of releasing them should be used and the amount of traffic controlled by the flagship. Regular curves of daily traffic of the fleet must be kept and the valleys filled in with " dummies." The average hourly traffic should be kept up to the maximum demand point reached during activities of the fleet.
In addition to serving the above purpose, dummies play havoc with the enemy's code experts because the meaningless jargon can never be interpreted . These experts are bound to include many dummy groups in their respective group classifications. This inclusion makes the application of mathematics in " average reoccurrences " difficult . Also the handling of dummy messages is excellent training for operators as they become accustomed to handling peak traffic continuously and consistently. When " dummies " are used, operators must be required to handle them with as great care as is exercised in real messages .
We should always consider communications from a psychological standpoint. Anything we can do to break down the morale of the enemy's code experts should be carried out. They should be misled as often as possible by special programs . We must always assume that the enemy's commander-in-chief will not possess unlimited confidence in his code experts and communication officers . If they supply him with unreliable information he may be openly skeptical of them. This should be our object. Likewise, our own commanders must expect similar programs by the enemy. Imaginary movements are easily manufactured and staged through clever manipulation of radio sets.
The radio compass has become remarkably reliable ashore in the past two years. We hope for greater accuracy on board ships soon. The radio compass aboard ship is now dependable for relative bearings of a general nature and would often betray simple " fakes " as mentioned above . The writer understands that the Zeebrugge affair was made possible by radio compasses , which were extensively used in plotting the enemy's channels through mine fields by averaging up bearings observed upon testing

1064

FLEET RADIO COMMUNICATION IN WAR

submarines as they passed in and out. Radio compasses are at least 25 per cent more accurate now than in 1917 , so we must consider the possibility of their employment for similar purposes in future wars.
Radio compasses in aircraft enable them to steer the shortest course to a ship at sea using radio . This fact complicates the scouting problem and makes concealment practically impossible , either of position or of strength.
It would appear from the foregoing that the use of radio at all is unwise but such is not the case. Communication experts
and radio operators will never be 100 per cent efficient and not all opportunities offered will be availed of. Commanders- in-chief and other commanders for many years will be reluctant when it comes to relying wholly upon deductions from intercepted enemy traffic. If the communication system of the enemy could be made 100 per cent efficient, strategy would be almost eliminated and all we could do would be to give battle at the most favorable point, provided he was willing to meet us there. But 100 per cent efficiency will never be obtained in radio any more than in ordnance and gunnery, so then our success in naval warfare must depend to a large extent upon difference in relative efficiency. We must assume that our potential enemy will be naturally endowed with cunning and stealth and prepare to play his own game. This requires training along special lines of the best fitted minds.
We should have a lasting communication organization afloat which will be independent of changes in fleet command. This organization requires an original definition of policies which should be governed by the principles laid down at the War College. Communications, strategy and tactics are inseparable.
Until we have properly trained communication officers we can not properly organize fleet communications. The present- day communication officers are too often accidental rather than designed . There are more communication officers in name than in fact. There are too many different kinds of organizations aboard ship, whereas every ship should be organized along the same lines. Each communication officer organizes his force according to his own ideas, but, granting that 75 per cent of the ships are excellently organized, cooperation to the fullest extent is handicapped . These facts are too well known to have these statements construed as critical.

FLEET RADIO COMMUNICATION IN WAR

1065

We need a communication college and it should be closely allied with the War College, if not directly under it . There should be initial courses and post graduate courses . The initial courses should be given to officers of suitable temperament and experience. These courses should prepare radio and signal officers. After actual service in both branches , those officers who have been satisfactory should return for a post graduate course in communications and radio strategy. If an officer demonstrates unusual ability in communication work, he should be encouraged to remain in this work. Many communication officers are disheart- . ened because of the fact that long tours of communication duty are jeopardizing their careers. Some arrangement should be made to allow the most skilful and sagacious communication officers' to take an advanced course in radio strategy, code and cipher work and languages with the idea of fitting them for division and force radio officers . The logical communication career of an officer would be as follows :

Midshipman Ensign

Naval Academy four years.
Routine duties afloat three years-engineering and line.

Lieutenant (j . g.)

Eight months Communication College. Radio and Signals. Six months Signal Officer Afloat. Twelve months Radio Officer Afloat. Six months Communication College-post
graduate course.

Lieutenant

Communication Officer, battleship two years and then if unusually efficient to Communication College for post graduate advanced course, if desired. If not the above, then return to watch and division duties. If above the average and due for shore duty, then to duty with D. N. C. or Asst. D. S. C.

Lieutenant commander ... If due for sea and has finished advanced post * graduate course, to duty as division communication officer, two years.
If due for shore duty and has finished post graduate course, to duty as D. C. S. or with D. N. C.
District Radio Material Officer.

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FLEET RADIO COMMUNICATION IN WAR

Commander
Captain Rear admiral ...

Take regular War College course. To duty at sea as Force Communication Officer. To duty ashore-Coast Communication Supt.
or Assistant to D. N. C. Bureau of Engineering (Radio ) .
Fleet Communication Officer, Assistant to Director Naval Communications.
Director Naval Communications.

The program above depends upon the constant elimination of the unfit and unwilling. Regardless of the period spent in communication work no officer would be handicapped in his preparation for command. As a matter of fact the British consider that com-
munication experience is the best kind of preparation for ultimate command.
A communication staff corps is advocated by many but such a corps has many drawbacks. Communication work cannot be
handled intelligently until an officer is well acquainted with lin.e duties, fleet organization, strategy and tactics. The formation of a staff corps would tend to isolate the members from the service as a whole . It would also necessarily include many of the present line officers who might not prove to be qualified temperamentally. Subsequent vacancies would have to be filled with civilians or from the ranks . After the nucleus were well up, the lower grades would certainly be filled with officers lacking versatility in general naval work. Many advocates of the staff corps point out that the Army Signal Corps has been a success . The signal corps does little but receive and deliver despatches and maintain the channels. The communication service of the navy is charged with the execution of liaison between departments, which requires a broad knowledge of the service as a whole. The communication officer mus! always keep his perspective enlarged and correct and be sensitive to the tendencies and trend of policy changes.
We also need an intelligence system reorganization which will keep communication officers informed concerning foreign communication activities, especially those of potential enemies. I doubt if one communication officer in fifty knows of a single unique feature of the Japanese communication system. As early as 1917 the Japanese Government was educating some of their best communication officers in American colleges. I have in mind a lieu-

FLEET RADIO COMMUNICATION IN WAR

1067

tenant commander in particular who was sent to Harvard to study under Professor Pierce at Craft Laboratory. He carried back to Japan with him a very good education in radio engineering and an intimate knowledge of our communication service as well. He studied the personnel of the radio school at close range . He " listened in " upon current official radio traffic and usually gleaned some information from each of his conversations with the most astute. He saw us in action in war time. I venture to say that Lieutenant Commander Nichizaki could instruct many of our own communication officers to-day about their own system . If the Japanese have utilized this officer with their customary thoroughness, he has already instructed their whole service along these lines. before now. Other Japanese officers are undoubtedly under instruction in the United States of America now. If there should be war with any strong naval power to-morrow, could those of us now on communication duty be reasonably expected to hold our own against a service so well prepared and carefully trained ? Our Yankee ingenuity avails but little. Isolated cases of ingenuity are never effective and more likely to confuse our own forces than the enemy .
I have brought out many facts-some of which are not pleasant to consider. It is only fair to state unreservedly that the present heads of the communication service are above any criticism I have raised here . All of these heads are line officers of broad experience , who have been fitted for their present duties by an unusually large amount of service in communication work or its allied branches. These men have demonstrated unusual ability to organize but to get lasting results they must be supplied with enthusiastic officer material to organize upon. The present heads of the communication service deserve great credit for their accomplishment in holding communications to war-time efficiency. It has been a great task to do even that. I believe we have made progress in the last two years towards better preparation for war.
To stimulate greater progress it is essential that all higher ranking officers be fully convinced of the true importance of radio communications. They must also recognize the value of communication duty from an educational standpoint in the preparation of officers for ultimate command. If the officers eligible to serve upon selection boards will give proper credit for communication duty, it will become more desirable duty and attract some of the
42

1068

FLEET RADIO COMMUNICATION IN WAR

most brilliant minds. If brilliant minds, enthusiastic to improve conditions, are enlisted in the course, we can leave to present leaders the work of reorganization.
The present organization has been adjusted to utilize the present type of communication officer-usually one lacking experience and performing many extra duties.
The reorganization must be built upon properly trained versatile communication officers, who are enthusiastic and contented because they are confident that their accomplishments in communications will receive the same weight as those of other officers other lines.

[COPYRIGHTED ] U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE , ANNAPOLIS, MD.
VENUS AS A DAY SIGHT
By LIEUTENANT R. B. CARNEY, U. S. Navy
The problem of accurately determining the ship's position during the day is one that presents many difficulties and varying errors . For the most part, it seldom occurs that proper cross-bearings can be obtained and the navigator is obliged to fall back on that rather uncertain quantity, the run to local apparent noon . On ships whose missions permit of steady steaming on an uninterrupted course, the calculation of the correct interval to noon presents few real difficulties and no real disadvantages, but there are many times in the course of naval work where it is wellnigh impossible to properly run the ante-meridian sight up to local apparent noon with any degree of certainty. The navigator cannot be considered in the matter of maneuvers, and this very question of maneuvers gives rise to an error that varies in amount with the character of the evolutions performed, and with the nature of the ship performing them.
Particularly in latitudes where the range of solar azimuths is small, that is to say where at no time is the sun near the prime vertical, the greatest accuracy is necessary in order that a good noon fix can be secured ; this is evident from a consideration of the intersection of lines inclined at a small angle, and it is also evident that a small mistake in the matter of the ante-meridian line will result in a magnified error when the line is run up to local apparent noon . This accuracy of advancing the line is a hopeless task where there are numerous changes of course such as are encountered in destroyers or other craft engaged in screen , scout, maneuvering, or attack work, and it was this contingency that led the writer to consider the feasibility of using Venus in conjunction with the sun during daylight hours, as a method of

1070

VENUS AS A DAY SIGHT

determining position without reference to a sun sight previously taken and run up.
Venus is generally visible to the naked eye some time before sunset as the evening star, and this very fact seemed to indicate that it was only a matter of locating the planet at any time during the day in order to make use of it . This use of Venus is by no means original with the writer ; it has been used for years by older navigators, but its general use does not seem to be known among junior members of the craft and it is for their information that this paper has been prepared .
The problem, then , is the location of Venus during daylight hours when it is not discernible to the naked eye, and its solution is so simple as to make it practical , quick, and accurate. It becomes purely a matter of working backward with the star identification tables . Let us first consider the general method involved before taking up a concrete example.
A glance at the chronometer will give an approximate idea of the G. M. T. Apply the data from page two of the Nautical Almanac to obtain the G. S. T. and to this apply the D. R. longitude to determine the L. S. T. From the ephemeris of Venus take out the right ascension and declination roughly, applying the R. A. to the local sidereal time to determine the hour angle. The hour angle and declination, together with the D. R. latitude, are now known— the necessary arguments for entering the star identification tables.
Turning to the identification table with the latitude nearest to that of the D. R. position , find by inspection that part of the table where the tabulated hour angle and declination correspond to those predetermined for Venus ; pick out the azimuth and altitude corresponding to these arguments, having due regard to the direction in which the tabulated azimuth must be applied , and also to the fact that should the declination be marked minus ( - ) it is to be named opposite to the name of the latitude . It is unnecessary to interpolate more closely than is possible by inspection. . With this altitude and azimuth set the sextant and pelorus accordingly. Owing to the fact that these calculations are all made by inspection and are not exactly accurate it has been found advisable for purposes of practical work to use the solar telescope attached to the sextant. This telescope facilitates the location of the star by virtue of its magnification but at the same time offers little hindrance owing to its relatively lage field . Venus, although

VENUS AS A DAY SIGHT

1071

invisible to the naked eye, shows up surprisingly plain when viewed through the solar telescope in this manner.
The steps enumerated sound rather complicated on the face of it, but in actual practice it is not more than a matter of two or three minutes' work to obtain the necessary information to properly set the sextant and pelorus. An example will serve to illustrate the method more fully.

On February 8, 1921 , in about latitude 21 30 oo South, longi-

tude 76 30 00 West, destroyer maneuvers in conjunction with the battle fleet made it impossible to accurately run up the ante-

meridian line to local apparent noon. The latitude was easily

determined by catching the sun on the dip, but the longitude could not be set down with any degree of certainty. So at about 12.55

p. m. , the chronometer was seen to read 6.02 ; allowing five minutes

for working out the data , and knowing that the C. C. was 2 m. 24 s. , it was evident that five minutes hence the G. M. T. would be

roughly 6 04 36. Applying the correction for G. M. T found on page two ( 2 ) Nautical Almanac, the G. S. T. was found to be

3 17 47.6. Subtracting the longitude ( 5h. 06m . oos. West ) gave

the L. S. T. By inspection the R. A. of Venus was seen to be about oh. 21m. The hour angle was therefore 22 11 47 and the

declination was roughly taken as 3 25 00 North.

Chro. (allowing five minutes ) 6 07.00

C. C.

(- ) 2 24

G. M. T.

6 04 36 21 12 11.8
59.8

G. S. T. Long. ( D. R. ) L. S. T. R. A. (Approx . )

3 17 47.6 5 06 00
22 II 47.6 21 00

H. A. Venus

21 50 47.6 or 2 09 12.4 East

Dec. Venus 3 25 00 North

Entering the star identification tables, it was seen that the above hour angle and declination were closely approximated in juxtaposition where the altitude was 52 00 00 and the azimuth South 128 East or 52 True. The sextant and pelorus were set accordingly and Venus was at once picked up near the horizon

1072

VENUS AS A DAY SIGHT

close to the calculated bearings. The actual altitude and azimuth were found to be 50 31 00 and 50 00 00 respectively when the sight was taken.
The ease with which Venus may be located in this manner is surprising and the advantage of its use in connection with the sun is self-evident . Numerous methods of application of Venus as a day sight will suggest themselves to the navigator. For example, the altitude may be predicted for local apparent noon and a cross obtained , the meridian transit of Venus may be predetermined and simultaneousely taken with the sun . In point of fact only the roughest assumptions need be made in regard to the selected G. M. T.; if the H. A. is worked to minutes by inspection
no difficulty is experienced in locating the planet . Jupiter offers almost the same advantages at certain times, de-
pending upon its determining coordinates, and the writer has even at times been able to make use of Sirius before sunset, although in the case of the latter more exact calculations are necessary .
The use of Venus and Jupiter, however, is commended to all navigators as a most simple and efficient method of eliminating the uncertainty entering into all calculations that necessitate the advancing of one line to another through a period that may cover hours of steaming through unknown currents or doubtful errors due to service conditions.

[COPYRIGHTED] U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE, ANNAPOLIS , MD.
SPECIALIZATION VERSUS AMALGAMATION
By LIEUT. COMMANDER S. J. ZEIGLER, JR. (C. C. ) , U. S. Navy
From time to time articles appear in our service papers advocating amalgamation of certain staff corps with the navy line. More elaborate essays appear in our professional publications . Occasionally recommendations on the subject find their way to committees of Congress . The alleged advantages of amalgamation vary from monetary saving by the omission of staff initials following officers' names in official correspondence, to improvement in warship design , and even to changes in human nature which will eradicate differences of opinion.
Amalgamation," a recent article in the U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, by Commander N. H. Goss, U. S. Navy, discusses the amalgamation of the Construction Corps . Although many of the arguments for the maintenance of one group of specialists, or staff corps, apply with equal force to other staff corps as well, this discussion will be restricted to the Construction Corps.
That a " Navy versus Construction Corps problem " exists at all, or even that a Line versus Construction Corps problem exists is seriously doubted . If such a problem does exist in the minds of any line officers, and is allowed to continue and increase, it may lead to failure of cooperation and loss of efficiency. However, the real problem which constantly engages the attention of the naval constructors is rather the one of the Construction Corps for the Navy. The Construction Corps is an integral part of the navy. Its only reason for existence is for service to the Navy. It has no independent measure of success ; its sole index of efficiency is the degree of success or failure of the fleet, which the Construction Corps' function is to design, construct and maintain. This